

**New Geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe
Between European Union and United States**

Stefan Batory Foundation
Warsaw 2005

Proceedings of the conference

organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation

in co-operation with

the German Institute for International and Security Affairs

of the Foundation for Science and Policy, SWP, Berlin

European Studies Centre at St Antony's College, University of Oxford

on 7–8 May 2004

in Warsaw

Conference Partners

ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG

ORACLE[®]




Embassy of the French Republic



STEFAN **BATORY**
FOUNDATION

New Geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe

Between European Union
and United States



Stefan Batory Foundation

ul. Sapieżyńska 10a
00-215 Warsaw
tel. |48 22| 536 02 00
fax |48 22| 536 02 20
batory@batory.org.pl
www.batory.org.pl

Editor

Monika Ewa Kamińska

Translators

Damian Leszczyński
Andrzej Pawelec
Witold Turopolski

Proofreading

Urszula Pawlik

Art director of the Stefan Batory Foundation's publications

Marta Kusztra

Cover design

Teresa Oleszczuk

Photos

Marek Fijałkowski
Dariusz Żurek

Typesetting

TYRSA Sp. z o.o.

© Copyright by Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego

ISBN 83-89406-47-0

Distributed for free

Warsaw 2005

Go to www.batory.org.pl for electronic version

Contents

Introductory note	7
Letter to the Participants of the Conference from Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland	9
Welcome Address Aleksander Smolar, President of the Stefan Batory Foundation	11
Opening Speech Adam D. Rotfeld, Secretary of State, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	15
Session I: Between Germany and Russia, Europe and America: historical points of reference of Central and Eastern Europe	21

Session II: Europe in US policy	65
Session III: European attitudes towards US and transatlantic relations	107
Special Lecture: America and Europe, facing new challenges Henry A. Kissinger, former US Secretary of State	161
Session IV: Central and Eastern Europe in search of a place in Europe and worldwide	173
Closing remarks Danuta Hübner, Member of the European Commission	205
Conference agenda	211
Biographical notes of speakers	215

Introductory Note

The 'Letter of the Eight' signed, *inter alia*, by Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and later by Slovakia; the subsequent letter of the 'Vilnius Group'; the US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld's suggestion that the centre of gravity is shifting from 'Old' to 'New' Europe; and finally the reaction of President Chirac to the political position of the EU candidate states – these developments led to a profound shock in Europe. The European constitutional debate that went through a deadlock in Brussels added uncertainty to the future relations between new and old Member States. The countries once located on the Western periphery of the Soviet Union, apparently doomed also to be peripheral within the European Union, have found themselves in the centre of a heated debate on the future of the transatlantic relations and a new balance of power in Europe.

For the past decade, the Western perception of Central and Eastern Europe was shaped first by a romantic vision of the peaceful revolution of 1989 and the slogan 'Return to Europe', later by the less admirable picture of the national and ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia, and the growing role of populist politicians and nostalgia for the communist past. By the end of the 1990s, the situation became more stable, giving way to a routine of mutual contacts based on a profound asymmetry between the Member States and the Candidate States. The concept of reunification was replaced by the project of enlargement with clearly defined roles: the Candidate

States were questioned and evaluated on how they conformed to the set conditions, and eventually either praised or reproached. Paradoxically, the Western interest in these countries seemed to be fading. Central Europe was no longer a fascinating revolutionary phenomenon, nor a source of instability jeopardizing Western Europe's security. 'New Europe' dreamt about becoming the West, finding the way to the luxurious club that ensured security, prosperity and high status among the nations. These aspirations did not generate much excitement in Western Europe.

'New Europe's' perception of its strategic priorities and attitude toward the EU and the United States started to evolve in a manner that initially was not recognized in Western Europe. In this context Poland is seen as a country not only willing to integrate with the EU and strengthen its relations with the United States, but also to assume a leading role in the region. Yet among countries demonstrating a strong preference for a close alliance with the US, there are important differences in the degree of assertive formulation of the national interests; in the readiness to play an active role in the transatlantic relations and within the European Union. Finally, some countries seem inclined to strike an alliance with a particular dominating state, or to follow the 'coalition of the willing' model – in other words, to shift coalitions within Europe depending on their particular interests.

Perhaps for the first time after 1989, Central Europe is facing truly difficult political choices. Following their Cold War experiences, the countries of the region are not prepared for this challenge; their previous history is not very helpful either. The necessity to make tough political choices in the times of profound changes taking place globally and in Europe is, however, the price of freedom and sovereignty that these countries achieved only fifteen years ago.

Letter to the participants of the Conference from Aleksander Kwaśniewski President of the Republic of Poland

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me extend my thanks to the Stefan Batory Foundation, to the Centre of European Studies of St. Antony's College at Oxford University and to the German Institute of International Affairs and Security in Berlin for organizing this Conference and for suggesting that I should become honorary patron of this project. The debate on the new geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe and the relations between the European Union and the United States is very topical and interesting. This Conference is taking place in the first days of a completely new reality in Central and Eastern Europe. A majority of countries in the region are today rightful members both of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and of the European Union. For the first time in decades, we have had the chance to define our own foreign policy independently. This is a great opportunity for our countries, but also a challenge. I believe we can meet this challenge.

Today, Central Europe is in an exceptional situation. In many places in the world, and on many levels, the countries of our region are co-operating with the United States and other NATO members in order to build a system of international security. Within the united Europe, we are striving to ensure the best possible standards for our citizens in various spheres of life. Through international organizations, and individually, we are developing

friendly relations with other countries and regions around the world. At the same time, we are forging partnerships with our East European neighbours. Together – if sometimes by different methods – we are facing up to the threats of today’s world, including international terrorism. I firmly believe that, despite occasionally serious problems and differences of opinion, we can rise above particular interests and work together in the name of democracy, solidarity and fraternity. Unquestionably, there are more things that unite us than those that could divide us.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Central and Eastern Europe must find its own place in the changing reality. But I am convinced that this should not mean taking sides with the United States against the European Union, or taking sides with the European Union against the United States. Such an attitude would be extremely risky. Today’s globalized world, full of new dangers that individual states, and sometimes even groups of states, are not able to cope with, is forcing us to find a common ground for agreement and co-operation, not new lines of division. The partners in the transatlantic alliance are competing with one another in the economic sphere and differ in their perception of certain issues in world politics. We should speak about this honestly, because only an open exchange of views will allow us to build positive transatlantic and European relations. The countries of our region have a unique opportunity to emphasise the fundamentally common strategic interests of the European Union, the United States and other democratic countries in the world. They should contribute to the strengthening of the transatlantic alliance, but without undermining the need for a common foreign policy and greater political integration. I believe that this Conference will afford you the opportunity to draw conclusions that will inspire decisions determining the new geopolitics of our region. I wish you all a fruitful debate.

Aleksander Kwaśniewski

President of the Republic of Poland

Welcome Address

Aleksander Smolar

President of the Stefan Batory Foundation

I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all the guests from Poland and from abroad to the conference organised by the Stefan Batory Foundation in co-operation with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the Foundation for Science and Policy, SWP, Berlin and the European Studies Centre at St Antony's College, University of Oxford, on: 'New Geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe. Between the European Union and the United States'. We thought that celebrating the enlargement of the European Union is an excellent opportunity to approach one of fundamental problems concerning our region, as well as the whole of Europe, a problem which was fully revealed around a year ago. I refer here to the general orientations of foreign policy of the countries in our region. During this conference we would like to consider to what extent the differences which have appeared between Central and Eastern Eu-



rope, and the public opinion and many governments in Western Europe, are rooted in historical experiences and in a particular attitude towards the problems of security, and to what extent they have been influenced by the current situation in Europe and in the world.

The present moment is rather exceptional in the short history of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. During the past fifteen years – although it may sound paradoxical – the problem of making a choice was non-existent. Not because we did not have alternatives, but because our objectives were obvious and generally accepted by the societies and governments of the countries which joined the European Union a few days ago. All the countries in our region chose integration with the West, that means with NATO and with the European Union. They were motivated by old dreams about Europe and the West, the desire for security, the hope to finally join the world of stable democratic institutions and to pursue development opportunities after unsuccessful communist modernisation.

The real problems with making choices in politics have appeared only now that two fundamental challenges facing Central and Eastern Europe have been completed. We are now in a normal situation of European states and we are facing similar choices. By nature these choices are much more complex and much less obvious as for the costs and benefits. Our aim in organising this conference has been to show the complex international context which co-determines the decisions of the countries in our region, in particular the decisions concerning relations between Europe and America, as seen from the two sides of the Atlantic. The title of the conference is intentionally provocative, both because of the timing of our discussions – just a few days after the enlargement of the European Union – and because of the suggestion contained in the title itself, that tensions and differences between the United States and Europe are unavoidable and permanent. Is the United States interested, as it used to be, in the European integration? Or rather, will the Washington policy be dominated by the distrustful principle *'divide et impera'*? And as for the European Union: will we witness a domination of the sense of fundamental bonds and unity of interests with

the partner from the other side of the Atlantic, or just the opposite – will an increasing sense of dissimilarity, which Freud once called ‘narcissism of a small difference’, contribute to separating Europe from America, and in consequence also to weakening the bonds within Europe itself? These questions and concerns will define the background of our debate.

In these introductory remarks, I would like to warmly thank those without whom this conference would not be possible: Ms Ingrid Hamm, the executive director of the Robert Bosch Foundation and Mr Paweł Piwowar, the CEO of Oracle Poland. I would also like to thank the Embassy of the French Republic for their support.

Also, I would like to express my gratitude to Mr Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, for extending his patronage over our conference.



Opening Speech

Adam D. Rotfeld

Secretary of State, Polish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

I would like to question the title of this Conference, not on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in my own name, as one of the participants of this debate. The point is that the idea of new geopolitics is – in my view – an attempt to respond to the need to formulate a new attitude vis-à-vis the current process of changes in the international system. Traditional international systems in the history of Europe were defined by the results of great wars: after the religious wars there was the Treaty of Westphalia, after the Napoleonic Wars – the Congress of Vienna, after the Balkan wars – the Berlin Conference, after the First World War – the Versailles Treaty, and after the Second World War – Yalta and Potsdam. But it so happens that what we have been witnessing over the last fifteen years is not the result of defeat in a great war, but of a change that came about due to countless factors. And as a rule, these factors were internal.



My first claim is that today international relations are shaped to an incomparably higher degree by the development of the internal situation in individual countries than by relations between countries. This is evidenced by the fact that out of the more than twenty serious armed conflicts that took place last year, only one can be described as a conflict between states; all the other conflicts were internal. But experts and researchers of international relations usually focus on what is going on between states, not inside states. Consequently, this research is somehow detached from reality. Many eminent and prolific scholars of the international system had not, in fact, been able to accurately predict the developments of the years 1989–1990 which would fundamentally change international relations. Only a few of these scholars had the courage to ask themselves why their predictions had been wrong.

I do not intend to analyse – here and now – the incapacity and helplessness of the social sciences in this regard. I will only repeat that international relations are usually studied by those who focus on relations between states; they are much less interested in what is going on inside states. And it is precisely the situation within states that defines the relations between states in the present day.

The second reason to question the thesis that now we are dealing with a new geopolitics is that today geography is losing its significance; in the sense that the world is becoming smaller and smaller, that we are dealing with globalization and fragmentation of the world. Geography is not the causal factor. Formerly, a state's security was defined largely by natural geographical obstacles – distance, mountains, rivers, seas. Today all of these are losing their significance. The US army, as well as the armies of EU countries – including the Polish army – maintain a huge part of their armed forces in various regions of the world, far away from those countries' own borders. These distant armies are performing diverse functions usually not connected with their geographical region. In other words, geography is not the decisive factor anymore.

Moreover, in order to emphasise how little significance geography now has, I will remind you that fifteen years ago Poland had three neighbours: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. Since 1991, Poland has had seven neighbours, and none of them is what it used to be. Instead of the Soviet Union we now have Russia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine; instead of Czechoslovakia we have the Czech Republic and Slovakia; and instead of the German Democratic Republic we have the Federal Republic of Germany. In other words, Poland has remained in the same place, its geographical situation has not changed at all, but the world around it has changed dramatically.

My third claim is that, contrary to the widespread opinion that September 11 changed our world, I do not think the world has changed. The world, meant as an international environment, and the security should be both perceived as processes. Our perception of the world has changed radically, that is, some phenomena have started to be perceived with much more clarity than before September 11. In short, the result of the terrorist attacks of September 11 was that all countries, and especially the United States, realised that they were now in a completely different situation, in the sense that the nature of the threat had changed. It was at that time that the concept of asymmetrical threat emerged. Well, I would like to question this concept as well. In my view, threats have never been symmetrical. Here we are simply dealing with a different kind of threat, one that does not come from the outside, but from within. The United States was attacked by a group associated with Al Qaeda, but this group did not attack the United States from a foreign territory, from Canada or Mexico, but from within the United States itself; indeed, the attack was actually prepared within the country. What happened on September 11 to some degree shattered the definition of aggression formulated by the League of Nations in 1933 and enshrined in a convention signed by eight countries at that time. As a matter of fact, the first state to sign the convention was Afghanistan, accompanied by two Baltic states (Estonia and Lithuania), as well as Poland,

Romania, Turkey, Iran and the Soviet Union. But the signatories included none of the leading countries of that period.

That definition of aggression was in a sense much better at predicting various situations than the many definitions suggested later on but never universally adopted: it is worth mentioning here that of the elements included in the definition was a state's support for organized armed groups invading the territory of another state. Yet those who formulated the definition back in 1933 displayed a certain lack of imagination in assuming that such an attack would always come from the outside, not from the inside. My main point is that everyone who deals with international relations must realise that in today's world internal situations determine security to higher degree than do traditional threats of attack from the outside.

Finally, two more remarks, one of which concerns Poland. Recently I was asked what the biggest threat facing Poland is. I replied that the biggest threat to Poland was its internal situation. Mind you, I am not referring here to a presumed weakness of Poland; indeed, if we consider some classical criteria of stability, we cannot but recognize that over the last fifteen years, and even over the last three years, Poland has made some considerable achievements. I am referring to the relations between Poland and its neighbours, to the country's relations with the great powers and, above all, to its economic development. In other words, Poland has stabilised relations with its neighbours, the transition to market economy and liberal democracy has been a success, and, from a legal and constitutional perspective, Poland has forged a sound basis for future development. Nevertheless, I believe that Poland's internal situation impinges very negatively on the country's security. What I mean here is that in Poland, as in many other countries, populism is on the rise. If I were asked how to express in one sentence the biggest threat to modern Europe, I would reply, paraphrasing the famous 19th century Manifesto: 'A spectre is haunting Europe: the spectre of populism'. But this populism does not exclusively relate to the parties of Le Pen, Heider or Lepper. Above all, it relates to long-established parties considered to be stable and middle-class, which are succumbing to

populist pressure. It is precisely these parties that are most threatened by the new populist disease and which could significantly change the situation of Europe. From the Polish perspective, accession to the European Union is a means of preventing such a turn of events.

Today, Poland should not be perceived in terms of 'Poland and the European Union'. Poland has become an integral part of the Union and will influence it just as other Member States will influence Poland. This is a qualitatively new situation.

Aleksander Smolar

I just want to remind you that general de Gaulle used to say that while geography is a fate, geopolitics is a choice.



Session I

Between Germany and Russia, Europe and America: historical points of reference of Central and Eastern Europe

Intellectual and political traditions and choices

- Chair: **Adam D. Rotfeld**, Secretary of State,
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Panellists: **Marcin Król**, University of Warsaw;
Jacques Rupnik, Centre for International Studies
and Research, CERI, Paris;
Timothy Snyder, Yale University.

Adam D. Rotfeld

The dilemma of choice between Russia and Germany has been faced by many countries of this region but most obviously so by Poland. Aleksander Smolar has just observed that geography is an objective factor, while geopolitics is a choice. And indeed, in the past, Poland was constantly forced to choose between Germany and Russia in order to seek its security either in alliance with Germany against Russia, or with Russia against Germany, or

else – the course chosen by the pre-war government – attempting to strike a balance between the two powers.

After World War II Poland, like all the other countries of Central Europe, was deprived of this choice (at this point, let me add a footnote: I do not think this was agreed at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences; it was rather a consequence of the development and the outcome of the war). Would the situation have been different – let us consider this scenario – had there been no Yalta and Potsdam? It would have been just the same. The presence of the Red Army in the heart of Europe, in the heart of Germany – Berlin – was, of course, the decisive factor. If the Russians had not crossed the Polish border and if Poland had been liberated by the Allies, it would have belonged to the other part of Europe and its present condition – and the level of civilization – would be radically different. In other words, the position a given state occupies among other states is determined by facts – not conferences. This is a mistake committed by many scholars who are impressed by events like round table talks which result in some agreements. As a rule, such conferences only sum up a given stage of the historical process. Of course, they come handy for the purpose of periodization and labeling. Let me remind you of an article by professor Zbigniew Brzezinski published in 1985 in *Foreign Affairs* under the title 'A Divided Europe: The Future of Yalta'. Its first sentence read: 'Yalta is unfinished business'. Professor Brzezinski made the point that in fact, the Yalta agreement obliged the powers to grant Poland an opportunity to become strong, democratic and independent, and he extensively quoted the document, which hardly anyone has read, to prove that. Of course, the real significance of the agreement was very detached from the wording it was given. Its authors put those obligations on paper to have a clear conscience; they knew that the situation would not be shaped by the phrasing of the document but by military action – the presence of Soviet divisions in the heart of Europe.

After 1989, the situation of Poland and Central Europe changed radically. For the first time in many decades Poland was free to make sovereign choices. Nowadays, one can often hear the accusation that Poland is becom-

ing dependent on Washington just as it used to be dependent on Moscow. Those who make this claim ignore a basic fact: this time it is a matter of free choice. It is the Poles who have decided, the way they wanted to. The Americans did not invade Poland and did not impose their law and order. Poland wanted to be an ally of the USA and still does. The case of Poland can be generalized to embrace the other countries of Central-Eastern Europe and to prove a substantial change in the situation of the region.

My second point relates to the conference title which expresses the view that while previously a choice had to be made between Russia and Germany, nowadays a choice to be faced is between America and Europe. Let me repeat the claim that geography is never decisive. I believe that the bone of contention, the cause of misunderstandings between America and Europe, is not the physical distance but certain cultural differences: the USA has developed a civilization, a mentality and a culture that differ from those we find in Europe. For a very long time, American politics was dominated by European standards. American intellectuals from the East Coast defined the way America viewed the rest of the world. Still, the USA did not seek the dominant position and rather turned inwards. America was a universe of its own kind – the relations between its states were of more importance than the relations between global powers. Texas was certainly more important than, for instance, Belgium or Luxemburg. This has changed. In the new context the powerful position of America makes it impossible for Americans to run away from their new destiny: they have taken great responsibility for the world and the world vests great expectations in America. On the one hand, Europe criticizes America, but on the other hand, Europeans expect a lot from Americans.



Marcin Król

Let me make a few points which will be deliberately overstated. Also, let me add that I have no intention to logically structure my argument, because such a task is impossible as I will try to prove further on.

First, let me share my impressions of the last ten days filled with celebrations and political statements concerning Poland's accession to the European Union – impressions that could be shared by anyone in this room, Poles and visitors from abroad alike. I have noticed a surprising convergence of rhetoric employed on this occasion in the three countries I can speak of with a measure of competence, namely Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and also in Hungary which I mention here with diffidence in the presence of Elemér Hankiss.

Presidents of those three countries stated that 'We are returning to Europe'. To my great surprise, this view was expressed by president Vaclav Klaus and also by president Gasparovich. President Kwaśniewski had voiced this opinion many times before. 'The return to Europe' – such is the present political stance. There is also another position, presented most often (but not exclusively) by the Polish Church: we need not return to Europe, since we have always been a part of it. We have discovered again our true location which for some time was 'hidden' from us.

My point is simple: I believe that both claims are completely false. I shall try to explain why this is so with the proviso that I am not going to talk about culture, civilization and the Church (or rather Christianity). As far as culture is concerned, I concur with an opinion expressed by Czesław Miłosz: in Poland, Bohemia, Slovakia and Hungary the thin 'cream' which was European in its cultural ambitions has always floated on a swamp, to repeat Miłosz's blunt formulation. In the 19th century there was a strong

tendency in those countries to advance civilization following West European patterns (professor Jerzy Jedlicki described this process brilliantly in his book). And finally, Christianity, especially Western Christianity – and this point is perhaps most crucial – has always united us with Europe (the case is not so clear with the Church hierarchy). These three points are settled: we may go on repeating that Polish, Czech or Hungarian writers have been European writers – nobody will question that. In the 1980s such a perspective on Central Europe was extremely fashionable and it was not entirely groundless because at that time several remarkable writers and thinkers born in the region made a significant contribution to European culture. However, this fact has nothing to do with politics and my subject is not the history of cultural ideas but the history of political ideas in Poland and some other countries.

I have nothing to say about this history up to the end of the 16th century. First of all, because I am not competent enough; and, secondly, because it is very difficult to talk about Europe at the time when Latin was its common language. I leave speculations on this subject to the historians of relevant periods; I believe that they would have little bearing on our discussion.

From the end of the 17th century till the year 1989, perhaps even later, there was not a single pro-European party in Poland, nor a pro-European tendency (in the political sense), nor even pro-European thought of any stature. This state of affairs could be explained in three ways. First of all, such political ideas were not to be found anywhere – this is one reason. In the 18th and 19th centuries the idea of common Europe was not very exciting for Europeans and very few people dealt with Europe as a whole of some kind. It is also doubtful whether anyone conceived the idea of Europe as a whole. Second, even though from the Polish perspective ‘Europe’ did exist (this name could be found in the titles of some excellent books published in the 19th and at the turn of the 20th century), it could never serve as a political point of reference for reasons to be mentioned in a moment. And, last but certainly not least, Europe never wanted to be a political point of reference for us, if we accept that it existed in some very limited sense (in

the period from the second half of the 18th century till the first half of the 20th century).

What was the Polish, Czech and Slovak perspective on these issues? Who did we address our political longings to? How were they formulated? What imaginary geopolitics could be discerned in those longings? In that period, Russia was a fundamental and constant element of this imaginary world. I want to remind you – and I am saying this with no intention to offend – that, for instance, the founding father of the Slovak nation, Ludovít Štúr, whose monuments can be found in any Slovak town, had a very unequivocal view on this matter: since he was anti-Hungarian and anti-Austrian, he drew the conclusion that Slovaks should adopt Orthodox Christianity and develop as strong as possible ties with Russia. That never happened, which was lucky for Slovaks, I believe. When Štúr's biography is presented today, these views are never highlighted, which is quite understandable. Let me remind you that conferences of the Panslav Movement, a powerful organization, would take place in Prague, since Czechs strongly promoted the panslavic idea. Poles were much more skeptical about this movement. Let me also remind you that in the Polish political thought of that period, till as late as the seventies of the last century, Russia constantly played a crucial role – not only in a negative sense, but also as an alternative to the West. This was visible in dramatic circumstances – for instance, when the Marquis Wielopolski, indignant with Austrians who instigated the Galician Jacquerie, turned to Russia for protection; this attitude was also visible in more peaceful or even comical contexts – for instance, in 1979 Stefan Kisielewski wrote his famous article 'Is geopolitics still important?', in which he suggested that Poles should have a party representing their interests in Russia.

The conviction that there should be a Polish party or a Polish lobby in Moscow is at least 150 years old and it seems to have been shared by most Polish politicians and political thinkers till the year 1990, when it mysteriously disappeared. I think this is a great shame, because a Polish lobby in Moscow is needed also today.

There is also another very important attitude towards Russia, namely fear. This attitude was rooted in the belief that Poland was actually the only nation which defended the world against Russian barbarism. Astolphe de Custine visited Russia and wrote his famous book 'Russia in the year 1839'. A few years later, Polish writers – Zygmunt Krasiński in particular – wrote numerous memorials which landed on the desks of important politicians thanks to Krasiński's aristocratic status (there is no evidence, however, that they were read). Krasiński (like many other Poles, but with more eloquence) tried to convince pope Pius IX, Malebranche and other personages that Russia was a real threat to Europe. In other words, Europe's historical function is to defend Poland against Russia, since in this way Europe defends herself against Russia. Otherwise, Europe is objectively an ally of the future 'Red Republic', as Krasiński so aptly and brilliantly calls it. Remember that we are talking here about the turn of the forties of the 19th century. Such awareness is quite impressive.

I do not know any serious Polish writers in the 19th century whose position was unambiguously pro-European. The most sober of them, thoroughly liberal Henryk Kamiński wrote a book about Poland, Russia and Europe in which Poland is again assigned the role of a go-between of sorts. This view survived for a long time, even – to a degree – influenced the intentions and sometimes actions of Polish communist leaders, who also had some pretensions to act as intermediaries between Europe and Russia, the West and the Soviet Union.

Of course, these pretensions had little weight. Up to a point this view was, however, decisive. Afterwards, another factor made its appearance – namely, Germany. It is clear that in the Polish political imagination and political thought Germany appeared in earnest at the time of Bismarck. Previously, as Stanisław Stomma described in his excellent book, Germany had not been Poland's enemy; it had not even existed, had not been perceived as a serious problem.

Germany appeared only together with Kulturkampf. At that moment 'the problem of Germany' was triggered off – by Germany itself, not by Po-

land. 'The question of Poland' in the terms of its place between Russia and Germany was conceived by Polish political thinkers as late as the interwar period, when several books with this very title were published.

Now, let me add an explanation concerning the Church. To tell the truth, Poland was a Catholic country which suffered an incredibly deep breakdown of Catholicism during the Partitions. Catholicism was saved only thanks to the Romantic thinkers and their followers, and thanks to numerous and almost sectarian movements which became influential with time. The breakdown of Catholicism is also linked with the Papacy and its total disregard of the whole region, or an extremely negative attitude towards it, and Poland in particular. In the 19th century the popes did not uphold the Polish cause; on the contrary, they repeatedly condemned the Polish struggle for independence. Catholicism survived in Poland, and even grew stronger only by the fortunate coincidence that the great Polish Romantics were also believers (though not following the contemporary teaching of the Church in the case of Mickiewicz; Słowacki was a complete heretic, while Krasiński was on the verge of heresy; Norwid, perhaps, was the only true follower, if we do not apply very stringent criteria). The literary influence of the Romantics is today visible in the language used by the Pope, who very often quotes Krasiński (probably unwittingly, after much exposure to the poet's literary output).

This is one side of the coin. As for the other one, in the 19th and 20th centuries nobody in Europe had ever good political intentions towards Poland. Naturally, one can find plenty of favourable references in the domains of culture, civilization or Catholicism, but in the domain of politics – not a single one.

It is not difficult to find the reasons. The European Conservatists (whose genealogy, which dates back to Metternich, was described so brilliantly by Henry Kissinger) were after the balance of power and Poland could only upset this balance. The success of Polish insurrections would have ruined Metternich's plan. Several years ago this observations was made for the first time by the great Polish historian Emanuel Rostworowski. In fact,

Poles have never admitted that their insurrections – crucial as they were under many other respects – never had any political chances of success, simply because Europe did not want an independent Poland. So much for the Conservatives.

As far as the Liberals are concerned, John Stuart Mill is one of many authors who mention Poland. Mill enumerated twelve non-barbaric nations (those passages are not widely known and liberals do not quote them willingly). Mill's position was clear: there is no reason for the barbarians to become free, liberty cannot be imported, nobody can be forced to be free. Only those who want to be free can be so; if someone does not want to be free, let him remain a barbarian. In this context Mill had no doubts: Russia is barbaric, while Poland is non-barbaric.

Mill wrote about civilization. If we follow, on the other hand, the history of liberal foreign policy statements in the 19th century, we shall find out that all liberals unanimously speak against the independence of Poland – not on principle, but because the struggle for Polish (and also Italian) independence would lead to war, while the basic tenet of liberalism in the 19th century (as in the 20th) was the avoidance of war. The risk of an eruption of war in the process of liberating Poland was too big to give it a try. That explains why liberals did not back up Polish aspirations.

And finally, the Socialists, who were for the most part Luxemburgists. I believe that Luxemburgism was often painted black, while in many respects it is quite reasonable and also not far removed from my own standpoint. I am not convinced that the nation-state, rejected by the Luxemburgists, is the best idea born in the history of humankind. This claim may be risky but, after all, I have warned you that I am not going to prove theorems. Among socialists of note there was one unambiguously pro-Polish thinker – namely, Karl Marx. One should realize that he was the most pro-Polish thinker (in the political sense!) of the 19th century; I do not think, however, that this fact is enough to draw any far-reaching intellectual conclusions.

And now we reach the interwar period: despite the widespread view that Poland returned to Europe at that time (as people used to say in the years

1918–1922), there was, in fact, no return to Europe. Naturally, the impressive Polish culture and literature of the time developed numerous contacts with Europe – this applies also to the Czech and partly to the Slovak culture – but Poland did not enter Europe in the political sense. Poland, of course, did not become a member of the League of Nations, which was a European body (it is not my task here to evaluate it). Throughout this period Poland was a burden for Europe. Poland was perceived as a problem very early – already in the year 1920, when Europe (if such an entity existed) could not make up its mind about the Polish-Soviet War and did not know how to deal with it. We cannot be sure but, perhaps, if Western Europe had given us a hand, the fate of the world would have been different.

In the subsequent years, Polish foreign policy cannot serve merely as a proof of irrationality. The compacts with Romania and France, the so-called ‘exotic alliances’, did not result from mistaken judgments. They resulted from a lack of options, as simple as that. On the one hand, we faced Russia, on the other hand, Germany. The Poles were quite aware of the developments in Germany, even more so – I would say – than the countries of the West. The same goes for Russia: in the interwar period Polish Intelligence was very effective and we had almost the full picture of the situation in the Bolshevik Russia. Already in the thirties there were reports on the Ukrainian famine in the Polish press, especially in Jerzy Giedroyc’s *Bunt Młodych* and *Polityka* – much earlier than Robert Conquest published his famous book. Poland, however, had no options, no offers coming from the West. Europe still had no idea how to deal with Poland, while Poland did not know what its place in Europe should be. For me, this sorry state of affairs is reflected in the French-Romanian-Polish alliance, which was a failure and, in a sense, a bit of a joke.

Let me raise the last point. Can we find in the last two centuries any virtues in the Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian geopolitics – in our foreign policy debates, in the reflections concerning our place in Europe? To quote once again Jerzy Jedlicki’s brilliant text ‘A thousand years of Poland’s return to Europe’: all the time, we have believed that we are returning to Europe; we

have cherished three fictions: the fiction of 'Europe', the fiction of 'a return', and the fiction of 'us' (it is not clear whether 'we' refers to 'the Poles' or just 'the Polish elite'). 'We, the Poles' – this is a very recent phenomenon, not older than 15 or possibly 45 years; in any case, not much more than that. 'We, the Polish elite' have, indeed, attempted to return to Europe but Europe has never really wanted us back. To tell the truth, in the last 250 years Europe has done nothing in the least for us. This is not meant as a reproach; my point is that such facts shape attitudes. If one has never ever answered your pleas, then this is bound to have consequences. Now, there was one institution with 'Europe' in its name which played an enormous role in Poland, namely Radio Free Europe. But it was an American, not a European body. This case apart, I know of no other form of help on the part of Europe; even in the 'Solidarity period' – in the early 1980s – the situation did not change radically. But I do not want to dwell on bygones. Are such sentiments important? They should not be overestimated, perhaps; at the same time, one must not underestimate them. In Poland, the historical memory (ever weakening, I admit) tells us that there were the partitions, World War II, the new order after WW2, and nobody raised a finger to help us.

This burden is our legacy and also a backdrop against which America appears as our benefactor: America has never done anything to hurt us and much to make us happy. You remember, perhaps, Tocqueville's description of American (and, to be fair, also French) reactions to the November Rising of 1830: in Boston, Americans celebrated the Rising and Polish liberty. At that time, John C. Calhoun, vice-President of the USA and one of the most remarkable minds of the 19th century, albeit very conservative, praised the idea of *liberum veto* as a very ingenious and useful device (but one misused in practice); he belonged to the select group of thinkers who understood its true significance and perceived it as an embodiment of Rousseau's ideal of democracy. Since that time till the present America has never hurt us, which explains the natural pro-American sentiments in Poland.

To sum up: we do not want to be pro-Russian, because we are afraid of barbaric influences; we are pro-European, since we are Europe's neigh-

bours and there is no alternative; we are pro-American, because the USA has never hurt us.

Let me finish with an anecdote. Several years ago, I had a meal at a restaurant in Alabama and I was asked about my place of origin. I answered 'Europe' and this was followed by some other questions. At last, the bartender exclaimed: 'Aha! Europe, Utah, my relative lives there.' I did not make it to Europe in Utah but till this very day I have been convinced it must be a lovely place.

Adam D. Rotfeld

Two brief comments. Professor Król helped us realize that history very often exerts subliminal influence; in other words, that we are simply not aware to what extent our attitudes are conditioned historically. History does influence our decisions, it has shaped us – this point was well-made.

As for the other comment, professor Król mentioned the Polish party in Russia. If we do not stick to this 19th century terminology, we could say, I believe, that there is a Polish lobby in Russia. I have in mind groups we tend to underestimate; most of all, Russian liberal-democratic intelligentsia for whom Poland in any period was a window on the world and remains to be perceived (like it was during the communist years) as the country through which the ideas of liberty, democracy and openness infiltrate Russia. This attitude is still present and, I would say, it even gains in importance. It is not reflected in politics, however, for the simple fact that the Liberal Democrats in Russia are losing their support – but this is another story.

