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War reveals the true resilience of states and their societies. Ukrainian society, together with public institutions, local authorities, and the military, has proven strong enough to withstand aggression from the Russian Federation – an adversary that is, at least nominally, far more powerful. One of the pillars of Ukraine’s remarkable resilience is its proactive civil society, which not only rises in times of revolutionary upheaval but engages daily in matters of public importance: supporting the armed forces, caring for veterans and forcibly displaced persons, fighting corruption and overseeing government structures at both local and national levels, documenting war crimes committed by Russians, protecting cultural heritage, as well as fostering its development even under wartime conditions.

The collection “Resilience and Solidarity” consists of texts by Ukrainian experts and interviews with Ukrainian civil society activists. The publication seeks to describe and explain the mechanisms behind the functioning of Ukrainian civil society, which has proven remarkably adept at handling the most challenging of realities.

The collection includes texts by Edwin Bendyk, Alevtina Kakhidze, Piotr Kosiewski, Andriy Lubko, Olesya Ostrovskaya-Luta, Valeriy Pekar, Maria Repko, Olha Reznikova and Mykola Ryabchuk, as well as conversations between Piotr Andrusieczko and Taras Czmut, Adriy Dlihach, Lyubov Halan, Tamara Hundorova, Julia Krasilnykova, Oleksandr Matviychuk, Viktor Nestula, Halyna Petrenko and Yevhen Shapoval.

Since November 2013, when Ukrainians first gathered in Kyiv’s Independence Square to protest President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, they have remained unwavering in their European aspirations. The full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022 only cemented their conviction that European integration is not merely a choice but an existential necessity for their country. In response, President Volodymyr Zelensky moved swiftly to prepare Ukraine’s EU membership application, submitting it in the immediate aftermath of the Russian attack. By early June 2024, accession negotiations had formally begun.

The process of accession to the European Union follows a predetermined framework that applies uniformly to all candidate countries. The the accession negotiation phase is also strictly and precisely regulated. These negotiations are divided into clusters and chapters, each corresponding to specific areas where the candidate country must implement EU laws and standards. Progress in each area requires unanimous approval from all EU member states, confirming that the necessary requirements have been met. This study, crafted by a Polish-Ukrainian team of experts, offers a dual perspective on the challenges and opportunities within the six negotiation clusters, illuminating the mutual benefits that Poland and Ukraine stand to gain by overcoming these obstacles together.

US President Donald Trump has called Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine who is defending his country against a Russian invasion, a „dictator without elections”. The US administration is said to be pushing for the organisation of presidential elections in Ukraine, which have not taken place in 2024 due to the armed conflict throughout the country and the ongoing martial law. An analysis by Olha Aivazovska (chair of the board of the civil rights organisation OPORA and expert in electoral law and political processes) shows the true state of Ukrainian democracy during the war.

Olha Aivazovska explains the legal and factual reasons why no presidential elections were held in Ukraine in 2024, even though Volodymyr Zelensky’s five-year term had ended. She also cites a study according to which the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who were against holding elections during the active phase of the war in October 2023 was 81%, while in May 2024 it was 74%. Only 24% of citizens support the idea of holding elections during the war.

As the Aivazovska shows, even without elections, Ukraine has a structured system of citizen participation in governance during wartime, which is not so visible against the backdrop of military threats, but prevents any political figure from becoming an authoritarian leader. It is also important to note that Ukraine is an unprecedented case of a developed representative democracy forced to simultaneously fight for the country’s survival, adhere to standards regarding potential post-war elections and implement an ambitious package of fundamental reforms necessary for accession to the European Union.

The report provides an in-depth review of judicial reforms in Ukraine from 2014 to September 2024, prepared in collaboration with experts from the Ukrainian analytical center DeJure. These judicial reforms are a key component of Ukraine’s progress towards European Union membership. The report highlights key achievements, challenges, and strategic priorities within the reform process. It examines the historical context and reasons for past reform failures and underscores the value of international expertise in implementing innovative solutions, including the establishment of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court. The report also details future steps that are essential to ensure the transparency and independence of the judiciary in line with EU integration standards.

Particular attention is paid to developments after 2021, when the Verkhovna Rada adopted two important laws to restructure the High Qualifications Commission of Judges (HQCJ) and The High Council of Justice (HCJ), the bodies responsible for judicial selection and disciplinary oversight. The restructured HQCJ and HCJ began their work in 2023. The report assesses the trends and effectiveness of these bodies and highlights the need for further reforms in critical institutions, including The Constitutional Court, The Supreme Court, and The Higher Administrative Court, which remain focal points for Ukrainian society and international partners.

