

NEW DIRECTIONS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION

THE MAPPING METHOD

A Guide to Charting Corruption
and Influence Processes

JANINE R. WEDEL



INTRO- DUCTION

Understanding corruption is one of the most urgent tasks of these deeply unsettled times. Corruption comes in many forms and afflicts impoverished, less developed countries as well as the world's richest liberal democracies—from Brazil, where the “Car Wash” bribery scandal put a former president in prison to Pakistan where the family of an ousted prime minister was outed in the Panama Papers for offshore dealings to the United States where President Donald Trump has installed numerous advisors directly connected financially to the sector they oversee. Corruption shows few signs of abating. And, as protestors around the globe have taken to the streets, anti-system (aka “populist”) leaders have capitalized on their rage; even as, once in power, these leaders often make corruption worse. Perhaps now, more than ever in living memory, there is a pressing need to thoughtfully address corruption lest we allow would-be autocrats to continue creating the narrative for us.

To do so, we must answer these questions: How can we identify and track corruption and influencing in the environments in which we operate, observe, or study? How can we learn how corruption or influencing activities are organized and carried out in a given context or across contexts? And how can we effectively intervene? This Mapping Method offers an approach and guiding questions to help committed individuals—be they analysts, scholars, journalists, prosecutors, civil society organizations, or regular people—to investigate corruption and influencing in given cases.

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We call for test runs of the Mapping Method by people engaged in on-the-ground study of corruption or influencing activities. It is hoped that a further, expanded handbook would then be developed that incorporates feedback regarding aspects of the framework that may require reconsidering or adjusting and that encompasses complete case studies from a variety of contexts and forms of corruption and influencing.

RETHINKING



ANTI- CORRUPTION

Today, some 25 years since the inception of international anti-corruption regimes in the 1990s, many of those same regimes are reconsidering prevailing approaches to studying and countering corruption. Despite the hundreds of millions of dollars invested by the international financial institutions, individual governments, and NGOs in anti-corruption projects, there is scant evidence that the approaches undertaken have been effective. Corruption (and influencing activities), including the examples given above, cannot be adequately understood through the government (vs. private) sector or the country-centric unit of analysis that have framed much corruption work, nor through the survey, quantitative, metrics-focused, or modeling methods that have dominated corruption research and informed international anti-corruption efforts.¹ Momentum has been gathering for the need to “rethink corruption.”²

Today these approaches and methods are even less well-equipped to investigate and help combat corruption than when they configured corruption studies a quarter century ago. There are two reasons for this. First, new forms of corruption and influencing have emerged amid the past few decades of privatization; deregulation; post-Cold-War dispersal of global authority and new, sparsely governed arenas; and digital revolution. These transformational developments have eroded boundaries between state and private spheres. They have unleashed informal, often transnational, social networks³ that play a greater role in governance and policy and interact in complex and opaque ways with hierarchies. Many of the players involved in grand corruption and influencing activities not only bridge and broker state and private sectors and work across countries; their influence derives from their ability to do so. Thus, frameworks that confine analysis to a specific country or to a state or private sector without examining how these sectors might be linked will miss the very drivers of corruption.⁴

Second, and further complicating the analysis of corruption, is the more recent development over the past several years of anti-system movements and leaders such as President Trump who have unsettled the rule of law and a once-more stable global system. Inexperienced outsiders have been vaulted into some of the most powerful leadership roles in the world; outsider political parties less than a decade old are gaining parliamentary seats across Europe. Corruption now takes place amid perhaps the most unsteady state of affairs in Western democracies since the post-World War II era.

These two seismic developments mean that any rethinking of corruption and design of fresh approaches must thus not only mitigate previous flaws in framework and method; they must additionally take into account (1) these new forms of corruption; and (2) the fact that corruption is now often conducted against a political and legal backdrop in flux. This is true not just in the less developed countries where corruption has traditionally been most scrutinized but also in the most developed countries, which have been greatly under-examined in this regard.

This Mapping Method provides an antidote. Anchored in social anthropology,⁵ the approach departs conceptually and methodologically from prevailing frameworks. It is a grounded, real-world approach that begins by identifying the parties (players, networks, and organizations) in a corruption or influence effort. It then examines such factors as the parties’ agendas; the players’ interactions, networks, and roles vis-à-vis one another and in government, corporate, and other organizations; and the larger circumstances of power and resources in which the parties operate.

The Mapping Method is ideally equipped to investigate some of the most egregious and difficult-to-track corruption and influencing today. It works equally well in and across Western democracies not long ago seen as stable and in “ungoverned spaces” such as new, fledgling states or post-conflict settings where authority is contested. While the above examples reference what has been called “grand” or “greed” corruption, the Mapping Method is also equipped to examine “need” corruption.⁶

GETTING STARTED IDENTIFYING AN OVERARCHING QUESTION AND METHOD TO USE



We begin when corruption or undue influencing is suspected with regard to (a) given player(s), organization(s), or venue(s). With the Mapping Method, we then identify an overarching question for investigation.