Jacques Rupnik

Speaking in Warsaw, at the beginning of May 2004, one cannot help feeling that the great geopolitical programme of post-1989 Central Europe has just been completed with the joining of the European Union and of NATO. You can say that the transition is over, that the integration is over

and maybe the age of conferences might be over, as well. From Central Europe attention will be shifting to the Middle East. Unless of course the transatlantic divide and the Central European involvement in the Middle East brings a new dimension to our discussion.

From being for half a century and in some respect longer the West of the East, Central Europe is becoming now the East of the West. And of course as soon as one says 'the West' or 'United Europe', one is immediately made aware of the underlying divides of both Europe and the West and the role Central Europeans played in the new European and transatlantic situation which is at the background of our present discussion and which is a reformulation of some of the traditional geopolitical dilemmas of the past. Indeed these reflections from the past, of which Marcin Król gave us a wonderful account just now, are interesting not because history repeats itself, in fact quite the opposite, but because the political thought of this region has very largely been shaped, since the 19th century, by geopolitical discussion or the discussion about the geopolitical predicament of the region which traditionally was between Russia and Germany and which in some respects is now being redefined (and we will have to discuss to what extent) as being between Europe and America. These discussions in East Central Europe have a long history. I will briefly look at the legacies of the debates about the empires of the past, briefly refer to the legacies of the Cold War and of the Soviet Empire and look at the way this affects the current predicament.

Marcin Król has made my task more difficult and easier at the same time by already pointing out some of the defining features of East Central Europe, where the term Europe has always needed a constitutive other. The constitutive other for Central Europeans, particularly for the Poles, has been Russia. For the nations of the Balkans, even for some Central Europeans it was



Turkey. Turkey was a constitutive other for instance for the Hungarians, the major historical landmark being the battle of Mohacz in 1524 and a century and a half of Turkish domination. I will briefly mention three patterns, Czech, Polish and Hungarian, and return hopefully to the Balkan comparison in the conclusion. I can be brief about Poland because Marcin Król and Timothy Snyder are both infinitely more knowledgeable than I am about Poland. Clearly if you look at the history of political thought in Poland since the 19th century, at the divides between Piłsudski and Dmowski, between the Endecja and the socialists, they reflected two priorities in foreign policy, one considering Germany, the other Russia, as the main threat but also two internal visions of Poland, the narrow homogeneous vision of Poland of Endecja and the multinational, cosmopolitan vision of Piłsudski. That is interesting not only as a background of course, but also in the way it has affected the thinking of the opposition thinkers in Poland since 1956 and in the 1970s. In particular I have in mind an article by Adam Michnik in the mid 1970s entitled 'Piłsudski and us – the choice of a tradition'. So this is a very deliberate, very explicit reference to that line of thinking. Of course Michnik in that period rejected revolutionary culture associated with that tradition but not the geopolitical predicament that was there. And I think that it is still relevant, if we want to understand some of the current approaches to the issue.

The Hungarian and the Czech situation provide a contrast. Since dualism was established in 1867 till the end of the World War II, the dominant orientation of Hungarian politics was Austro-German, considering panslavism and Russia as the main threat. This has led to two disasters associated with the two World Wars. Although the Hungarian elites and most Hungarian intellectuals (this applies to many leading historians up to the present, Professor Peter Hanak was I think the most recent of them) consider the period since 1867 to the first World War as a kind of 'golden age' for Hungary. But already during that golden age others have anticipated that this could also be a dead end. This was particularly the view of Lajos Kossuth, who from his Italian exile clearly understood that what happened after 1866 at Sadová

meant that Austria became too dependent on Germany and that its fate therefore would be shaped by that of Germany, and that if those central powers failed, Hungary would suffer with it. And indeed this is what happened in 1918. The two dominant obsessions, two dominant traumas of the post-1918 politics of Hungary that shaped Hungarian politics were Trianon and basically the whole revisionist obsession with the loss of territory and the Hungarian population; the second was the Bela Kuhn revolution and the fear of Russian Bolshevism.

Both the rejection of the Versailles system and the fear of Russian Bolshevism led Hungarian politics in the war period into pro-German orientation and made it the last ally of Hitler. This double failure in World War I and World War II has made a clear break. And it is very difficult today to try to establish some continuity between the kind of thinking that prevailed since the 19th century till the end of the war. But you can find certain intellectual affinities in the main dividing line in Hungarian political culture between the urbanists turning towards the West, whether they are liberal or social democrats, and the national populists, or now the national conservatives. Those cultural divides still play a role in the perception and definition of some of the Hungarian foreign policy positions. For example Victor Orban's infatuation with Schuessel and Stoiber and their joint campaign two years ago for the abrogation of the Beneš decrees as a precondition for the enlargement of the European Union to the Czech Republic. In Prague, the Munich–Vienna–Budapest axis was called the 'other axis of evil'.

There are remnants of that sort and you can say that for Hungarians the European Union is a way of reconnecting with the Hungarian national programme of reaching to the minorities and overcoming the legacy of Trianon. One could also say that the reluctance to follow the US in the Middle East adventures on the part of people like that of Victor Orban is sometimes justified in those circles by insinuation that this is a policy led by America and connected to Israel and therefore has a cause in Hungary in a very particular and not always very pleasant context. But on the whole

one can say that the debates of the past shape to a relatively small extent the debates of the present.

Marcin Król referred to Czech sympathies for the panslavic cause and he described Marx as the most pro-Polish writer of the 19th century. You could add that Marx was also the most anti-Czech writer of the 19th century. In the 'Neue Rheinische Zeitung' in 1848/1849 you can read him and Engels both competing who will be most radical in promising Czechs not only defeat but even extermination. That was the term used. It was meant as extermination by the process of industrialisation and modernisation, which was to make the small nations of Eastern Europe and their dialects disappear. But what is interesting about 1848 is that the basic choice that Czechs were confronted with could be summed up as follows: on the one hand the panslavic congress of 1848 was held in Prague, on the other hand you had the famous letter of the Frankfurt Parliament addressed to Czechs. So there were the two options: panslavic cause with the Tzar or Western 'democracy', 'modernity' in German cause. And the response of the main political thinker and actor of the time, František Palacký, was to reject both. The concept of Austro-Slavism was born from that: since the Slavs are in the majority in the Austrian empire, the aim is to democratise and federalise the empire. Palacký even said that 'if Austria didn't exist, we would have to invent it' vis-à-vis Russia and Germany. Masaryk was a disciple of Palacký. He makes his contribution to this line of thinking during the First World War by abandoning Palacký's concept of reforming Austria, considering that it is by now lost cause, and trying to formulate a programme for a 'New Europe'. This is not only the title of his journal in London in 1915, but also of his lectures and later a book that he published still during the war, at the beginning of 1918. Czechs are not very good at fighting wars but they are reasonably good, at least Masaryk was, at formulating what the war's aims should be for the Western powers. And he does formulate the vision of a new Europe, with the small, Central and East European democratic nations associated with the Western democracies. In fact, the West then means both the European powers, France

and Britain, but also the United States. Masaryk relies as much on United States at that time.

The idea that Western democracy as opposed to both central powers, Germany and Austria, and as opposed to Russian Bolshevism is really born in 1918. And that new concept of Central Europe is of course supposed to be the antidote to Naumann's Mitteleuropa, to the German concept. Masaryk's first lecture, 'The New Europe', is launched in London in 1915, in the year that Naumann's books are published. And he does refer to Central Europe of small nations as an antidote to the concept of Mitteleuropa from Berlin to Bagdad, that is how a German sphere of influence was defined in Masaryk's writing.

If you look at that and you try to see what connections you have to the present, you could argue that Havel is in many ways an inheritor of Masaryk (the philosopher king, the idea of politics based on values, on culture), also in his orientation to the West meaning both America and Europe. The one major difference between Masaryk from his book 'The New Europe' and Havel from the 1990s would not be over America (both recognised the 'democratic mission' of America) but over Germany. Masaryk formulates his position clearly on Germany as the main enemy. For Havel on the contrary, Germany is a vector of Central Europe's integration into Europe. And that is obvious when he organises for the first time a Vyshehrad meeting with the German and Austrian presidents in 1994. The crucial thing about the Czech mindset (perhaps this can be more generally applied to Central Europe) is the Munich trauma and the feeling of the failure of Western democracies in that context and the return in 1945 to the idea of support from the East again. The pendulum swings again: the Slavofiles of 1848, then a 1918 swing to the West, and now in 1945 again a new swing to the East. That is materialised in Beneš's theory that Central Europe should be a bridge between the East and West; that was supposed to fit the spirit of Yalta but, as we know, the spirit of Yalta did not last very long and was very dubious in any case.

So we have there three different experiences, three different outlooks on the dilemma between Germany and Russia with, of course, the Cold War putting everybody in the same boat and considering the Soviet domination as the main threat and making the identification with the West as a priority. If you have to consider the legacies of the Cold War in a nutshell, you could say it strengthened the identification with the West. Oskar Halecki's book *The limits and divisions of European civilisation* makes the point that it is the division of Europe that has created the Atlantic bond, the Atlantic community as a form of compensation. The idea of the West is born as a compensation for a divided Europe. But nowhere is this identification with the Atlantic community and with 'the West' stronger than in Central Europe, which was deprived of its belonging to that community. That is one important legacy which we find again in the present transatlantic debate. You could say that Central Europeans are European because they are Western, they belong to the West; the two terms are inseparable. The French and Germans are Western because they are European. And the second legacy or lesson from that experience is of course the primacy of keeping the United States and NATO in Europe. The famous quote for what the real purpose of NATO is ('to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down') in a way remains valid for the post-1989 approach of Central European elites.

How do these two historical legacies with empires fit into the post-1989 situation? Resisting, accommodating, thinking about empires, has shaped certain political categories which are not always terribly relevant or useful for the post-1989 world. Nevertheless, they exist and they become themselves a crucially important element in the transatlantic or the intra-European debate. The first lesson is the lesson of history. After World War I the United States left Europe and that has born very badly for Central Europe in particular. It remained in Europe after World War II and that has helped to create the conditions for the recovery of sovereignty and democracy after 1989. So: America as a way of protecting Europeans from their own demons – you can find that idea in a number of writings, Havel in particular.

Thinking about the security predicament of post-1989, you have basically three main modes of managing the international system available: hegemony, collective security or multilateralism, and the balance of power. The West Europeans tend to prefer the second, while Central Europeans do not mind the first because they fear the third. So that is the second legacy from that history.

The third element is that the reading of the postures in the transatlantic debate is seen through certain historical prism, not just the prism of the Cold War but also deeper historical roots. As soon as you had a diplomatic convergence or alliance between Paris, Berlin and Moscow, immediately this was seen as a 'new Rapallo' and the priority of the Central Europeans therefore was *not* to hold America, a 'hyper power' of the unipolar world, in check. They have no nostalgia for bipolar world and therefore seem to mind less the unipolar world. Here is a reconnection with the German question. The implicit reason for making the choice they made between old Europe and America is that this made sense in the strategy of entering Europe. America is seen as an equaliser of power on the European scene, and particularly vis-à-vis France and Germany. That is why not just former dissidents but also former communists from Iliescu to Miller or Fatos Nano with impeccable ex-communist credentials offer their bases as substitute for German or Turkish bases, i.e. those of the old imperial powers; Poland insists on Christian values being put in the European constitution, while ignoring the Pope's statement about the war and claiming protection of the holy Shiite sites in Iraq. All this is understandable, not only with a little bit of irony which is absolutely necessary, but on the condition that we have those predicaments of the past somewhere at the back of our mind.

Central Europe provides a comparison with the Balkans. It is crucially important to look at the way political and intellectual elites in the Balkans have tried to interpret the post-1989 situation and particularly the war in former Yugoslavia. In mid 1990s the dominant mindset was to read the conflict of the Balkans through the prism of the beginning of the century, and to see it as a return on the Balkan scene of the powers that were de-

feated in World War I. And you have cultural geopolitical axes: with the North East, Croatian-Slovene axis turning to Germany, the orthodox Serb axis looking East all the way to Russia and Greece as supporters, and the Muslim axis, supposedly with Bosnians, Albanians, backed by Turkey. Any closer examination of that proposition demolishes this. Germany was virtually non-involved in the managing of the crisis itself from 1992 onwards. Russia did not have the means, and reluctantly followed, most of the time, the Western world. And the same thing about Turkey who had a remarkably restrained policy.

These positions are completely anachronistic, however they have apparently existed in some circles which continue to interpret the Balkan conflicts in these categories. It is particularly ironic given the fact that the current situation in the Balkans is not a conflict between Russia, Turkey and Germany but a conflict between the US-led intervention and the Protectorates under the European command. Of course there are different approaches to this issue within the Serb or Slovene elites, which would rather co-operate with Europe than with the US, while Muslims in Bosnia and in Kosovo prefer to trust the Americans rather than the Europeans. Actually, one can say that the situation is opposite to that of the Middle East one, where the Palestinians trust the Europeans rather than the Americans.

The choice between the US and Europe is actually a choice that is not rooted in the political culture of Central Europe because the main dividing lines in the political culture of this region were not between the supporters of Europe and those of the US but between the pro-Western circles pursuing the aims of modernisation and of uniting with Europe and with the West, and the nationalists, the populists who feared modernity. This is how the 19th century's divides were shaped. Professor Jerzy Jedlicki superbly described these debates in his book *Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebują?*; interestingly enough, the translated version of this title is *A Suburb of Europe. Nineteenth-century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization*, which illustrates well the development of a debate that has many contemporary resonances.

This historical and political divide in the political culture of Central Europe has now a limited significance in the context of the 'Europe vs. US choice' debate. Indeed, we can claim that Central Europeans themselves have nothing against filling up the vacuum generated by the collapse of old empires with new empires. The European Union may be perceived as a 'substitute for an empire' which imposes certain rules – economic integration – while the US provides security. The roles of these new empires are interpreted as complementary and not as contradictory.

The problem may consist in the fact the Central European vision is not in line with, or actually remains at the margins of, the current debate between the Western European countries, founders of the European Union, and the United States.

I believe that the Polish stance consisting in stressing the role of national state as a means of returning to the European arena after a long period of absence (we may compare this with the Spanish situation), and the fact that the first actions on this political arena were focusing on the use of the right to veto, is a symbolic return to an old Polish tradition.

However, if in our actions were guided by our fears or intuition-based on the geopolitics from the past, we generate the risk that they may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The intellectual and political traditions of East-Central European countries may provide a useful background to understanding their perceptions but has not always made them well-equipped for coping with new post-cold-war dilemmas. Thus Poland enters the EU by asserting itself in style and substance as a nation-state returning on the European scene after a long eclipse and its association with Spain (another recent returnee on the European scene) on the constitutional issue only reinforces that point. Its first political act in joining the European Union was to cast its veto over the draft of the new European constitution. I am not discussing, of course, the merits or the legitimacy of the Polish stance; simply in a historical perspective one is struck by the persistence of a certain political culture. The *liberum veto* has an old though not altogether very successful tradition in

Polish politics. A number of observers in Western Europe have been surprised by such assertiveness and the will to join the EU by opposing its two main founding members. Anachronism about the Cold War mind-set, the argument goes, coupled with anachronism about the return of the European nation-state at the beginning of the 21st century. Unless, of course, it is the other way around: Poland and more generally the experience of Central European countries of being at the receiving end of totalitarian powers has made them more sensitive than others inside the EU to new totalitarian dangers and the return of power politics in Europe. Perhaps their reservations about the heralded post-national era and shared sovereignties point to a more pessimistic scenario of post-Cold War and post-September 11 return of geopolitics and of the balance of power in European politics, perhaps even within the enlarged EU. However, the risk in acting upon a fear or intuitions inherited from reflections upon the geopolitics of the past is that it may also contribute to turning it into a self-fulfilling prophecy for the future.

Adam D. Rotfeld

One remark after listening to Jacques Rupnik: ideas live longer than the circumstances and conditions in which they were created, sometimes with a positive effect, sometimes with a negative one. The idea of Central Europe has both positive and negative effects: in the cultural sense it is a very positive phenomenon, but I think that in the political sense Naumann's concept of *Mitteleuropa*, which is now being revived in some capitals, has a very negative side.

One more remark concerning the issue of veto. Poland has been stigmatized because people see the *liberum veto* as it was in the last period of its existence, when Poland was in decline (though, actually, not only because of the *liberum veto*). I want to point out, however, that for two hundred years the *liberum veto* played a similar role to that of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, which served as a deterrent to armed conflict. The *liberum veto* protected certain values which were not questioned, because

people knew that to do so could have grave consequences. I am opposed to the so-called ‘obstructing minority’, and I believe we should look at the European Union from the positive side, but no one should think that the *liberum veto* was something negative from the outset: rather, expressed respect for minorities. [...]

Timothy Snyder

I have dealt quite literally with the task I was set, so I shall talk here only about the geopolitics of the region extending between Germany and Russia. I would like, in particular, to say a few words about a country which has not yet been mentioned here, namely Ukraine. It is traditionally assumed that geopolitics is concerned with states. One may ask, then, about a connection between geopolitics and the European Union. This could spark off a long discussion; to cut it short, let me mention just one factor due to which the EU may be treated as a state: the EU has external borders which can be defended by different means – not necessarily by the army but, for instance, by police forces (these borders, let me add, are in fact tighter than the borders of the USA – it is more difficult to slip across them).

[...] Because the external border of the EU has moved east, it is now easier for the citizens of Poland and other states of the region to cross the internal borders of the EU. We seem not to notice, however, the situation on the Polish-Ukrainian border which has been considerably tightened. I believe that for the EU this is a problem of a geostrategic nature. Ukraine is a traditional subject of geopolitics; two famous analysts of geopolitics – Jerzy Giedroyc and Zbigniew Brzezinski would claim that it is the key to political stability in Europe. Ukraine, however, is still a state



in the making. Since the documents ratifying the Border Treaty between Russia and Ukraine were exchanged as late as April 22, 2004, only now can we talk about the full statehood of Ukraine. If Ukraine – in a distant future, of course – is to become a member of the EU, it will have to delineate its borders in a more precise way and give a proof of its ability to defend them. This claim can be generalized: in order to be admitted by the group of states known as the European Union, one must first shape one's own state and strengthen its structures – this process has only begun in Ukraine.

Let me focus then on the time-span of one generation: within this horizon the Ukrainian state will not yet be mature and the accession to the EU will not be possible. How should the EU treat Ukraine in this period? We may expect rather unusual foreign policy from Ukraine. Let me remind you that this country has a record of quite contradictory moves in its foreign policy. For instance, when George Soros had a meeting with president Kuchma, the latter's press office came out with statements vilifying the former; when Ukrainian troops are engaged in Iraq, Radio Svoboda transmissions are jammed in Ukraine. Ukraine is trying to approach simultaneously both the EU and Russia, which is extremely difficult.

I would like to mention here some historical points of reference – some moments in the history of Europe which are significant for Europeans from the West and also for Poles and Ukrainians. I have chosen five such key moments. Let me start with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, a nearly forgotten episode which marks the threshold of the system of European nation-states – it set off the process which is only now transformed due to the development of the EU. In 1648, Europe (Western Europe and Ukraine alike) was an arena of religious wars: in that very year Ukraine entered the Thirty Years War which did not result, however, in the creation of a state and its structures; on the contrary, Ukraine virtually disappeared as a subject of history. In 1648, Ukraine belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Afterwards, it was partitioned between Poland and Russia to remain dismembered throughout the Modern Age.

The French Revolution, or more broadly the Enlightenment, is the second historical moment I would like to mention here. In Europe, it led to the emergence of the idea of a universal nation-state, the first such being France; other states would adopt this model, too. In Eastern Europe, the Enlightenment was also very important but it ran its rather unusual course in the conditions of absolutism. For Catherine the Great, the Empress of Russia, the Enlightenment served as an intellectual weapon, as an argument for a homogeneous empire. Having acquired Ukraine and a large part of Poland, the Russian Empire had become heterogeneous, but under Catherine's rule underwent a process of homogenization. What are the effects of her policy in Ukraine? Ukraine, of course, was now predominantly in the Russian hands but this period remains very ambivalent in the history of the nation. On the one hand, the Enlightenment Project of Catherine required Ukrainians to visit St. Petersburg, and St. Petersburg was Russia's window on Europe. Ukrainians move from Kiev to St. Petersburg, and so take part in this project. On the other hand, Catherine II extended serfdom in Ukraine: under Russian rule Ukrainian peasants became serfs, while their lords – aristocracy, nobles, landowners – were predominantly Polish. Hence, the Enlightenment was an attractive, European project, while at the same time, for the majority of the Ukrainian population, it meant serfdom – these developments, however, were not linked with the West, but only with Poland and social stratification.

The year 1848 and the Spring of Nations in Europe is the third moment to be noted. The surge of liberal nationalism and the revival of great hopes reached Ukraine but, of course, only its Western part – properly speaking, Eastern Galicia without Lodomeria. This part of Ukraine did not belong to the Russian Empire but to Austria-Hungary: the Ukrainians, like other nations of this dual state, took part in the process of national rebirth. After 1848, the process accelerated due to the introduction of the freedom of press and the extension of franchise. As a result of Austrian liberalism, the Ukrainian national movement developed quite vigorously in Galicia. At the same time, the Polish nobility in Galicia, which was the ruling stratum, was

granted political autonomy. This meant that the Ukrainian liberation movement was in practice directed against the Polish nobility. [...]

The Great Depression in the year 1930 is the fourth historical moment. In Europe, this event translated into a crisis of capitalism and at the same time provided an opportunity – grabbed by Hitler – to seize power. Hitler could also use the German trade policy to subordinate some countries of East and Central Europe. In Ukraine, some developments were parallel, while some were unique. In that year, most of Ukraine belonged to the USSR which at that time was an arena of Stalin's efforts to consolidate his power. For Stalin fast modernization meant the collectivization of agriculture. It was a critical moment in the history of Ukraine: millions of peasants, who dreamed about their own land for centuries and were made landowners not long before, were deprived of their property. Forceful collectivization sparked off a million acts of resistance. In the early thirties, the Ukrainian society – like the Russian – suffered a great deal. Their ordeal reached this extreme also because Stalin linked the problems encountered in Ukraine with the influence of Poland. This may sound strange today, but in the year 1930 Poland was perceived as a threat to the USSR. Stalin believed, or at least pretended to believe, that Ukraine's problems were political – not economic – and that they were instigated by Poland and its allies in Ukraine, who should be crushed. As we all know, Stalin used hunger as a weapon: in the years 1932–1933, during the Ukrainian famine that followed the collectivization, some five million people died of hunger. The collectivization marked an end of private property in Ukraine. It also coincided with a campaign against the Ukrainian intelligentsia which emerged in the Soviet Ukraine in the twenties; its representatives were sent to labour camps or killed because they dared to talk, for instance, about the return to Europe.

World War II is the last point of reference and, surely, the one of greatest significance for the history of Central Europe. The sufferings in this region during WW2 defy description. Let me just mention that at that time Ukraine was in the very centre of the Eastern Front, which was the arena of a catastrophe incomparably greater than whatever happened

on the Western Front. Poland is, of course, the only country belonging to the EU at this moment which suffered a similar fate during WW2. One can show another point of convergence. Both in Western Europe and in the USSR, which held on to Ukraine after the war, there was a myth of a reunification and reintegration after WW2. In Western Europe, we have been told the optimistic story that after the tragic cataclysm, Germany and France made peace and started economic co-operation again, which resulted in political co-operation.

The story of Soviet-led integration is, perhaps, not so well-known but it sounds very convincing: Stalin had foreseen the Nazi attack, the cruelty unleashed by Germany and he came to the conclusion that the only way to guarantee the safety of the Soviet Union was to consolidate a group of satellite states. The safety of Ukraine, in turn, was to be bought at the price of some Polish territories, which were to be incorporated into Ukraine. Stalin completed this task in 1945. The whole plan [...] involved a shift of frontiers. In the Cold War period, Moscow tried to convince Poles that Germans could be back and claim the 'Recovered Territories'. Ukrainians were persuaded that in the case Poles left the Soviet Camp, they would claim Lviv and Vilnius. This perspective, which cast doubts on Polish intentions, survived virtually till 1991. Since that year the Polish and Ukrainian elites have been trying hard to give support to one another and to find a common ground; one should also mention important debates about the events dating back to WW2 – in this context, one should first of all congratulate president Kwaśniewski on several important initiatives. We must note, however, that all those extremely important developments started only in 1991. Hence, the reconciliation in the East began much later than in the West – for obvious reasons.

A few conclusions of a general nature: first of all, Ukraine does lie between the East and the West – this claim is not just political rhetoric of the current Ukrainian leadership. [...] The state of suspension between the East and the West is of relevance – this point of reference in geopolitics may be important. It is possible that Ukrainians will become pro-Western;

I have already mentioned that such an orientation could be detected on a limited scale in the year 1648, 1848, and also 1930. Such aspirations, however, cannot be fulfilled if people remain passive.

Now, some conclusions concerning the significance of the historical points of reference in the context of the EU. First of all, to draw the lesson from the experiences of the year 1648 and the Treaty of Westphalia, as well as the making of the European system of nation-states: every state system tends to include the excluded. [...] Poland fell prey to the system started in 1648 precisely because it could not solve the Ukrainian question. Pope John Paul II talked about the passage from the Union of Lublin to the European Union. One should remember that Ukraine was a liability of the Union of Lublin and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Second, the year 1789 and the Enlightenment: it is obvious that the pursuit of universal standards and reform – whether they should be effects of the French Revolution or a program for the European integration – attract elites. There has always been an elite in Ukraine which is attracted by Europe. Universalising reforms, however, pose the risk of alienating the majority of the society, for instance, when Catherine the Great summoned the Ukrainian elite to St. Petersburg, and at the same time extended the serfdom of the Ukrainian peasantry. At present, the Ukrainian elite may travel to the EU, while the Treaty of Schengen limits the contact with Europe for a large part of the population. I hope that Europeans will soon realize that the borders delineated in Schengen overlap with the borders between rich and poor countries, between Western and Eastern Christianity, between the countries belonging to the NATO and non-members. An attempt should be made to blur such divisions, rather than to pronounce them ever more vigorously.

My third conclusion refers to the year 1848, Galicia and the Spring of Nations: it is institutions that make a nation; the survival of a national movement depends on the strength of its institutional structure. There are good reasons for the fact that the Ukrainian national movement was born and developed in Galicia. We could compare that situation of a few millions

of Ukrainians in Austrian Galicia to the situation of only several hundred thousands of Ukrainian in Poland: it is possible that Ukraine will not be a member of the EU for many years to come (if at all), but the Ukrainians who are Polish citizens already live in the European Union.

My fourth conclusion concerns the year 1930 and the collectivization: a large group of the Ukrainian population used to know the market economy; unfortunately, this tradition was forcibly ended. Still, when Ukrainians travel to Poland to work there, they adapt to a market society very fast. At long range, the EU will face the problem of labour shortage, while Ukraine will have to deal with unemployment. Perhaps we should already think about a way to solve both problems at one stroke.

Finally, the year 1945 and World War II which rightly opens the narrative culminating with the EU: the European Union is a successful postwar project. Since WW2 was conducted mostly on the fronts in Eastern Europe and it was won there, the Polish narrative about the war – as resulting in Communism, and not peace and prosperity – should now circulate in the EU and enrich European thinking on this subject. The Ukrainian perspective on WW2 is also valid. If the EU is to overcome the legacy of WW2, there remains much to be done in this domain.

Adam D. Rotfeld

It is important to underline the influence of the situation in Austria on the chances of Ukrainians in the 19th and the early 20th century. Austria, like Prussia, was not a democratic state, but it was a country under the rule of law. Today, the advocates of extending democracy to this or that state simply forget that there is a difference between the two. It is clear, however, that the rule of law must be established first, if democracy is to survive. Now, both Austria and Prussia, as opposed to the Russian Empire, were under the rule of law and this certainly helped Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia to forge their modern identity. [...]



Discussion

Jerzy Jedlicki (Polish Academy of Science)

I will start with an anecdote. At the end of my stay at Wilson Center, I went to the bank where I had my account. The bank was situated in the very centre of Washington, the political heart of America. I asked to have the contents of my account transferred to my bank in Poland. The bank clerk started to search frantically in the bank's address book where countries were listed alphabetically. After a while she gave me a resigned look and said: 'There is no such country as Poland, there is nothing between the Philippines and Portugal'. So when I hear people talking about the American perception of Eastern Europe or Poland, I always remember this story.

I had a feeling of discomfort while listening to my friends Aleksander Smolar and Marcin Król who were talking about America in terms of it being interested or uninterested in something, or about Europe that 'had not cared about Poland'. I realise that these are mental shortcuts, but in my view they are above all examples of a hypostasis. States and continents do not think, do not feel, and do not have any attitudes. It is people who think, feel, and act. This language of geopolitics does not suit me. Apart from purely linguistic problems, there are also convictions about some stable arrangements, about certain objective conditions. Minister Rotfeld has said that today geography is losing its significance. I think that also geopolitics

is losing its significance, if it is understood as a constant arrangement of certain motivations and conditions resulting from one's location on the map. We should not say that Poland has a choice between Europe and America, or that Poland has chosen an American policy and prefers it to a European policy. We should clearly say: the Poland of president Kwaśniewski, prime minister Miller and foreign minister Cimoszewicz, at a certain moment of our history made, in my view, the very bad decision of attaching itself to the chariot of the adventurist policies of president Bush and his associates. Then the situation becomes clear. [...] Let us say briefly that this Poland of minister Cimoszewicz, for whom I have a lot of respect, but who, I think, has been conducting a very bad foreign policy, this Poland has several times, especially during last year, disregarded the opinions of leading European partners, for which it should have shown much more consideration.

I am an ardent supporter of methodological indeterminism. Today's speech by Tim Snyder, which I think was excellently presented and constructed, demonstrated, among other things, how important good choices are when they are made at the right moment by people who can see far ahead. There was no necessity to create the European Union, and similarly there was no necessity for Poland to extend her hand to Ukraine and try to settle old feuds. It was an effort of several, perhaps a dozen, persons who had a political vision, could see far ahead and could influence the decision-making processes. I would suggest that we should use the language which stresses that political decisions are obviously not entirely free, but neither are they determined and foregone.

Jerzy Holzer (Polish Academy of Science)

In today's debate little space has been devoted to the fact that actually in the 19th and 20th centuries the national idea, or even simply nationalism, was of the utmost importance. In this respect Central and Eastern Europe was increasingly under the influence of Germany and Russia since the beginning of the 19th century. After all, it was Mickiewicz who wrote both about the

German hydra in *Konrad Wallenrod* and about the Russian danger in *Dziady*. At that time romantics from various countries in Central and Eastern Europe lived and breathed this national idea. But the problem was that in the 19th century German nationalism and the German state, which finally emerged in 1870, were forming simultaneously. Russian nationalism, though with some delay, was also rising. I think that the nations of Central and Eastern Europe (at least some of them) which were situated between Germany and Russia, looked to Austria as a non-nationalist state.

It is an open question whether the two World Wars constituted the height of the national state and national conflicts in Europe. In the aftermath of these disasters, two ideas were born on how to emerge from the catastrophe and these were the Communist idea and the European – or Western European – idea, both of them supranational. Because the Communist vision was anti-libertarian and anti-democratic, the movements acting against it appealed largely to the national idea, if not to nationalism itself. With this awakening of nations we entered the year 1989 and found ourselves in a democracy. Now the problem is to what extent this national awakening of ours is in line with the principles of the European Union.

I think one should openly say that the nations of Central and Eastern Europe do not want national interests to play too big a role in the European Union, because that would go against European solidarity, and only European solidarity can allow poorer countries to integrate. If at this moment anyone in Poland wants a European Union with national interests strongly pronounced, it means they do not understand that this would backfire against poorer nations, and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are among the poorer ones. No matter what Jerzy Jedlicki was saying about current politics, the European and American value systems are significantly close, though not identical, and in this sense the United States and Europe are closer to each other than to anyone else in the world. However, when we talk about European solidarity, we must say that inside the European Union the nations of Central and Eastern Europe want to emphasize this relative closeness of the United States and Europe, but not at the expense of weakening European

solidarity. This means it is not a choice between the United States and Europe, but a question of priorities, and in fact European solidarity is given priority to the relationship between Europe and the United States.

Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas (American Studies Center,
University of Warsaw)

It has been said that geography has lost its significance. I think that only some kinds of geography have lost their significance. I would like to point out some changes which are now taking place and determining what kinds of geography are important. Physical geography is much less significant; I myself have very interesting professional experiences in this respect, as I operate more and more often in cyberspace and I have come to understand that an ever greater part of at least Western civilization lives in cyberspace, where every two points are adjacent, where there are no physical distances between Warsaw and New York, between San Francisco and Beijing. Does invalidation of physical distance mean that geography has lost its significance? My answer is no. All the more important are other kinds of geography, above all a cultural geography and demography. The world is divided into communities of values, communities of behaviour; two points in cyberspace are close to each other, two persons or two communities in cyberspace are close to each other if they are culturally and socially compatible, but they can be totally alien and isolated even though the physical distance is merely the width of a street. This is why modern geopolitics, which takes into account an anthropological geography, or a cultural geography, the geopolitics of civilisations, is important and should accompany us in our further debates.

Adam D. Rotfeld

I have two remarks. The first one is connected with the fact that we rightly speak about states and nations, because – as it has been mentioned

several times – since the time of the Treaty of Westphalia, when the post-medieval universalistic system in Europe started to disappear, initially the only agents in international politics were states, and later nations in the modern sense of the word. In my view, today there is a certain tension between the status of states and nations on one hand, and of societies and communities on the other. Often, we do not fully realise to what extent this new reality affects the shaping of relations in the world. The influence of a community, including the European Community, is more and more important. I would say that our inability to define and use terms which are adequate to the new situation results in the fact that, for example, in many countries of the world, especially in Western Europe and in the United States, Russia is still perceived as an empire. This is due to a particular fascination with Russia. In effect this perception is in a way more important than the actual reality.