Over the past 10 years, the authorities and the public have jointly created anti-corruption infrastructure, adopted legislation and reformed public procurement. This all became the foundation on which the new European state has successfully been built. And in 2019, the Verkhovna Rada even amended the preamble of the Constitution of Ukraine, enshrining there ‘the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine.’

The report presents Ukraine’s main achievements in increasing state transparency and anti-corruption reforms from February 2014 to March 2024, and also discusses post-war reconstruction issues. For each of the analyzed issues, the authors propose further actions that will help consolidate the changes made and bring Ukraine closer to EU membership.

The report was prepared by Transparency International Ukraine experts.

As part of the Report’s preparation, the European Commission invites stakeholders to provide contributions through a targeted consultation. The Commission encourages the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in this process. Indeed, many CSOs invest significant capacity, resources, collective intelligence, and expectations into it. Thus, the Report could create an important space for dialogue on the rule of law, both at the EU and national levels. However, this potential is not fully exploited or developed. Ultimately, the Report is only a tool to capture important developments; it lacks measures to act and to assess how it contributes to improving the rule of law in Europe.

This paper aims to enhance the effectiveness of the processes involved in creating, publishing, promoting, and monitoring the Report’s recommendations. Developed with inputs from organizations hailing mostly from the Central and Eastern European region and involved in the day-to-day work around the Reports in their countries and at the EU-wide level, the paper reflects discussions from a workshop held in Brussels in April 2024. The recommendations herein emerge from a practical assessment of the entire process.

Compiled with a genuine interest in supporting the Report’s preparation and engaging CSOs from CEE countries, this paper seeks to improve honest dialogue on the rule of law. Consequently, it may come across as critical, focusing deliberately on procedural weaknesses without diminishing the Report’s importance as a tool—a point well acknowledged by the authors.

The ensuing introduction outlines challenges that CSOs experience in their work on the Report, followed by recommendations to the European Commission and civil society organisations.

The abuse of power in Poland, including corruption, is a complex, systemic phenomenon that escapes narrow definitions or criminal code regulations. Since coming to power in 2015, the ruling party has steadily laid the foundation for grand corruption, understood as a monopoly on power, arbitrary decisions, lack of transparency and accountability, and particularism (including political clientelism), with the particularistic redistribution of public goods (such as posts or funds) aimed at satisfying the party base’s interests.

Experts and researchers studying the quality of public life are aware that this is a growing problem and that it results from the conscious policy of Law and Justice (PiS in Polish) party, which ruled Poland until the 2023 elections. It involved the steady lowering of the standards of the rule of law; above all, abandoning the principles of the separation of powers and the rule of checks and balances. The executive – or more precisely, its party base – became dominant. Parliament was steadily weakened; in particular, when it comes to providing a check on the executive and, especially in the parliament dominated by PiS, a place for public debate and exchanging views on state policy. Since 2015, we were observing a constant attack on the third branch of government in Poland: the judiciary. The ruling party increased pressure on judges, seeking to limit their autonomy and independence, and striving to subordinate the judiciary to its priorities. The prosecutor’s office, a key state body in the fight against corruption and abuse of power, was almost completely subordinated to the authorities. Restoring the model of prosecutor’s office in which a politically-appointed minister is also prosecutor general, and expanding his powers in a way that enables him to freely interfere in any rank-and-file prosecutor’s work, created a structure in which the people with political control over the prosecutor’s office and law enforcement agencies can remain unpunished. Decisions on whether or not prosecutors investigate suspected crimes involving politicians and officials from the ruling party – and whether or not these cases were even considered in court, where they can finally be clarified – were political. Citizens and watchdogs tasked with keeping the authorities in check are deprived of basic tools, such as guarantees concerning access to public information. People who have the courage to speak out about abuse in the workplace – in other words, whistleblowers – are still not protected by law. The authorities are in no hurry to improve their situation, which could be accomplished by implementing EU regulations. All this adds up to a crisis of the rule of law, broadly understood. In these circumstances, it is difficult to speak of the state’s resilience to abuse of power and corruption.

This analysis seeks to highlight the complexity of contemporary corruption and how difficult it is to counteract abuse by the people in power. Our aim is to stimulate public debate and, in doing so, raise awareness of just how dangerous abuse and corruption are.