Examples of such overarching questions are:



After identifying the overarching research question, the Mapping Method then aims to address it through a series of empirical questions. To shed light on these questions, all manner of methods can be used that are useful in gathering information relevant to specific questions. The Mapping Method entails obtaining information from as many means and sources as are available—including open-ended interviews and ethnography; big data mining; public and off-the-record documents; media and investigative journalists' accounts; regulatory agency findings; scholarly studies; and accounts and diaries of people involved in or adversely affected by corruption and influencing activities.⁷ These data must then be verified to the extent possible through cross-checking and triangulation of data.⁸

It is important to note that mapping corruption and influence processes can start from different places; there is no one correct place to begin. While the list of questions below presents the conduct of an investigation in a particular order (beginning with the players), one could equally well start with (an) organization(s) and, in course of investigation, return to the players. If you know about (a) player(s) who may be involved, begin there. If you know instead about the involvement of (an) organization(s), or have been leaked information (for instance, about particular offshore accounts), then begin there. If you know people who are victims of corruption that disadvantages them (or if you are one of them), you can start by asking what their experience is—and what they know about the players and organizations who may be implicated—and go from there. If you have in your possession big data like the Panama Papers or you've been tipped off about a corruption activity or effort without specific names of players or organizations, you will still, at some point in your investigation, need to identify the involvements of players and organizations and explore these involvements.

FOLLOWING THE PLAYERS GUIDING QUESTIONS⁹



The open-ended questions listed below guide the Mapping Method’s approach to empirical data gathering. To show how these questions can be used to investigate specific cases, this document examines, in very abbreviated form, three examples from vastly different contexts dealing with diverse issues.

These examples are:

1

the distribution of water resources in Karachi, Pakistan, from the 1990s to the mid-2010s;¹⁰

2

the conduct of energy policy players in Tanzania beginning in the mid-1990s;¹¹ and

3

the making of and deregulation of U.S. financial policy in the 1990s.¹²

While all three examples have been published (with regard to Pakistan, as a full-fledged case; with regard to Tanzania and the United States, as partial accounts that we have pieced together), the brief answers provided here are meant only to provide a rough summary; more comprehensive data and analysis can be found in the works from which they are drawn and other sources, many of which are cited in endnotes. Please note that the suggested format of the Mapping Method is to follow through only one case at a time; three examples are given here to provide a sense of the range of cases to which the approach can be applied.

After identifying an overarching question for investigation, the Mapping Method then proceeds to answer it by addressing the following six empirical questions. It is important to note that, while these questions can be approached in a linear fashion, the process of working through them and gathering information is seldom linear. The process might entail, for example, examining professional, social, and / or ideological affiliations or past influence efforts. Such examination might variously make use of direct observation or interviewing, thorough assessments of media accounts, consultations with scholars across several disciplines, social network analysis, and analysis of big data.



Who are the parties (players, social networks, and organizations) involved, both formally and informally, in a corruption or influence activity or effort?

Who are the players, and what, specifically, are their roles?

“Players” are people who are actively involved, indeed the most influential or important people, in an organization, endeavor, mission, situation, or (series of) event(s). They are sometimes identified when their names keep appearing in conjunction with activities under study or through identification by others known to be involved. Some players can be found by determining who might have a financial, professional, or ideological stake in activities underway or being proposed. Please note that while some players have a formal role or title commensurate with their influence, crucially, many others do not.

KARACHI

In Karachi, a collection of players who have been dubbed the “water mafia” has been deemed more reliable than the formal water delivery service. This “mafia” has run an informal water delivery system that serves many of the city’s low-income residents. Players directly involved include water tanker operators and illegal hydrant owners, both entrepreneurs trying to make a living;¹³ government bureaucrats in the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board engaged in the water delivery racket; (usually low-level) police officers who facilitate the business through inaction or by taking bribes from the water mafia in exchange for the tacit support of the police;¹⁴ and members of state paramilitary forces who have also dipped their hands in the water racket business.

TANZANIA

In Tanzania, from the mid-1990s onwards, energy policy has been shaped by competing private interests, both from inside the country and abroad, which helped pushed through energy projects. Players include senior, elected politicians up to the cabinet level; officials in the Ministry of Energy, among a number of other ministries; executives at the major state-owned utility TANESCO; judges; officials in the Bank of Tanzania; millionaire businessmen from both the local Asian and African communities, including James Rugemalira and Harbinder Singh Sethi, and entities they empowered; operatives from the ruling CCM party; representatives of a state-controlled newspaper and other media outlets; law firms; and overseas banks. Means of corruption have included bribery, kickbacks, the creation of shell companies, offshoring, money laundering, and outright theft of public funds. Meanwhile, Tanzanians have been faced with frequent power outages, misuse of public funds, overbilling, and an outmoded power plant and energy system.¹⁵

WASHINGTON

In Washington, players involved in 1990s deregulation of exotic derivatives under President Bill Clinton include a “power clique” — a small group of like-minded players whose members position themselves in state and private positions to achieve mutual goals. This was the Rubin power clique around former Goldman Sachs chief and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (from 1995 to 1999) and Rubin deputy Lawrence Summers, who became secretary when Rubin departed. Also playing crucial roles were Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., and allied Wall Street bankers.



What government, corporate / business, nongovernmental organizations, other organizations (such as think tanks or consultancies), or venues are the players connected to, and how do they use them to carry out their corruption / influence activities or efforts?¹⁶

KARACHI

In Karachi, the water mafia—in addition to encompassing operatives from the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board, the police, and paramilitary forces—has received de facto support from these organizations beyond the fact that these operatives are part of the influence network. Moreover, some of these government players are connected to political parties that support their illicit activities.

TANZANIA

In Tanzania, organizations and venues have included all organizations referred to above, as well as entities connected to the players. Law firms helped set up shell companies and overseas banks invested in disastrous or sham power projects over the years.

WASHINGTON

In Washington, members of the Rubin power clique had circulated through top firms (especially Goldman Sachs), Harvard University, the Treasury Department, specific think tanks, corporate boards, advisory councils, and international governing bodies. Members of the clique and key allies held pivotal positions in the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Group of 30 international consultative group on banking standards, and top Wall Street firms.

