The publication is being published at a turning point – as Ukraine, defending itself against Russian aggression, is simultaneously fighting for the trust of its citizens and international partners. One of the pillars of this effort is the transparency of the functioning of the state, public institutions and the international aid system.
Olha Ajwazowska, Jewhen Hlibowycki, Krzysztof Izdebski, Jana Ochrimenko i Ołesia Ostrowska-Luta have prepared a collection of texts devoted to the phenomenon of corruption, which serves as a starting point for a broader analysis of contemporary democracy in Ukraine and the complex relationship between society and the state. The authors recommendations inlude:
Effective anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine must be accompanied by the de-shadowing of the economy;
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), despite its reliability and reputation, still does not reflect the level of corruption. Ukrainian studies indicate significant discrepancies between perceptions and actual experiences of corruption among businesses and the public. Therefore, conclusions about successes in the fight against corruption in Ukraine should be drawn on the basis of a wider set of analytical tools than the CPI.
„Everydayʼ corruption in Ukraine is a direct consequence of structural problems in the public and communal sectors. Reform of the remuneration policy for civil servants and employees of the public and communal sector should contribute to reducing the level of corruption in Ukraine.
The authors remind us that overcoming corruption is one of the key conditions for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Despite many achievements in this area, corruption in Ukraine remains not only a formal obstacle on the path to EU membership, but more importantly, it hinders economic growth, sustains a large informal sector, and prevents the establishment of close cooperation with member states in various fields.
These texts also touch upon more universal issues, reaching far beyond the borders of Ukraine and Europe, as well as concisely address the phenomenon of corruption and citizens’ relationship with the state, moving beyond regulatory matters. They describe psychological, historical
and systemic factors which are too rarely discussed in the context of attempts to grasp the crisis of citizen trust in the state, with the debate too often narrowed to the regulatory sphere.
Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine has led to forced migration on a scale unseen since the Second World War. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by mid–2024 the number of people from Ukraine who had received temporary protection in European countries (excluding Russia and Belarus) and in North America exceeded 5.2 million, including nearly one million in Poland. The prospect of Ukraine’s European integration brings with it the challenge of a further outflow of people who, once granted European citizenship, will gain the right to live, work and study freely in a united Europe.
For Ukraine, whose population is rapidly declining due to negative demographic trends and massive forced emigration caused by the war, the return of compatriots to their homeland is a strategic task. For Poland, on the other hand, whose significant spending on supporting refugees from Ukraine is already bringing positive economic effects, it is in the national interest to harness the potential of the Ukrainian diaspora in the Polish labour market.
Reconciling the interests of the three main actors in the migration process – that is, the country of origin, the destination country and the migrants themselves – requires a clear definition of those interests, precise data on the scale of migration, and reasonable public policies developed in consultation with relevant stakeholders. This report aims to contribute to that goal by outlining the current migration situation of Ukraine, analysing possible scenarios for its future development, and providing recommendations for both Polish and Ukrainian migration policy.
Autorzy przyglądają się nowemu fenomenowi, który pokazał sondaż late poll po pierwszej turze wyborów prezydenckich 2025 roku – wzrostowi demobilizacji wśród starszych grup wyborców, w wieku między 50. a 60. rokiem życia oraz 60+. Analizując te dane, zastanawiamy się, co to zjawisko mówi o długofalowych zmianach na polskiej scenie politycznej oraz jakie wnioski można z niego wyciągnąć przed ostatecznym etapem wyboru głowy naszego państwa.
Zwraca uwagę przede wszystkim wyraźnie niższa frekwencja wśród wyborców w wieku 60+, która wyniosła w tej grupie wiekowej 59,3%, czyli o ponad 13 p.p. mniej niż wśród wyborców w wieku 18– 29 lat. Z kolei wśród wyborców między 50. a 60. rokiem życia była wyjątkowo wysoka – 74,5%. Najstarsi wyborcy okazali się zatem najmniej zmobilizowani. Przypomnijmy, że w wyborach parlamentarnych w październiku 2023 roku do urn poszło 67% osób w wieku 60+, niewiele mniej niż najmłodszych (68,8%). W 2023 roku, podobnie jak w pierwszej turze wyborów prezydenckich 2025, rekordzistami frekwencji były osoby pomiędzy 50. a 60. rokiem życia – zagłosowało ich wówczas 83,2%. Wprawdzie do głosowania w pierwszej turze aktualnych wyborów prezydenckich znowu poszli wyjątkowo licznie, to mimo wszystko demobilizacja była wśród nich wyraźna, bowiem frekwencja spadła w tej grupie o 9,3 p.p. A warto przy tym zaznaczyć, że w przypadku wyborców i wyborczyń 60+ mówimy o najliczniejszej grupie wiekowej w naszym społeczeństwie. Według danych GUS na koniec 2024 roku było to prawie 10 milionów osób.