To illustrate my thesis I will tell you an anecdote: in 1975 at the time of Easter I visited a place called Horyniec in the area close to the Eastern border of Poland; I wanted to see some small Ukrainian Orthodox churches still remaining in this region. I met a very old peasant, asked for information, and we started talking. I realised that he was actually speaking Ukrainian, not Polish. He confirmed that he was Ukrainian. I asked him: ‘You had a choice – so why didn’t you leave for Ukraine, instead of staying here on the Polish side?’ – ‘You know – said the peasant – this was because I knew that in Poland there would be no collective farms, kolhoz’. – ‘And how did you know that there would be no collective farms?’ – ‘You will not understand this, but the point is that France would never have allowed this’. Still unsure, I said: ‘France?’ – ‘Yes, Mister, but you will not understand this’. So the peasant’s awareness stayed at World War I, his world was shaped at that time and has not changed since. Now, whenever I meet French ambassadors, in Warsaw too, I suggest they should go to Horyniec to see that France is still playing an important role in the consciousness and world-view of Poles from the elder generation.

Krzysztof Zielke (Polish Academy of Science)

At the beginning of this session it was suggested that no one in Europe supported the independence of Poland. Well, Napoleon did support Polish independence, and we have even written the project of Poland in Europe being united by Napoleon into our Polish national anthem, 'Bonaparte has shown us ways to victory'. Another example is the German liberals and triumphant march of Polish emigrants after 1830 through Germany and France, when Germans used to sing the famous 'Polenlied', knowing that the independence of Poland is needed for the German national consciousness: after all, initially the German revolution supported the creation of Polish army units in the Poznań region so that the resurrected Poland could be a shield against Russian interventionism.

My second remark refers to the opinion that the United States has never done any harm to us. Well, no harm apart from such trifles as Yalta and the Yalta order in the years 1945–1989.

The third issue concerns the historical identities of Poland in Europe. The archbishop Życiński says that we should build a Polish patriotism which would be combined with love for Europe. It seems that it is enough to reach back to Polish Romanticism, which has been mentioned also by professor Król: the Polish romantics, especially Józef Hoene-Wroński, saw the future and freedom of Poland in a European federation. Mickiewicz was the father of Polish Romanticism, which combines love for Poland as a political organisation, the Polish Republic, and love for Europe – 'by one word you'll betray that you used to live on the Niemen river, that you are a Pole, a resident of Europe'.

Zdzisław Najder (University of Opole)

[...] My remark refers to the image of Europe in Polish thinking about the world, and in European thinking about the world, which has been presented by professor Marcin Król. I am not a historian of ideas, but I have doubts

about this image. Up to the time of the emergence of the European Community, Europe, if it ever defined itself, was in contrast to something/someone else (when Franks were fighting Saracens, for the first time the concept of 'Europeans fighting someone' was used, similarly when later the battle of Vienna was fought). The French, the English and the Dutch did not really need this concept, but it was needed by the Italians, the Poles, the Czechs and the Germans. That is why there was the movement, a quite significant one, of the 'Young Europe' in the 1830s and 1840s. I want to remind you that Mickiewicz was writing about a European federalism, and the father of Joseph Conrad, Apollo Korzeniowski in his text *Poland and Moscow* used the concept of Europe, and he blamed Europe that it is not up to its task: the concept was just a postulate. I was surprised by the complete overlooking of the 'Young Europe' movement active in the middle of 19th century, in which Poles also participated. The aims of this movement have been realised only now, before our very eyes.

Krzysztof Iszkowski (*Krytyka Polityczna* quarterly)

I would like to thank professor Snyder for one point he made in his speech, which is often overlooked in Polish historiography, namely his remark that the Polish inability to manage the 'Ukrainian issue' was the factor which determined, in the second half of the 17th century, the collapse of the Polish state as one of the European states. However, I would draw different conclusions from the ones that you did in the subsequent part of your presentation. Namely, if our engagement in Ukraine once led to the collapse of our state, then why should we now engage ourselves there again?

Leszek Moczulski

I would like to add something to the speech delivered by professor Król. The first point is that modern Europe is a Europe built differently from a geopolitical point of view. This is a Europe which since the 16th century

has been divided into two very distinct parts with different orientations, and traces of this division are visible to this day. So there is Western Europe which has Atlantic and global orientation, and Eastern Europe which is a buffer zone shielding Western Europe from Turkey, Russia and Asia. This geopolitical divide has had a significant impact on our understanding of the concept of Europe. In this sense, events such as the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 undoubtedly had a weaker influence on Eastern Europe than on Western Europe, in both the conceptual and the institutional way. This division of Europe is very clearly visible in the 20th century and only the events of the second half of the 20th century have evoked in Western Europe a real interest in the lands on the Vistula river, on the lower Danube, and on the Dnieper river.

The second issue is that of Poland between Russia and Germany. It has been rightly pointed out that Germany emerged only in 1870, and this was not the emergence of an empire, but of Germany, for the first time since the Hohenstaufs. In the meantime there were the Luxemburgs, the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, and the emperor, but there was no Germany. Treating Germany as a permanent phenomenon is formally unfounded. It is more justified factually than formally because starting from the second half of the 18th century, from the time of Frederick Wilhelm II's failed attempts to integrate Eastern Germany, the perception of Poland's position as 'between Prussia and Russia' began to emerge and it continued through the 19th and 20th century (in the second half of the 20th century it was artificially maintained, because the country was, in terms of choice rather than the actual political position, between the Soviet Union and the United States, but surely not between Germany and Russia). However the old stereotype is remarkably strong. [...]

Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (Warsaw University)

A month ago the Institute of History at Warsaw University hosted professor Maurice Aymard from *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* in Paris.

One of the interesting theses presented in his lecture, which was not received with full understanding, was the conception that America obviously does not belong to Europe, whereas Russia (at least the areas extending to Irkutsk) does. This is the problem of perceiving the borders of Europe. To an average Frenchman, Russia is a part of Europe; this has not been questioned since the mid-19th century, but the United States surely is not a part of Europe. To an average Pole, Russia may not be a part of Europe, whereas the United States in some strange way is. I would like to remind you of a particular fact: in 1790 Ottoman Turkey signed, along with the Republic of Poland, an offensive treaty against Russia, a treaty which was not, in the end, ratified. In this treaty, written in French and in Turkish, we find a statement that the excessive growth of Russia had upset the European balance, so Warsaw and Istanbul decided to save the European balance.

The second problem is a question which we, as new members of the European Union, must address at a school textbook level: can we create a new European identity without negative stereotypes and without using xenophobic themes? Can we be Europeans and at the same time, subconsciously, not demonstrate our superiority towards others?

Sławomir Łukasiewicz (Institute of Central and Eastern Europe in Lublin)

It seems to me that in the 19th century, as you have mentioned here, but also in the 20th century, there was a Polish European thinking (we can illustrate this with a number of examples, for instance, the activity of Józef Retinger, the initiatives of the Polish government in exile, and the initiatives of Polish federalists), but its realisation was rather difficult. This was because the realisation of the fundamental postulate of regaining independence in the 19th century, and later of regaining sovereignty in the 20th century, encountered serious problems as a result of the international situation. So I think that we should modify the thesis which has been formulated here:

there was a political thought in Poland, we wanted to be in Europe, but our options to act were very limited.

Timothy Snyder

I want to reply to the very boldly formulated question about Ukraine and why one Poland should want to get involved there. As a matter of fact, the argument in my speech was that from the European perspective, and all the more from the Polish perspective, it is impossible not to get involved there. When a European state system is forming, it influences the neighbouring countries, so the choice is not if but how to be involved – wittingly or unwittingly.

Replying in more detail – it is true that in the Chmielnicki's period Poles had their problems in Ukraine and their apprehension of being involved there is natural; that is how the situation was perceived by Roman Dmowski, for example. But I would say: as Poland was unable to solve the Ukrainian question, it was done by Russia instead, and that is how Poland actually lost its sovereignty.

I belong to Giedroyc's tradition of thinking or (in a slightly different way) to Brzezinski's tradition: they believed that it was in the interest of Poland to have a buffer zone of stable states between Moscow and Warsaw. From this perspective, Poland should be keenly interested in supporting the state-building processes in Ukraine or Belarus.

If we look to the future – Poland has joined the European Union now that the EU is trying to create its own foreign policy. This is an urgent issue, and not only because of Iraq. And Poles are being asked: what contribution can they offer to the new foreign policy of the EU? What will be the Eastern dimension of this policy? And Poles may have something to say in this respect.

This brings me to a general remark on geopolitics and I will refer here to professor Jerzy Jedlicki's deliberations. I do not particularly like the term 'geopolitics', because it can encourage a passive attitude. This is a situation

which is now present in Ukraine, where unfortunately it is believed that ‘as we occupy a place which is very important from the perspective of geopolitics, we do not need to do anything’. Of course it is just the opposite – to integrate with Europe one needs to act, instead of waiting passively. This passive style is sadly associated with the term ‘geopolitics’.

My second remark about geopolitics, or rather geography, is that in my view geography (even simple physical geography) still plays an enormous role. Does anyone here really believe that it is not important for the United States, or for Europe, where oil deposits are located in the world? Of course this is an issue of the utmost importance for all of us, and it concerns among other things European-Polish-Ukrainian relations. Because the question of whether oil will be delivered through Ukrainian territory or not is a very important one for Poland and Europe.

Finally, I would like to say something about a different kind of geography, namely the geography of experience. What is our experience of geography? In my view such concepts as ‘globalisation’, or ‘European integration’, appeal to those who easily move around the world. If I do not need a visa to go to Warsaw, in a sense, Warsaw is close to me. If I need a visa to go to Ukraine then, in a sense, Ukraine is somewhat further away. And for example, to a Mexican citizen who wants to work in the US, America is far away because of visa requirements. So there is the geography of experience. When someone needs to move around and encounters problems, then they will have a different view on globalisation and European integration. Perhaps this geography is very modern, but it is still a kind of geography and should be taken into account.

Jacques Rupnik

Timothy Snyder has just said that geography is important, and I would say that the mental geography is as important as the real, physical geography. And that is why the discussion we have had this morning is so useful, but it can also lead to some traps of a political nature, as I have tried to

demonstrate. The dilemma of Central and Eastern Europe is completely different from the dilemmas in the 19th century. The categories which were employed to elaborate on geopolitics, on international issues, and on the place of nations in Europe, are obsolete, out of date. But these categories have shaped our political thinking and still influence our perceptions. We could have avoided some misunderstandings in Europe over the last several years, if these issues of the geography of experience – the mental geography – were taken into consideration. [...]

Marcin Król

I agree with Jerzy Jedlicki that one should say that it was the Poland of Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller which entered the war in Iraq. Nevertheless, history will judge it differently: simply that Poland entered the war. People who have written on these topics did not use personalized terms. If we look at the authors, from Kamiński to Bocheński, they spoke about Poland being situated between Russia and Germany, similarly as Krasieński wrote in his memorials: Europe, Poland, France. This tradition is a fact. Moreover, whether one likes the government or not, this is our Polish government and in history this event will be recorded as Poland entering the war in Iraq on the side of the US.

I would like to remind you that my statement concerned exclusively Polish political attitudes, and the beautiful passage from Mickiewicz quoted here concerns cultural, social and religious attitudes. Polish political attitudes were different. One can refer to the Polish debate on federalism, which started during the Second World War in Great Britain and was carried on later in the pages of *Kultura* (and not only there). This very interesting moment of history had little consequences in Western Europe, but very important consequences in shaping our attitudes towards Eastern Europe. Jerzy Giedroyc and his school played an enormous role (and I think president Kwaśniewski has been under his influence).

So Polish European thinking started then. I will remind you that one of the fundamental texts on Europe, in which by the way Poland is mentioned, 'Pan-Europe' by Richard de Coudenhove Kalergi, has never been published in Poland. The Polish pan-European movement had around 20 members, moreover, some of them joined it on ambiguous grounds, because in fact they were anti-European: they were pro-Greek and thus pro-German, for example, professor Tadeusz Zieliński, a great but not very famous historian, and unfortunately an advocate of Nazism (not an active participant).

My third remark: the categories of memory are very important, and the public memory stores various things, it is like a rubbish bin; even if one does not look into this bin, that does not mean it is empty. Some day someone will find what is in there. That is why one should be very careful; it is better to remember more than less.

Aleksander Smolar

I am not going to defend the term 'geopolitics'. We have used it here – as I explained in my introduction – fully aware of its provocative nature, but also because this term has a certain tradition in the Polish political language. We wanted to make an attempt to define basic determinants of Central European and Polish politics.

In this session, a historical and not a geographical dimension has been the most crucial. In debates on 'Europe and America' history is usually hardly ever present. We live in times when a synchronic, and not a diachronic perspective is dominating. The past is hardly ever mentioned, as if there were some radical discontinuity in history and the current world was created by the events of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. In organising this session, our objective was to regain the memory of historical debates and problems as well as of fundamental factors which determined previous political choices in our region, and to see what their influence is on our thinking today.



Session II Europe in US policy

Is the United States interested in further European integration? The US and the European Union or Washington and 'coalition of the willing' in Europe? The role of NATO. 'New Europe' in the US strategy towards Europe and in the US policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

- Chair: **Andrzej Olechowski**,
former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Panellists: **David P. Calleo**, Johns Hopkins University, Washington;
Pierre Hassner, Centre for International Studies
and Research, CERI, Paris;
Ken Jowitt, University of California, Berkeley;
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton University.

David P. Calleo

Our instructions for this panel – 'Europe and US policy' asked us to ponder the following question: Is the United States interested in further European integration? We need of course to define what we mean by further European integration: further 'widening', adding more countries? or further



‘deepening’, strengthening the economic, diplomatic, military dimensions? If we mean ‘widening’, then the US is generally in favour, sometimes – it seems – because more ‘widening’ appears to mean less ‘deepening’. But what about ‘deepening’ itself, building a stronger, more cohesive European Union? The honest answer, I imagine, is no. The United States is not interested in further European ‘deepening’.

The US is not interested in European integration in two senses of the word ‘interest’. To begin with, European integration does not attract the administration’s attention, let alone its admiration. In this, I fear, the administration mirrors the country as a whole. The sustained and very significant transformation that has taken place in the EU since Maastricht and the introduction of Euro has excited little attention in America. Neither in the government, nor in the media, nor among American political elites. As for the general public, it is abysmally uninformed.

The word ‘interest’ of course has another meaning. Having an interest can also mean having a share in some venture and therefore wishing it to succeed. Probably a significant portion of the political elites, in particular those that identify themselves most closely with the Bush administration, do not really favour that deepening which has been taking place in Europe since Maastricht because they fear it is not in the interest of the United States, in this second sense of the word. I am not speaking of course about earlier American attitudes when Americans sometimes seemed more enthusiastic about European integration than Europeans themselves and American support was probably critical for Europe’s success. But even by the late 1960s this early enthusiasm was on the wane. As Europe grew more integrated, it also grew more Gaullist. Europe’s combined economic strength made it a more formidable competitor and forced us into arduous negotiations where we did not always prevail. Indeed

the roots of the Euro can be traced to the monetary quarrels of the Carter administration with the Franco-German partnership of that era – Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt.

But until a decade ago these economic antagonisms were safely contained within an over-arching geopolitical framework created by the Cold War. Indeed, that geopolitical framework, pitting the US and the Soviet Union against each other, goes a long way to explain America's early patronage of the nascent European Community, as well as American sustained tolerance for the economic rival that has emerged out of that Community. Western Europe was, after all, the great prize of the Cold War, a prize that the United States could not afford to lose. The Soviet threat to the Western Alliance was not only military, it was also political, economic, and cultural. West Germany had powerful neutralist inclinations. France and Italy had strong Communist parties, widely supported among intellectuals. The integrating European Community was probably the West's best answer to that threat. At the same time, of course, the development of that Community created an ever more powerful rival to the United States within the West.

Thus the Cold War system, which was so terrible for Eastern Europe, had numerous advantages for Western Europe. We used to call that Cold War system bipolar. Arguably, it was really tripolar. The integrating West Europeans were free riders on two horses, so to speak – on the American forces that protected them against the Soviets, and on the Soviet forces that balanced the Americans – that made Americans solicitous of West European governments and publics.

It was, I suppose, this general comfort all around in the West that made so many Western analysts blind to the growing weaknesses of the Cold War system and so reluctant intellectually to come to terms with its demise. With the retreat and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and the European Union and, in particular, the major continental states of the European Union have been nursing different, indeed contradictory, geopolitical models for the future. As we saw things in America, the Soviet collapse left the US the great winner of the Cold War. Not only was America now the

greatest military power by far, but it also began enjoying an unprecedented economic boom. Under the circumstances the American triumphalism of the 1990s was only natural and that triumphalism provided the psychological and cultural environment within which American elites began formulating their unipolar vision of the future: an integrated world system with the United States as the single, hegemonic superpower.

But Europe too saw itself as a great winner from the Soviet collapse. With the Soviet empire gone, Europe no longer depended militarily on the US. Europeans finally felt restored to their own geopolitical space. They regained not only the captive states of Eastern Europe, but the way seemed open for a new and productive relationship with Russia itself. Of course the new opportunities also meant new dangers. A reunited Germany with weak states all along its Eastern border, together with an enfeebled Russia, raised the spectre of a resurrected German problem. It was widely accepted, above all among the Germans themselves, that Europe that did not go forward to greater unity risked falling back to its traditional murderous disunity. Moreover with the Soviets gone, the Europeans had lost their external balancer of American power within the West. Hence, the need they felt to balance the Americans themselves, to restore the lost transatlantic equilibrium, by creating a strong European Union. The result was Maastricht, as you remember signed in February 1992, where Western Europe, led by France and Germany, dedicated itself to a much strengthened European Union, striving for common money, common foreign and security policy, and common defence. That was followed by Copenhagen, in the fall of 1993, where the EU also committed itself to further enlargement toward the East.

With Maastricht and Copenhagen, the EU asserted its determination to make itself the dominant institution in the new pan-Europe. This European perspective implies a radically different world order from America's triumphalist, unipolar vision. Europe's perspective points not to America's unipolar world, but to a pluralist world, with several regional great powers, hopefully Europe, perhaps Russia, Japan, India, certainly China. And as old Europeans tend to see things, the ideal arrangement for such a plural

world in the making is not the hegemony of a hyperpower but a multilateral concert of all the major powers. In effect, you might say, Old Europeans prefer a world that is their own European system writ large.

Between the American unipolar vision – hegemonic and unilateral – and the European pluralist vision – plural and multilateral – there is a great potential for conflict. Both visions, in their own ways, are radical. It is not surprising therefore that there has been little American admiration or sympathy for the formidable challenges that the Europeans set for themselves at Maastricht. Instead, there has been a distinct tendency to use NATO as a rival pole of attraction – a rival Westernizer, and thereby to create a pro-American East European block inside the enlarged Union.

These rival transatlantic visions have now had more than a decade to work themselves out. Europe has achieved the Euro, enlarged in the East, and after stumbling badly in the Balkans is seeking more and more insistently its own diplomatic and military cohesion. But many obstacles obviously remain – above all, accommodating the new members is likely to prove a long and arduous process.

Meanwhile America's unipolar project has appeared in two models – Clinton's model for an economic superpower and Bush's model for a military superpower. Despite America's manifest strength, each model has revealed severe vulnerabilities. Clinton's aim was to make the US the world's economic superpower, the global champion of advanced industry and services of all kinds. But all along Clinton's boom depended on massive infusions of foreign credit. Today, with an even bigger current account deficit, our need for foreign credit is greater than ever. Ominously it now comes less and less in the form of investments in our real economy and increasingly from selling short term treasury instruments to Japanese and Chinese central banks. In effect, it is the Chinese and, above all, the Japanese, supporting the dollar in order to hang on to their trade surpluses, who now finance American prosperity. This seems a rather fragile economic foundation for a unipolar superpower. Absorbing more than we produce is not of course a new habit for the American economy, but now that the

Cold War is over, and the Euro is rivalling the dollar, our insatiable need for foreign credit seems more and more likely to impose limits on what we can borrow, on what we can spend, on what we can do, particularly on what we can do by ourselves.

Since September 11, as we all know, the Bush administration has defined the American global project in military terms. President Bush sees himself as a war time president conducting a global war on terrorism that appears to legitimate American interference anywhere in the world. A vigorous posture is bolstered by even more aggressive doctrines: preventive war against anyone seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction or otherwise developing a potential threat to American security or, in some formulations, a threat to American predominance.

This expansive redefinition of American security is accompanied by what seems a radical change in America's attitude towards its alliances. The administration often finds its traditional allies a hindrance rather than an addition to national power, and proclaims that such allies can and should be ignored.

America's heightened assertiveness naturally triggers reactions among its transatlantic allies, particularly since they are themselves acutely interested in the principal regions where the US is most active, that is to say, the Arab world, and the Middle East in general, including Turkey and Iran, or the great ring of former Soviet states that border Russia. Europe's interest in these regions is not voluntary or elective: these are Europe's near abroad. Their stability and prosperity inevitably bear on Europe's own security. Not unlike Americans, Europeans are increasingly inclined to doubt the value of the transatlantic alliance. Many Europeans see today's hyperactive US as less a contributor to Europe's security than a problem for it. In the Middle East, for example, many Europeans see US policy as a constant irritant that threatens to goad Europe's Muslim neighbours into a real war of civilisations, a war that Europeans know would be disastrous for them and would like to believe is unnecessary. Many also fear hyperactive America extending its military reach all along Russia's near abroad as a major complication

for Europe's long term relations with Russia. Using NATO to legitimise the encircling American forces but without really taking Russia into the alliance pre-empts any new co-operative pan-European security system. Building such a system, and enlisting Russia within it as a partner rather than a captive, is surely one of Europe's major long-term interests.

Given the perennial disharmony between Europe's basic geopolitical interests and America's current policies, it is not surprising that European states reacted so strongly to America's determination to invade Iraq. The European reactions, of course, were not similar or even complementary. The divergences make the European geopolitical vision at least as problematic as the American. To start with Western Europe's big three – France, Great Britain and Germany: when America's invasion finally brought the transatlantic break into the open, each of the three responded in a more or less predictable fashion. France took the lead in asserting a European position, distinct, that is, from the United States; Britain sided with the Americans. More surprising was the resolutely European position of the Germans. Germany threw away its balancing act and became, if anything, more vehemently opposed to the Americans in Iraq than the French themselves. And the Bush administration's initial reaction was also predictable: to heap vitriolic scorn on the French, while trying to play on America's special relationship with the Germans.

The American strategy, however, got nowhere – not with the French who are hardened and impervious to transatlantic tempests, and not with the Germans, neither with the Schroeder government, nor indeed with the most of the CDU opposition. America's initial policy was soon overtaken by what seemed a more fundamental shift: a definite American turning against European integration, Franco-German style. And this manoeuvre did reveal the great influence that the US could still exercise in European affairs. The US, it seemed, could count not only on the British, together with habitual trimmers like the Dutch, Irish, Swedes, Danes, and so on, but also on the Italians and Spaniards or, at least, on the Berlusconi and Aznar governments.

From the Franco-German perspective, what was perhaps even more disheartening was the vigorous support for the US position from the EU's candidate members, above all Poland, where at first even public opinion appeared to support the Americans. For a time, at least, it looked that the Franco-German vision of Europe was being revealed as, at best, a fragile dream sustainable only when tolerated by America. America's unipolar vision seemed confirmed and vindicated.

By now things have evolved somewhat differently. Iraq seems less a quick and easy American victory than a quagmire. The war has split not only Europe but also America. With an election coming on in November, the Bush administration is under severe attack from the Democrats and there seems considerable unease among rank-and-file Republicans. Its critics fault the administration not only for having made a fundamental strategic error but also for having then compounded it by arrogantly rejecting the advice of major allies and in the process forfeiting their support.

As *The Financial Times* quoted Senator Kerry in mid March, 'We are still bogged down in Iraq and the administration stubbornly holds to the failed unilateral policies that drive our allies away'. Nobody, of course, can now predict how the presidential campaign will unfold or what will happen in Iraq or in Europe, including Britain, before this year is finished. Nevertheless, the transatlantic conflict over Iraq suggests a great danger for us all: that the dreams of Europe and America will end up defeating each other – a fatal tragedy for the West, and for the world in general.

Views like these have not been very popular with Bush administration, arguably they were not very popular with its predecessor either. America's obsession with its own unipolar fantasy has crowded out America's interest in Europe's own grand vision. Perhaps Iraq is now giving us an expensive education. In any event, with restless Muslim societies from Indonesia to Morocco, with the rapid rise of China, and perhaps India, with a unifying and increasingly independent Europe, not to mention Russia and Japan, the vision of a unipolar world grows more and more implausible. Possibly the Washington unipolar consensus has begun to crumble. With this crumbling

has perhaps come a certain rebirth in the US of the old idea that a strong Europe with a mind and will of its own is in America's own interest.

There is, I believe and certainly want to believe, a considerable uneasiness among Americans that the US has grown too powerful for its own good; a realisation that the Soviet collapse, which left us the unique superpower, is in some senses a victory too far. By favoring triumphalist rhetoric and a unilateral disposition, it generates its own security problem, making us more and more a target of dislike around the world. And perhaps worst of all, a victory that so concentrates military and financial power in the American government threatens to overwhelm our old-fashioned system of domestic checks and balances.

A global power, it seems, requires a global as well as a national constitution – global checks and balances, as well as national checks and balances. Obviously no one should lament the passing of the Soviet Union, certainly not in Poland, nor in Western Europe, nor indeed in Russia itself. But the Soviet passing does create an urgent need to rebalance the international system. The more powerful the United States becomes, the more a strong and friendly Europe, with a mind of its own, becomes essential. A friendly balance is needed not only to limit and refine the exercise of American power in the world but also to keep it within constitutional channels at home.

Any nascent American awareness of limits could, I suppose, be dismissed as a revival of isolationism – a sign of a naive desire to run away from responsibilities that history has imposed on the US. I myself prefer to see it as a rejuvenation of American constitutionalism, a tradition at least as old as American imperialism. A renewed respect for the restraining of power through multilateral practices obviously has implications for transatlantic relationships. It points, I should like to think, toward a different kind of Western alliance – one that reflects a still friendly but now genuinely balanced relationship. We should not, I think, blame the present lack of such a balance on America's deficient interest in it. Creating a balanced relationship will finally depend heavily on Europeans themselves. Before there can be a genuine special relationship between Europe and America, there must

be a special relationship amongst Europeans. This is Europe's own great challenge. It represents, you might say, the debt that Europe owes to the world, to America, and of course to itself.



Pierre Hassner

[...] As usual, I agree with David Calleo, with the nuance that he is usually more optimistic about Europe and I am more pessimistic. So I will circle around the actual policies because, in a way, there are not so many policies towards Europe as Europe is no longer central to American policy, a distance has occurred. So I distinguish the objective situation and interest, the subjective views and attitudes and only at the end I come to the policies and strategies [...].

In the present situation the distance between the United States and Europe has increased very much. Henry Kissinger said that 'ours is the last generation who feels sentimental about Europe'. Now the memories of World War II and the struggle against Communism are rapidly fading. The demographic changes, the Asian and Hispanic population, the military gap with United States shooting up with such a great superiority to Europe and, on the other hand, Europe becoming a trade and economy competitor and raising fears that it can resist the United States in the WTO and elsewhere – these are objective situations and evolutions which would exist whatever the administration and which explain why, as David Calleo said, the United States, which almost invented European unity and helped it very powerfully (certainly until Kennedy), has become more ambiguous. Henry Kissinger again said that Kennedy administration had had it all wrong as it had encouraged European economic unity, allowing Europe to become a competitor, and had discouraged European military

independence, which could otherwise alleviate the burden for the United States. Richard Haass, one of the more moderate members of the administration, who is now the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, said 'we must disaggregate the European unity by opting for bilateralism: it is much better to talk to different capitals than to Brussels'. This change makes even very moderate Americans find that Europe is too passive militarily and too active politically. The Americans are less attached to Europe and also their problems are less connected with Europe. This is not necessarily the case for their interests because, although there is a contradiction between the two plans of the old Europe and the United States, there are still many basic common points of interests, like terrorism or the predictable rise of China, the interest in a viable capitalist system; out of necessity both are interested in the Middle East, in oil, in Iran and in non-proliferation. On the other hand, there are different priorities and, as David Calleo said, sometimes different visions.

It brings me to the second point about views and attitudes. Here I will borrow from a former student and present friend and colleague, John Harper, who has formulated an interesting thesis about the three basic views of the United States on Europe: the Roosevelt's one, the Kennan's and Eisenhower's one and the Acheson's one. The unexpected thing is that John Harper finds in the Bush administration a revival of Roosevelt's policy. Roosevelt was not for European unity, but rather for being a policeman for the continental Europe: he stressed that Germany should be supervised by Britain and Russia and more distantly by America, while his main idea was that Europe is finished and it has to be managed from the outside or from above. Kennan and Eisenhower thought that one has to rebuild Europe and then let it be a power on its own. And Acheson's idea was that one should encourage European unity but only as long as it is in an Atlantic framework, under benevolent leadership of the United States; it should not be allowed to compete.

As John Harper notices, in the present administration there are very few people who have the Kennan's view (which was presented here by David

Calleo), there are a few people who have the Acheson's view but who are on the defensive, while the prevalent view is the unipolar one. And this is linked to the psychological thing, to the idea which has been popularised by a current American author Robert Kagan, that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. The Europeans are weak, spoiled by not being threatened and by being protected by the Americans. America is in the real world and fights the real enemies, while the Europeans know only negotiation and integration. This was made worse by the conflict in Iraq, which revived an old American view of the simple, good-hearted American and the wily, cynical, sophisticated and treacherous European, which usually means, Frenchman. This background is expressed in the political divergences.

Now to the policies themselves, America is no longer for European integration in the sense of Europe becoming a power or an actor [...]. An American author, David Gompert, makes a useful distinction saying that Americans are for Europe's integration as a region but they are not for European integration as an actor. I think that is true and that was always true to some extent. The idea of integration of the region is important here and I would think it is the Americans who have the more lucid view that European integration cannot stop there [...]: one cannot leave outside countries which are very important both for Europe and the United States, which are at the margins – above all Turkey where the United States wages a very active campaign; Ukraine where the United States is not very active, and does not give it much priority but still more than West Europeans; the Caucasus where France has a new secret weapon, which is selling our French diplomat of Georgian origin to the Georgian government as the foreign minister.

So there is a view that the great problem is what Zbigniew Brzezinski calls global Balkans or the arc of crisis, namely the Middle East and the European side of the former Soviet Union. This is an area that Europe and the United States should care about, and where European integration can be a very important and powerful tool, since this is the main tool of Europe

as empire, as Robert Cooper would say – a co-operative empire through extension.

This view clashes with the ideal of federal Europe, because the more Europe is extended the less it can deepen. There is a difference of visions between the US and Europe as to the relations with the countries on the threshold of Europe which are politically very important for the United States. There are differences, for example, on how to settle the Israeli-Palestinian issue, whether to let Turkey in. So Europe still has a positive place in American policy but as a tool for integrating, as pacifying the extended periphery, whereas the Europeans don't seem to be very active or very interested in that [...].

Ken Jowitt

I am going to present you with a caricaturisation, not characterisation, of one scenario involving the United States and its relationship with Europe.

Suppose that under a second Bush administration the United States becomes a 'successful North Korea'.

The United States re-emphasises the centrality of an ABM shield and makes credible gains in its development. We join a long list of historical examples of countries who, when faced with a threat, created a barricade – the Great Wall of China, Hadrian's Wall, the Berlin Wall, the Israeli Wall... In this case a wall along the American-Mexican border and a Canadian curtain. Additionally, we would go nuclear, i. e. energy-wise, thereby copying, God forbid, the French. And we prepare to militarily occupy the oil producing areas of Saudi Arabia, i. e. deny them the status of being the world's most successful family run gas station. With these moves we would outdo the North



Korean effort at Chuche and create a neo-Aristotelian situation of near autarchy.

If during a second Bush administration the US 'withdraws' from the world, initially there would be enormous relief in many sectors in Europe. Rather than a nasty relationship between 'Mars' and 'Venus', it would be as if 'Mars' had left the galaxy and from the perspective of some Europeans international politics would resemble the Age of Aquarius. In response to America's North Korean-like withdrawal, Europe could revel even more in its South Korean-like antipathy towards the US.

However, I suspect that quite quickly European euphoria would be replaced by confusion, given how substantial, even definitive, the American presence in Europe has been for sixty years. And after the confusion some hard choices would have to be made. Particularly, by the UK which has put in play the most successful foreign policy in Europe. Ridiculous some say. Playing 'Tonto' to an American 'Lone Ranger!' Still, UK foreign policy has prevented a genuine rupture between the US and the UK. A 'bridge over troubled [Atlantic] waters' if you will. And enjoying, or at least benefiting from an ambivalent but effective relationship with both the US and the EU.

A Bush administration demand of the UK that it 'choose' either Europe or America would more than complicate international relations. If the choice were for America, those in the US fearful of a Mexican immigrant takeover would be delighted as would the UKIP. Still, it's one thing no longer being an Empire but to accept the position of becoming America's 'Austria' (particularly when Canada already holds that position) might be a bit too insulting to both English soccer fans and OxBridge graduates (a formidable political coalition).