Through what roles are the players linked to each other, and additionally, through what affiliations, organizations, or venues? How do these links, affiliations, organizations, and venues enable the corruption / influence activities or efforts?¹⁷



KARACHI

In Karachi, officials in the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board have additionally supported a particular political party through voting or even served as party activists. These same officials sometimes have also engaged directly in the water delivery racket by providing patronage to owners of illegal hydrants and by not reporting illegal hydrants to the local police.¹⁸



TANZANIA

In Tanzania, beginning in the late 1980s, economic liberalization and the retirement of longtime President Julius Nyerere led to the rise of competing informal networks that encompassed government officials, parliamentary representatives, politicians, and members of the ruling CCM party. One of these networks, the Wanamtandao network, used patronage and propaganda to gain supremacy during the early years of the energy project debacles. The Wanamtandao network eventually weakened as the corruption was investigated; the prime minister, the ministers for Energy and Construction respectively, and other Wanamtandao members were forced out of government.

WASHINGTON

In Washington, as noted above, members of the Rubin power clique had been or were affiliated with the same top Wall Street firms, Harvard University, the Treasury Department, specific think tanks, corporate boards, advisory councils, and international governing bodies. This served to solidify both their joint agendas and the consensus view that what was good for Wall Street was good for regular people. In addition, many of the Washington policymakers had recently come from Wall Street (or would soon take a role there upon leaving public office). The clique's close connections with Wall Street CEOs helped them form a bulwark against government officials whose roles indicated they should be centrally involved in decision making. A case in point is Brooksley Born, head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, who was actively shut out of key consultations while top bankers and members of the power clique who did not occupy official positions were included.

How do players use these organizations or venues as vehicles of influence? Do any of the players or organizations or venues use media (including social media) to enhance their power and message? If so, how, and what is achieved?



What are these players' social network configurations (say, in terms of density) as they link to each other and to organizations and what features of the corruption / influence activity or effort are enabled by a specific configuration?

(For instance, the more density in a network or group, the more disincentive there is for players to defect from it and the more incentive for them to remain part of the network / group and continue their participation in corrupt activities. In another example, a social network configuration that features a single broker between two otherwise disconnected networks or groups [say, suppliers of illicit goods versus distributors] has these consequences: Having a single broker decreases the risk of discovery. At the same time, however, it increases the risk that business operations will be disrupted if the broker is discovered and removed).

KARACHI



In Karachi, powerful players in the government have described the informal water delivery system to the media as being run by a "water mafia." In doing so, they taint the system as criminal and distance themselves from the public perception that they are part of it. This characterization distorts the reality of the enterprise, which, though illicit, is more reliable than formal water delivery and receives de facto support from government officials and political parties.¹⁹

TANZANIA



In Tanzania, business interests penetrated the higher echelons of the governing CCM party, and the Wanamtandao network even created new positions to accommodate its business allies. This ensured that key members of parliament initially supported the deals and projects, despite disastrous public impact. The government-owned newspaper was described as a "loyal mouthpiece" for key player Rugemalira by one Tanzanian corruption-watcher and former member of parliament.²⁰

WASHINGTON



In Washington, members of the Rubin power clique and their allies used the nascent television business media, hungry for compelling hero narratives, to lionize themselves. This created an echo chamber in which questions about their economic stewardship and close connections with Wall Street were quickly dispelled, if they were asked at all. Specific think tanks and academic institutions followed suit.

KARACHI



In Karachi: Insufficient research was conducted to address this question.

TANZANIA



In Tanzania, the Wanamtandao network had a deep reach, and in various directions. In addition to enlisting the support of people at the very top, cooptation went down to the level of a regional party chairman. Alliances were made, and media were worked to ensure favorable coverage. But as one extensive report on competing factions in Tanzania notes, "The paradox is that it may very well be that the success of the Wanamtandao [network] in co-opting a broad range of powerful actors was the source of its collapse."²¹ The implication is that it was too large to sustain unity.

WASHINGTON



In Washington, members of the Rubin power clique invariably had numerous professional and personal roles vis-à-vis one another (past and present); density characterized the clique. Members of the clique additionally were linked to myriad influential allies on Wall Street, as well as in academia, think tanks, and the media.

2

What are the parties' respective interests, agendas, incentives, goals, motivations, operating assumptions, and expectations with regard to the corruption or influence activity / effort?

Please note that apart from helping to identify specific players, as mentioned above, understanding potential motives can help the researcher discern why the end result of certain actions does not serve the public interest, but some private agenda instead. It can also provide clues as to how players might proceed with future actions. Please also note that the parties' interests can be difficult to discern and that the answer to this question is often revealed through actions. An official who takes a bribe is likely seeking financial gain. But, of course, this does not mean that money is his only enticement: motives are not only often multifaceted; they can change over time and in response to shifting circumstances.

KARACHI

In Karachi, the players have been motivated either by financial gain, solidifying their institutional or political power, ensuring their physical safety (by maintaining political loyalties), or a combination of the above. Ministry officials control the city's water, as well as the money for development projects. Because positions in the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board are highly contested among political parties, how these officials deploy resources stands to benefit particular political parties financially and politically. Involvement in the water delivery racket not only reaps lucrative profits; providing water to neighborhoods populated by constituents who, in turn, contribute their political support to specific political parties, yields political profit.


TANZANIA

In Tanzania, the motivation of the Wanamtandao network was to maintain supremacy over the other informal networks and to ensure the continuance of fundraising for CCM leaders. Parties involved in the various energy projects benefited financially and kept their positions of power and influence, until accusations of widespread corruption finally fractured the network.