Kiedy starsi wyborcy decydowali się jednak zagłosować w pierwszej turze wyborów, najczęściej głosowali na kandydatów dwóch największych partii. Na Rafała Trzaskowskiego zagłosowało 42,5% osób w wieku 60+ oraz 36,8% osób między 50. a 60. rokiem życia. Na Karola Nawrockiego w grupie 60+ oddano 45,3% głosów, a w grupie między 50. a 60. rokiem życia 36,3%. Pozostali kandydaci i kandydatki uzyskiwali w tych grupach wiekowych wyniki jednocyfrowe.
Z tych preferencji wyborczych można wyciągnąć wniosek, że starsze pokolenia w wyraźnie większym stopniu niż młodsze nadal głosują na polityków z dwóch największych partii, wymieniających się przy władzy od ponad dwóch dekad, natomiast wzrósł wśród nich teraz odsetek osób zniechęconych do sceny politycznej. Zniechęceni rzadko jednak wybierają kandydatów z innych, młodszych i mniejszych partii – a wolą pozostać w domach. Potwierdzałoby to też tezę mówiącą o tym, że osoby starsze trudniej przekonać do zmiany poglądów politycznych i przekazania poparcia na nowego kandydata czy kandydatkę.
War reveals the true resilience of states and their societies. Ukrainian society, together with public institutions, local authorities, and the military, has proven strong enough to withstand aggression from the Russian Federation – an adversary that is, at least nominally, far more powerful. One of the pillars of Ukraine’s remarkable resilience is its proactive civil society, which not only rises in times of revolutionary upheaval but engages daily in matters of public importance: supporting the armed forces, caring for veterans and forcibly displaced persons, fighting corruption and overseeing government structures at both local and national levels, documenting war crimes committed by Russians, protecting cultural heritage, as well as fostering its development even under wartime conditions.
The collection “Resilience and Solidarity” consists of texts by Ukrainian experts and interviews with Ukrainian civil society activists. The publication seeks to describe and explain the mechanisms behind the functioning of Ukrainian civil society, which has proven remarkably adept at handling the most challenging of realities.
The collection includes texts by Edwin Bendyk, Alevtina Kakhidze, Piotr Kosiewski, Andriy Lubko, Olesya Ostrovskaya-Luta, Valeriy Pekar, Maria Repko, Olha Reznikova and Mykola Ryabchuk, as well as conversations between Piotr Andrusieczko and Taras Czmut, Adriy Dlihach, Lyubov Halan, Tamara Hundorova, Julia Krasilnykova, Oleksandr Matviychuk, Viktor Nestula, Halyna Petrenko and Yevhen Shapoval.
Since November 2013, when Ukrainians first gathered in Kyiv’s Independence Square to protest President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, they have remained unwavering in their European aspirations. The full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022 only cemented their conviction that European integration is not merely a choice but an existential necessity for their country. In response, President Volodymyr Zelensky moved swiftly to prepare Ukraine’s EU membership application, submitting it in the immediate aftermath of the Russian attack. By early June 2024, accession negotiations had formally begun.
The process of accession to the European Union follows a predetermined framework that applies uniformly to all candidate countries. The the accession negotiation phase is also strictly and precisely regulated. These negotiations are divided into clusters and chapters, each corresponding to specific areas where the candidate country must implement EU laws and standards. Progress in each area requires unanimous approval from all EU member states, confirming that the necessary requirements have been met. This study, crafted by a Polish-Ukrainian team of experts, offers a dual perspective on the challenges and opportunities within the six negotiation clusters, illuminating the mutual benefits that Poland and Ukraine stand to gain by overcoming these obstacles together.