An 'exclusive' choice by the UK for America and withdrawal from the EU would also add to American cultural and psychological isolationism. Not a positive development in a culture whose Achilles heel has always been hysteria. The French regularly suffer from malaise, the Germans from angst, the Japanese from the need to apologize for things they are not sorry for, and we Americans from hysteria: over witches, fluoride, commies, AIDS and

other lethal invisible contaminants. A 'purely' Anglo community would only add to the 'contamination' hysteria.

On the other hand, let us consider a UK choice for Europe. Would that improve US-EU relations? Hardly! The character of contemporary American military, technological, scientific and economic power allows America to become a 'Christian' nation, that is to say, 'in' but not 'of' this world. A national power 'able' through regime change, i.e. 'the imposition of', not 'the transition to' democracy, to proselytise the world, and simultaneously sterilise itself from the violent weakness characteristic of third world conflicts and even attack by movement of rage, á la Al Qaeda. In short, an America that could simultaneously be national hermit and international missionary.

An America without the UK would be even more withdrawn and suspicious/angry at the world. It would also be an America that establishes close relations with a Russia understandably afraid of being a ghettoed nation next to a gated EU. There would in the first place be a more tolerant attitude on America's part towards Russian authoritarianism and a less utopian demand for digital democracy in Russia. Russia would also prove a useful and growing counterweight to China. However, a closer Russian-American relationship would 'contribute' towards a weakening of Poland's democracy and the Polish Republic's ability to deal with Russia, the EU, Ukraine, Germany and the US.

Insofar, as Poland is the most important addition to the democratic world since World War II, that, to me, is an unacceptable development.

And what of the French-German relationship. I doubt the French want the UK fully in. The reason is simple, the number of political coalitions dealing with a growing variety of issues will grow. The current clarity, manageability, and thus far non-biodegradability of the Franco-German will dissolve.

The Germans would probably welcome a Britain closer to Europe if only because it would provide them with more leverage in relation to both the French and Americans.

But what if Kerry wins? Won't all these problems disappear in the face of a French speaking president with a Mozambican, South African, American

wife. Won't a shift from Toby Keith [see American country music] to Edith Piaf [no reference needed for this audience]; from parochial Crawford to cosmopolitan California, where movie stars are the 'real American' end all problems – if not history? No.

First, the obvious. Movements of rage, á la Al Qaeda will persist. Disintegrating states will still define the international landscape. Nuclear proliferation will proceed. America's indiscriminate support of Israel will have to be addressed, and so will Iran's development of nuclear weapons – perhaps on Israel's own initiative and then what? The UN is pathetically ineffectual. And while the Bush Doctrine is fatally flawed by its eschatological belief in global democracy, its analysis of novel dangers in the world is spot on (a phrase I have always wanted to use).

Second, and perhaps less obvious. If the Bush administration is a ship with a dogmatically stuck rudder, then a Kerry administration will be rudderless. I don't consider that an improvement. To substitute a President with blurred vision for one with tunnel vision is again not something to celebrate about.

As for Europe, it is essential that the EU develop a practical ideological sense of what it is. Specifically, a practical ideology of social democracy to complement America's capitalist democracy. The EU has successfully avoided the 'I' (ideology) word, and has developed since World War II in good measure due to that fact. But today in radically changed circumstances, a categorical division of labour between a Don Quijote America and a Sancho Panza Europe acts to the detriment of both. Europe must become a 'Protestant' complement to a triumphalist 'Roman Catholic' America, a 'Democratic party' competing with an American 'Republican' one.

In fact without the development of a new democratic ideology in Europe, space is created for the development of nativist mentalities and new malignant anti-democratic ideologies.

Europe doesn't need military power equivalent to the US; it needs a level of political and ideological coherence that its previous success based

on avoidance of such makes all the more difficult to arrive at or even appreciate.

Anne-Marie Slaughter

It is a particular pleasure to be here this week, immediately after May 1. It's also an odd and even sad experience. I'm half Belgian. I grew up moving back and forth between the United States and Brussels countless times. Yet never in coming to Europe have I felt ashamed when I showed my passport at the airport. I do now. I wonder if historians will look back and mark last week as the week in which Europe extended from fifteen to twenty-five, and in so doing, demonstrated that it was not simply a Western European experiment or a Western European response to World War II, but rather a model for global governance for a new century in the same week that the utter bankruptcy of the US policy in Iraq was demonstrated. It is a telling coincidence and I say that about the US policy in Iraq regardless of what happens on June 30. Because regardless of what happens in Iraq in terms of the future of the Iraqi people, U.S. interests have clearly been harmed. The conflict has clearly made our security much, much worse. We will now have to spend much more time repairing the damage we have done to ourselves in Iraq than we would have even in the situation we were in right before we went.

When we talk about United States policy in Europe, I start from the proposition that, although an expanded Europe is no panacea – we are not going to see a gloriously integrated twenty-five countries anytime soon – it will be a turning point for the United States. For the United States, anti-Americanism is going to become itself a threat that the United States has to face at a time when Europe offers a much more attractive model.



Let me offer three reasons why I think the widening of Europe, the expansion from fifteen to twenty-five, will in fact make the United States have to focus much more on Europe, have to take the EU much more seriously than it does now.

I absolutely agree with much of what David Calleo said. [...] Above all, I think it is very important to realise that most educated Americans (who would fill a conference hall like this one), who know something about foreign policy, are incredibly ignorant with respect to the EU. Not with respect to Europe – they speak European languages, many of them have European ties, many of them have spent a lot of time in different parts of Europe – but they know almost nothing about the EU as an entity. If you ask them how it is governed, how it makes decisions, how the EU defines itself, as opposed to the images that Americans project onto it, it is quite astonishing how little they know. I remember talking about the enlargement of NATO, not so long ago, sitting at the Council on Foreign Relations and hearing a quite noteworthy foreign policy expert in the United States say, ‘Oh, NATO shouldn’t enlarge, the EU should just take all those countries’, as if it could be done tomorrow, as if it was something that the EU could simply decide, with again no appreciation of what it meant economically or what the governance policies were.

However, now that the EU has widened, the United States will look to Europe and see in the first instance a number of friends that it is going to increasingly need. Let’s hope they remain friends. For all the clumsiness of Rumsfeld’s comment on the old Europe and the new Europe, there was something there in the sense of attitude towards the United States. Without question we saw that over Iraq, but it wasn’t just over Iraq. You can see it in virtually any meeting of Europeans – East, West or Central. Obviously the image of the United States was a different one during the Cold War and while the Western Europeans and the Americans were certainly close allies, they had the luxury of fighting with one another routinely over just about everything except the need to stay together as long as the Soviet Union remains the principle threat.

Now the United States looks at Europe, sees a tremendous amount of anti-Americanism in Western Europe and will look increasingly to Central and Eastern Europe to find countries that are at least willing to engage (I'm leaving out Britain). I think it will become increasingly important to find countries willing to support US policy, as indeed it has already happened in Iraq. The axis of evil, and the policies associated with it, have made anti-Americanism an axis of enmity. The United States is thus going to spend a great deal of its time trying to address anti-Americanism, not only in Islamic world, but elsewhere. And there again Eastern and Central Europe will become increasingly important.

The second reason that the expansion of the EU will raise the salience of the EU in American politics is not a reason of geopolitics but of good old-fashioned American domestic politics. I started my academic career in Chicago. It will not come as a big surprise in Warsaw that there is a large part of Chicago in which there is almost no English, either spoken or on the street signs. There is a large Polish community – something true for many cities across the mid-west – and it is not just limited to Poland. And we have seen this before, we saw this with NATO expansion, where part of the US willingness to expand NATO was driven by very strong domestic interest groups. These were interest groups, of course, that had a strong base during the Cold War and that now will see the EU differently because their families, their ethnic ties are now to countries that are also members of the EU. So I predict that American domestic politics will increase the impact of the EU with the addition of the Central European countries.

The third reason that the expansion of the EU will raise the importance of the EU is because having moved from 15 to 25, the EU becomes an entity that is very hard, even with wilful ignorance, for Americans to say: 'Oh this is going to be an entity like us.' With 25 countries, and the prospect of 30 countries, this is a new entity, it is a new form of regional governance, and, as I said, a model for global governance. The United States typically has looked at Western Europe and the EU and said, 'Oh yes, it is going to become a United States of Europe'. And many people who know a lot about

the EU have said 'No, it is not going to be a United States of Europe; it is going to be something different; it is going to be a European version of an integrated entity.' It is going to be one which retains the autonomy of nation states far, far more than the original states of the United States.

The debate was always this: 'Oh yes, the states of the United States were much more autonomous before the civil war, it took two hundred years, Europe too will head that way.' I have no doubt that Europe will become more integrated but I would stake my own academic reputation on the proposition that however it develops it is not going to look like the United States, it is not going to become a federal system (federal in United States sense of that). Once you look at twenty five states and the prospect of additional states including possibly Turkey, the United States has to realise that this is big enough and powerful enough for us to take note. And I strongly agree with David Calleo's economic analysis: most of the economists I know don't talk about 'if the dollar is going to crash' but 'when the dollar is going to crash'. And I mean really crash.

But at this point what you see is that the EU has a different model not only of how to organise itself, but also of how to stabilise and democratise other countries, thereby creating a greater zone of both security and prosperity. And it is a model that frankly has done more in the 1990s to enhance the security of the entire West, and I use this in the broadest sense, than anything the United States has managed to do. Even if we manage to get out of Iraq with a reasonably stable rights-regarding government, what are we going to do with respect to other Middle Eastern countries in the coming decades? I am fairly certain that the US will not be sending in its troops. What the US will do is urge the EU to take in Turkey. Why? Because they are going to say 'we desperately need to stabilise Islamic democracy and the best way to do that is for you to embrace Turkey as a role model for other Islamic countries'. And beyond Turkey, the United States will be saying, what about some partnership status with Iran, with Syria, with countries that will start to be on the periphery of the EU? Those countries are not likely to enter the EU any more than Russia will, and even some of

the other countries that are now between the EU and Russia, but they will undoubtedly be assimilated into some kind of relationship with the EU that looks like NATO's partnership for peace program. That will once again be a political approach to trying to address security problems, economic problems, immigration problems.

Here I have to credit my husband, Andrew Moravcsik, professor of politics at Harvard, and now at Princeton. He has written extensively on European, and by that he means the EU's, civilian power. What the EU stands for, to respond to Ken Jowitt's point, is in large part the power of civilian power, of economic incentives, but more than just economic incentives – the power of having a club that other countries want to join, having an entire set of political carrots that you can use as inducements to strengthen particular domestic political developments in other countries. In other words, saying 'if you want to be in the EU or even if you want to be in a partnership relationship with the EU, you must meet the following standards'. I submit that this civilian power is certainly as important if not more important than military power, in actually creating beneficial conditions in other countries.

But finally, I think the EU also has developed. I realise that this sounds very utopian; I am well aware of many of the EU's problems. Nevertheless, the EU has developed a model of governance that is going to be the model for a new generation of global institutions. It is the model of networked governance. If you think about how the EU works, there are obviously some quite powerful supra-national institutions, although, as my husband likes to point out, the entire size of the bureaucracy in Brussels, by the standards of the US federal government, is nothing. It's a very small supra-national entity. You have the Commission and the Court – both are obviously important. But most of the work in the EU is done through networks of national officials, the Council of Ministers, all the different ministers in all the different areas, networks of national judges, and increasingly networks of national parliamentarians. These networks are important in part because they allow nations to maintain a good measure of national independence and autonomy while participating in some larger structure. But they are

also critical because they allow us to penetrate below the surface of the traditional sovereign state when we are trying to implement the traditional goals of foreign policy. What do I mean? If you are trying to face any of the threats we face, whether they are economic, environmental or security, you cannot do it through traditional diplomacy where a country commits to do something, passes a treaty and then supposedly implements it. You have to actually operate at the level of the government officials who are in charge of a particular area. So if you are talking about regulating the global economy, you need to be talking to the finance ministers, and if you are talking about terrorism, you need to be talking, not only to the financial regulators, but to the entire criminal justice apparatus, the border officials, and ultimately, of course, in some cases, the military.

What the EU has is a structure that involves networks of all those officials. It socialises new members, so when as here with new members from Central and Eastern Europe, a large part of joining the EU will be essentially integrating government officials from all the new countries into these EU networks. These networks support these officials, allow them to exchange information, and foster the implementation of a general policy at the level of the officials that actually have power. Ironically, that is a model that the US likes globally: the US pushes for global networks of competition officials and environmental officials. But the US has been very slow to realise that the place that has really pioneered this approach to governance is the EU.

So in closing, I want to come back to where I started, that we face a historic moment. If President Bush is re-elected I think much of what Ken Jowitt said could well come to pass. This would make Europe even that much more attractive in the rest of the world. But I think what we see is a period in which the bankruptcy of a unipolar, hegemonic policy has become clear and a moment when the EU has demonstrated for all its faults that it is actually pioneering, not only economic integration, but also modes of political governance.

Discussion

Adrian Pop (University of Bucarest)

I would like to draw your attention a little bit further East and to touch upon a subject which I think is relevant both for the geopolitics of the EU enlargement and for the concept of near abroad referred to by David Calleo. In April 2003 the EU launched a new initiative, which is called 'Wider Europe. New Neighbourhood Initiative'. Out of the fourteen nations covered by this concept, only two will have a direct border with the future EU enlarged after 2007, with Romania and Bulgaria in. And amongst the two countries which are going to have the direct border with the enlarged Europe, Ukraine and Moldova, only Moldova has an unsolved conflict on its territory, which is the frozen conflict of Transdnistria. Apparently EU has realised the importance of having an unsolved conflict in its backyard and it is more committed than in the past to be involved in the process of the resolution of this conflict. This is obvious for different reasons, I will only recall the alluding to sending peace-keeping troops there by the former Dutch Foreign Minister, who used to be the former OSCE chairman and now is NATO Secretary General [...]. Now it is not so clear if the US is also interested in being as involved as in the past in this conflict. Some would say that the US is not interested in jeopardising a new co-operative relation with Russia after September 11 for a distant territory which is not among its priorities.

I would like to ask the panel about the following possible scenario. The democratic opposition in the Republic of Moldova and the civil society have repeatedly asked the international community to get involved in the mechanism of conflict resolution and they specifically asked for the EU, US and Romania to become members of this mechanism. Do you think a co-operative relationship is possible between US and EU [...] on putting an end to the Transdnistria issue?

Robert Cooper

David Calleo spoke of Europe wanting a plural world and then Ken Jowitt said that Europe needed an ideology. I think I have a slightly different view. It seems to me that there is a kind of ideology in Europe, at least about international relations, and at the heart of that is the idea that Europe would like to see the world governed by law, and that is visible in its enthusiastic espousal of things to the International Criminal Court, it is visible in the way it organises its relations with other countries, in terms of legal instruments and contractual agreements. And it is after all what Europe itself is: Europe is a community of law and it is not unnatural that it should wish to create a world of law in which it will feel comfortable. And I don't think that it is an unattractive vision of the world, but it is very different from the vision of a world of power, which, at least some, in the US seem to favour.

Timothy Garton Ash

I have an appeal and a question. The appeal is: can we please stop talking about old and new Europe. I mean it is bad enough that we spent more than a year characterising European-American relations on the basis of an amusing but fairly simplistic caricature by Robert Kagan. But it is a whole lot worse that Europeans are talking about their own differences in terms invented by that great intellectual Donald Rumsfeld in a crude, off the cuff, instrumental remark at a press conference. And I stress instrumental. And

now for more than a year Europeans have been going around at a thousand conferences clacking about old and new Europe as if Donald Rumsfeld was some Michelet or Lelevel, some great authority on European history. All our countries are a mixture of old and new, you only have to look out of the window to see that here.

The crudeness of this distinction should have been apparent to us at the latest at the moment of the last Spanish elections, when with the election of Zapatero suddenly Spain from being new Europe becomes old Europe, which is absurd. There is a great argument about America dividing Europe. Simply put, it is an argument between Euro-Gaullists and Euro-Atlanticists. This is an argument that goes within countries as much as between countries. There is no solid block of Euro-Atlanticist countries, nor a solid block of Euro-Gaullist countries. Of course there are more Euro-Atlanticists in Poland and Britain but in Britain too we have Euro-Gaullist, believe it or not, and there are even Euro-Atlanticists in Paris. I think one may be sitting on the panel.

And if we want to talk, and we should be talking, seriously about Europe's argument about America, let's abandon this absurd cross notion of old and new Europe and let's start talking about the real argument between Euro-Atlanticists and Euro-Gaullists. My question is a question of information to the panel. We know that America is much less interested in Europe than it was during the Cold War, we agree on that. We know that most of the American elites are increasingly ambivalent, to say the least, about further steps of European integration, as David Calleo said. But there is also something more pro-active of which Rumsfeld's remark about old and new Europe was actually an example, namely, an active policy of divide and rule. What Richard Haass rather politely calls disaggregation or even more politely multilateralism *a' la carte*, an elegant formulation, what others call more crudely 'cherry-picking', is actually among some, certainly in the Bush administration, a conscious policy. *The Wall Street Journal Europe* had a leader who said that if France goes on behaving as it is, the time will come when we should regard the Atlantic alliance itself as a coalition

of the willing. And in this Poland, by the way, plays a very important part. My question to you is, how widespread that active, conscious tendency of *divide et impera* is. Do you think it is confined to a few neo-conservatist and people within the Bush administration or is it a much wider view within American foreign policy elite, possibly, extending even into a new democratic administration?

Heather Grabbe

I wanted to try and link this panel and the one we had this morning in which there was so much discussion about Russia. Because – although I agree very much with Timothy Garton Ash that old versus new Europe is a distinction that perhaps should have got a few days, perhaps a couple of weeks of comment and it has not really justified a whole year's worth – nevertheless, one area where it is clear that the new members of the EU will have rather different views from the old members is on the question of Russia. At the moment we see the big countries in the EU – Paris, Berlin, London and Rome – vying with one another to offer Russia favours and undermining EU foreign policy in many respects. In Central and Eastern Europe there is much more of the attitude of 'get tough, let's put more conditions on Russia, let's make sure Russia is contained'. I would be very interested in the panel's view, given that you have been talking so much about US attitudes, how is the US going to view in the future the tension between Russia's resurgent interest in what it sees as its natural sphere of influence and the European Union's concern about what it sees as its near abroad, its neighbourhood. We are already starting to see some tension, certainly not conflict yet, about issues like that Adrian Pop raised, question of Transdnistria, Moldova, also the question of Georgia and whether or not Russian troops should withdraw, as well as other frozen conflicts in this region. Now what is the US attitude going to be? We have seen some hints of a change in the Bush administration's view of Vladimir Putin as an individual, but what will be the reaction of the US in the longer term? Will

it be encouraging the EU to accept Georgia, for example, as an EU member, perhaps to accept all of the Caucasus as a means of stabilising them and how will that square with US policy on Russia and what it regards as its sphere of influence? This seems to me a very important question for Central and Eastern Europeans, who have so often felt themselves to be caught between big powers. It is not something that worries the old members of the EU very much. But it is something which is absolutely central to the EU's future relationships with Russia.

Anne-Marie Slaughter

Let me start with Robert Cooper's question. I have been very hard on the United States and as I said, I think we are at an extraordinary low point for the United States. I want to begin by clarifying something and then I will turn to this question of law versus power. I said I was ashamed to show my passport not because of what has happened in Iraq. I actually think no country has completely virtuous armed forces or police authorities. We all have our problems in this regard. Certainly we have had them in the United States in our cities. We have no monopoly on virtue but neither has any other country. What makes me ashamed is the response, is the failure to acknowledge how devastating this is, the failure to have any action instantly in terms of a government response, particularly with high-level resignations and a public willingness to admit that we could actually be wrong. So I just wanted to clarify that I am not ashamed of my country, but that I am very ashamed of my government at the moment. But having said that, I don't think it is right to say Europe stands for law and the United States stands for power because a large part of the mess that we got ourselves into over Iraq, and when I say 'we' I mean both sides of the American political scene, was born of the experience of the 1990s when many Americans (not on the right, not the neo-conservatives but many liberals from the Clinton administration) had lived through a series of devastating internal conflicts in which the solution was more force

not less, applied sooner not later. From their perspective, the Europeans simply would not do what was necessary. The experience of the people on the ground in Bosnia in the Clinton administration was one that left them despairing of the rhetoric of the rule of law in the European Union and the unwillingness to recognise that there is evil in the world and sometimes you do need to use force.

That is why when Bush started his campaign to invade Iraq it divided the American left, because most people were very opposed to the way he was purporting to do it but many people thought, well if you can do this multilaterally, maybe indeed if Saddam Hussein does have weapons of mass destruction, we also know that he is a hideous tyrant, and this may be a case where we do in fact need to use force. I think those of us who may have thought that have at least been reinforced in our point that if you were going to use force you had to use it multilaterally and maybe it would have been better not to use it at all. But my overriding point is that in the end you need both. You do need a community of law and you do need international institutions. These institutions must have impact, but they are not ever going to be enough without real power behind them. Law and power must work together.

So let me turn just briefly to Timothy Garton Ash's point; I stand chastened and corrected on the old and new Europe. And I welcome the correction about Euro-Gaullists and Euro-Atlanticists. I think that is a far better way to talk about it but I am going to just reformulate my point in those terms. I think the addition of the ten new members, many of whom are probably more reflexively Euro-Atlanticist, is going to be valuable for the United States. The consequences of the Euro-Gaullist versus Euro-Atlanticist debate within the EU is going to be much greater for the US as the US formulates its economic and the security policy, regardless who is elected.

Quickly on how conscious is it a 'divide and conquer' policy. I think that is a very important point. Right now I would say it is limited to neo-conservatives. But I think Europe has a lot to say about whether it continues. If Europe is seen increasingly in the United States as anti-American, it will become

increasingly legitimate to argue against increased European integration. So I think there is a danger there.

Finally I just want to conclude on a more positive note. I do not think of the world in poles. I think effectively what we are starting to look at is, as I said, networks of different government officials – financial officials of all kinds, economic officials, judges, and national leaders. Maybe David Calleo is right that we need the EU as a constitutional check on the US. But if that were to work I can very much see a world in which the US and the EU of course have very strong common interests, not only economic interests but also security interests and ultimately the interest in spreading the values that are our – meaning from the EU to California and beyond – our common heritage. I think there is a way to promote that worldwide. I simply suggest that the form of co-operation in other regions of the world is more likely to resemble the organisation of the EU than it is any notion of a federal state. If you would like to hear more, I have just published a new book called ‘A New World Order’ that makes all these points.

Ken Jowitt

Indeed, law can play a central ideological role. The problem is you don’t get effective law without power. Canon law was backed up by, based on, a quite powerful Catholic Church. Similarly, Roman law rested on a powerful French state. And then of course there is the more recent example of law combined with power in the role of the Supreme Court in the US election of 2000.

Next, the issue of America’s attempt to invidiously distinguish between new and old Europe in an imperial effort to divide and conquer. There are those in and around the Bush administration who do NOT want to divide and conquer. Divide and conquer is too complicated and suspect. Theirs is an ‘either-or’ attitude towards everything. It is a bit like reading Stalin. Either you are for Paris or you are for Washington. Either you are for Israel or you are for the Palestinians. For them – the Wolfowitzes and Perles,

Ledeens and many others, the world is Manichean. It is the US, the UK and Israel. and then the rest. It is as if you were reading a lecture by Zhdanov in 1948. This attitude is radical in the extreme. I am conservative, I find nothing conservative about this group. They are happier with Paine than Burke. Their idea of America forming alliances with some members of the EU against other members both new and old is desirable. The issue is not whether America lines up with or favours some EU members on some issues against other EU members. Nor is the issue whether or not there is a regular tendency to favor some over others – that is called partisanship and makes for democracy. The issue is whether these are shifting alliances within the Western community and favor toleration or mutually exclusive antagonistic alliances that favor European fragmentation with American help.

Should the US get involved in the Transdnistria issue? No. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has reunited on Western terms, the EU and NATO have moved to the Russian border. The US has a base in Uzbekistan, and expressed a 'democratic' interest in Georgia. Kennan once observed it is right/incumbent to defeat an enemy, but gratuitous to insult one, even a former one, if as in the case of Russia it has the potential to become great again. So given the fact that Transdnistria is not of any strategic value I would leave it alone.

Pierre Hassner

I think I disagree with Ken Jowitt on Transdnistria but after all I am a Romanian by origin so anything which eats away the Russian empire is good for me and I think that in Georgia it is good that it is an improvement. And in fact, in Haiti too. It's one of the few parts in the world where France and the United States are co-operating for the good.

To Robert Cooper's point and I agree with what Anne Marie Slaughter said. But there is, it seems to me, an ambiguity in the European stand which is expressed when Dominique de Villepin says we want a more unipolar world and we want a more multilateral world. It's not the same. After all the

League of Nations was made against the policies of the balance of power, of the three against five. It's not obvious what the Europeans want. Kagan, in his *post scriptum* to his article, which I think is an improvement, says it is not so much the Europeans who want the law, I don't think the French are converted to the Security Council on which they were pouring scorn but they don't like the United States deciding without consulting the Europeans because they would like Europe to be part of the constellation more or less equal with the United States. Others really want to eliminate power out of international relations. There was always this ambiguity among Europeans: do you want Europe to become a great power or do you want to eliminate great power calculations and make the world peace through world law which was more of an American idea in fact.? So there is this ambiguity and it is well founded because, it seems to me, you will have the inequalities of power. The idea of multipolarity depends on what you call that. In a way the world is multipolar. Fidel Castro is a pole, Ben Laden is a pole and George Soros. There are all sorts of centres of power and of resistance but if one means to have a constellation of five or seven great powers which would be more or less equivalent in power and more or less equidistant – no, the United States is obviously much stronger than the others and there are some ties, whether economic or ideological with them, and, as has been said, there are many other actors and ties in the economy than those between the states. So it is a complex world but where it remains true that it is not healthy to have one hegemonic power which doesn't admit any kind of reciprocity, which is ultra-sovereignist for itself and ultra interventionist for others. International relations are made of the compromise between inequality and reciprocity and both are imperfect, there will be stronger and weaker. But if the strong don't admit some kind of legitimacy which goes beyond their own, beyond the American constitution and electorate, then you can't have any order. The Europeans are, I think, divided in the priority they give to the balance of power factor or to the rule of law factor.

As for Tim, yes – I completely agree, I was using 'old and new' ironically at the beginning. It remains true, especially in connection with Russia that

the East-Central Europeans and the Balkans have a special sensitivity, well founded, on Russia and on the danger which can always be recurrent and the behaviour towards the small states, especially those from the former union being very arrogant. And that's why they want a counter from the West.

The interesting thing, and I link it with Heather's question, is that the difference is above all between the so called new Europeans, the East Central ones and the Westerners because we [the Westerners] have all been competing for Putin's favours: Bush in the name of the struggle with terrorism, abandoning the Chechens; Chirac saying that Russia is progressing courageously towards democracy just at the time when it is becoming more autocratic every day. But I must say that recently the Americans seem less intent of not displeasing the Russians as shown with these policies which are a mixture of balance of power thinking and of using the terrorist thing and all that to be present in Central Asia. On Georgia, as I was saying, there was an agreement between France and United States to support the Georgians. I am on the side of the West, so if a country becomes more Western I will not shed tears upon Russia, although I know one must reach an arrangement with it. But one must also show Russia that it cannot have any type of behaviour it wants against its smaller neighbours.

David P. Calleo

I will focus on a group of related points: Robert Cooper noted that Europe does have its own global ideology, which provides it with strong views on how the world system should be organized. Anne Marie Slaughter, I believe, said Europe itself is a model for how the international system should be structured and governed. What kind of model? It is multilateral but is it 'balanced' in the old fashioned sense of having a 'balance of power'? And does that make it susceptible to the old-fashioned policy of 'divide and conquer', Timothy Garton Ash's point? Pierre Hassner distinguished between a contentious balance of power system and a co-operative multilateral system – a perfectly sensible point and everybody knows what he means. But, in my

view, the issue needs to be qualified further. Every healthy constitutional system, national or international, combines the two. It requires not only multilateral institutions that guide the interactions of competing elements, but also an underlying balance of power that prevents any one element or combination from regularly dominating the constitutional machinery. Thus, in a proper liberal and democratic system, loyalty to the constitution is maintained because the dice do not seem permanently loaded against one group or another. An underlying balance compels respect for the rules of the game. In other words, I don't think multilateralism can persist unless underlying it is a certain balance of power. I don't mean by this a caricature of the balance of power, as in some 18th century system where everyone wakes up in the morning and calculates who's got what overnight and decides whether or not to go to war in the afternoon. By the balance of power I mean a system, domestic or international, where there is a sufficient balance of force, whatever form that force may take – electoral or military, so that no one is inclined to behave too badly, because the penalties for behaving badly are evident and quickly invoked. I think that's what Samuel T. Coleridge, that great student of the British Constitution once described as 'potential power'. Coleridge argued that you cannot really have liberty and stability in a constitutional system without a certain underlying balance, capable of being summoned effectively in defense of balance itself. In that sense balance of power and multilateralism are not incompatible, but really are complementary. It helps, of course, if politics is not regarded as a zero-sum game, where every gain for one is automatically regarded as a loss for the others. This is not, of course, how the EU has worked in the past. Its now long history suggests a more hopeful view of interstate relations.

Timothy Garton Ash distinguished between Euro-Atlanticists and Euro-Gaullists. Again, everybody knows this division. But while we are at it, we should also note that de Gaulle himself always favored a close connection between Europe and the United States. He differed with Churchill because he thought Europe would not have a serious voice in American policy unless there were, first, a special relation among Europeans. Otherwise, the

tremendous imbalance of power would make close ties with America disadvantageous and uncomfortable for Europeans. Of course, many Europeans besides the British believe themselves to have their own national 'special relations' with the US and are thereby inclined to play their own hands at the expense of European solidarity.

Poles, for example, are good at this. But having observed these special relationships from the other end, so to speak, I suspect Europe's interests, and indeed America's, are better served by de Gaulle's position. This leads me to suspect that the real differences between the Euro-Atlanticist and Euro-Gaullist positions are probably not as great as it might seem. To have an effective and durable Euro-Atlanticism probably does require a major strengthening of European solidarity. In that sense I think de Gaulle was and is right and Churchill was and is wrong. Another question raised: Do we try to divide and rule? Yes, of course. You cannot expect Americans to respect European unity if Europeans themselves do not respect it.

Finally Iraq. Pierre Hassner talked about Kagan's idea – the American view – that Europeans come in after the meal to do the dishes. For obvious reasons, Europeans are not terribly interested. But it is not easy to imagine any scenario where conditions in Iraq do not get worse. In Washinton, simply getting out is gradually growing acceptable as the alternate strategy. It obviously has great appeal. But can we? Vietnam is perhaps a misleading parallel. There, a serious government did exist in the north – not very nice perhaps, but serious. We were not leaving the country in chaos. There is no such regime in Iraq. We will leave behind a civil war that seems likely to engage Iraq's major neighbours – a real catastrophe, not just for the United States but even more for Europe. This asymmetrical vulnerability may be the basis for a transatlantic bargain of mutual interest. It will require an American government intelligent and skillful enough to manage it – obviously nothing to be taken for granted. To pull it off we would have to go to Europe, Russia and China, and to try to create some kind of international authority, presumably using the Security Council, to bless an international occupation for a sufficient time to give some chance for stability. Everybody

would have to contribute forces and the deal would have to include a serious settlement for the Palestine question. This sounds utopian and no doubt it is. But given the difficulty of our either staying or leaving, there may not be another solution that is not a tragedy whose consequences may well engulf Europe. Whatever happens in the election, we will still be in a mess, and the same real options may well remain.

To close: These challenges are coming on rather thick and fast. Meanwhile Europe has a lot to do, to deal with its own affairs. But the rest of the world does not wait. And Europe has got into some bad procrastinating habits during the Cold War, when nothing fundamental changed and Europe began to look upon its problems and choices with a certain leisurely complacency. Common defense and diplomacy, but not just now. That frame of mind may be growing increasingly dysfunctional. Old issues are now perhaps more pressing than Europeans are accustomed to think.

Christoph Bertram

I have two points, one concerning the issue of ideology which I thought deserves some more thinking from us Europeans. Not so much in terms of being different from the United States but in terms of uniting all those that are going to live in Europe. We are going to have, perhaps not in Poland, but in rest of the Union, a growing Muslim population. What kind of values do we have that we call European which are capable of bringing in people from other parts of the world into a sense of being a citizen of the society we are creating? I think that is where a certain degree of ideology has to come in.

My second point and question to the panel is on what David Calleo has referred to already and I very much agree with him on the need to try and get ready for the possibility that disaster looms in Iraq. We Europeans may have to think of doing something about it. And unfortunately we are very far away from that. The question is this: in all the presentations we have had from the panel there was a view of the United States that is basically

going to be what it is now, in the future. How would the panel think that the experience of failure, if not defeat, in this grandiose, neo-conservative strategy will affect the United States and American policy in the future? Will it mean that there is going to be an increasing finger pointing at the Europeans 'you weren't there when we were in trouble' and the Europeans saying 'you have got us into the mess'? Are we going to enter a whole different kind of Atlantic relationship, are we going to have an America, which says perhaps one of the problems that the neo-cons didn't see was precisely that they didn't have a view of the real world, so we have to get back to the real world. Is there going to be some kind of post-Vietnam syndrome of withdrawal? I think this is a question which will be rather important to address ourselves to. America has after all this extraordinary ability of self-correction, sometimes faster than Europeans fathom.