WASHINGTON

In Washington, the players promoted a "free market" ideology, insisting that the policies that greatly enriched Wall Street were also helping regular people. Wall Street firms eagerly embraced the so-called New Democrats, notably President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, as privatizers, deregulators, pro-business, and pro-Wall Street. The business press (and sometimes the general press as well), academic and think tank economists, and Wall Street players formed a cross-venue consensus that a low regulation and low inflation environment was ideal.

3



What is the ecosystem in which the various parties operate and how does it affect their corruption / influence efforts? What are the “culture(s)” and mindsets of the milieus, organization(s), or venues in which the parties operate (such as norms and mindsets of a community of practice, norms and ethics of a profession, mafia honor codes) and how do these affect their corruption / influence efforts?

Please note that if you do not understand that different milieus / ecosystems possess different cultural and professional mindsets, and that they constrain and enable agendas and activities that can be vastly different from one another, you are likely to miss the ability to understand motives and agendas. It is important to have both a day-to-day understanding of milieu, as well as a larger and longer-term view. It should be helpful to consult scholars and historians of the region and journalists on the ground.



KARACHI

In Karachi, operatives in the informal water delivery system must constantly take political considerations into account in charting their actions. Moreover, government functionaries need political affiliation to acquire access to resources, and those working in the government bureaucracy for water delivery are no exception. The Karachi Water and Sewerage Board is highly politicized.



TANZANIA

In Tanzania, starting in the 1980s, the loss of a president who had served since 1961, combined with the economic liberalization encouraged by Western donors, created fertile ground for corruption. The end both of one-party rule and central planning allowed corruption to flourish, and the interests of the political and business systems began to converge. As one study put it, “corruption grew strong societal roots” with “support from within the social networks to which a public servant belongs.”²² The accumulation of vast wealth became acceptable. With encouragement from international donors, the country was growing fast and opening itself to more transnational connections.




WASHINGTON

In Washington, with Bill Clinton as president, the belief in the free market and deregulation was no longer just the province of Republicans; it took on the feel of a creed among establishment Democrats. The New Democrats and Wall Street coalesced around the idea of financial deregulation, low interest rates, and high growth, all of which would play a role in the 2008 financial crisis. This creed was additionally bolstered by academic economists, who added gravitas and credibility to deregulatory policies, both through research and media appearances. A burgeoning business news media (and sometimes the general media as well) amplified their goals and message. Those who warned otherwise were sidelined.

4

Who are the parties' sponsors (such as funders or providers of other indispensable resources) and what are their interests, agendas, incentives, goals, motivations, operating assumptions, and expectations with regards to the corruption or influence activity/effort?

Note that "sponsors" can overlap with or be the same as "players" or "organizations." Please also note that sometimes players involved in an influence effort benefit directly from their actions, but additionally that various sponsors are involved and also benefit. Sponsors' involvement must be understood to explain why certain decisions are being made; a baffling decision becomes less so when you can determine that a player is satisfying a sponsor's directive. Because players often have a vested interest in obscuring their sponsorship, answering this question can be difficult. Thus it might be necessary to employ multiple methods to adequately investigate this issue.



KARACHI



In Karachi, a cursory look at the informal water distribution system might reveal only end-of-the-line distributors of the "water mafia." But it is crucial to also see political parties vying for votes and government functionaries feathering their bureaucratic nests by ensuring that Karachi residents have a stable supply of water through the informal delivery system.

TANZANIA



In Tanzania, international donors have played a huge part in funding the government, contributing as much as 30 percent of its budget. In the 1990s the World Bank and the IMF were pushing a "least cost" power strategy.²³ But players within the Tanzanian government instead promoted outmoded energy plants, using anti-colonial sentiment to thwart World Bank efforts. Inefficient power deals were promoted as an alternative, both by the government of Malaysia under its then (and now) prime minister, Mahatir Mohamad, and in the name of Richmond, a shell company registered in the United States and promoted by then Prime Minister Edward Lowassa. Later, when various additional scandals came to light, donors withheld their money until they perceived the country was taking positive action.

WASHINGTON



In Washington, Wall Street firms that had embraced the New Democrats provided funding for their politicians, notably candidate Bill Clinton. Chief among them was Goldman Sachs, from whence Robert Rubin had come. The most powerful firm on Wall Street, it was long known as a Democratic stronghold.



5

What are the *larger* context(s) / circumstances of power and resources in which the parties are embedded (such as the broader geopolitical landscape, money laundering regulations and enforcement [or lack thereof], availability of huge amounts of “dark” money from informal / unrecorded economic transactions)? How do features of the larger context(s) / circumstances constrain, enable, or otherwise affect the parties involved in corruption / influence efforts?

Please note that addressing this question helps to situate the parties’ actions in political, societal, economic, and historical context. Answers to the question shed light on the circumstances that might lead or have led to the corruption / influencing activities and whether and how they can be addressed as reformers seek change.

KARACHI

In Karachi, political instability and the real possibility that key elected leaders would be unseated in the next election has motivated the players to try to maximize their spoils in a short time period. The 1990s in particular were marked by a succession of democratic governments, which were then dismissed. With high levels of violence, political affiliation came to guarantee jobs and physical safety. During that decade Karachi’s residents also experienced a big gap between their daily water needs and water availability.²⁴ The political instability led to uncertainty about the prospects of particular political parties and contributed to the parties’ persistent fear that, despite being in power, their governments could be removed through quasi-legal or legal measures—culminating in the coup perpetrated by General Pervez Musharaff. Both before and after his military rule, because governments seldom completed a full term, political parties, government functionaries, and entrepreneurs concentrated on making quick financial and political gains. The urgency of securing their “share” of the pie motivated all players to perform their respective roles with dispatch.