US President Donald Trump has called Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine who is defending his country against a Russian invasion, a „dictator without elections”. The US administration is said to be pushing for the organisation of presidential elections in Ukraine, which have not taken place in 2024 due to the armed conflict throughout the country and the ongoing martial law. An analysis by Olha Aivazovska (chair of the board of the civil rights organisation OPORA and expert in electoral law and political processes) shows the true state of Ukrainian democracy during the war.
Olha Aivazovska explains the legal and factual reasons why no presidential elections were held in Ukraine in 2024, even though Volodymyr Zelensky’s five-year term had ended. She also cites a study according to which the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who were against holding elections during the active phase of the war in October 2023 was 81%, while in May 2024 it was 74%. Only 24% of citizens support the idea of holding elections during the war.
As the Aivazovska shows, even without elections, Ukraine has a structured system of citizen participation in governance during wartime, which is not so visible against the backdrop of military threats, but prevents any political figure from becoming an authoritarian leader. It is also important to note that Ukraine is an unprecedented case of a developed representative democracy forced to simultaneously fight for the country’s survival, adhere to standards regarding potential post-war elections and implement an ambitious package of fundamental reforms necessary for accession to the European Union.
The report provides an in-depth review of judicial reforms in Ukraine from 2014 to September 2024, prepared in collaboration with experts from the Ukrainian analytical center DeJure. These judicial reforms are a key component of Ukraine’s progress towards European Union membership. The report highlights key achievements, challenges, and strategic priorities within the reform process. It examines the historical context and reasons for past reform failures and underscores the value of international expertise in implementing innovative solutions, including the establishment of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court. The report also details future steps that are essential to ensure the transparency and independence of the judiciary in line with EU integration standards.
Particular attention is paid to developments after 2021, when the Verkhovna Rada adopted two important laws to restructure the High Qualifications Commission of Judges (HQCJ) and The High Council of Justice (HCJ), the bodies responsible for judicial selection and disciplinary oversight. The restructured HQCJ and HCJ began their work in 2023. The report assesses the trends and effectiveness of these bodies and highlights the need for further reforms in critical institutions, including The Constitutional Court, The Supreme Court, and The Higher Administrative Court, which remain focal points for Ukrainian society and international partners.
Over the past 10 years, the authorities and the public have jointly created anti-corruption infrastructure, adopted legislation and reformed public procurement. This all became the foundation on which the new European state has successfully been built. And in 2019, the Verkhovna Rada even amended the preamble of the Constitution of Ukraine, enshrining there ‘the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine.’
The report presents Ukraine’s main achievements in increasing state transparency and anti-corruption reforms from February 2014 to March 2024, and also discusses post-war reconstruction issues. For each of the analyzed issues, the authors propose further actions that will help consolidate the changes made and bring Ukraine closer to EU membership.
The report was prepared by Transparency International Ukraine experts.
As part of the Report’s preparation, the European Commission invites stakeholders to provide contributions through a targeted consultation. The Commission encourages the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in this process. Indeed, many CSOs invest significant capacity, resources, collective intelligence, and expectations into it. Thus, the Report could create an important space for dialogue on the rule of law, both at the EU and national levels. However, this potential is not fully exploited or developed. Ultimately, the Report is only a tool to capture important developments; it lacks measures to act and to assess how it contributes to improving the rule of law in Europe.
This paper aims to enhance the effectiveness of the processes involved in creating, publishing, promoting, and monitoring the Report’s recommendations. Developed with inputs from organizations hailing mostly from the Central and Eastern European region and involved in the day-to-day work around the Reports in their countries and at the EU-wide level, the paper reflects discussions from a workshop held in Brussels in April 2024. The recommendations herein emerge from a practical assessment of the entire process.
Compiled with a genuine interest in supporting the Report’s preparation and engaging CSOs from CEE countries, this paper seeks to improve honest dialogue on the rule of law. Consequently, it may come across as critical, focusing deliberately on procedural weaknesses without diminishing the Report’s importance as a tool—a point well acknowledged by the authors.
The ensuing introduction outlines challenges that CSOs experience in their work on the Report, followed by recommendations to the European Commission and civil society organisations.