Krzysztof Zielke (Polish Academy of Science)

My question refers to Ken Jowitt's prediction that during Bush's second term there will be a new alliance or a new coming closer between US and Russia. Is it because the Eastern barrier, or the new Europe, failed to balance the old Europe, as we have seen in Spain when they decided to leave the new Europe arrangement? Or is it because the US wants to balance? Another question, is Russia enough to balance both Europe and China at the same time?

Krzysztof Iszkowski (*Krytyka Polityczna* quarterly)

Anne-Marie Slaughter said it would be beneficial for the United States that Turkey joins the European Union and that the United States would press for it. My question is: would it be beneficial for the European Union to admit Turkey as a Member State? And because I expect to get an answer, 'yes it would be beneficial because more stability in Turkey means more stability and more safety for Europe', I would also ask another question, if

it was not so that while accepting Poland and Slovakia and Hungary, Europe is pushing Ukraine away because those countries are more interested and involved in inter-European politics than in good relationships with Ukraine. Wouldn't the same happen in the Middle East where Turkey would be more engaged in Europe, and taking care less of its neighbours that need to be taken care of, namely Iraq and Syria?

Aleksander Smolar

Ken Jowitt raised a fundamental issue when he mentioned that this period is shapeless, nameless. You can say that this is an intellectual problem but the real problem is how to manage the world order and what could be the dangers of the Iraqi war and of the possible US defeat or withdrawal, with Europe behaving as it is? What is the real global danger? To say that US should be punished certainly is not enough. This is Schadenfreude which intellectually can be satisfying but politically is extremely dangerous.

Pierre Hassner

I just think aloud because, of course, I don't have the answer to Christoph Bertram's question and it is linked also with Timothy Garton Ash's remark on the policy of dividing Europe. Personally I have always stressed, perhaps excessively, that there are two Americas, Bush is not America. If you take the period 1999/2000, ideology in America seemed to be political correctness, compassion and repentance, you couldn't be in the CIA if you had a criminal record, etc. The Europeans were making fun of American legalism and of American masochism as against the old wisdom of diplomatic, military thinking. Now it is completely different, there is a revolution in America itself and September 11 gave a great advantage to that other America. But is it permanent? I don't know, Bush seemed to me discredited by the Iraq war but his polls have grown. There seems to be for the time being a rallying around the president based on the idea that at least he knows what

he wants. I still would expect that at one point things reverse themselves and there is a Vietnam syndrome which was replaced by the September 11 one, but where it goes from there is a question. Whether it is withdrawal or resentment, everybody blaming everybody else, as my pessimistic view would tend to be; or whether everybody is converted to balance, I really don't know.

This is also the answer about attempting to divide the West. I am very afraid of the psychological consequences on both sides of the coming disaster in Iraq. Because I agree that the Europeans should come in, and yet my gut feeling is that they will not come in and hence there will be a disaster and the disaster will be of mutual resentment.

Anne-Marie Slaughter answered Tim's question by saying that for the time being the only active opposition to European unity are some neo-conservatists. But recently everybody, including Madeleine Allbright, has had Brzezinski's notion that we should be nice to the Europeans, we should encourage them, but as long as they don't challenge American primacy. I am afraid that the aftermath of Iraq will mean mutual recrimination, which will make the kind of balance, which David described very well, very difficult for both sides.

David P. Calleo

Who knows what the ultimate reaction to Iraq will be in the United States or elsewhere. The only thing I can say is that I am more optimistic, I guess, than Pierre Hassner. But who knows? Americans are, I think, in the process of learning something about how dysfunctional the unipolar world view can be. But the lesson is very painful and who knows what the psychological reaction will be? It does seem to me that whatever scenario prevails in the end – a United States which is suddenly much easier to get on with and interested in serious co-operation, or an ill-tempered United States inclined to withdraw – a strong Europe is highly desirable. If the United States is in a mood to co-operate, which I very much hope will be the outcome of Iraq,

it is important that there be a Europe with a mind of its own to co-operate with and not merely a group of states where it is easy to play one off against the other. If the United States withdraws in ill-temper, and leaves behind a great mess, Europeans are likely to be vulnerable to the consequences and it will be important for Europe to have the machinery to be able to act militarily to protect its vital interests. This doesn't mean spending half a trillion dollars annually on defence, like the US, but it does mean seriously coordinated defence capabilities which can function. Nobody can do that for the Europeans except themselves. Meanwhile, I suppose you can say that the Bush administration has done as much as is humanly possible to unite Europe. But the rest will still have to be done by the Europeans themselves.

It seems to me that for Americans the fundamental issue is the unipolar view of things that has become so pervasive among us. Having dwelt so long in a bipolar world, now that the Soviet pole is gone, we habitually assume only one superpower remains, and we are it. This is a vision where we play the role of God. We have all God's problems. If we are omnipotent, and yet there is evil in the world, how come? It must be because we are not doing our job as God. Without too much exaggeration, that seems to me the view of some main thinkers in the Bush administration. Until we get rid of the unipolar view, we will not be very good partners. But we have created by now for ourselves ample incentives to learn a new way of looking at things, and that may be what follows.

Anne-Marie Slaughter

I think that the impulse to withdraw, the isolationist impulse, is going to be very strong. In the first place, if Bush is re-elected that is what he said he was going to do when he was elected the first time. It is the move that Reagan made with the marines in Lebanon: 'We really don't know what we are doing. Let's get out.' And of course there is always the argument that we ought to be focussing on homeland security and the fortress idea. I agree with Ken Jowitt that it is going to have a great appeal.

I don't think it is going to work for a number of reasons. One is that George Bush's politics and his religion run the same way. The Israel factor is very important here. Right now it is his base and he must satisfy his base and he has to stay engaged in the Middle East. He can't pull out. I also think that he personally thinks that after September 11 he has a religious mandate. This is what he is intended to do. So I think those two things will remain even if he is re-elected. I also think terrorism is not going away, and indeed it is likely to get worse. There is this notion, which is very politically appealing in the United States, that at least we are fighting the terrorists 'there not here.' Because of course the backlash of September 11 is for 'God's sake we'll fight them but let's not have it happen here.' That is why I don't think we can pull out completely and then I think there is simply no alternative to eating whatever crow we've got to eat. We simply cannot afford to keep bearing the burden. Forget the military side, just economically our deficits are going to be through the roof. That's the one thing you have to see. The US economy is a mess and we are not going to get intra-American trade, I will predict, certainly for a decade if not longer. So I think you are going to have to create some kind of multilateral structures for the simple economic and political reasons that you cannot pull out completely as much as you would like to.

Ken Jowitt

First, Christoph Bertram's question: what's going to happen in the United States? The Bush Administration is in Maginot Line mode. And we know what happened to that strategy. To survive, Ashcroft, Rice and Wolfowitz must announce they are leaving for missionary work, the National Football League and reality testing. Wolfowitz actually thought Gus Dur would bring democracy to Indonesia (and Wolfowitz was our Ambassador to Indonesia).

The Bush Administration is defensive and unfortunately inadaptable. Cheney is a liability both politically and policy wise. He should resign and be

replaced by the best bet the Republicans have now and in the near future, the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist. Rumsfeld is a decided asset as is Powell who is not so much a racial as a status token. In fact given his treatment and position he should have resigned. His one genuine fault.

Point: the Republican party is severely conflicted at both the elite and citizen level.

The Democrats. Obviously, Hilary wants George to win so she can be President (Oprah would be her perfect vice-President; Dr. Phil. Secretary of State. Al Sharpton Presidential press secretary. Commerce is easy – Ralph Nader. And Defense – who needs it?).

But take the Kerry team.

Blacks, Jews, University towns, Hollywood and people scared of Bush will vote for Kerry. You might ask then, how could he win? Bush scares a lot of people, including a lot of Republicans.

Face it, if the Bush Administration is dogmatic, defensive, and likely to be defeated; the Kerry 'team' is elitist, vague, and therapeutic.

What a choice!

The most serious development in American politics today is NOT the polarisation of the electorate – check the data. It is the absence of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats: the visceral polarisation between political elites.



Session III

European attitudes towards US and transatlantic relations

'Old' and 'New' Europes: Security preoccupations, attitudes towards Euro-Atlantic community and prospects of overcoming European divisions.

- Chair: **Timothy Garton Ash**, University of Oxford.
- Panellists: **Christoph Bertram**, Foundation for Science and Policy, SWP, Berlin;
- Robert Cooper**, Council of the European Union, Brussels;
- Ivan Krastev**, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia;
- Dominique Moïsi**, French Institute of International Relations, IFRI, Paris.

Christoph Bertram

My first point is that, although European – American relations are of course shaped by the events we are all living through at the moment, I think it is important to say at the outset that the Iraq issue has really been a very exceptional one. This is not the normal way in which the United States deals with its allies. It is exceptional that the leading power in the Atlantic relationship, the Atlantic Alliance, decides to go to war on a basis which is spurious (and it turns out to be even more so in the process); that it does



so regardless of trying to get its allies to join it; that it declares it is going to do what it wants to do anyway; and that it itself is going to decide who is part of the alliance and who is not. I think that this exceptional situation is unlikely to repeat itself. So we should not, in our analysis of American – European relations in the future, take this as the most obvious and the most reliable precedent. Having said that, the kind of divisions we have seen among the members of the European Union (both those that already were in before May 1, 2004 and those who joined on that date) are likely to remain at least temporarily. Amazingly, divisions are unlikely to appear on issues of money and trade and competition, all areas in which the European Union has acquired a degree of supranationality and a sovereignty of its own. But in security matters it is still the states that decide. And as far as security is concerned, the twenty-five Member States of the European Community don't see eye to eye with each other on all issues.

My second point is that this situation is likely to change over time. Enlargement has a number of consequences for foreign policy of the European Union and security policy in the Union. One consequence is that a number of countries who join the Union, not least out of security concerns, are going to have a much stronger voice within that Union. Today it is interesting to see that when Finland joined the European Union a few years ago, and it did so primarily out of security concerns rather than economic ones, the Finns succeeded in shaping the policy of the Union in one important respect – the Northern Dimension. I think that now with the accession of a number of countries bordering on Russia, and with a particular history of relations with Russia, the new members will influence much more strongly the policy of the Union as such, vis-à-vis its new neighbours. They will have a much stronger voice, and the kind of display of dissent and disunity we have seen recently over relations

with Russia, on whether the Baltic states should or should not behave differently towards Russia, will be matters of the past. We are going to see the Baltic states, Poland and other states playing a much greater role in shaping the common European position.

The other consequence of enlargement is of course that enlargement moves the Union more and more towards troubled parts of the world. When it started with six, it was nicely surrounded by the Atlantic Alliance, protected in a way by the Cold War from all those nasty parts of the world beyond. Now the Union, expanding to twenty five members and more, is moving towards areas which will force it to take common positions. This has already been very clear on the Balkans: remember how disunited the European Union members were at the beginning of the Balkan tragedy, and how united they are today. These challenges will push us together. I think that over time the differences that have been so marked in an exceptional case like Iraq, are likely to be less pronounced. In relationship with the United States they are also going to be less pronounced because the overall interest of the European Union members is to have and retain a close relationship with the United States. We have, in contrast to practically all other countries in the world, the extraordinary advantage of having a special relationship with Number One and that makes a lot of sense in strategic terms for all of us. The differences that are likely to arise are not going to be stronger than what unites us, namely the need, the desire, the strong strategic interest in having a close relationship with the United States, even when the United States is unilateral and may not always behave according to our wishes. Do not forget that we have experienced extraordinary four years of an extraordinary administration and still the Atlantic relationship has survived.

Now what is it that really links us together in the new era which we all are beginning? It is, I think, a common interest in international order. International order will not be possible without an Atlantic union. The Atlantic union is, I think, the basis for formulating rules and institutions that are relevant way beyond the Atlantic union; it is the only institution which can,

not least through its mixture of Europe and America, define rules which are acceptable and regarded as fair by a much larger number of countries. The common interest in an international order of rules and institutions is what effectively ties us together even when our security concerns are no longer identical (and even in security terms, there are enough issues that unite us).

A final remark is an observation that perhaps many of you have shared in the last few years when governments have not been really dealing with each other in the same harmonious manner we were used to in the Atlantic relationship: it is the civil society that has been extraordinarily active and has held the West together. The desire of Europeans to talk to Americans and of Americans to talk to Europeans in these last few years has been extraordinary, supported, no doubt, by wise foundations, by people who actually realise the necessity of this relationship. The civil society links across the Atlantic have proven remarkably resilient, and therefore we have this double assurance: that interests across the Atlantic are going to link us, but also that civil society is going to link us because the US and Europe are natural partners and they mutually regard themselves as natural partners.

Robert Cooper

First point – the enormous similarity of Europe and the United States. Margaret Thatcher, a lady who I don't necessarily agree with on absolutely every point, spoke of 'that other Europe across the Atlantic Ocean', and there is some truth in that story. And there is some truth in the enormous intermeshing of the two economies, particularly of investment. There is a lot of trade across the Pacific, but as far as investment is concerned, Europe and the USA are more or less one community, one pool of capital. And there is an enormous similarity of the way in which Europeans and Americans view the world: fears of terrorism, fears of weapons of mass destruction, concerns about global warming (that is the position of the US population rather than the US government); support for the United Nations (that again

is the position of the US population rather than the US government).

There are two big differences between most European countries and the USA. One is that the United States is much more patriotic. When you ask the question in most European countries: 'Are you proud to be French, German, British?', people answering 'Yes' are less than fifty per cent. The second difference is that the US is much more religious (I suspect that both of those characteristics are probably not true in Poland).

And there are two big policy differences between US and Europe at the moment. One is how people think of George Bush: all the opinion polls show that European publics are not on the whole anti-American, indeed they remain rather pro-American, but they are not pro-Bush. That remarkably is true even of the Conservative Party in Britain at the moment. The second difference of course is about Iraq, and I will come back to that in a moment.

If you look at the US national security strategy, and if you look at the European security strategy that the European Council signed off a few months ago, you find that basically they are very, very similar (only some differences of language and nuances, but not much more). Also, I wanted to say something on a contrast in attitudes between law and power. I think that there is an enormous emphasis underlying European thinking, almost an ideology of law. Europeans like treaties, they like contracts, they like international law, which is not surprising because the European Union is essentially a community of law. And therefore the attitude of the US administration, and not just the Bush administration, to treaties, to the CTBT, to Kyoto, to the additional to the protocol for the biological weapons convention, to the international criminal court, to the ABM Treaty, is something where there is a systematic difference of view between Europe and the USA. You can see that again in the letter of George W. Bush



to Ariel Sharon about recognising reality (that is to say the settlements): that is about recognising facts rather than the legal position. The law is there to protect the weak, and the powerful do not need it. Similarly, you can see it in the attitude, for example, to targeted assassination in Israel, which again is universally condemned in Europe and not in the USA. And you can see it again in the attitude to the Guantanamo Bay. Of course there are many Americas, and there are many Americans who probably feel in these issues more European, but there does seem to be a systematic difference there.

The problem is that law depends on power and while the Europeans like the idea of the world governed by international law, they know that the power is owned by the United States. And sometimes it seems that European policy or the main thrust of European policy is to influence the United States because the Europeans know that actually it is the United States who organises things. What is the Europe's policy on the Middle East? Actually it is to influence the United States, and that is not a stupid policy because the US is a powerful player there and everywhere. It does not work but that does not mean that it is not the right policy. There is a recognition that if you want to get anything done, you cannot do it against the USA, and doing it without the United States is probably extremely dubious. And yet, there is another difference here, and that is that sometimes you get impression that the US conceives the world primarily in military terms and the Europeans certainly do not. I think they see the world primarily in political and legal terms.

I definitely want to say one word about NATO, it seems to me always strange that NATO (as is frequently written in declarations by everybody) is the main forum for transatlantic consultation. I ask myself if that really remains true on either side of the Atlantic now. For example Afghanistan after September 11 (the number one foreign policy issue), is not really discussed in NATO. When I went to Washington shortly after that to try and persuade the USA *inter alia* that NATO ought to take over ISAF, nobody was interested at all. So NATO, far from being the place of first resort for dealing with problems, is not in the game at all. Even less in Iraq. So I ask

myself if NATO does retain that function at all now. In fact there is a famous quotation on Iraq from Rumsfeld, somebody asked: 'Did you think of using NATO?' and he said: 'It didn't even cross my mind'. If that is the primary forum for transatlantic consultation, then it is in a bad way. At the same time there is European ambivalence, because they again really do not see military matters as central.

US – European relations have been exposed to two shocks. The first one was the Balkan shock and it was just as divisive in the nineties as is Iraq now. The striking thing about the solutions in the Balkans, although they are still some way off, is that they are joint European – American solutions. Europe is united in the Balkans, but united with the United States. And I don't believe there is any possibility of Europe on a serious issue being united against the United States. And secondly Iraq, and there, I think, the question was put best by German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, who asked at one point 'What do you do, when your principal ally embarks on a policy that you consider extremely dangerous?' And that represents exactly the European dilemma, one of enormous dependence on the US, an increasing question mark about its actions, a dependence which means that you have to accept their policies, even if you do not like them. So this is a highly asymmetrical relation.

One last remark, I don't agree with Christoph Bertram, I think there is some serious damage to the fabric of the relationship, and it is being visible in the language.

Timothy Garton Ash

Just to answer the question about whether the differences on patriotism and religion between Europeans and Americans do not apply to Poland. The figures from the World Value Survey indicate that 72 per cent of Americans say they are very proud of their country, just pipping the Poles: 71 per cent of Poles say they are very proud of their country. This is way above the West European figures: the Britons, the Germans are under fifty per cent;

the noble Dutch – only twenty per cent say they are very proud of their country; there is one European country which is even more patriotic than the Americans, and that is the Irish – seventy four per cent of them say they are proud of their country.



Ivan Krastev

I will try to answer two questions that were flying around yesterday. The first came from Timothy Garton Ash who asked: 'Do you believe that in the United States now there is a policy trying to divide Europe?' I will try to answer the question: 'Is really Central Europe a resource for dividing Europe?' The second problem was about the ideology of united Europe: one of the projects was to create European Union very much around anti-Americanism, trying to repeat, *au rebours*, what Americans did in the 19th century; trying to create a united Europe being very much the alternative of the United States. This came very much after the famous Habermas – Derrida plus five fathers letter. I will try to answer these questions, and I will try to answer them trying to argue that there are two great illusions which both Western Europe and the United States are facing with respect to Central Europe.

The first is the American illusion of the Iraq case. I believe that the United States misread the support they have got over Iraq. The coalition of the willing was much more the coalition of the reluctant and I will try to give five or six arguments that have been much more critical than the 'value talk' and the 'history arguments' that are usually used.

They are the following: first of all, there is something which the United States share with Eastern Europe, and that is a feeling of insecurity. I believe that Western Europe for the first time is much more secure and feels much

more secure than the United States, while Eastern Europeans, for many reasons, have this feeling of insecurity which is not simply the fear of war and of military conflict but the fact that the world is very vulnerable and the *status quo* is very fragile.

The other important thing is that there is a major sensitivity gap. If you see the major value issues on which America and Europe disagree, you can see that they are not big issues in Central Europe. Kyoto? Kyoto is not a huge problem for our publics. Death penalty? I am sorry to say but if there is going to be a referendum in Bulgaria, we are going to 'go Texas', and we are going to have much more support for the American position than for European position.

The third problem is the welfare state. What have we learned about welfare state in Eastern Europe for the last fifteen years? In a certain way there is no sense of identity with the welfare state because welfare state has never visited Eastern Europe for the last fifteen years.

Then the issue of religion, very strange because on the one hand in Central and Eastern Europe you have some religious countries like Poland and on the other hand you have such secular places like Bulgaria where we cannot even believe that Bush is talking seriously about God; for us it is simply rhetoric. So this major divide in values between Europe and America does not play a role in Central and Eastern Europe.

The next issue is the lack of Muslim minorities; I am saying this despite of the fact that there is a Muslim minority in Bulgaria but this is an ethnic group that has been with us for the last five hundred years. But we are not the place where people go, we are not receiving immigrants, we are sending emigrants. So from this point of view when the Iraqi conflict for certain countries, for example France, was also a problem of how it is going to affect their Muslim minorities, for our part of the world it was not an issue.

Then of course you have 'the Russia factor', but 'the Russia factor' is not related to the fact that we are afraid that Russia is going to attack any of our countries. In Central Europe there has always been the fear that West Europeans are ready once again to talk to Moscow on behalf of Warsaw,

Prague and Budapest, and this despite of the fact that these countries are now in the European Union. When it comes to important decisions, Mr. Schroeder and Mr. Chirac are going to invite Mr. Putin, but they are not going to invite their European allies.

I think that all this (plus the fact that I would call 'a Blair factor'), when Europe was divided on Iraq, made the decision not so difficult for Eastern Europeans, in spite of the fact that the public opinion in our countries was anti-war. Actually, if you see the public opinion polls in most of the Central and Eastern European countries, they are not very different from what you see in Western Europe, with one exception – West European anti-war majorities have been active, you could see them on the streets, while in the case of Eastern Europeans you could see them only in the polls.

I think that if the United States perceives the Iraq case as a potential for splitting Europe, this is going to be a huge misreading. And the International Criminal Court discussion showed it very clearly. First of all, when there is a united European position, Central and Eastern European countries are much more tending to go with the European Union. Secondly, there are three other factors which have been critical for shaping the position of Eastern Europe, and here the tendency is negative to the United States.

United States has invested for the last fifteen years a lot in the civil society and in the military. As a result of this, the opinion makers and the military in Central and Eastern Europe understand much better the American debate than the European debate. That is why the think tank communities, some of the leading journalists and the generals have been much closer to the American position on Iraq. However, with the accession to the European Union and with the membership, the role of the administrative elites, of the bureaucracies, is growing up. And these bureaucracies are going to be much more pro-European because this is their career. The second is the education pattern: ten years ago most of the students in Central and Eastern Europe would go to the American universities. In the last five years, we have seen a huge shift, and now they would rather decide to go to the West-European universities, because of many reasons, one of them being the

fellowship policies, but also the visa policies of the American government after September 11. This is critical and from this point of view I believe that the neo-conservatives are going to make a huge mistake believing that the Iraq case can be repeated.

There is also an illusion in some European circles which believe that Central and Eastern Europe is just another Spain, and it is enough to change the government, and because you have the public which is not supportive of the war, you can have the anti-American identity. My point is very simple – I believe that Eastern and Central Europe is not so much pro-American, but rather it is strongly anti-anti-American because of several reasons. Eastern Europe is afraid of anti-Americanism because anti-Americanism is becoming the key ideology of some of the populist and anti-democratic movements in our countries. We have polls from the Balkans that show that anti-American constituencies are also the most anti-European ones, anti-market ones and anti-democratic ones. The split between Europe and America which can be seen in some of the Western European countries, is not the same. Anti-Americanism has become an ideology of those who do not have ideology any more, but they have been trying to change the *status quo* of the last fifteen years. As a result of this, political elites and democratic elites in Central and Eastern Europe are not going to tolerate, for domestic political reasons, the anti-Americanism as the major discourse.

Another very important problem is that while for example Paris is interested in having the united Europe as a check and balance mechanism or counterweight to the United States on the global level, many Central and Eastern Europeans are interested in having the United States as a European power to play the role of a counterbalance for possible French – German alliance.

There is also one important geo-strategic difference which is going to create problems in the relations between the USA and the Central and Eastern Europe. And this comes with the fact that the United States is trying to convince the European Union, in my view rightly, to look very much to the Middle East. Central and Eastern Europe countries are going to be

much more interested in looking out to their neighbourhood: Ukraine and the Balkans are going to be much more of a priority to the post-communist countries, rather than the Middle East where we do not believe that we have a part in this war.

I believe that the most healthy thing for the US – European relations is going to be to try and view the Iraqi crisis and the fact that the Central and Eastern Europe sided with the US as an isolated case on the basis of which you cannot make conclusions (just like the Spanish case where the change of the government meant the change of the policy).

The last paradox I want to mention: Mr. Prodi was interviewed just after the enlargement and to the question ‘Do you believe that the Italian troops should leave Iraq?’ his answer was: ‘No’. It may seem strange, but while it was the United States that invited Eastern and Central Europeans to go to Iraq, now I believe that now it is the European Union that is very much interested in convincing us to stay.

Dominique Moïsi

Let me start with an anecdote and my personal experience. Yesterday I entered Poland only with my identity card, and I felt extremely happy and proud of it: that was the success of my generation. Full of joy, I rush to my hotel, open my television, and what do I see? – the US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld in front of the Senate hearing. So at the same time I was celebrating, the country that had made that celebration possible more than any other country in the world, the United States of America, was in the midst of a very, very deep mess.

The second anecdote: two days ago we had at IFRI, the French Institute for International Relations, the former Prime Minister of South Korea who said: ‘Well, yesterday to be anti-American in the world was a French specificity, part of France’s exceptionalism. Today, if you are not slightly anti-American, or definitely anti-Bush, people start wondering what’s wrong with you. It has become an anomaly not to be anti-Bush’. And I think this is the

issue we have to discuss. And this is where I believe the role of Central Europeans can be fundamental. As much as we will gain, I hope, from the hunger of young Poles, young Hungarians, who want to catch up their lost time in economic matters, we, in Europe, may need Central and Eastern Europe very much as a remainder of sanity in our relations with the United States and of the fact that we need to be together much more than in previous times, for Americans have lost the peace in Iraq. And the consequences of that failure are for the entire West.

Yesterday we were frustrated by the American strategy; at the same time we had no strategy of ours. Today we are confronted with the consequences of the failure of the American strategy. And we have to realise that 'Schadenfreude', a kind of silent satisfaction, expressions of the kind: 'we warned you, we told you, now look where you are', cannot represent a policy. For if the American boat is sinking in Iraq, it is the entire Western strategy that is sinking in the world.

What could be the role of Europe today? First to contribute to an awareness of what the challenge is. I mean, there is a war which is going on, not a war between Islam and the West, but a war of fundamentalist Muslims against the West and against the modern Arab world. And what the Americans have been doing in Iraq has been playing largely of course to the ends of the fundamentalists. In fact the true challenge for the West, Europe and the United States together, is not to lose moderate Islam, is to make sure that – as a result of what the Americans are doing in Iraq, as a result of the American benign neglect, if not encouragement, of Ariel Sharon's policy in Israel – the majority of Muslims, the entire Arab, Islamic world will not move in the direction of the fundamentalists. And this is, I believe, the role of Europe. We have a greater understanding of the nationalism of others than Americans do,



because of our own experience. The paradox of what has happened in Iraq is that the most patriotic country in the world, the United States, has completely failed to integrate the nationalism of others. For probably two major reasons, the first one being that America, like France, as it considers itself a universal country, carrying a universal model, could not conceive that Iraqis would not wish to become, as quickly as possible, Americans. The goal of democratising the Middle East, starting with Baghdad, was very noble but in retrospect completely absurd.

The second reason for which the Americans were wrong in Iraq was that, because of the fact America is such a melting pot of all nationalities (including 'American Iraqis'), they believed that, thanks to some local Shalabys, they understood the Iraqi situation. Of course it did not work, it led to the situation in which we are. The paradox today is that Europeans are nearly begging Americans to stay in Iraq, 'please do not leave', for short-term political consideration, because it would be catastrophic. And the problem is of course for us to define together (and the fact that we are together, new Europe and old Europe, is fundamental) the best way to make sure that the ship of the West does not sink in the Middle East at large. In this context, I believe that it is important that we have a new Europe, in which there are not only France, Great Britain, and Germany, who are leading Europe, but that there are also new countries who are bringing in not military or economic possibilities, but the sense that it is essential to maintain a Western cohesiveness, at the worst of times, because this is precisely what is needed.

So from that point of view – what do we need? First we need to remain ourselves, the challenge to democratic nation can only be answered by the more democracy. This is why the disgrace that is taking place in Iraqi jail is a threat for all of us, because it is a moral failure not only for the Bush administration, not only for the United States of America, but globally for the West and the democratic model. We came with the vision that we were better and we have been as bad as others. The second message is that apart from more democracy we need more Europe. And apart from more Europe we need more West, because if there is no more Europe, and no more West,

we lose together. And this is the most important challenge we have been facing, and we will be facing for a very long time to go, this is a real war, and we may be losing it right now.

Timothy Garton Ash

I think many of us probably stayed last night watching these quite extraordinary hearings before the American Congress. I heard one congressman saying: 'This moment is a political and public relations Pearl Harbour', which is a pretty striking remark.

There is a slightly alarming degree of agreement between all our panelists. I suggest that we should try and focus specifically on Vladimir I. Lenin's question: 'What is to be done?' And what is to be done specifically by Europe, not by the United States. We all know much better than the Americans what the Americans should do, but let's think about what we should do.

On the analysis, it seems to me that the essential question here is 'the structural versus the contingent'. That is to say: was Iraq, as Christoph Bertram said, just an exceptional moment (I heard Robert Cooper slightly disagreeing)? To what extent is it anti-Bushism? Anti-Bushism, as Dominique Moïsi and Ivan Krastev said, unites most people in Europe and beyond Europe. But what is the relation between anti-Bushism and anti-Americanism? And this phenomenon of anti-anti-Americanism, which we find, I think Dominique Moïsi will agree, for example in Bernard-Henri Lévy in France, is not so much pro-Americanism as anti-anti-Americanism, and partly it is because people sense in anti-Americanism certain other things, sentiments about ourselves, about our own societies, about Europe, that they do not like. So my question is: 'structural versus contingent'. If John Kerry is elected, how much of what we are talking about, disappears? What is changed in America that will not change back if Kerry is elected?

For example – international law; Europeans are proud of it, but historically, I would say, Americans have even more than Europeans to do with introducing respect for international law into the international order after

1945. Do we feel that the people around Kerry would come back to that great American tradition? On the other side – what is changed in Europe over these few years that we feel will not change back even with a new administration in Washington and a new administration in Brussels and even a few new leaders in national capitals in Europe?

Christoph Bertram

Let me try and emphasise my point. Since 1945 we have had a predominant America, we have had an America which produced an extraordinary group of people, who were able to manage the relationship of Number One with a lot of much smaller allies. And did it extremely skilfully, much more skilfully than any of the so-called big European countries are managing their relationships with the middle or smaller countries of the European Union. An extraordinary success story. We have become used to accepting America's predominance because of the way in which Americans themselves were able to make their predominance acceptable. And what we have seen for the last four years is a real departure, not just from ten or fifteen years of American policy since the fall of the European walls and the fall of the Soviet Union, but from fifty years of American diplomacy. And I think this is what makes me confident that whoever is going to win the elections, is going to realise that: A) it is not going to be that simple to produce regime change, and B) that there are limits to military force. If you see now the Americans running around and saying 'Can you please provide us with some military force so that we can stay in Iraq', it gives witness to the limitations of military force. And then it seems to me that the American public which was willing to go into this war, because they believed that what their leaders told them was true, are going to be much more sceptical next time. So I think it is very unlikely that we have some more Iraqs in the future, while it is much more likely that whoever is going to sit in the White House from January 21, will again learn the ability, the tricks, the quality, the talent of dealing with countries one wants to have on one's side. It does not mean

that our interests are going to be the same, quite often they were not in the past, but we found ways in which to deal with that. And if only the language of Number One becomes more accommodating, a lot of anti-Americanism will also fall by the wayside.

Robert Cooper

The first reason why I think it is not just contingent, but I think that there is something structural, is that I am not sure that George Bush is an exception. I think that George Bush in some ways is more American than many presidents. I think he represents a very strong stream of American thought. And I must say I am not sure if I would put my hand up to say I am anti-Bush because there are many things that I rather admire about this government: willingness to act – I mean when they see a problem, they do not just sit around and talk about it, they do something, which very different from Europe. This great American optimism has gone too far in Iraq, but nevertheless that has been the driving force in the world, in the world economy as well as in the world politics. So I think that in some ways when you look at Bush you see the real thing, that is the real America, and that is what is underlying America and will always be there like that. But on the other hand I agree with Christoph Bertram that a bit of consultation will fix a lot of things. It does not need very much to bring Europeans along and it could be done.

Another big reason why I think that what we have at the moment is a structural problem, and we will see whether we can fix it or not, is the fact that we are dealing with something completely new, something we have not really dealt with before, the Islamic world, the Middle East. Previously we were dealing with the Soviet Union. We knew what it was, we spent a lot of time studying it, we understood it pretty well because it was after all invented in the British Museum and various other European capitals, that was a part of our culture. We are now dealing with a culture that we do not understand, and I am not even sure that I agree with Dominique

Moisi, that what we need to find is non-fundamentalists. I suspect that fundamentalism is what we will have to be dealing with. I suspect the idea that you can somehow work with the Islamic world by supporting secular government in Turkey, may not be the answer either. Actually the answer in the Islamic world may be fundamentalism. After all, America was founded on Protestant fundamentalism. So I am not even sure that we understand the categories. And that means that there is a completely new problem, which is above all a problem for Europe, but it is a problem for the USA as well, that we do not know how to understand it, how to deal with, and it is an area where the US's global responsibilities and interests in things like oil, bump against the European wish to live in a peaceful neighbourhood and not have troubles among the populations here. So there is something very big indeed we need to work out and I will tell you in a few years time whether we manage it.

Timothy Garton Ash

Something I did not expect to hear this morning was a praise of fundamentalism. One could say of course that it is interesting to find out that Iran is now the most pro-American country in the Middle East, so that twenty years of Islamic fundamentalism is a pretty good cure, and you just have to wait twenty years, that is the only trouble.

Robert Cooper

France is fundamentalist; banning head scarves – that is fundamentalism.

Dominique Moïsi

Laïcité (secularism) is a French specificity, but I am not sure you can equate it with fundamentalism.