TANZANIA

In Tanzania, the arrival of multi-party politics along with economic liberalization created a scramble for resources from the mid-1980s onwards. One of the side effects of this was a huge increase in the informal, unrecorded economy, creating a vast reservoir of dark money. Dark money then served as a source of capital flight and unrecorded domestic investment—investment that was never included in national accounts.

WASHINGTON

In Washington, President Clinton inherited an economy coming out of recession, having beaten his predecessor, President George H.W. Bush, with the line, “It’s the Economy, Stupid.” Pro-Wall Street Democrats were a new breed, and, armed with elite credentials, these players were well-positioned to push their agenda unimpeded, to a fawning press.²⁵ While players seemed to truly believe the free-market ideology they touted, the result was a vast concentration of wealth among Wall Street allies, personal riches for the policy players who came from and went on to take Wall Street jobs, and the impoverishment for millions after these policy catastrophes came home to roost amid the 2008 financial crisis.

6



To what extent is the structure that facilitates corrupt activities or efforts institutionalized (or becoming so) even if it remains informal /unincorporated and the players change over time?

Please note that addressing this question helps to determine the extent to which the identified corruption or influencing might be intractable or not. Clues that corruption has become institutionalized include statements from those involved along the lines of “this is just how things work.” If activities persist even as the players change, that is a strong indication of institutionalized corruption.



KARACHI

In Karachi, the informal water distribution system has become institutionalized. Nearly 41 percent of the water supply is consistently siphoned off from bulk distribution and sold in the informal market. While this structure is informal, it depends on formal organizations and functionaries, as discussed, both for operational ease and for some form of legitimacy among people.



TANZANIA

In Tanzania, President John Magufuli, elected in 2015, has launched a very high-profile corruption crackdown, disrupting existing networks. Many players at different levels have been stripped of office or jailed. In the eyes of the public, this seems to be paying off. A survey for Transparency International conducted in 2017, two years after Magufuli became president, found that more than 70 percent of the population thought that the government was “doing well” in fighting corruption, up 34 percentage points from the previous survey,²⁶ a remarkable development and an “outlier” in the African context. Whether new circuits of influence will emerge is yet to be seen.



WASHINGTON


In Washington the reliance on Wall Street-allied policymakers has continued well past the 2008 financial crash. President Barack Obama hired some of the very players of that era, notably those from the Rubin power clique; President Trump, despite railing against Wall Street “elites,” did the same. This strongly suggests institutionalized practice.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The Mapping Method provides a flexible approach to understanding and hence to countering corruption. It meets corruption how and where it happens. It enables us to sort out parties’ relationships, activities, and interactions and allows them to tell the story, rather than fitting the data into a preconceived framework. The approach can deal both with simple and highly complex forms of corruption, such as chains of corruption that weave through multiple social networks, organizations, and countries over time.

While at first glance the Mapping Method might appear to be a “micro” approach in that it hones in on specific players, organizations, and contexts, many of the contexts in which it is employed might sound more “macro” (for instance, the Tanzanian or Washington examples). In fact, the approach is neither micro or macro and it is both. Common frameworks deployed to study corruption (such as macro vs. micro, state vs. private, formal vs. informal) and a focus on countries as the unit of analysis can distort the field of vision and blind analysts to the actual drivers of corruption. A huge benefit of the Mapping Method is that it does not delimit data in such potentially biased ways. This benefit is especially relevant when it comes to investigating complex forms of corruption.

Your feedback and comments are enthusiastically welcomed.



ENDNOTES

¹ In the 1990s the use of metrics as analysis in cross-country studies bred a body of corruption literature, some of it with rather sweeping conclusions. Although the economists who dominated the field did not abandon their earlier [Cold War–era] focus on modeling hypothetical transactions, the economics of corruption largely turned to employing indices and large data sets—data purportedly comparable across countries—to make their arguments. Especially popular have been correlative studies, containing varying degrees of persuasive evidence regarding causality. Political scientist Michael Johnston wrote in 2005 that “[m]uch recent work has been cross-sectional, often applying statistical measures and models to large numbers of countries to account for their scores on various single-dimension corruption indices” (Michael Johnston, *Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 4).

Critiques of these approaches and what anthropologist Steven Sampson has called the “anti-corruption industry” began to mount (Steven Sampson, “The anti-corruption industry: from movement to institution,” *Global Crime*, vol. 11, issue 2, 2010, pp. 261-278). Sociologist Hans Krause Hansen is among the critics (Hans Krause Hansen, “The Power of Performance Indices in the Global Politics of Anti-Corruption,” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 15, no. 4, 2012, pp. 506-531). He argues that “performance indices are not simply techniques of reporting about things, but are themselves a performative part of social action in general and of governmental and managerial action in particular” (p. 509). See also these critiques of corruption research and anticorruption efforts: Hans Krause Hansen, “Corruption and Risks: Managing Corruption Risks,” *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 18, no. 2, May 2011, pp. 251-275; Elizabeth Harrison, “The ‘Cancer of Corruption.’” *Between Morality and Law: Corruption, Anthropology and Comparative Society*, Italo Pardo, ed. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2004, pp. 135-154; Bruce Heilman and Laurean Ndumbaro, “Corruption, Politics, and Societal Values in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Mkapa Administration’s Anti-Corruption Efforts,” *African Journal of Political Science*, 2002, vol 7, no. 1, <https://embomex.sre.gob.mx/kenia/images/stories/pdf/ajps007001002.pdf>; Kalin S. Ivanov, “The Limits of a Global Campaign Against Corruption,” *Corruption and Development: The Anti-Corruption Campaigns*, Sarah Bracking, ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 32-33; Ivan Krastev, *Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004; and Janine R. Wedel, “Rethinking Corruption in an Age of Ambiguity,” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, vol. 8, December 2012, pp. 453-498.

² Several international “rethinking corruption” workshops, organized by Professor Paul Heywood of the University of Nottingham and supported variously by DFID, Global Integrity, U4, ASI, UNDP, ESRC, the British Academy, and the University of Nottingham, were held in London, Washington, DC, and Accra, Ghana. They included several leading corruption researchers and representatives of international financial institutions, governments, and NGOs involved in anti-corruption work. These workshops followed the publication of a number of works with “rethinking corruption” in the title. These works include: John M. Ackerman, “Rethinking the International Anti-Corruption Agenda,” *American University International Law Review* 29, vol. 2, 2014, pp. 293-333; Franklin A. Gevurtz, “Rethinking Corruption: An Introduction to a Symposium and a Few Additional Thoughts,” *McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2007, pp. 237-242; Meredith L. Gore, Jonah Ratsimbazafy, and Michelle L. Lute, “Rethinking Corruption in Conservation Crime: Insights from Madagascar,” *Conservation Letters* 6, vol. 6, no. 6, 2013, pp. 430-438; Paul M. Heywood, “Rethinking Corruption: Hocus-Pocus, Locus and Focus,” *Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. 95, no. 1, 2017, pp. 21-48; Marlon Arthur Huwae, “My Voice: Rethinking Corruption in Southern Hemisphere,” *USA Today*, November 6, 2015, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/11/06/voice-rethinking-corruption-southern-hemisphere/75325512/>; Daniel Kaufmann, “Rethinking the Fight Against Corruption,” *The Brookings Institution*, November 29, 2012, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rethinking-the-fight-against-corruption/>; Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Niklas Kossow, “Rethinking the Way We Do Anti-Corruption,” *NATO Review*, 2016, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/anticorruption-corruption-laws-regulation-control-anticorr-budget-index/EN/index.htm>; Michael Sidwell, “Rethinking Corruption in the Middle East and North Africa,” *Transparency International*, July 7, 2011, <http://blog.transparency.org/2011/07/07/rethinking-corruption-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/>; Rustamjon Urinboyev and Måns Svensson, “Rethinking Corruption in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan,” *Eugen Ehrlich’s Sociology of Law*, Knut Papendorf, Stefan Machura, and Anne Hellum, eds. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2014, pp. 207-235; and Janine R. Wedel, “Rethinking Corruption in an Age of Ambiguity,” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, vol. 8, 2012, pp. 453-498.

³ See, for instance, Alexander Cooley, J.D. Sharman, and John Heathershaw, “The Rise of Kleptocracy: Laundering Cash, Whitewashing Reputations,” *Journal of Democracy*, Jan. 2018, vol. 29, issue 1, pp. 39-53.

⁴ These developments have reconfigured the ecosystem of power and influence. At the top of the food chain is a new breed of players—“shadow elites” (sometimes called “influence elites”). Defined by their *modus operandi* rather than family or class background, wealth, or institutional position, shadow/influence elites “intermesh hierarchies and networks, serve as connectors, and coordinate influence from multiple, moving perches, inside and outside official structures,” as Wedel writes. The organization and *modus operandi* of shadow elites, which differs in key respects from those of their recent predecessors, makes them highly effective, while also less visible, less accountable, and more challenging to democracy. Janine R. Wedel, “From Power Elites to Influence Elites: Resetting Elite Studies for the 21st Century,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, Special Issue: Elites and Power after Financialization, September 2017, pp. 153-178, p. 153; *SHADOW ELITE: How the World’s New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government, and the Free Market*, Basic Books, 2009.

Shadow/influence elites are defined by the interaction of the following characteristics:

- a. They are unmoored from particular sectors or organizations and take their influence with them [The players’ agency is not confined to circumscribed hierarchies or circles based on shared background, such as those that characterized the “power elite” described by sociology C. Wright Mills’s 60 years ago [C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956]. Today, hierarchies coexist with forms of power grounded in networks. Those in hierarchies not only exert direct power to get their policies enacted, they can also connect hierarchies to other organizational power centers and, crucially, coopt the media from within.]
- b. They are more flexible and global in reach than their forebears [Flexibility and mobility of roles also extends to the ability to transfer from one arena to another.]
- c. They often operate informally and use formal and informal means interchangeably [While informal networks and communication channels among elites also existed in Mills’s day, such networks and channels are not only much more prevalent today, they can also deliver far more influence than in the recent past because influence is no longer predominantly exerted in the context of stable and vertical relations.]
- d. They set up, mobilize, or modify existing entities to help organize their sway in policy and public opinion. (Given today’s more diversified governance and policy landscape, it is much more necessary for today’s elites to appeal to the media and public opinion to achieve their agendas. The ways in which such appeal is made have changed with the digital age, and with the increased sophistication and ubiquity of public relations. With the Cold War’s end, along with the demise of the more predictable U.S.-versus-Soviet global decision-making framework, nongovernmental organizations such as think tank and nonprofit entities, as well as consulting firms, proliferated.)
- e. These entities are more flexible, mobile, malleable, multi-purposed, short-term oriented, and global in reach than those of their forebears, and can stand in for official authorities while also representing other interests. (With regard to think tanks, for instance, not only have they grown in number but the part they can play in the influence ecosystem is also transformed. Think tank sponsors [corporations, billionaires, foundations], the media [which has a fast-evolving relationship with them], and contracts [with companies and governments] all influence their activities and outputs. Think tanks lend a scholarly imprimatur that is attractive to influence elites, who seek legitimacy and an impartial banner. Many think tanks have become partisan fighters, with rapid-response teams, media-friendly reports, and timely messaging. They are under constant pressure to demonstrate ‘impact’ through metrics. They are often populated by journalists, newly displaced by digital media.)
- f. Shadow/influence elites are connectors in an ever-expanding universe for elite intermediaries and experts. [Elite power thus resides not as much in formal organizations or roles, but, much more than in the past, substantially derives from players’ positions in informal social networks and links to organizations and venues connecting elites across a global plane.]