Three quick things – on Bush and anti-Americanism – I am torn between two contradictory statements. The first one would be to say (as most people do) that if John Kerry is elected (although that does not seem to be likely today but it may change tomorrow), American diplomacy will not be fundamentally modified. The style will be different, but the trends are there, and they are structural and fundamental. At the same time one may say that the elections that are about to come might be seen in historical light as the third most important elections in American history. Abraham Lincoln in 1860, Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, and George W. Bush re-elected or defeated in 2004, because somehow if Bush is re-elected I sense that the cultural gap that exists between the US and Europe will be reinforced, and if he is defeated it does not mean that Europe and America will close the gap, but there is a possibility that the structural difference might be slowly being reduced. So from that point of view, of society, of culture, and not of diplomacy, I believe that for the relationship between Europe and the United States the next elections are decisive.

I will end up with one remark, which follows what Robert Cooper said, and I am not sure I agree or disagree with him: it is true that the paradox is that the West, Europe and the United States, was much more united against the threat that came from within – Soviet totalitarianism, than against the threat that comes from outside. And you may have two interpretations – the first one is that it is we who have changed. Yesterday you had two Europes and one West, today you have one Europe and two Wests, as a result of the fact that America has deeply changed and that Europe has as well. But the other interpretation is that somehow we do not understand at all the challenge that comes from outside. And because we understand so little, we are defining extremely different answers. When Robert Cooper says: ‘maybe fundamentalism is the only way’, I cannot accept it, because somehow I would be resigning myself to the worst scenario. No, I don’t think you can accept that, it is too passive.

Robert Cooper

Just to say that all our lives, at least when Britain was a colonial power, we were dealing with colonies and we spent all our attempts trying to find moderates rather than extreme nationalists. Actually it always turned out that nationalists were the authentic representatives of the people, and not moderates. And therefore I always distrust people when they say that we must look for moderates, because normally those are not authentic representatives. I think that within what we call fundamentalism there is a whole range of different people, some of whom want violence, some of whom want Islam, and they do not see that as violent. Fundamentalism is not equal violence. You know, Dominique, the reason why you believe that George W. Bush is going to win (all the opinion polls actually show John Kerry ahead at the moment) is because in your heart you know that Bush is more representative of America than Kerry.

Timothy Garton Ash

I was thinking about Dominique Moïsi's equations – two Europes, one West, and now one Europe and two Wests – which I don't think I quite agree with. I think I would say: one Europe, two Americas, and no West, which is our problem.

I just want to underline the importance of what Dominique Moïsi said: the European elections are in June, but in a way the European elections are also on November 2, in the US, in the sense that the most important single determinant and influence in this formative period of Europe building (after the enlargement, with the constitutional debate when we are really asking ourselves: What is Europe? Where is Europe? Why Europe, what is Europe for?) will be the policy and approach and language of the United States. That is why it is an election of fundamental importance to us: if Bush wins, and they continue as they are having the first term, then the overwhelming temptation for Europe will be to define itself as the not-America, not

necessarily as the anti-America, but as the not-America, to define being European by our differences from America, which I think would be actually a very bad thing for both parts of the divided West.

Ivan Krastev

I just want to make three simple points. Bulgaria does not have a colonial history, but I tend to agree to some extent that looking for moderates means that the only acceptable regime which we have in mind in the Middle East is a secular regime. Is it realistic? And this is coming to the problem of Turkey. What kind of Turkey do we want in the European Union in order to be a model for the others? Secular Turkey? Does it mean that European Union is going to save the Atatürk's model, when there are no domestic resources for this any more? Or are we talking about Islamist democracy which means that these 'bad guys' are going to win elections? From this point of view I believe it is going to be a critical question because if there is going to be a secular Turkey in the European Union, it means getting Turkey out of the Middle East; but then you cannot have any example because the secular model is not going to be an example for anybody in the Middle East.

The second problem is that I believe that we have reached the critical point, namely that the American hard power is in decline – they cannot control territories. Of course American soft power is in decline, but I believe that also the European soft power in a way is in decline. In my view, the European Union is the best embodiment of what Joseph Nye called 'soft power', because, on the fact that it exists, it managed to convince twelve countries around itself to change their legislation, to change their identity. This is soft power: to have the others want what you want. This is what happened in this century in Eastern Europe. But the essence of the soft power of the European Union was offering membership. How are you going to be influential with countries to which you cannot offer membership? European Union is not in a position to easily offer a membership any more, not because of financial reasons, but in my opinion because of political

reasons and structural reasons. If this is the case, while the American hard power appears to be overestimated, the European soft power is also slightly overestimated, we are going to see this in the Balkans. Because European integration is fine, but you should have functioning states in order to integrate them. You cannot integrate failed states or weak states because you cannot put conditionality on them.

So here I am going to my third problem, and this is anti-Bushism and anti-Americanism. That is a nice division for European elites who do not want to say that there is anti-Americanism. But nobody is going to convince me that all these people as shown in the opinion polls in Brazil and some other countries, I am not even talking of the Middle East, are making this distinction. Anti-Americanism is not simply the reaction to the American foreign policies, anti-Americanism is the representation of something else: it is where anti-capitalist sentiments are sheltered now. How are you going to talk against globalization in a popular language? How are you going to talk against the elites, your own but also global elites? All this sense of dissatisfaction in my view is very much consolidated in anti-Americanism, so from this point of view, even if John Kerry wins, I don't believe that the public opinion polls are going to change very much. Kerry's victory is important because it would give a window of opportunity for European elites and some other democratic and reform elites; for the general public outside of the United States and in my view especially outside of Europe, it is not going to make a huge difference.

Timothy Garton Ash

I would just say that the research centres in their polls which showed high level of anti-Americanism did ask a question: Is the problem America or is it Bush? And in Europe at least, the overwhelming majority, as I remember above seventy per cent in most European countries, said: 'The problem is Bush, not America'. Now, that may be partly because people do not like to admit to being anti-American so they say 'of course the problem is Bush', but

nonetheless it is a striking result. I hope we will come back to the important question which Ivan Krastev raised: what can Europe do for its neighbours if it is not offering them membership ? Because, as he rightly said, all our European soft power is based on what I call 'the politics of induction', a magnetic appeal which ends with the induction into the club.



Discussion

Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas (American Studies Center,
University of Warsaw)

I think there are two Americas, there is the conservative, Republican America which now is much more visible, and there is the liberal and Democrat America which also exists. None of these is truer than the other. And there is an equilibrium, roughly, between them. Bush did not gain the majority of the votes in November 2000. With a different electoral system he would have never become a president, Al Gore would have won. Our discussion is too focused on the current situation, on the current administration which may no longer be there in half a year from now.

One more thing: it is the other America that is much closer culturally to Europe, and to Europe's vision of international relations, the United Nations for example is mainly an invention of the United States, but not of the conservative, Republican and unilateralist, but of the other liberal, Democrat and multilateralist United States which is not less true than what we have now.

Heather Grabbe

I have got two questions to the panel about NATO's role. Robert Cooper raised the question of what is NATO's role going to be in practical terms. And it seems to me that the new Member States, new members of both NATO and the European Union could well change their views over the next few years. They have had a great shock in coming into NATO and finding that it is not an insurance policy but a fire brigade in which they have to go out and do lots of peace keeping. On the whole I think they have reasoned to that challenge remarkably well and impressively.

The fact is that NATO's role is changed not just militarily but also politically (Robert Cooper talked about it being no longer the pre-eminent security forum), and it also changed as an identity organisation. NATO does not embody the West and Western values in quite the way it used to, because it is less important as a political forum, and because essentially the expansion of NATO's membership knows no limits. It is actually quite easy for NATO to expand. We have discovered it is rather harder for the EU to do so. So what does this mean for NATO? We can argue a lot about what it should be doing in practical terms, for example: should it go into Iraq? Is it part of the solution to re-unify the West? Or is that role simply gone forever?

The second question is, as an embodiment of values, does NATO have a role perhaps in defining these values? And Ivan talked very interestingly about the fact that Western values are still Western values, there aren't huge differences actually between European and American values. This is rather important also for the soft power of the Western alliance. If we do not know what our values are, if we cannot define them, is there any point in trying to find more and more subtle distinctions between American and European values? Or should we be re-thinking the whole concept of Western values? And thinking actually about what we have more in common, the fact that our credibility as a source of values for the whole West is being massively damaged not just by Iraq, but also I think by the disagreements across the Atlantic.

Marcin Król

I just want to answer Timothy Garton Ash's question: what Europe is supposed to do? And I have one answer, a short one – I think we should start with stopping pretending that we are not at war. Dominique Moïsi said that very openly. We are at war, wars are not always wars where military power is used. There are cold wars, half cold wars, less and more cold wars. We are at war, and if we pretend that we are an oasis of peace, we are going to lose that war, actually I think we have already started losing it. I am very afraid that Europe is going to lose more than the United States because of being naïve and pretending that nothing is happening when the house is practically getting down on our heads.

Stanisław Zapaśnik (University of Warsaw)

It so happens that I specialise in Muslim fundamentalism, I am a cultural anthropologist who does field studies. After September 11, I spent over six months among the Muslim fundamentalists. My area of research is primarily Central Asia, but I am also familiar with the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now I would like to say that in those societies I don't encounter hostility towards Western values. On the contrary, there is a sympathy which is not to say that they accept all the values of the West. I would confirm the conclusions arrived at by the Gallup Institute that there is no basic enmity or hostility towards the West, but what there is, it is the lack of trust, the suspicion of the West intentions. My research, and this is confirmed by other researches, shows that there is not a Muslim who would believe that behind the events of September 11 there is Osama Ben Laden. In fact the common belief is that it was done by Bush or by people from within Bush administration as a pretext to declare war on Islam.

Now I understand why the people I speak to take this view. This would be the fault of American pop culture where Hollywood equates Islam and terrorism, by American preachers, reverends. I don't know which Evangelist

called the Koran 'a handbook of terrorism'; somebody compared the prophet Mohammed to Hitler; then came the statements by Bush himself and by Lt. General William Boykin, Rumsfeld's second in command (US Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence), who is in charge of the war on terrorism. If I recall correctly Boykin said that 'they hate us because we fight under the banner of Christ'. And one could conclude that the Americans are the army of God, whereas the Muslims worship false idols and are generally the army of the devil. So this is an argument to the effect that under the cover of the war on terrorism there is a war on religion and there is a clash of fundamentalisms.

As a researcher I can confirm one thing: there is only one cause for terrorism, and that is political. When I ask why – they always say: 'Palestine', then they refer to the local regimes, the local authorities. It usually happens that the local regime enjoys the support of the US, is a close ally of the US. And this leads me to another conclusion: Al Qaeda in Arabic means 'a method'. The entity we hear about in the media doesn't really exist in a real life. The two things these people have in common is their attitude towards the US and the fact that they have usually been trained in camps run Osama Ben Laden or in other training camps. So if that is really the case, if that is the true nature of Al Qaeda, then the threat would be driven not from Islam. When I hear the panellists, I believe that we misunderstand, misconstrue Islam. We transpose our view of religion onto something which doesn't resemble religion as we know it, here in the West. If it is truly the case that Al Qaeda is a myth, in the way it is presented, as a bugbear, the danger has to do with attitudes and convictions, and I am not surprised that we hear increasingly often that in the US libraries there is a surveillance of what students read and that the academia is also under scrutiny.

I don't believe that the threats stemming from the Islamic terrorism will go away once Kerry assumes power. Even if Kerry is elected, it is a problem we will have to face for at least another generation. And this is why I am a pessimist because I believe that the main victim, which is most threatened by Islamic terrorism, is Western democracy. And when we observe what

the Europeans are doing, compared to what the Americans are, I believe that the battlefield, the source of ideology which Europe needs, as one of the panellists mentioned, is the attitude towards democracy. I believe that Europe can survive, democracy can survive, and it will be more robust than the democracy in the US if Bush is re-elected, but I am concerned that the logic around which Europe will be united will be human rights and the issue of values and democratic procedures which we are opposing the US with.

Dominique Moïsi

The question of Heather Grabbe, what can we do in Iraq now? In retrospect (it is so much easier to be wiser after one year): if the Americans just after the fall of the statue of Saddam Hussein had handed over the responsibilities to the UN, and if the UN had called upon, let's say, part of NATO to come and help, the situation would be of course extraordinarily different. And Rumsfeld wouldn't be in a position today to become a new McNamara in the eyes of history. But you cannot re-write history, and what they have done so far after that great moment of joy, was an accumulation of mistakes, one after the other, some of them were maybe inevitable, most of them were not.

The second statement – yes, there is a discrepancy between the American feeling of still being at war and the European reaction. We had our September 11, which was March 11 in Madrid. Somehow it was not integrated by most Europeans as a sign that Europe was also at war. I have two interpretations for that discrepancy. The first one is that there is no Europe in emotional terms. And what took place in Madrid, for most Europeans took place in a different country. Madrid is not to Europe what Washington and New York were to the United States of America. The other interpretation is even more negative: that we don't want to see the reality which we are in, collectively. And the two interpretations, you may combine them with one another. But there is a great gap between what happened and the way we reacted to it.

Ivan Krastev

Just two points. One is the opinion, now shared by everybody, that it is enough if the UN goes to Iraq and NATO takes the military part and the problem is over. I don't believe this. We are talking about legitimacy, but we are talking about legitimacy through the eyes of the lawyers. What is really going to change on the ground, from the point of view of the Iraqis? Not much. The troops are going to be the same. You are going to have a UN flag, Al Sistani is going to talk to Ibrahimi, and not to Bremer, but I believe that the level of political radicalisation is so high that nothing is going to change with one exception. There is going to be West there, especially if NATO takes over. Maybe NATO does not represent West to the Westerners, but NATO very much represents the West to the foreigners.

The second problem is Al Qaeda. This is now also a commonplace, but the issue of the war on terrorism is at the root of the problem. When you have a war, you first look for the enemies. Al Qaeda was modelled by our media, as a kind of an army, with different battalions from different countries, so in a certain way we have invented Al Qaeda, and we have decided we were going to destroy it. But because it was really difficult we turned to the idea from the 1980s, of state sponsored terrorism and we went to Iraq. I am saying this because maybe the most important thing would be to stop talking about Al Qaeda. I totally agree that terrorism is a local phenomenon, very contextual, very political, it has a lot to do with local tensions, with local elites, and if we decentralise totally the response to terrorism, we have a much greater chance to succeed.

And here we are coming to my last point, which is a major problem – we have irrelevant knowledge concerning terrorism. We should really try to understand communities, because what is the victory going to be? The victory is supposed to be a reduction of the political influence of the terrorist groups; you can arrest terrorists, but if this is going to result in having three times more new terrorists, to what extent it is going to be a victory? I am very much afraid of this military understanding of the problem, I am

concerned about the fact that even the European Union is creating a commission on terrorism and is trying to centralise the response. And in my view it should be totally decentralised, and we should look for anthropologists and sociologists who are dealing very much with local communities; not specialists on terrorism, but specialists on different suburbs in European cities, in American cities, so that we gain this new type of knowledge, which is very soft and cultural. And here we have the legacy of the cultural wars in America, and the fact that the government, especially the current administration, does not trust universities and especially the cultural studies departments. It does not trust sociologists, it does not trust anthropologists. I believe that the reconciliation between the soft knowledge and the security studies might be a huge problem.

Robert Cooper

I am delighted to find that we have here somebody who actually really knows something about fundamentalism, Islamic communities, and is studying them, and I think that is something that we really need to do much more often in the future. I wanted actually to come back to the questions about NATO. One of the things that strikes me very forcibly about the Iraq story was this strange episode in NATO, when the United States (not Turkey!) insisted on NATO's action to help Turkey. Later on the Turks agreed that they would like to be helped, but initially it was the US that wanted NATO to help them. It was completely unnecessary, it could have been done without any debate in NATO at all, it could have been done bilaterally. Actually it was the US raising the stakes in the debate with France and Germany, and the point about this story is that the USA would never have done this in the Cold War. It would have fixed it behind the scenes before having a debating NATO. And if it had thought there was going to be a disagreement, it would never have had the debate. And the point is that the US was prepared to gamble NATO. Now that to me represents a fundamentally different attitude to NATO from the attitude during the Cold War when NATO was central to

security. Of course France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg then headed straight into this trap that had been created for them and that was almost as bad as creating the trap. That represents a fundamental difference in US's attitude to NATO, and the second point is the point Ivan Krastev made just now, that NATO essentially is a military organisation and the problems that we face now are essentially not military problems.

Christoph Bertram

Two remarks, one on NATO and one on war. Imagine for a moment that September 11 would have happened without people being able to pinpoint it to Afghanistan. To have an enemy that could be localised distinguishes September 11 from March 11. And here, Dominique, I am fundamentally in opposition to you, I think what we have seen in the European reaction to March 11 was the recognition that the term 'war on terror', while it is generally in use, is quite useless. It does not help us to define what is happening, it does not give us a chance to organise battalions, to define exit strategies, to know what victory is. The Europeans' reaction to March 11 has been much sounder: they have recognised the specific nature of terrorism, be it organised from afar, and the need to cope with it. And every time we see in the news that somebody else is apprehended, and the Spanish police seem to work very well in these matters, and European and international co-operation works well in these matters, that is a small step towards what might be at some stage a victory. I think the European reaction to this was much more in tune with the challenge than the American reaction.

We saw Senator Lieberman yesterday talking about three thousand Americans having been killed on September 11; actually, one thousand of those so called 'three thousand Americans' were not Americans, they came from all over the world. But the way in which the Americans have translated September 11 as the model of the challenge, identifiable enemies, location of enemies, I think is one which we must not follow because it leads down the wrong road.

On NATO, I think we would all (especially we Europeans) make an immense, stupid mistake, if we were to throw NATO away. It is the one organisation in which the Americans have contractual commitment of a multilateral nature, in which there is a body of people who work together every day and in which it is possible to make use of the institutions in order to develop consensus. We have not made use of these institutions to develop consensus, not only because the Americans didn't want to, but because the Europeans didn't use it either. And if NATO has a future, it will only have a future if we actually use it again. If we don't do it but just sit there and wait for the Americans to take the initiative, we cannot blame Americans if they make use of it just when they want. It would be absolutely mad to forgo the chances that NATO offers and to throw it into the big waste paper basket of history, we would suffer most, and, I think the Americans would also suffer. So let's think not of whether NATO is still in tune with the times, let's make stay in tune with the times.

Timothy Garton Ash

I would like to suggest that we try to focus our thought specifically on what Europe, not what America should do, and I propose four particular questions:

Firstly: we talked a lot about attitudes, values, perception, approaches, can we talk a moment about interests and ask specifically the question: what common, specific, distinctive European interests do we identify which differ significantly from those of the United States?

Secondly: what could be the distinctive European contribution to the struggle against the threat of international terrorism? I deliberately didn't say 'war on terror', because that ideological formula is in my view deeply compromised, by the way it has been used over the last few years, but certainly, and I agree here much with Marcin Król and others, we are in a kind of war.

Thirdly: what do we Europeans want NATO to do? We complain how Rumsfeld treats NATO, but what do we want NATO to do?

And finally (and I think, very importantly, particularly speaking here in Warsaw a few days after enlargement): who else do we want to bring into the European Union in the next five, ten, fifteen years? I think we need to have an answer to that question, and secondly – for those who we feel (for whatever reason) we cannot bring into the European Union in the next ten to twenty years, what do we propose to them? What do we propose to Morocco, to North Africa, who are not going to become members of the European Union? Let's focus our debate on those questions – what is to be done?

Katarzyna Żukrowska (Warsaw School of Economics)

What can be offered by the European Union? The answer was given by Romano Prodi on December 5, 2002. He said that Europe cannot enlarge endlessly. The question is – who will be in? He said that what can be offered to the countries interested in closer co-operation with Europe has to be as attractive as the membership. And he said finally that the membership in the European Economic Area is the goal for those countries who would like to co-operate with the EU, which will share everything except institutions. It is rather clear and then it was repeated in relations to Russia and in relations to Mediterranean countries.

I have a question to the panellists related to sovereignty. I think it is quite a sensitive issue if you compare the new Member States of the European Union and the old Member States, because the old Member States are used to delegating their sovereignty to the international level and we, Poland in that number, have just regained our sovereignty. How do you see these differences in the future co-operation, being members of the European Union, and in relations to our American partner as well?

Maciej Kozłowski (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

The issue of Middle East conflict, the Israeli – Palestinian conflict was mentioned here briefly. I would like to focus on that because nowhere the division between the United States of America and Europe is as deep as there. I just recently received the results of work done by a professor from Vienna who analysed the voting in the UN for the last twenty years, and it came out that on all issues usually the difference between the United States and Europe (the European Union), was something like 25 per cent. On the security issue it was less than fifteen per cent. On the Middle Eastern issue that was 88 per cent difference. In the last twenty years, only 12 per cent of votes on this issue in the United Nations were the same between the US and Europe. Observing this in Israel for the last four years, I have found that whenever the so-called ‘peace process’ was coming to some maybe hopeful solution, either the Europeans were coming and supporting Palestinians in doing something against what was agreed or Sharon was going to Washington to get blessing for some action which was against what was decided between Europe and the United States. And I am wondering, and I would like to ask the panellists – is Middle East a suitable battleground between the US and Europe, or that is where the differences are so prominent that they cannot be reconciled?

Aleksander Smolar

I would like to answer the questions posed by Timothy Garton Ash. First about the attitudes, values, the differences here between Europe and America. Robert Cooper mentioned two major differences, concerning religion and patriotism. I would add two more. First – the attitude to immigration which is one of the most dramatic potential problems in Europe. To simplify, there are two different models of dealing with immigrants: one of assimilation, traditional, continental, European. With a mass Muslim immigration it doesn’t work, it cannot work any more. In

France, there are now problems with the attempts to reinforce certain traditional elements of the secular policy of *l'État laïque*, based on the assumption of possible assimilation. The consequences can be quite serious: France who refused the clash of civilisation outside (it was one of the major reasons why France refused to follow the United States policy in Iraq), now is risking the clash of civilisation inside France. But this is not only the problem of France. In general, Europe, maybe with the exception of Britain, has a problem with dealing with multiethnicity and multiculturalism.

The other difference between the US and Europe concerns the attitudes towards Israel. They are quite opposite. In the US, the Holocaust became an element of a national myth. In American schools, the only topic in international history is quite often only on the Holocaust. This influenced very strongly the attitude of Americans towards anti-Semitism and Israel. There is also a very specific case of Evangelical Protestants with their literal interpretation of the Bible. Those 'Christian Zionists' are considering the territory of Biblical Israel as belonging, by the God's will, to Jews. Very rigid, they can be an obstacle to a peace process in the Middle East. The sympathy and the identification with Israel in the US is also reinforced by the fact that it is the only democratic country in the region.

In Europe we have quite an opposite tendency. No respectable person would obviously put into question the Holocaust, its tragic dimension and its importance for the European history. But the Holocaust is increasingly de-historicised, detached from the past, from its sources, its origin and from its consequences. In Europe today there is no sense of responsibility for the fate of Israel because of the Holocaust. We could even argue that regarding the problem of peace in the Middle East, Europe behaves in a totally irresponsible way. Europe maintains that the major problem in the relation between the West and the Muslim world is the Israeli and Palestinian conflict and it is criticizing the US policy in this domain. There are certainly good arguments in this critique, but without any positive proposals whatsoever.

And now shortly about another point – what Europe can do. There are certain things Europe is doing better than America, for example in the domain of assistance to less developed countries. But of course in order to be efficient, the European policy cannot be hypocritical. An example of hypocrisy is of course the Common Agricultural Policy, which is destructive for the Third World. US policy of subsidies for agriculture is also very detrimental for the poor countries. Europe can play here an important role, but it must have a clear policy.

Europe plays an enormously positive role in stabilizing and contributing to the development of the neighbour states through enlargement. Besides the imperial logic of US policy there is a logic of continental empire of Europe where stabilisation and development come through integration. The major question now posed in relation with the candidacy of Turkey concerns the limits of the expansion.

The last point about NATO. Europe needs NATO but at the same time the traditional formula of NATO is not very much adapted to the today's world. NATO is doing now a lot of new things but without changing the definition of itself. NATO was about security in Europe, so here a change must be done. Not only here. This is a paradox that NATO is the only place of institutionalised relations between USA and Europe. The world changes, the transatlantic relations change and I do not think that we can limit our relations to channelling them through NATO or *ad hoc* initiatives.

Timothy Garton Ash

I am sure that you are characterising very important differences. The question is – are they really differences in interests, as opposed to attitudes, experiences, views. And my question was specifically about interests because I would argue that certainly we have at least as much an interest in a certain kind of settlement in the Middle East and even more of an interest in successful assimilation of emigration, as the United States does.

David P. Calleo

I was a bit surprised to hear that our American Republic was founded by Protestant fundamentalists. I have been trying to remember the early Presidents, I got through several without finding an enthusiastic Christian, let alone a Protestant fundamentalist. May I remind everybody that the United States was founded in the 18th century, not the 17th century. Even in the 17th century, our Puritans were certainly Christians, highly sophisticated Calvinists, but it is a great stretch to describe them as fundamentalists. Maybe there is a larger point here. In our thinking about the Muslim world, perhaps we are too inclined to presume that the fundamentalists are the real representatives of that world. But Islam, after all, is not just a sect but a great civilization. It has been having great difficulty coming to terms with the modern world. So, of course, has our own Christian civilization. Assuming that fundamentalism is the real voice of Muslim civilization encourages a condescending approach to that civilization. But the future of Islam probably does not lie with its fundamentalists any more than the future of Western Christianity lies with the American fundamentalists. In any event, our American Republic is certainly not a creation of fundamentalist Protestants. Its roots lie in the enlightenment and are only elliptically Christian.

Christoph Bertram

I would like to respond to two questions: what strikes me is that there is always a European foreign policy when there is a prospect of an EU enlargement. There is no foreign policy in any other respect. The moment we can say: 'perhaps one day you are a member', we have a foreign policy. But if that is not the case, we don't have a foreign policy, and you can tick all parts of the world off where we don't have a foreign policy precisely because these are people and countries which we do not regard as potential candidates, including the United States, for enlargement. We do not have a foreign policy.

We need to stop enlarging. This is an extremely difficult decision because it has to be an expression of political will in that it is impossible to draw any objective lines. Christian Europe? Not sure. Geographic Europe? Well, we are already beyond that. Value Europe? Our values go much beyond that. So we have to get twenty five countries to commit themselves to say: stop. It is so difficult because it is tempting to say: if you behave properly, then perhaps one day you can become member of the European Union. But of course the converse is also true – unless we say stop, we, the Union, will not develop a foreign policy towards those who cannot become members. So, in order to make the European Union an international actor we need to say stop. This is an extremely difficult but necessary decision.

Timothy Garton Ash

Perhaps in responding to these question we could on the panel all say: A) do we think negotiations should be open with Turkey in December, which is an immediate issue? And B) to whom else should we definitely hold out the prospect of membership in the longer term?

Christoph Bertram

I think Turkey should be in, although I don't think Turkey will be in. Negotiations will be started, but I don't think that when ratification is put to referenda, ratification will occur, so in relation to Turkey, at some stage we need to think anyway of real alternatives.

It cannot just be that the Union says what you ought to do and that is the new relationship. There has to be some institutional involvement although it is very difficult. I think we should say: the Balkans – yes, commitments have been made, Turkey – commitments have been made, Switzerland, Norway – whenever they want, maybe Iceland, but that's it. But Ukraine – no, it is very big, and has a lot of problems, and it should be an example where we can develop an alternative relationship, I mean, not

all deserving countries should be members. And the idea that we can, by holding out the prospect of membership to Ukraine, significantly affect the domestic developments in that country, seems to me quite unproven at the moment. So I think we should use our minds, not least in relation to Ukraine, to think of other types of linking Ukraine to the fate of European Union, but not in membership.

Robert Cooper

I just have one thing to say quickly to David Calleo. I was not thinking about Thomas Jefferson but more about the Pilgrim Fathers, but there is a point. I actually think that even the term 'fundamentalist' is probably unhelpful in the context of Islam. But what I definitely reject is the Bernard Lewi's view which is that there is only one approach and that is that everybody becomes like Turkey. Because I think that it is completely to ignore what the Islamic world is.

I wanted to come on to the question that Christoph Bertram raised about the limits to enlargement and about the need to have a foreign policy other than enlargement, and I come back to the quotation from Catherine the Great that I find very powerful: 'I have no other way to defend my borders except to enlarge them'. And I am not sure that I disagree with her because the point today is that the real heart of policy is not about alliances but about domestic issues. And a real foreign policy is about getting inside people's domestic systems, is about agricultural subsidies, etc. And you cannot conduct these matters in a kind of 19th century foreign policy way, you can only conduct them through common membership of institutions, common commitment, common framework of law. And as for: 'is there a limit to the growth of the European Union' well, if it can work at twenty-five (I think it can, it requires a bit of adjustment) and can work at thirty, we are committed up to there at least, what is wrong with thirty-five, forty? I am not sure that there is a limit. I think that this process of creating common legal space is the most important piece of foreign policy that

you can do. And if you think of other bits of foreign policy, Britain, which has had a fantastic foreign policy over the years, has achieved more or less nothing. The real achievement of American foreign policy was actually through NATO, through the creation of common institutions. Other bits of American foreign policy, let's remember American policy in Ethiopia, Angola, the Middle East – there is almost a common institution between the US and Israel...

Christoph Bertram

So we should consider Iran and Iraq as members?

Robert Cooper

Well, I am not saying that. But this is the most important piece of foreign policy. Iran and Iraq are different, but is American foreign policy so successful in other areas?

By the way, Europe actually does have actually quite a lot of other bits of foreign policy, Iran for example is one, which is relatively successful, so far so good, more successful than American foreign policy. What about US foreign policy in Cuba, is that such a success? The European policy of enlargement has been a gigantic success, just like the American policy of NATO used to be, which was about creating a common Western identity. That is the only way you can have a real foreign policy that has real impact on people.

What about Ukraine? The answer is: if you take Turkey, and if Turkey makes the European standards (there is still a long way to go), then the answer to Ukraine must be: 'yes'. We made so many promises, if you take Turkey, you cannot say 'no' to Ukraine. That is absolutely clear.

What about Belarus, what about the other bits that break off Russia – well, we look at these when they come along. What about Morocco? I don't actually see that for the moment.

Timothy Garton Ash

Robert, because you are so close to the heart of making what is intended to be a European foreign policy, don't you think that Christoph Bertram has a point that in a sense a pre-condition for making a neighbourhood policy for the Maghreb (for countries like Morocco, which would have a free trade area and so on) is to say: 'no, you are not going to be a member for twenty years, but we are going to do X, Y, Z...'

Robert Cooper

Actually Morocco is not seeking membership, it is not even thinking about it. It did once, and the European Union said 'no', the Treaty actually says 'Europe'. Today Morocco is not seeking to change that answer. But what I wanted to say it was the Prodi's remark that made me think that maybe this is going to end at this side of Mediterranean, because 'everything but institutions' has been the European slogan all along with the European economic area, the Mitterand's plan for confederation, all of these things: everything except membership. And it never works because what people want is to sit at the table, they want to be consulted, want to have the voice in deciding their own fate. And the more powerful the European Union becomes, the bigger it becomes, the more people want to join it.

Ivan Krastev

I would try to make three points, and one of them is: where is the essence of the soft power? OK., membership, but why? Yesterday there was an interesting re-formulation here, saying that Europe is about international rule of law. I don't believe that this is so attractive. I don't see any Bulgarian going for the European Union because of respect for the international rule of law. The European Union was about the solidarity on a non-national level. It was about re-distribution, it was not simply about shared sovereignty, but

about a kind of shared identities, so from this point of view I believe that the problem of the European Union is to what extent it can sustain its reference of attraction, turning simply to a strategic community, which, I agree very much, is what really matters from the security point of view.

But when you have twenty five, or thirty, thirty five members, you lose the idea of a community to which you belong. It is becoming much more a kind of institutional arrangement which can work on policy level and on economic level, but it is very difficult to have the feeling of belonging to it. And this feeling of belonging, in my view, was critical for the European project, especially for the new generation of Europeans.

If this is the case, then there is a fundamental problem with the European soft power, with the EU's soft power. If you cannot offer solidarity, I am going to indicate two other things that the European Union cannot offer beyond its borders.

One is the welfare state. Do you imagine any of the Third World countries trying to develop the welfare state which was created and which was part of the political and social identity of the European Union for the last fifty years? No, to the extent that when the European Union tries to assist the economic policies, it sells the American policies. Washington Consensus is not supported simply by the US, it is supported also by the European Union. Neither IMF, nor the World Bank are simply American institutions. I am saying this because this is a huge problem and it has a lot to do with what the European Union wants to make out of itself, when the first generation of soft power is totally exhausted.

The second problem goes very much with the problem of political identity of the European Union before the post-modern states. What was the major political export of Europe in the 19th century, in the early 20th century? It was the nation state. And this is critical: the European Union, in order to be successful, needs states. And here we have the problem of the post-post-colonial dilemma: you cannot allow any more of this type of a failed state territory anarchy because of security reasons, but there is no supply side for any type of territorial control. From this point of view the European

Union is much more vulnerable than the US, because of geography, because of the fact that the US is a very classical nation state. US is not afraid of immigration because US was born out of immigration. But for the welfare states in Western Europe immigration is a type of biological weapon which is going to destroy their welfare system, their social identities and change their political landscape. From this point of view the immigration problem, I agree totally with Aleksander Smolar, is going to be critical.

If you see the demographic trends, something strange is happening: the US is becoming more and more European. There are more and more Americans being born in the United States. Europe, and especially Western Europe, is becoming more and more American, there are more and more immigrants that you are going to see there (the republican France is an interesting case here). So in a strange way also the sensitivity gap results from the fact that the US, at least demographically, is very much europeanised, and Europe is very much americanised, and I do believe it matters.