⁵ The perspective presented here is informed by social anthropology, including the “extended case method” and “studying through” (Michael Burawoy, *The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition*, University of California Press, 2009; Susan Wright and Sue Reinhold, “‘Studying Through’: A Strategy for Studying Political Transformation,” *Policy Worlds: Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Power*, Cris Shore, Susan Wright, and Davide Pero, eds., New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2011, pp. 86-104; Janine R. Wedel, “‘Studying Through’ a Globalizing World: Building Method through Aidnographies,” *Ethnographies of Aid-Exploring Development Texts and Encounters*, Gould, Jeremy and Henrik Secher Marcussem, eds., Denmark: Roskilde University, 2004, no. 24, pp. 149-198).

⁶ Monika Bauhr distinguishes between “need corruption”—people managing an impossible system—and “greed” corruption—players gaming the system for financial benefit (Monika Bauhr and Naghmeh Nasiritousi, “Why Pay Bribes? Collective Action and Anticorruption Efforts.” Working Paper Series 2011:18, QOG The Quality of Government Institute, December 2011, pp. 1-23).

⁷ A cross-national study that attempted to understand the financial practices and problems of poor people commissioned diaries from 250 households in Bangladesh, India, and South Africa (Daryl Collins, Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford, Orlanda Ruthven *Portfolios of the Poor*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009, <https://press.princeton.edu/titles/8884.html>). See also blogs on the topic by Duncan Green (Duncan Green, “Why Aren’t ‘Diaries of the Poor’ a Standard Research Tool?” Oxfam Blog: *From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World*, November 2, 2016, <http://oxfamblogs.org/wp2p/why-dont-we-use-diaries-of-the-poor-as-a-standard-research-tool/>; and “Portfolios of the Poor – a great new book,” Oxfam Blog: *From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World*, October 13, 2009. Duncan Green reports that “Oxfam and IDS [Institute of Development Studies in Brighton] are trying a bottom up approach through ‘governance diaries’ projects in Myanmar, Pakistan and Mozambique” (email correspondence of October 26, 2017).

⁸ This approach is grounded in the “extended case method” (Michael Burawoy, *The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition*, University of California Press, 2009). It entails “studying through” (Susan Wright and Sue Reinhold, “‘Studying Through’: A Strategy for Studying Political Transformation,” *Policy Worlds: Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Power*, Cris Shore, Susan Wright, and Davide Pero, eds., New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2011, pp. 86-104; Janine R. Wedel, “‘Studying Through’ a Globalizing World: Building Method through Aidnographies,” *Ethnographies of Aid-Exploring Development Texts and Encounters*, Gould, Jeremy and Henrik Secher Marcussem, eds., Denmark: Roskilde University, 2004, no. 24, pp. 149-198). For methodological guidance, see Wedel’s “‘Studying Through’” above.

⁹ This template is informed by these works: Janine R. Wedel, Nazia Hussain, and Dana Archer Dolan, *Political Rigging: A Primer on Political Capture and Influence in the 21st Century*, Oxfam America Research Backgrounder, 2017, pp. 71-77; and an earlier template by Janine R. Wedel, “Uncovering the Structure: How Are Influence and Resources Organized in Practice? Guiding Questions for Observation in and around (an) Organization(s) and for Analyzing a Wicked Issue, Problem, or Conflict,” Unpublished, 2004; amended October 2015.

¹⁰ This example is based on the doctoral dissertation of Nazia Hussain (*Tracing Order in Seeming Chaos: Understanding the Informal and Violent Political Culture of Karachi*, Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 2016). While field research for the study was conducted in 2012, the study conveys a much longer-term perspective and also includes recent information from news and other reports.

- ¹¹ This example was substantially drafted by Lawrence Cockcroft and further informed by sources cited in the endnotes.
- ¹² This example was written up in Janine R. Wedel's *UNACCOUNTABLE: How the Establishment Corrupted Our Finances, Freedom, and Politics and Created an Outsider Class*, New York, NY: Pegasus, 2014, pp. 18-23 and 64-73. Supporting evidence can be found in these pages and in the corresponding endnotes.
- ¹³ Junaid Ahmed, "A Day In The Life Of A Water Tanker," *Dawn*, Dec. 17, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1377090>.
- ¹⁴ "Police is the patron of illegal hydrants: MD KWSB," <https://www.geo.tv/latest/80895-police-is-the-patron-of-illegal-hydrants-md-kwsb>; "For Karachi's Water Mafia, Stolen H2O Is A 'Lucrative Business'," Sept. 10, 2018, NPR: All Things Considered, <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/09/10/645525392/for-karachis-water-mafia-stolen-h2o-is-a-lucrative-business?t=1558701553974>.
- ¹⁵ Sources for this example include Lawrence Cockcroft, who helped draft the text on Tanzania, as well as these references and specific subjects:
- Overview article: Brian Cooksey, "IPTL, Richmond and 'Escrow': The price of private power procurement in Tanzania," Nov. 1, 2017, Africa Research Institute, https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/publications/ipitl-richmond-escrow-price-private-power-procurementTanzania/#_edn14.
 - Overall context on the role of corruption in Tanzania: Bruce Heilman and Laurean Ndumbaro, "Corruption, Politics, and Societal Values in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Mkapa Administration's Anti-Corruption Efforts," *African Journal of Political Science*, 2002, vol 7, no. 1, <https://embamex.sre.gob.mx/kenia/images/stories/pdf/aips007001002.pdf>.
 - Report about Tanzania and informal networks, including the Wanamtandao network: Sambaiga, R.F., Baez-Camargo, C. and Koechlin, L., "Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms. Dismantling networks of corruption: challenges and opportunities in reforming informal governance in Tanzania," Basel Institute on Governance, July 2018, https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/tanzania_informalgovernance_country_report.pdf.
 - The role of judges and religious leaders: Louis Kolumbia, "IPTL tycoons charged for economic sabotage," *The Citizen*, June 19, 2017, <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/IPTL-tycoons-charged-for-economic-sabotage/1840340-3977296-13d8cch/index.html>.
 - Concerns of government regarding the image implications of nationalizing: Erick Kabendera and Mark Anderson, "Tanzania energy scandal ousts senior politicians," *The Guardian*, Dec. 24, 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/dec/24/tanzania-energy-scandal-ousts-senior-politicians>.
 - Distribution of power within the elite and its implications for the ability of a president or any group within the ruling party to halt grand corruption: Hazel S. Gray, "The political economy of grand corruption in Tanzania," *African Affairs*, vol. 114, issue 456, July 2015, pp.382–403, <https://academic.oup.com/afaf/article/114/456/382/24510>.
 - Donors' withholding of aid—up to 30 percent of its budget, one of the highest in the continent—due to corruption: Kizito Makoye, "Tanzania vows to charge more officials over energy scandal," *Reuters*, Jan. 17, 2015, <https://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAF11N0UWQGX20150117>.
- ¹⁶ Some generic examples of this might be: (1) An organized crime ring that funds a political group in power in exchange for exemption from judicial scrutiny; (2) government procurement officials who award government contracts in exchange for kickbacks; (3) police or military personnel or units who tip off or protect corruption rackets from adverse consequences in exchange for kickbacks; (4) funders of political campaigns who hope to receive favors if these candidates are elected; and (5) executives of a multinational corporation collaborating with a country's political elites to minimize recorded profits and reduce taxes, to the financial benefit of both parties.
- ¹⁷ Net-Map, developed by Eva Schiffer, is an innovative and very effective method for helping to sort out how players and organizations are linked to each other and who has influence (<https://netmap.wordpress.com/about/>).
- ¹⁸ Hafeez Tunio, "11 senior KWSB officials 'patronising illegal hydrants'," *The Express Tribune*, Dec. 10, 2017, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1580299/11-senior-kwsb-officials-patronising-illegal-hydrants/>.
- ¹⁹ Ali Ousaf, "The missing links: This is where our water goes," *The Express Tribune*, Sept. 19, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/606055/the-missing-links-this-is-where-our-water-goes/>.
- ²⁰ "How PAP acquired IPTL for almost nothing and looted US\$124m from the BoT," *TransparenTanzania*, Aug. 24, 2014, <https://escrowscandaltz.wordpress.com/2014/08/24/how-pap-acquired-ipitl-for-almost-nothing-and-looted-us124m-from-the-bot/>.
- ²¹ Sambaiga, R.F., Baez-Camargo, C. and Koechlin, L., "Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms. Dismantling networks of corruption: challenges and opportunities in reforming informal governance in Tanzania," Basel Institute on Governance, July 2018, https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/Tanzania_informalgovernance_country%20report.pdf, p. 23.
- ²² Bruce Heilman and Laurean Ndumbaro, "Corruption, Politics, and Societal Values in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Mkapa Administration's Anti-Corruption Efforts," *African Journal of Political Science*, 2002, vol 7, no. 1, <https://embamex.sre.gob.mx/kenia/images/stories/pdf/aips007001002.pdf>, p. 3.
- ²³ Brian Cooksey, "IPTL, Richmond and 'Escrow': The price of private power procurement in Tanzania," Nov. 1, 2017, Africa Research Institute, https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/publications/ipitl-richmond-escrow-price-private-power-procurementTanzania/#_edn14.
- ²⁴ David Satterthwaite, *Water and Sanitation*, <https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=hwWvj1vmED8C&pg=PA36&lpg=PA36&dq=kwsb+water+tanker&source=bl&ots=s5flMh-E4&sig=ACfU3U04yN5QTOW7qXRNSyMuOiqs-D1wJQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi0utuN3q7iAhXQ8KYKHb37BsA4FBD0ATAFegQICRAB#v=onepage&q=kwsb%20water%20tanker&f=false>, p. 37.
- ²⁵ For more background, see Laurence Cockcroft and Anne-Christine Wegener, *Unmasked: Corruption in the West*, London, UK: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2017, Chapter 5: "The Banks' Story: An End To Trust," pp. 83-98.
- ²⁶ While conducted in 2017, the survey was published in 2019. Transparency International, "Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019: Citizen's Views and Experiences of Corruption," https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/gcb_africa_2019.



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