Now the Israeli – Palestinian conflict – I believe it is critical because in a certain way it is the only problem to which nobody can really offer a workable solution. Is it a secret for anybody that the majority of Arabs want to destroy the state of Israel? No. Isn't it obvious that the only way Israel is surviving is by abusing the rights of Arabs and by creating more and more resentment?

There is a debate in the United States now about the connection between anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism, and there is an accusation of Europe becoming totally anti-Semitic. I believe that something different is happening. Now in certain parts of the world, anti-Americanism is creating anti-Semitism which (because of many reasons) was not there before.

The Israeli – Palestinian conflict was globalised to the extent that it totally lost its local character and as a result of that it is unsolvable. It could be solvable only as a local conflict, as a conflict very much resembling the Kosovo – Serbs contradictions. But for the Arab community, this conflict has become all about symbolism and not about decisions, and then it is a part of the American domestic politics.

My last point – there is one important source of the weakness of the European Union in its attempts to influence the US: if you want to influence the US, you try to mobilise your ethnic group in the US, you try to influence the electoral process in the United States (Poles are one of the nations who know this best). But while we have Europeans in Europe, but we do not have Europeans in the United States: we have Poles in the US, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Germans, but when they decide to vote in the American elections, they never take seriously the fact that they are Europeans. And this is critical for the weakness of the European Union versus the US, because being a very type of a post-modern empire, the US doesn't have interests, the US has voters.

Dominique Moïsi

I want to make two remarks on the question raised by Aleksander Smolar and touched by you recently. The Middle East and the emotional impact of the Middle East on the US – Europe relations. It is clear in the issue of the Holocaust. While, as Aleksander Smolar said, it has become a part of the American curriculum, in French schools in the suburbs of Paris you cannot teach the subject because of the fear of reactions by the students of Maghreb origins. It shows the gap in emotions.

But what is the most needed thing is unfortunately the most difficult to do. And that is for the Americans to restore the credibility vis-à-vis the Muslim world, and for the Europeans to restore the credibility vis-à-vis Israel. By doing so, they would play a useful role and they would limit the extent of the transatlantic gap on the issue. Unfortunately it is nearly impossible to do.

And from that standpoint, the association that has been recently created between Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush (in which nobody knows who has a stronger influence on the counterpart), has had a suicidal impact on the way Israel and the United States, if not the Jewish world, are perceived. What has been most tragic in that association is that, contrary to Iraq, which

is an obvious failure, it may appear as a success, a short-term suicidal success, a proof that the use of military superiority can work. I think that in the long run it can only fail, especially in that part of the world. So what is the responsibility of Europe? The responsibility of Europe is huge – given the history. Europe was at the creation of the problem through colonialism and anti-Semitism. And Europe therefore should be part to the solution of the problem, if there is a solution to this problem.

But the solution to the problem returns to three words: a two states solution. There is a tendency now among the extremists of both sides to go beyond the two states solution, to consider that it is no longer valid but this is a recipe for disaster because I don't think in the end there will be a solution without a two states solution.

The second term is really a 'restoration' of Europe's credibility in Israeli eyes. And it is all the more difficult that the prejudice, the stereotypes have been increased. For the Muslims the United States is anti-Muslim and for the Israelis the European continent is not only anti-Israeli but probably also anti-Jewish. And this is something new, it is the return of something old, which in itself is new, it was not the case a few decades ago. This restoration is an absolute priority, and the debate on enlargement should be placed in that framework. If the issue is preventing a war between Islam and the West, if Europe has to play a role in finding a solution to that issue, then you have to ask yourself seriously: what is more dangerous for Europe – to take the risk of integrating Turkey or to take the risk of saying 'no' to Turkey? And if you take that strategic vision I do believe that the risk of saying 'no' to Turkey is a much greater negative responsibility in the eye of history. But it means that what we are emphasising is the geography of values above the value of geography. And from that standpoint I think today Turkey is much closer to Europe than Ukraine is. It is far, but if we look at our own criteria – democracy and market economy – I have no doubt that Turkey is closer than Ukraine. It doesn't mean that by accepting Turkey I am closing the door to Ukraine. On the contrary, I am telling the Ukrainians: look, we have taken a country which is not European, but whose values are moving

towards Europe. So if you do the same, you will become European, too. The enticement will be even greater for them to conform.

Krzysztof Bobiński

I just want to ask briefly if the Barcelona process can play a role here, trying to give support for democracy and the human rights in the Middle East?

Krzysztof Zielke (Polish Academy of Science)

Let's assume a totally positive scenario about transatlantic relations, let's say John Kerry wins and nominates Richard Holbrook as the Secretary of State, and Holbrook brings again Clinton's new transatlantic partnership scenario back to the table. What will be the European answer this second time around? I think that, first, this time Europe should agree to take responsibility in building new global order and should agree to NATO stabilising Iraq as we did in the Balkans, and, second, that Europe should support NATO enlargement to Ukraine as was done in the case of Poland. I think these answers to a 'new American policy' will again unite Europe and the US, may help to secure and stabilise the Middle East, even can help to secure a new oil road from the Caspian Area.

Ireny Comaroschi (Romanian ambassador to Poland)

I would like to comment on what I think is important in the debate on what we want and how we want to achieve our interests. I think the key word of today's world is 'exclusion'. Many citizens, even in Western Europe, feel that they are excluded, just as some states feel excluded by not being part of the European Union or NATO, or some, like Mediterranean or the Arab countries – by not being some part of other organizations. It seems that

the basic difference between Europe and the US is that people in America do not feel excluded.

Jan Wróbel (*Europa Weekly*)

Speaking from the Bulgarian and Polish perspectives, perhaps we do not have to choose between the European Union and the United States, but rather between the alliance of Great Britain and the United States and the alliance of France and Germany. This alliance, of a member of the European Union and the United States, is just smashing the European Union.

Bartosz Cichocki (Centre for Eastern Studies)

Last year I had the pleasure to participate in a meeting of experts and officials of the Task Force 'Wider Europe', a team headed by Mr. Verheugen. A question was asked of the Polish participants – why Poland was so forcefully supporting the rapprochement of the European Union and Ukraine, to the point of membership. And I answered I thought it was because in Poland people were hoping that the membership of Ukraine would raise the profile and the role of Poland in the EU, and one of the colleagues and collaborators of Mr. Verheugen, confused, said: 'this is why Ukraine will not be accepted'.

I am certain that only the full membership of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova of the EU, rather than their participation in four freedoms, is the precondition and a standing guarantee of the integrity and security of those states and a condition of the security of Poland and other countries of the region as well as the entire European Union, and this is why Poles are such avid supporters of the membership of all these countries of the European Union.

A brief comment concerning what you started with, on the panel: Mr. Bertram mentioned the impact of the new EU states on the Eastern Dimension. I think this impact will not take the Finnish form in that there will not

be an Eastern Dimension. When I asked in Helsinki why and how the concept of the Northern Dimension was so successful, I was told that this was because for a long time nobody knew what it was all about, it was a great idea, sounded well, but nobody really went deeply under the veneer and this is how the Finns were able to promote the idea so well. It is different with the Eastern Dimension, we all know it will cost a lot of money, and it will have far reaching consequences. And first and foremost in the European Union, its old member states do not trust the new member states as for the relations with the East. So it is not surprising that the Task Force 'Wider Europe' basically consists of Germans and the French as well as Spaniards in terms of relation with Northern Africa, while I don't think that Lithuanians or Poles will be numerous members of this Task Force.

Ivan Krastev

Albert Hirschman in his great book 'Passions and Interests' claims that what happened during the Enlightenment and Modernity was that certain passions have been domesticated as interests and I believe that in some other parts of the world we still should talk about passions. And this in my view the weakness of the European Union.

'Interest' makes sense when it is a domesticated passion, when it is not simply a strategic calculation. One of the biggest challenges the European Union is facing is the extremely low trust in the democratic elected governments in the European nation states. From this point of view the problem of the European interest is becoming very difficult. In a certain way Europe is very much afraid of ungovernability of other countries. But Europe itself is becoming ungovernable.

And here I go to the problem of pre-emptive wars and the fact that we are at war. It is very difficult to simply say that we are going to avoid the war when one of the countries in the alliance is in the state of war. The problem with pre-emptive wars is that they are based on a judgement. And if the population does not believe in the judgement of its government, or its

intelligence services, these wars are never going to have a popular support and they are going to go from crisis to crisis.

Mr. Bush's failure with the weapons of mass destruction de-legitimised an otherwise very important concept of pre-emptive wars. Even if today, imagine for a while, the American government receives a reliable information about something bad going on in North Korea, and they think they should start a pre-emptive war, can this government do this? Can the next government do this? Who trusts the intelligence? Who trusts the political leadership? If you have a crisis of political leadership I don't believe that pre-emptive wars are possible.

Robert Cooper

First of all, on interests. There are no separate European interests from American interests. They are exactly the same, there is only one area in which I would have a doubt about that; it concerns the Middle East, where sometimes it seems to me that the United States defines itself to include Israel. That is a difference almost of identity rather than of interest. But apart from that, there are no differences of interests.

Second – a small correction I wanted to make to what I have said before. And that is, there is a limit to enlargement. And the limit to enlargement is set by the existence or non-existence of a European identity. That is why for the moment, at any rate, and I should think for as long as I am alive, Morocco is not included, but that is why Ukraine, if that is what it chooses, can be included. That is the choice Turkey has made as well.

Third, I just want to refer very briefly to the Barcelona process. It is extraordinary that Europe has a way of calling everything 'a process', and giving it a name so that nobody really understands what this is. This is an enormous, important activity which provides the only forum in which Israel and the Arab countries sit together, actually we have seen a meeting between Israel and Syria chaired by the Palestinians at the sub-committee level: it is a really important set of policies.

The real objective of that is to re-create the Mediterranean that existed once, long ago. A very long project, if we were Americans we would find a much better way explaining how important this was.

Next point, to somebody who mentioned Britain as a destructive force in the European Union – no. It is absolutely essential for Britain to be in the European Union, it is essential for the European Union that Britain is there, it is essential that the European Union has a good relationship with the USA, to which Britain makes a contribution, but so do others.

The next point I wanted to make is the general answer to Timothy Garton Ash's questions. What should Europe do? I can give particular answers for lots of things, but what Europe really needs to do is to get it act together. So that it really has something to offer to the United States other than endless consultations. So that it is not a Europe of committees. I don't mind committees, committees are necessary, so let's say, as well as being a Europe of committees, that it is also a Europe of armoured divisions, and – more important for the next generation - a Europe of effective intelligence services, to which perhaps new members like Poland who has a great tradition of a highly effective intelligence services, may offer an important contribution there.

What we need out of that in Europe, is the clarity about our policy. We need better capabilities across the world, we need to be more active. If we do all those things, then we will have influence in the USA. They are practical people, if we bring something to the table, then they will listen.

Christoph Bertram

Let me make three points. One is on interests, I fully agree with Robert Cooper, I don't think there is any real difference of interests between the United States and Europe, there are differences in method, but we must not translate differences in methods into differences in objectives.

I would include here the Middle East issue. We sometimes forget that what we have at the moment has not been the normal situation. We have

had an Israel after all, since the Oslo Accords, interested in creating peace in the Middle East in a particular way, and you didn't have any falling out between Europe and the United States on this. The moment that Israelis themselves offer a prospect for a peace for the Middle East, many of the problems we are facing now in transatlantic relations will disappear.

Moreover, as Ivan Krastev has reminded us, the problem with the Middle East is that neither the Americans nor the Europeans have an answer to the Israel-Palestine problem, it must be found by the Israelis themselves, and if we can assist them in finding it we should do that.

The second point is on the role of France, Britain, Germany and the influence that countries like Poland can have in the European Union. I don't think that the Union can be led by any duo or a triangle. That is going to be fundamentally counterproductive. What all these groupings indicate, is the fact that none of these countries has yet understood that in order to get what they want in the European Union they need to work through others before they go to Brussels. Learning how to work through the methods of the Union to get what you want is something that none of our countries in foreign policy have yet understood. And the idea that if the British, French and Germans get together then they can define the policy is erroneous, it is perfectly counterproductive and it will not work. What is necessary is that all countries, big and small ones alike, understand that in order to move the Union they first have to have an idea, they have to be willing to take initiative, they have to get others on board, and when that is done, they can go to Brussels.

The whole idea that better institutions in Brussels are going to produce better policy is erroneous. The policies will have to be thought of at the initiative of states, and moved in a much more intelligent way than any of us have done, with a possible exception of the Finns, which need to be mentioned here again and again, not because they hide their true intentions behind big formulas (it may also be a clever way of doing things) but basically because they knew how to work the system. And if Poland wants to have an impact on the way the Union defines its

foreign policy (and perhaps what Poland did just before it joined was not the best way of going about it), it will have to learn how to operate. Unfortunately, there are not very many successful models that others have developed. As for my own country, I am deeply disappointed and displeased by the way in which the Germans tend to think that if they say: 'this is what we want', that is already European policy – it is not, it will not be. And if Poland says 'this is what we want', it will not become European policy, either.

But if Poland says: 'this is an idea that we have, we are willing to take the initiative, we are willing to put some efforts and resources into it, and these are countries that we want to have on board and win over for our ideas', and then move to the Brussels institutions, then, I think, it will be successful.

My final point on what Europe should do in relations to the United States – not just think, which is always helpful, but also speak. I have been very struck by the way in which Americans, even in the Bush years, have travelled through Europe, the neo-conservatives have been trying to spread their Gospel. But if you look at the other side, how many Europeans actually go to America and take part in the American debate? We have been not very forthcoming.

America is an extraordinary place for trying to take part in the debate, precisely because they don't see themselves as a traditional nation state, precisely because they think they have a universal vision and mission. They are happy to accept that others criticise them because they think they are part of the same universal nation that America represents, it is a unique chance. And Europeans have to use that chance, they have to use it imaginatively, they have not done that so far. So let's not believe that the gap is widening just by itself; it can narrow if we make an effort, and the effort means not just to think, but also to talk and make our point, get our point across not just perhaps to the America that is sympathetic to us but also to the America that is sceptical about us.

Timothy Garton Ash

I think that is a marvellous note to end on, as is, I think, the remarkable statement that there are really no differences of interest between Europe and America, something that many people in Europe and many people in America have not perhaps noticed.

I think that this remarkable session has shown at least two things:

One, that when the best heads thinking about foreign policy in Europe get together they can come up with a pretty coherent, realistic and incisive prescription for what Europe can do. It is not impossible, by any means, to design a foreign policy strategy for Europe. It is very difficult to implement it, but it is not impossible to design it.

Secondly, that the design of that strategy for Europe is hugely enriched, not just quantitatively but qualitatively, by the enlargement. I think we have sensed it also from the various contributions from the floor here today, and, of course, in that enrichment, Poland as the largest new member from Central Europe, plays a particularly important part as in a sense the only regional power among the new members.

Special Lecture: America and Europe: facing new challenges

Henry A. Kissinger
former US Secretary of State

For me it really means a great deal to be here in Warsaw. I see here my friend and inspiration, Bronisław Geremek, and my old friend, Jacek Woźniakowski, who was a student of mine at Harvard longer ago than I dare admit. You cannot imagine what it meant in 1957 to hear from somebody who had been in the Polish resistance. We had not met anyone from Poland when he came to Harvard to speak to us. The vision of freedom this country represented has served as an inspiration to me throughout the period of the Cold War, and since.

When Europeans write about me, they say, 'He was born in Europe, so of course he understands Europe – he is a European at heart'. The fact is that I was born in Europe, but I cannot say the period before I emigrated from Europe was the most glorious period of my life, or one that would attach me indelibly to European values. In fact, my formative experience of Europe was in the period after the war, when I came back to Europe with the army of



occupation. I saw a Europe totally smashed and witnessed its recovery, the restoration of relations with Germany and with other European countries and the fight for freedom in Eastern Europe. That was the period in which my political thinking was formed.

I mention this because I am of the generation for which Atlantic relations were identical with American foreign policy. When I joined Richard Nixon's White House, the first trip that he took was to Europe. It was a matter of course and the basis of our foreign policy. Since then, there have been one or two intervening generations on both sides of the Atlantic. The Europe I knew best, first as a professor and then in government, was a Europe tied organically to the United States by necessity and by principle. In that Europe, co-operation with the United States was a matter of course. It was not always smooth, and there were many crises in the Cold War so, from that point of view, one should not look at it as some romantic period. But the fact was that, during that period, one had the sense of a common destiny and a common direction. The disagreements, when they occurred, were about the methods with which to achieve the common objective. They were not about the principle of whether we should co-operate. It is this which has now changed fundamentally.

I understand that the basic question here this morning was: 'Is America interested in a united Europe, and what kind of Europe would America want?' One other question I have heard from Polish friends in the day and a half that I have been here – and which was inconceivable the last time I was here five years ago – is: 'What are we Poles going to do caught as we are to some extent between our friendship for America and the hostility to America of France and Germany?' That is not to say that France and Germany are hostile to America, but the perception of some of my Polish friends is that, at a minimum, there is tension between France and Germany on the one side, and America on the other; and that it presents a problem for a Poland that very much wants to be part of Europe but does not want to separate from America. So let me deal with those two issues.

First, what kind of Europe does America want? The real question is: which America are you talking about? When you talk about the vast, overwhelming majority of Americans, they have no idea what sort of Europe they want. The problem you face from that America is not hostility but indifference. For policymakers, the big concern is how to make them interested in an Atlantic relationship rather than overcoming their hostility. One of the psychological dilemmas between Europe and America, if not on the policymaking level, is the amount of time policymakers in Europe spend on European identity versus the amount of time American policymakers do. I would be amazed, and I don't want to shock you, if any top policymaker in the United States has read the European constitution. I would be amazed if middle-level policymakers have read the European constitution. European foreign ministers spend 40 percent of their time on European matters; American policymakers spend very little of their time on the institutions of Europe. Therefore, if you ask the question 'what kind of Europe does America want', I cannot give you a positive answer. But I can tell you this: as I have said, I am of that post-war generation in which the people I know and have worked with all believe in close relations between America and Europe, so we don't have to be convinced. That's an opportunity, but it's also a problem, because the Europe we are familiar with is a Europe that was connected to America by the necessities of the Cold War and by the needs of its own economic recovery. So when a Europe appears that begins to oppose the United States, we are perhaps irritated more than we should be, in the way a father proclaims the importance of his son's independence but who can't guarantee he will like it when he sees it. Still, as a general proposition, I would have to say that the attitude of France and Germany to the Iraq issue was shocking for many Americans. Disagreement as to tactics we had all experienced before, even disagreement as to strategy by opposition parties; but what we had not seen before was governments that encouraged an attack on basic American motivations, this independently of what one might think of America's judgment in that period. This is what created the current situation, especially with respect to France, though not with respect to Germany, where the late

night comedians on TV make jokes about France. Normally they couldn't make jokes about foreign countries, because 90 percent of their audience would not know what they were referring to.

Back to the question: 'what does America want?' America, as a country, has no clear-cut idea. The challenge we face is evident in the debate, at least in America, between multilateralism and unilateralism. The Bush Administration is accused of having committed unilateral acts while Europeans prefer multilateral policies. But that is just the surface. The real problem is whether there is a sense of common purpose. If there is a sense of common purpose, multilateral action is nearly automatic. If there is no sense of common purpose, you will then be driven either to stagnation or to unilateralism. It is inherent in the situation.

This issue is often presented as if it were a question of procedure. But it is not a question of procedure; it is a question of substance. And what is unclear is whether it is possible at this time to develop a common sense of Atlantic community. That is what both sides of the Atlantic must answer, and it is something to which I am committed. But I cannot tell you for sure what would emerge if we addressed it seriously, only that I do believe we must address it seriously.

The early model, the Cold War model, was simple: it was 'let Europe get stronger; let Europe get united, and then it will share some of our burdens.' That essentially implied that there was only one way of looking at things, which was the American way, and that the European contribution should be to share our own burdens. That will not happen now. Now there will be a European expression of a European view. But what seems to me to be happening is that some circles in Europe believe that European identity can be found largely, or importantly, in opposition to the United States. It is not a question of whether Europeans can criticize America or have a different policy view. It is a question of whether, institutionally, Europe can only or primarily come to know what it is by opposition to the United States. If you talk to Americans who think about these problems, that is what would worry them: a Europe that is strong enough to express its own views and that these

on occasion differ significantly from those of the United States, on balance a great benefit to the international situation. But a Europe that defines itself in the classical European sense, practiced through the centuries – of trying to cut down the eminence of whatever country is most powerful and that orients itself towards this goal – would be a problem for America.

In the long run, this would also become a problem for Europe and for the world. A great portion of my intellectual studies has been devoted to classical models of foreign policy, the relations of states among each other and the way peace has been achieved and preserved in an international system composed of sovereign states. But we now live in a world that is on some levels beyond sovereignty and yet is operating on the basis of principles of the sovereign state established in the Westphalian Treaty of 1648. The cardinal aspect of the new world is that there are some challenges and opportunities that inherently transcend sovereignty. One is the privatization of security. It is now possible for private groups not identical with states – autonomous of states but operating on state territory – to create possibly the most immediate security challenges we face. They cannot be dealt with by the principles of sovereignty and the definitions of aggression elaborated in the period of the nation state.

The American definition of the necessity for preemption is intellectually correct. The nature of the threat requires preemption. This is not a bunch of wild men looking for opportunities to start war. But the articulation of that principle was all too American: the belief that an American statement could be automatically universalized. It cannot be left to one nation to give it content for an indefinite period of time. In the immediate post-September 11 period, there was no choice. But one of the new challenges to America and Europe is to answer the question of whether it is possible to define principles of preemption that can be recognized by at least large segments of humanity, and which are applicable to a world in which even crime has become internationalized to some extent, not to speak of terrorism.

How does one deal with non-proliferation in a world in which you cannot afford to wait for aggression to take place and in which you cannot wait for

absolute proof? But neither do you want to establish a principle by which every nation can, by itself, define how to deal with proliferation, except as an absolutely last resort. In this sense the problem is not so much whether I can imagine European institutions that are compatible with America. I do not foresee any significant American intervention in the process of European unification. Most high ranking Americans and most people with influence on foreign policy do not have a fixed view on the details of European institutions. They do have a view on how the relationship with Europe should evolve on substance. It would be worrisome to them to find a Europe that opposes the United States as a matter of principle and as a means of establishing its own identity.

There are some practical considerations. There is the question of a European defense identity. Again, speaking to an academic group, I would say I have no problem with Europe developing its own identity in defense. But that raises two questions. One is the institutional question – what, then, becomes of NATO? At NATO meetings, does that mean the European members caucus first and then meet with the Americans? I remember when, as Secretary of State, I first encountered the European Community. I faced the following problem: when I dealt with European countries, we could talk on any level of the bureaucracy; when we dealt with Europe, there was nobody to talk to until the European Community or the European foreign ministers had come to an agreement; and after they had come to an agreement, there was no point of talking to them because they could not adjust their position, except going through the long process that produced the decision in the first place. So, if NATO is operated on the basis of a European caucus meeting with the Americans, one needs to build some flexibility into that system. Last year, at the height of the European-American disagreement, a group of Americans who had been in high office wrote a letter criticizing some of the rhetoric on the American side and urging a more conciliatory attitude. But they put in that letter one sentence in which they said it would be helpful if the Europeans permitted American observers to be present at the deliberations of European institutions. That one sentence in a letter

dedicated to the Atlantic friendship evoked vocal protest led by Jacques Delors and a German representative. Nobody congratulated these people for their appeal to restore the European-American relationship. Instead, they chastised them for the presumption that Americans might observe discussions relating to European institutions. I understand many of the criticisms, but let us look at the problem from the point of view of those of us who genuinely believe in an Atlantic relationship and who would like to develop some common purposes.

Whatever you think of how the war in Iraq started, how the political phase of the war is conducted from now on is a matter of absolute first importance for Europe and the United States. It is not a matter for the United States alone. If the war in Iraq ends under conditions in which radical Islam is empowered and encouraged, it will have the most serious consequences all over Europe and, for that matter, all over the Muslim world. It is a question of the tactics by which we get a UN resolution, but in terms of what we are trying to achieve. In the United States I have argued for the importance of a contact group of countries that have a stake in the moderate Islamic world. I could go through a whole catalogue of issues: Iraq, relations with Iran, Palestine (where the standard European view is that America should impose its preferred solution on the Israelis, regardless of the consequences). And these are only the immediate issues.

We are living in an extraordinary period in which the international system is changing and a new international system is emerging. But the existing international system is also fundamentally changing its balances. The emergence of China is an event more significant than the emergence of Germany was in the nineteenth century – and the dislocations the emergence of Germany caused to the international system of the nineteenth century were huge. Just behind China in entering the international system as a major power is India. In the Middle East, some of the issues are like those of seventeenth-century Europe during the wars of religion. In Asia, the problems are more similar to those of the balance of power of nineteenth-century Europe. And then there is a world for which there is no experience whatever

in history, a totally new system: the globalized system of the twenty-first century which has emerged in the Atlantic world. In that world, the questions are: 'Can Europe and America define a common destiny? Can they define values in the name of which they can answer this question? What are the two sides of the Atlantic willing to do for each other that they would not do anyway on the basis of national interest?

If the international system were operated entirely on the basis of national interest, we would be analogous to that before 1914. Then we would live in an international system like that of the European state system from before 1914, in which there is an America, a Europe, a China and maybe a Russia and India, all of them conducting relations with each other on the basis of immediate calculations. But if it did not work confined to Europe, it surely cannot work in a globalized world without catastrophe. Therefore, the key question becomes: is it possible for Europe and America to develop a special relationship? That is what America has to try to face when our elections are over, whoever wins. We must learn to translate power into consensus. And Europe should use the mechanics of its integration and the formal slogans of independence to deal with how America and Europe can shape a response to their challenges.

Questions:

From the public:

What do you think about focusing more on prevention rather than preemption with regard to US foreign policy, and to what extent do you believe that the current state of international affairs is a product of erroneous foreign policy decisions made in the past with regard to Afghanistan, Iraq or the Middle East in general?

Henry A. Kissinger

Theoretically, I think prevention is better than preemption; in principle, I agree with this. On the other hand, the shocking thing about September 11 for Americans was that, on September 10, no American would have believed that New York would be attacked from the Middle East, or thought of the Muslim world as an inherent enemy of the United States. So no amount of prevention theory would have prepared America of 2001 for this situation. Many argue that prevention consists of raising the economic level of developing countries. This has merit independent of terrorism. However, that is a long-term project which will not bring immediate relief from terrorism.

In my remarks I said that it is not possible to conduct policy entirely on the basis of the classical definition of national interest. Critics of the real-

ist school of foreign policy assert that foreign policy cannot be separated from values. I agree with this. Foreign policy is unmanageable if you don't have any values, but there is one practical aspect: values are universal and absolute; policy is contingent. Any policy act, most of the time, is incomplete and represents only a partial solution, therefore never fully meeting absolute values. How to live with the world in which values provide the strength to act in difficult circumstances but cannot be fulfilled completely in one lifetime is a key problem before our time.

Heather Grabbe

You said that the important thing about the Iraq war was not how we went into it but how to prevent it from empowering radical Islam. So how? How does the United States get out of Iraq, how do the Europeans help, how do we prevent things from getting worse as far as empowering radical Islam?

Henry A. Kissinger

The first thing we must do is to engage countries that have a real stake in this. I respect the representative of the Secretary General who is going around trying to assemble a government. But at an early stage, it is important to involve countries like India, Turkey, Algeria, countries that have experience with radical Islam and that know it. Not to send troops (that would be welcome, but it is not the key issue) but to deal together with us on how to conduct the political process that now has to take place in Iraq. First, so that we can learn from their knowledge and make it a more common project and, secondly, so that we are not in a position where we appear to be unilaterally trying to impose a solution. That is intellectually the next step that needs to be taken, but it is not a magic formula. You have to understand that I speak here as a private citizen, not as a representative of the American government.

Aleksander Smolar

What about your project for the Middle East, because I understood from your speech that you had some ideas?

Henry A. Kissinger

The worst thing I could say here is that I have a solution to this problem. An article I recently published described what I think should be done. My basic point was that President Bush was fundamentally right in pointing out what the parameters of the solution should be but that it should be achieved by a combination of America, Europe and the moderate Arab states. Israel has not been recognized by its neighbors in its entire history and can see on television and read in newspapers every day that its extermination is the principal goal of major segments of its neighbors. Some of the security concerns of Israel have to be recognized but, at the same time, the dignity of the Arabs and especially of the Palestinians has to be recognized as well. My fundamental point in it was that here is a classic case of something that cannot be solved by America alone. Europe forever urges America, 'go and bring pressure on Israel'. What we need to do is to find a position that we can justify to ourselves and in which America uses its influence in Israel, Europe uses its influence in the Arab world and, hopefully, we can get the moderate Arab states to co-operate with us before the situation gets totally out of control.



Session IV

Central and Eastern Europe in search of a place in Europe and worldwide

From rejection of choice between the EU and the US to a search for a new strategy between conflicting values and interests. Looking for common interests and allies inside the EU. The future importance of US connection and the political consequences of further EU integration. Interests, aspirations and expectations of Central and Eastern Europe: divergent choices between Europe and Transatlantic community.

Chair: **Aleksander Smolar**, Stefan Batory Foundation.

Panellists: **Timothy Garton Ash**, University of Oxford;
Bronisław Geremek, former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform, London;
Elemér Hankiss, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest (visual presentation, not reported in the publication).

Aleksander Smolar

During the first sessions of our conference we started with the history and the historical and geopolitical choices of the nations and of the elites of Central and Eastern Europe, then we moved to a more general problem: US – European relations as seen from the US side and from the European side. Now we are back to Central and Eastern Europe, although of course we do not want to limit ourselves to this region only. The question we would like to ask is what we think today about the new position and about the prospects of our region in Europe and in the world.

I would like to remind you of a sentence written by Timothy Garton Ash in the 1980s saying that ‘in Europe there are those who have Europe and those who know what Europe is’. By those who have Europe he meant Western Europe, by those who know what Europe is about he meant Eastern Europe. There are similar declarations of different people, including the Pope, about a more profound presence of European values in the part of Europe which was dominated by communism. It would be quite interesting to explore how far this perception is valid today.

There are a number of practical questions: what will be the role of East Central Europe, I would not dare using the term ‘the new Europe’, in the European Union? What is the model, the ideal of Europe we can read from the writings, from speeches, from the way of thinking of elites in our countries? Will our countries act on equal footing with other countries or are we going to see the reconstruction of Europe of different speeds, according to various projects we heard about stressing the need of a hard core of Europe? If such is a probable evolution of Europe, what will be the place of Eastern and Central Europe? And finally, the question that was discussed yesterday and today – what will be the role of our part of Europe in the construction of new relation between Europe and the United States, the transatlantic relation?

Timothy Garton Ash

I want to talk about what we in Europe, we together in Europe can do. It seems to me that the best way to celebrate the enlargement is not to talk about the past but to talk about what we can do together in future. Henry Kissinger has given us a masterly account of what America can do and what perhaps the transatlantic community can do, and I want to concentrate specifically on Europe and the role of Central Europe.

My first comment is – in our title we have said ‘Central and Eastern Europe’. I want to talk only about Central Europe. Central Europe is not between the European Union and the United States. Central Europe is in the European Union and in an alliance with the United States. We could of course have a long discussion about where Central Europe ends and shifting definitions of Central Europe, but most of what has traditionally, by different interpretations, been regarded as Central Europe, is now in the European Union. We might talk about Croatia later. Some would claim that Ukraine is now the new Central Europe. But I’m talking about Central Europe which is in the European Union, it is not anymore defined geopolitically, by the classic dilemma of being between Germany and Russia, it is not any more defined primarily geopolitically by being between East and West, nor is it defined by being between the European Union and the United States. It is defined, like Britain, by being torn between two competing versions of what should be the relationship between Europe and America, that is the issue.

Yesterday Jacques Rupnik reminded us that after 1848 František Palacký confronted the dilemma of the Czech land. He was asked to choose between a Russian dominated East and a German dominated West. And Palacký’s choice was not to choose but to find an alternative, Austroslavism (if Aus-



tria hadn't existed, he said, it would have been necessary to invent it). In my view Central Europe today would be well advised to take a leaf out of Palacký's book, and I think it is in fact doing so.

Central Europe is asked to choose between a definition of Europe against the United States, that's to say a version of Europe which defines Europe by what is not America, and seeks the future of Europe as a rival super-power of the United States, and on the other hand a version of European – American relation in which Europe is clearly subordinate to the United States; what is more – in which not Europe as a whole, as a Union, but individual European countries compete to be the most faithful lieutenants of Washington. I have to say, in all frankness, that I think in recent months there has been at least a temptation for Poland to become as it were more British than the British in this regard. I believe and I hope that Central Europe will refuse that choice and instead answer with a synthesis which has a name – and that name is Euro-Atlanticism. Now I would be happy to stand corrected by others in this room, but I certainly didn't hear many people talking about Euro-Atlanticism as one word, with or without a hyphen. Until after 1990, as far as I know, these terms were actually popularised by the leaders of Central Europe, by Vaclav Havel and others. What they meant was something different from simply Atlanticism. It's no accident that it was called Euro-Atlanticism in one and the same word. What it meant was that Europe and America should be equal partners in a community in which our starting point is that we share most of the same values, many of the same experiences, and most of the same interests. In other words, Euro-Atlanticism is quite consciously an answer both to what I call the 'Euro-gaullist' definition of Europe which tries to define Europe in terms of a set of values that are different from those of North America, in terms of a social and economic model different from that of North America, in terms of an approach to international relations different from that of the United States. You all know the litany: the Americans are hyper-religious, we believe in the division of church and state and secularism; we believe in the welfare state; we have gun control; we don't have capital punish-

ment; we believe in multilateralism; we believe in international law. In other words, an attempt to give the larger Europe of twenty five member states, since May 1, a collective identity to hold together, this large and very diverse political community, in the classic fashion of European nation building, by constructing 'an Other', a constitutive 'Other', against which we define ourselves, not anymore the Soviet Union, not anymore Islam, but America: Europe, in short, as a not-America.

Euro-Atlanticism is, it seems to me, a Central European, but not only Central European answer both to that temptation and to the temptation of competing as individual nation states for the status of the best friend of George W. Bush. So if we don't define Europe in terms of identity, how do we define it? And this is my last and in a sense my main point. I believe that when we sit around the European table together, with our new Central European full and equal partners in the European Union, we should look for a definition of Europe which is not based on any claims about European identity and about a distinctive set of European values, but which calmly analyses European interests and says clearly where they coincide with those of the United States and where they do not; but above all, we should look for a definition of Europe that is based on a strategic definition of the European Union, and that's to say to define the European Union by what it aims to do inside its borders but above all outside its borders.

Two particular aspects of that: firstly, as Henry Kissinger already mentioned, the very important discussion about the criteria for intervention, all together. Intervention both of humanitarian kind, to prevent genocide, but also the new kind of intervention to pre-empt, if we cannot prevent, the fateful combination of failed states, international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. This is a new and real security threat and the fact that this claim has to some extent been abused to justify the invasion of Iraq, does not make the threat any less real. What we Europeans need to do is to come up with our own proposal for how we should revise the work of that old European Thomas Aquinas and come up with some new criteria for intervention.

There is another thing which Europe specifically has to do, and this is to continue our discussion this morning. Paradoxically it seems to me the main effect of this enlargement is to focus our attention on the necessity of the next enlargement. That is to say the strategic definition of the larger Europe comes precisely in what it does towards its neighbours, and it can do two kinds of things. One thing we know how to do, one thing we don't know how to do. The thing we know how to do is what I call 'the politics of induction', that is to say a set of policies which lead eventually to membership of the European Union. These are the politics the European Union practised highly successfully towards Central Europe over the last fifteen years. In my view we should take a strategic decision to practise the politics of induction firstly towards Turkey (that is to say in December we agree to start negotiations for Turkish membership of the European Union), secondly towards the whole of the Balkans, a very difficult case for many reasons, but in principle a clear case for the politics of induction, and thirdly, and perhaps most adventurously, in my view we should take an explicit strategic decision that we wish to practise the politics of induction towards Ukraine over the next ten to twenty years.

In bringing us to make that decision, and I believe that the Polish voice will be very important, we can discuss subsequently why that is so important in terms of the whole geopolitics of Eurasia and the future of Russia, not just of Ukraine. But I believe we should take that strategic decision and take it explicitly now, knowing for well that the actual process will be a very long one.

Finally, there will clearly be a great many of our near neighbours (and when I say the near neighbours I mean here for example Morocco which is nine miles at its closest point from Spain) to whom for one reason or another we are not going to make even the strategic offer of membership in the European Union, even in the perspective of ten to twenty years; and the other thing we have to do as Europeans is to start developing a neighbourhood policy to those states who are not going to be members for the foreseeable future and to state that explicitly.

Henry Kissinger already mentioned two very particular cases: Israel – Palestine on the one hand, Iraq on the other. Let me mention two others: Iran, vitally important, a place where a certain kind of European influence is already apparent, and where a kind of European politics which we have practised between West and Eastern Europe and which consists in the rather subtle encouragement of processes both of reform from above and of social change from below, can be practised. Second example – the Maghreb, an area of vital interest to Europe since the politics of emigration, particularly from the Muslim world, threaten to destabilise the whole domestic politics of the European Union. Here Europe has a plethora of policy instruments which the United States does not possess. Where is the trade? It's with Europe much more than with the United States. Where are the movements of people? To Europe much more than to the United States. Where are the closest networks of cultural exchange and classical diplomacy with North Africa? They are with Europe much more than with United States. What I would submit that we together with Central Europe in the European Union should be doing is to develop a European strategy both for those countries which are candidates for membership and for those who are not going to be members in the foreseeable future and this should then be the offer that the new European Union brings to the table with the United States, an offer made very clearly to the new administration after November 2; whichever administration that is, whether it is Bush or Kerry, the offer should be there on the table as a European offer.

May I say my final word: in formulating that strategic policy over the next six months I do believe that the Polish voice, of all the new members, will be by far the most important. Poland is the only original power among the new members, it is the only country which has a foreign policy, which tries to think geopolitically about the whole region, particularly towards its Eastern members, and I think it would be a great shame if the Polish voice as you join us at the table in Brussels is heard, starting next month in June, as being a rather old Polish voice of the *liberum veto* on the constitution,

and not a new Polish voice which comes to the table with something really positive to offer Europe as a whole.



Bronisław Geremek

I would like to say how happy I am that Dr. Henry Kissinger is in Warsaw today, on this happy day for Poland, now that we are a member of both NATO and the EU. All the time, he was a sympathetic observer of the process of the Polish transformation and we will never tire of expressing our gratitude for his support for our membership in NATO.

I have a feeling that during the previous sessions everything that could be presented as a sophisticated analysis, has already been presented. So let me make some remarks concerning the simplest things, for sometimes the simplest things matter. The first one – the title of our conference ‘Central and Eastern Europe and Geopolitics’: Central and Eastern Europe needs some comment. Using this term we do not consider it as a Mitteleuropa. It is something else. So what is this Central Europe which we have a kind of nostalgia for? Central Europe has few common political interests. What Central Europe does have is a common history. One can say that history is the only cement of this region. Central Europe is first of all Europe, a Europe which is not central at all, but rather peripheral. The political effect of this situation is that we have this fear of being marginalised. This is a fear we have had for one thousand years. It matters now and it will matter in the future. So, for both reasons, Central Europe is looking for strong structures of co-operation and solidarity, for collective guarantees. It is thinking how not to fall prey to isolation and how not to have a feeling of being abandoned.

My second remark is the question of whether the notion of the West is a completely obsolete term. Can we see that the unity of the West means a kind of geopolitical axiology? Sometimes this question of change in the geopolitics of Central Europe refers to the axiological problem of values. In a speech I delivered in France I spoke about the importance of values for the future of Europe. I was very well received. Afterwards I proposed to analyse the notion of the West as a union of values and I was, of course, considered an American Trojan horse. To me, the West still seems to be an important reference in a world where geographical borders matter less than they used to. Axiology should be considered a political fact. The West presents these values that we share – freedom, human dignity, individualism, democracy, rule of law, maybe also a Promethean inventive spirit. These are the values and the spiritual heritage of the West. And if we, Central Europeans, are attached to the notion of the West, this is also because of our historical experience in which we have had to prove that we do belong to the West. The French, the Germans, the Italians didn't have to prove it – we did. So the West is something which matters for us as a reference. And if terrorism cannot be confined to borders, to geography, one needs to see that international terrorism is directed against some axiological rather than geographical borders. In such a situation, facing the phenomenon of terrorism, the concept of the West can be both useful and workable. Europe and America need each other but on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean this sentence is put in doubt. In Europe we see a search for a collective identity, through a process which could be called 'a process of emancipation'. This need of emancipation seems to characterise the European debate on the America–Europe relationship. In some European debates America is considered if not as an enemy, at least as 'the other', as a reference giving us the possibility to define ourselves.

In the United States, as Henry Kissinger said, the greatest and most pressing danger is the indifference to European affairs. Indifference, if not at times – in the political elites – disdain. It was with a tremendous feeling of happiness that I received the famous letter of American intellectuals and

politicians quoted by Dr. Kissinger. I read it while being in France, I spoke with my French friends, and their reaction was: so now Americans are proposing their presence in our debate on the future of Europe, but would they propose a European presence, a presence of European representatives, in the meetings of the National Security Council? Would they accept a European presence in debates concerning the future of America and the world? It is, I think, also one of the important reasons why sometimes the European reaction to American proposals – and even at times expressions of sympathy – is received with a kind of lack of trust. It stems first of all from the feeling that the process of European unification, which was supported by the US, which was regarded with sympathy by the US, is now viewed by the US in a rather negative way. The question is why? Why does America, so deeply interested in the process of European integration, now fear that it will change the relationship between the two? And that is giving rise to this feeling of the necessity to emancipate. Europe sometimes seems to be treated as a pupil.

Central Europe is concerned about both these attitudes. On one side as well as on the other we see our interests, but also our dreams and hopes, put in doubt. We wanted to escape from Soviet domination and we did it. We wanted to obtain membership in the European Union and in NATO as a community of values and interests, and we did obtain it. Now, we wouldn't like to see these guarantees obtained, these hopes realised, vanish. So we want the United Nations system reformed, but only the United States and the European Union can try to do it, only by working together can Europe and America do it. And that is a necessary condition for a multilateral, international policy.

We, Central Europeans, want a European Union with strong internal structures, with a constitution, and this Polish *liberum veto* was not part of the historical tradition of this institution. One should not forget that with the *liberum veto* Poland was able to live without problems for two hundred years. With the constitution without *liberum veto* we were unable to survive even for six months. I hope that now Polish policy on the

constitution will be defined in a definitive way. We need the European Union with the constitution, because only in the context of a strong European Union can we count on assistance policies, giving us the opportunity of rapid growth, but also because we want to be a member of a community and not only of a coalition of states. A community needs a common foreign and security policy, as well as a kind of European defence. One cannot think about foreign policy without military and policing instruments. But we consider it, or we can consider it, to be a defensive structure complementary to NATO. That was the very sense of the Blair – Chirac – Schroeder declaration which proposed European defence as a complementary structure. And I do believe that with such an approach we will be able to find the notion of the common European interest. We will have different internal alliances inside the European Union. And I don't think that Central Europe will form such an alliance in European politics. I do not believe that one can find a kind of complementarity between the Central European countries. The reference will only be historical, but not political. But I do believe that the Weimar Triangle, the special co-operation between France, Germany and Poland, can be considered as an interesting and intelligent instrument. I would like to see a more active role of the United Kingdom, but I am not sure that the policy the United Kingdom is proposing within the European Union could assemble different projects and different interests.

Central Europe can become a factor in European unification only when we will have a debate on the future of Europe. Unfortunately, debates like the one we are having in this room, and in some other rooms in Poland, are very rare. Still, as we are now members of the EU, we should consider the issue of the future of the EU as a question concerning us directly.

To my mind NATO, and that is my last point, is still relevant not only to Polish interests, to the future of Poland, but also to the European interest and to the future of Europe. Because of Article Five of the Washington Treaty, it is still relevant as far as peace in Europe is concerned. But it can also become global instrument of European – American co-operation for

world peace. And NATO now, changing its philosophy of action, thinking on out of area operations, is becoming such an instrument of global politics. And in a sense, it is an expression of the unity of the West, the expression of this tradition formed during the 20th century. It is a political and military tool which we still need, and which can be of tremendous importance. Do we need an independent defence structure? I do believe that Europe needs a defence structure but it should not to be considered as being in competition with NATO. Some European countries are unable to increase their military expenditures. Some European countries do not want to increase military expenditures. Pacifist Germany would not obtain democratic approval for such a policy. Neogaullist France does not want to pay for European defence. In terms of expenditure, Europe is not ready to accept military defence as one of its objectives. So maybe we should consider NATO as a European defence alliance and for us, Central Europeans, I would say it was from the beginning a European alliance with the participation of North America. Let's consider that the European Union is a very special superpower (because it is a superpower) but only in the sense of soft power. But this weakness can become a virtue, for it means that human rights issues and democracy are in the centre of European activity. And it is a programme, but still it is very difficult to obtain a unity of meanings in Europe, a unity of policy, concerning these traditional structures of European soft power. How to understand the fact that in the year 2000, the Warsaw Conference on democracy could obtain a consensus among more than one hundred countries, but France, one of the homelands of democracy and freedom, was not part of this document? So in my view we should not think that the conflict which appeared between America and Europe is rooted in cultural values. One can be critical of neoconservative doctrine, of a concrete policy, but I don't see a reason for seeing it as a cultural gap between America and Europe, rooted in culture. Thinking on the future of this relationship: perhaps this reference to the unity of the West may be a good argument.

Heather Grabbe

I am going to speak primarily about the question of how enlargement will change the European Union, what kind of Europe will emerge, now that Central Europe is fully a part of the European Union. In a sense all of us in Europe today are now asking ourselves the old Polish question: *Europa tak, ale jaka?* [Europe – yes! But what kind of Europe?] We don't really know what kind of Europe will emerge. But in some ways we have had a rather distorted vision of it because of enlargement coinciding with the question of Iraq. The issue of the war in Iraq has confirmed the prejudices of many people, especially in the fifteen old Member States, I think rather erroneously; it gives a very distorted mirror.

In France, in Belgium, in Luxembourg and in parts of Germany you often hear the expression: 'The Central and Eastern Europeans will be American Trojan horses', and in Britain you hear a slight air of triumphalism: 'Aaa, these will be the staunchest allies of the United States in every circumstance'. Both of these views, I think, are going to be wrong. I remember, on the night when the planes went to Iraq, when the war began last year, sitting at dinner with a senior British Defence official who was very proud to proclaim, or to predict rather: 'As Europe moves eastwards, its centre of gravity will move westwards', hoping, no doubt, that the heart of Europe would come closer to London's point of view in world affairs rather than that of Berlin.

But in fact, I think, EU foreign policy is going to move eastwards with the enlargement to the EU's troublesome neighbours. That is very good news in many respects, but it raises new challenges which the European Union is only just beginning to grapple with. I am just going to outline briefly four ways in which the European Union will change and how that will affect



its ambitions and its capabilities in the world. First of all – new versus old Europe is a false dichotomy. Iraq was a special case. Although the US can count on Central and Eastern Europe when it issues an ultimatum ‘Are you with us or against us?’, of course Central Europe is going to say: ‘We are with you’. But I don’t think the US can rely on Central and Eastern Europe to follow into further military adventures, although perhaps the US public may be in that position as well.

Certainly it is true that the new members of NATO are very active in peace-keeping operations around the world, they have a large proportion of their troops abroad, they are developing niche capabilities which are very useful for the Atlantic alliance, have a strong commitment to NATO, but there is a somewhat ambivalent attitude in this region towards international institutions and there is a somewhat different understanding of power. This is a desire not to meddle much, not to disrupt the status quo too much all over the world, there is certainly not in this region a sharing of the neoconservative agenda of spreading democracy from the barrel of a gun. There was a very interesting comment made by Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski last week. He was asked: ‘What do you think about the idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East?’ He shifted uncomfortably in his chair and said: ‘Well, I don’t really like to hear about promoting democracy because I heard for so many years the idea of promoting socialism in the world’. So I think the neoconservative agenda is not a shared thing here. And the understanding of power being somewhat different also affects the way in which the new members will approach one of the biggest strategic issues that the EU has to face in the years ahead – and that is its relationship with Russia.

Russia is still at the centre of security concern in many countries in this region, in the Baltic states for obvious reasons, not just because of their history of being coerced into the Soviet Union, but also because of continuing Russian pressure on issues like the Baltic minorities and the Kaliningrad exclave. This is why, I think, these countries are so strongly Atlanticist, more so even than Poland or Slovakia.

It is not so much that Central and Eastern Europeans are afraid of invasion, it is more a distaste for sphere of influence and balance of power politics. Their view on these subjects, their concern about the fact that the resurgent Russian interest in what it sees as its natural sphere of influence has a tension, has a potential conflict with the European Union policy for its new neighbourhood. That is an area into which the new members will be able to put their preferences, their history, their concerns. The idea that there is not necessarily a clear division of labour between Russia and the EU which can be neatly demarcated along the borders of particular countries, Ukraine of course is a classic example – how do you divide Ukraine between Russia and Europe?

A third area where, I think, the new members will make a significant difference to how the EU develops, is in what kind of European security and defence policy emerges. As Bronisław Geremek was just saying, it is clear that the new members prefer the ESDP which is compatible with NATO, of course. But how do we deliver it? And is it really attractive? It seems to me that for many people in Central and Eastern Europe, ESDP is only attractive in so far as it can deliver, in so far as it can actually resolve conflicts, sort out problems, not either as a rival to NATO or as an identity vehicle for Europeans to define themselves vis-à-vis the United States, but as a practical problem solver.

So far there has been rather lukewarm interest in the European Security and Defence Policy from Central and Eastern Europe. The Lithuanian Defence Minister for example commented on it: 'I would be great if ESDP caused Europe to develop serious military capabilities. But it will not, so let's stop kidding ourselves, let's stop paying the lip service to all of this'. But if ESDP can be used in the years ahead to sort out things like frozen conflicts, for example to replace Russian troops in Transdnistria, then, I think, the Central East European members of the EU could actually be convinced about it.

And in particular Poland could be a swing vote here. Poland could be a rather interesting country in this respect, Poland could change its mind about its enthusiasm for NATO over ESDP, if it were invited to join the big

three countries in discussing defence and foreign policy. If Poland were able to form a part of quartet with Britain, France and Germany on developing European security and defence policies, then Poland could become, I think, rather enthusiastic about it. But again it depends on the ability of the Europeans to deliver.

The final issue is in fact these big three countries – of course the new members of the EU do not want to see the EU dominated by the large countries alone. And the idea of having a hard core Europe which is essentially led by France and Germany is not welcome. There are some horrendous historical nuances and connotations of the idea of France and Germany getting together. We felt those, one could see people shuddering in Central and Eastern Europe last year when France and Germany got together with Russia to oppose the US in terms of policy on Iraq. This just had exactly the wrong kind of historical connotations.

But it may be that leadership from France, Britain and Germany, the big Three, on foreign policy in the EU is the only way to get things done. As some of the EU's top officials in foreign policy said last year: 'Most countries in Europe do not really have a foreign policy, and my job is to persuade those that do not have a foreign policy that the foreign policy of those that do have one, is theirs as well, and is appropriately European.' And I think that this person was right in seeing it as essential that Britain, France and Germany agree, it is the only way Europe can have an effective common policy, can have a voice in the world. But of course it is also quite understandable that the new Member States, like the small old Member States, want to have a strong say in the way the EU formulates and conducts its foreign policy. In fact enlargement nearly increases the dilemma we have of how to reconcile inclusiveness of decision making in foreign policy with effectiveness externally. The new members, of course, are keen to be involved, but they do not want to see Franco-German domination of foreign policy. But how can we forge a common policy if we spend so much time trying to reconcile fairly minor differences rather than facing the major challenges?

In that sense I think the new members will forge very different alliances. I agree very much with Bronisław Geremek that there will be no Eastern block in the European Union, that in fact the commonality of being candidates for membership, the commonality of being Central European is not really a glue that will hold, once the new members are fully integrated into the EU. And for that reason the alliances are going to be very fluid, there are going to be many shifting coalitions between new and old Member States, between big and small Member States, and I think actually the divides between Member States will be much more between big and small, between liberals and protectionists, between strong alliance defenders and strong Europeanists on defence, rather than between new and old members.

I have been doing a little bit work recently for a book which looks at how will the new members forge alliances on particular issues. Actually when you look across the whole range of EU issues, economic as well as those that have to do with foreign policy, security, justice and home affairs, there is no consistent, coherent constellation of countries which are always together. The new members don't stick together on many issues and Poland is hardly ever with the other new members. Poland is usually forming an alliance with old members, particularly other large countries.

From that point of view I think a very interesting question is whether Poland will take a large country view or a small country view on the ambitions for European external policy. Will it be, as I think, a large country with a small country mentality? This is still an open question for Poland. Poland has the potential to be an enormous contributor to the EU policy. But what about new other member states? I started off by saying that many people in Britain hope that the other new Member States will be rather like UK, that they will have very British preferences. Of course that is the fear in France and other countries that they might be like that.

But I would predict that actually most of the new members are not going to look like Britain at all, when it comes to their ambitions for EU foreign policy and the alliances they will form. They are quite status quo oriented, they do not necessarily want to rock the boat, they want European security

to be at the top of the agenda for NATO and for European security organisations. In this respect they resemble another Member State, not Britain at all, they look very much like Germany; like the traditional German foreign policy which is quite status quo oriented, which is strongly Atlanticist, but which also supports the idea of Europeans looking after their own backyard.

This idea that the new members might be rather like Germany in their preferences might be somewhat surprising and not entirely welcome in Central Europe. But that is, I think, the most likely outcome. And for that reason it is much more likely that Europe will end up being a regional power rather than a global power.

Discussion

Timothy Snyder

I would like to give a view about how we talk about the West. It seems to me that it is likely that this is the last conference that uses the term 'Central and Eastern Europe'. Eastern and Western Europe are strategic terms, they are political rather than geographical, they come from the Cold War, and over the course of the 1990s something very interesting happened: Central Europe was re-born as a cultural idea, cities (Vienna, Budapest, Warsaw, Cracow, Vilnius maybe) more than countries, had something in common. While as a mutation of the original political idea, Central Europe were the countries that had a chance to join Western European institutions.

As of May 1 of this year, this kind of Central Europe is now gone, just as Eastern Europe was gone roughly in 1989. We are not going to start talking this way immediately, but probably we should start talking this way as soon as possible, because I think that Professor Bronisław Geremek and Heather Grabbe are quite right that these countries are not going to behave as a block, and the things they have in common are actually the things that they HAD in common. It is precisely 'wanting to join the EU' that they had in common. Even in terms of good relations amongst themselves, 'wanting to join the EU' inclined Hungarians, Romanians, Poles and Lithuanians to

get along, more actually than 'being in the EU' will. The new dynamic will be different.

I don't think that Eastern Europe and Central Europe will go away, it does seem to me though that these terms are going to continue their migration to the East: there will be a Central Europe but it will relate to countries like Serbia or perhaps, Ukraine, in other words - countries which have some chance of joining European institutions and in which there are some people, we might call them 'the Central Europeans', who wish to join Western institutions. I think this is the way these terms will probably be employed because they are not only accurate but also useful.

This leads me to the second point about these terms and the way we talk about Europe. It strikes me that when the frame of reference of this conference was formed, one very much still had in mind likely American success in Iraq and also rhetorical American success in dividing Europe. Both of these things are much less likely now. The terms of the conference were formulated six months ago. I would like to finish this remark about time and space by asking what you will think about Europe six months from now. And now I am echoing the remarks of many others before me. Six months from now, whatever the new administration in the United States turns out to be, the United States is likely going to need help, and the obvious place to ask for help is going to be the European Union.

A great deal depends upon whether the European Union has first of all decided whether or not there is going to be any answer, that is whether the United States is going to be left to deal with the problems that it has itself created, or whether the Europeans are going to treat this as an opportunity to restore transatlantic relations.

A second thing which is very important is what that answer is going to be? And here I may be echoing Timothy Garton Ash, it strikes me that Poland has something very important to offer. Poland may be able to start the discussion within the European Union about just what the terms of this exchange are going to be. When the United States asks the European Union

for help, which I think is extremely likely, what it is that Europe will ask for in return, which allows for some dignity on both sides?

Robert Cooper

The new Member States have been at the table since the Treaty was signed about a year ago, and from the point of view of policy making they have been participating all along. So to some extent, some of the comments and predictions that were being made by the panel I can tell already whether they are true or not.

It is certainly clear that Russia features very high on the list of priorities, but the case that particularly came to mind when Heather Grabbe was speaking was the case of Georgia where there was actually the initiative for doing something, for being more active in Georgia (in spite of the nationality of the Georgian foreign minister). The initiative came from Lithuania and has received enthusiastic backing in particular from the new Member States. Among some of the new Member States there was clearly a kind of strong feeling of sympathy for a country at what we hope is the beginning of a transition.

Second point that I want to make is that the problem about the European Union is not about having policies, it is about implementing them. There are lots of policies available and it is often not too difficult to find what to do, but the business of particularly foreign policy, the business of implementing foreign policy, of continuing over the years when things don't seem to be going very well, of spending money efficiently around the Mediterranean, all of those things – those are the real difficulties, and that's why the new Treaty is important because implementation is about having slightly more efficient institutions. The new treaty is not going to solve all the problems but it makes some important steps in that direction.

I would just finish by saying two things, specifically addressed to the Polish members of the audience. The first is that looking around the new Member States at the table I must say that the Poles do pretty well. I think

that they organise themselves well, they have clear views, they find the right tone to put them across in the meetings, and are among the most effective if not the most effective of the new Member States. And the second thing I would say is: please do not get to hang up on the question of voting and voting weights. Not very many people vote, not very often, almost all decisions are taken by consensus. What people think about you, how they look at you, whether they regard you as being a serious and important player is much more important than the exact voting weight that you have.

Ryszard Bobrowski (Central European Review)

I would like to ask a question related to the Eastern Dimension of the new enlarged European Union. A number of speakers talked about Ukraine. But we didn't talk that much about Russia and the new relationship between the new European Union and new Russia, Putin's Russia. How the European Union will change its attitude toward Russia after this enlargement? And the second question is to what extent we, the Central European countries, the newcomers, will have a role in this process?

Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas (American Studies Center,
University of Warsaw)

First, a short remark about the borders, future borders, frontiers of the European Union. Russia is a case not yet discussed but I think that Russia should be invited, of course if and only if Russia itself chooses to become a European nation and abandons its exceptionalism, its attempts to present itself as a separate civilisation, something between Europe and Asia. But there are other difficult cases to be discussed, like the Caucasus region nations, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan (it is another Muslim European country potentially, like Turkey), Albania, Bosnia. Then there is Israel. The Treaty of Rome does not actually define Europe as a geographic or a physical Europe.

Could it be re-interpreted as a cultural Europe, for example? And in this case, if Israel settles its conflicts with Arab peoples, then maybe Israel should be invited to the European Union as well?

My second point is about a deeper dimension of changes which are taking place. This conference is conducted almost entirely in terms of international relations. We are talking about the relations between countries, states, nations, peoples, and about international organisations. But at the very moment we speak, thousands of Poles are on their way to the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and Sweden, because these countries have not imposed any restrictions on employment for the citizens of the new member countries. We are not talking about janitors or construction workers, we are talking about the young elite, mainly. They will be among the first Europeans who are more Europeans than representatives of any particular nationality. I think that this deeper dimension may result in the strengthening of the European identity. For many Poles, and I guess Hungarians or Estonians, being European is more attractive than being Estonian or Polish. This is different from being French or German or British. It is a beginning of an emergence of a very large stratum of people within the European Union who will be Europeans first. And by the way, the citizens of Poland account for almost nine per cent of the entire population of the European Union after the enlargement. We are talking about big processes here.

Tomas Strazay (Slovak Foreign Policy Association)

I think that Central Europe will not disappear from political vocabulary if some instruments of co-operation among Central European countries are maintained. Among the models of regional co-operation, the so called Vyshehrad co-operation has become very known. My question is quite simple – what are the prospects of the Vyshehrad co-operation in the enlarged European Union? And what role is Poland supposed to play, if any?

Roman Kuźniar (University of Warsaw)

The enlargement of the EU has obviously radically changed the Central European geopolitics and here I differ on this point from Professor Adam D. Rotfeld. It has changed our geopolitics much more than we, especially in this country, are ready to accept, we still hear a kind of cognitive dissonance. But while geopolitical situation in Central Europe has changed so radically, many of our politicians and intellectuals still prefer to live in the world that ceased to exist. It seems that they really prefer to live in the outdated decorations of 1945, of the middle of the Cold War. This change is due to two reasons – first is that the EU has removed the traditional Realpolitik from international relations within the EU and has introduced a new political culture into this region; second is the fact that the EU is becoming a collective defence and security system. The choice of Central Europe should be rather to strengthen this tendency than vice versa, which occasionally happens, unfortunately. The choice of Central Europe should be to contribute to strengthening of this role and of the responsibility of the EU in international affairs. And how this may happen? In this context I would like to refer to the famous slogan used by the Communists in Poland at the end of the 1980s, ‘there is no liberty without responsibility’. The answer was delivered by the Polish democratic opposition ‘Solidarność’ during the Round Table Conference: I remember that Jerzy Turowicz said ‘there is no responsibility without liberty’.

The only way for the EU to become responsible is to become powerful and independent which was not the case for the last fifty years. And it has to come true in opposition (at least at the beginning) to the US, because any new political entity, any new political identity usually comes into existence in opposition to its environment, especially the part of environment which is questioning its aspiration, and the United States is questioning aspirations of the EU on the international scene.

I have recently seen at least two important expressions of international role and responsibility of the EU which is the European security strategy

and the decision to set up the Rapid Reaction Force. Actually, the European security strategy differs totally from the American security strategy, on this I disagree with what Robert Cooper said during the morning session. I have to say I am quite optimistic about the way the EU is trying to become an important, international, responsible, global player, unless obviously Central Europe undermines this process.

As to the question what the EU should do about Iraq – I think it is a premature question because the US is not asking for help for the time being.

Aleksander Smolar

I would simply like to justify the title of the conference which was criticised: of course it was not meant in geographical terms, nor in classical terms, it was a provocation to attract attention. We wanted to stress something which was refused here for almost fifteen years – that there are tensions and there is a problem of choice. The fact that there might be situations in which interests or perceptions can be different as seen from Washington and from the EU, was totally refused, for psychologically understandable reasons: all our countries were very much interested in maintaining the unity of Euro-Atlantic community. Our objective was to stress that there is a problem implying choices about the war, the fact that was not recognized until the very last moment. Even in the case of the Letter of the Eight, the highest Polish authorities declared that nobody thought that it was directed against France or Germany.

Timothy Garton Ash raised a very interesting question concerning the identity of Europe. I don't think you can have any community without identity and any strategic choice without identities. The European ambition for emancipation that Bronisław Geremek talked about implies the existence of identity. Emancipation is also a process of defining differences.

Heather Grabbe formulated the hypothesis about changing alliances. This may also imply instability. I cannot imagine that France and Germany

will renounce their alliance, although it can be weakened through a much more complex relation with Great Britain.



Elemér Hankiss

I have heard many very interesting proposals and strategies on how the East European states and governments should act and participate in the work of the European Union and in building up a stronger and more beautiful European Union. Almost nothing has been said about the people living in this region, how to help the people in this region who, at least in the first couple of years, will suffer and not profit from enlargement.

Heather Grabbe

I am just going to address a few issues. The issue of how to define yourself in Europe is an endlessly fascinating one. I find it so interesting how many countries and how many cities call themselves the geographical centre of Europe, and I have heard this claim in cities from countries like Hungary, Romania, I have heard them even in Estonia and in Ukraine. The other claim you very frequently hear is: 'We are in Europe and the barbarian East begins on our border'. That is still a very powerful argument, you still hear from the countries which are knocking on the door for EU membership that: 'We are the last bastion. If you don't take us in then the Eastern hordes will be upon you'. I think Timothy Snyder is right in thinking that the whole concept of Central Europe is moving eastwards, and that it is more and more an aspiration term – to call yourself Central European means a half way to becoming West European. I think it is not actually a very fruitful dialogue after enlargement but it is one which is still very powerful in, for example,

Moldova, also in Ukraine, and you certainly hear that at the moment in the Caucasus, which brings me to the second interesting point, about Georgia and Russia, which Robert Cooper raised. The Georgians constantly stress their European aspirations and vocations, the new way of saying: 'We want to join the West' is to say: 'We want to join Europe'. And the probable question is whether Europe will live up to those expectations.

But I think we are heading for quite a major debate in Europe about how to deal with Russia in particular and I have already explained why. But just to add to what Robert Cooper said about this issue of Russia rising up to agenda – there are strong divisions in Europe about whether or not it is right and just and inevitable for Russia to establish a natural sphere of influence in the countries which were part of its influence during the Soviet period. We heard the views of Ken Jowitt yesterday who said: 'Yes, that was the case', and we have heard some interesting views of Christoph Bertram about countries simply not being suitable for EU membership and in fact having more in common with Russia.

A very telling anecdote on the differences of views you hear within the European Union is when Franco Frattini, the Italian foreign minister, appeared in front of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, very shortly after the Rose Revolution last autumn, and was attacked by an Estonian observer in the European Parliament, who said: 'Why haven't you, the Italian presidency of the EU, recognised Georgia? Collin Powell has just been to Tbilisi to congratulate Sakashvili on the Rose Revolution, when will a high level EU delegation go to Tbilisi to do the same?' And Franco Frattini, being of Berlusconi persuasion on this matter, replied: 'We are just consulting with Moscow when it will be appropriate.' That tells you a very great deal about the differences in the views between some of the old members and the new members on the power of Russia.

Next point is on what makes an influential member state, will Poland and other new member states be influential? I think certainly the issue of organisation which Robert Cooper raised is very important. The determinants of influence in the EU are not really votes or even necessarily size or

wealth. I will point to three others. One is ability to form alliances, effective alliances to pursue your interests. This happens all the time in the EU, and to answer Aleksander Smolar's point on shifting coalitions – do they cause instability? I don't think they do because that is what happens in the EU all the time. If you look at it, the same countries don't stick together on the EU's budget, on defence, on tax competition, on single market, on relations with the United States. You just don't see the same countries in coalitions, we already have networks of countries and different constellations of countries in the old EU. And we will see that very firmly in the enlarged EU. There is nothing wrong with shifting coalitions, you might even call them 'coalitions of the willing'. I don't think they cause instability but I think it would be dangerous if countries formed defensive alliances in order to protect their interests and do dirty deals, for example – I will kill your take-over directive if you kill my agricultural reform. I think the Franco-German relationship is in fact an anomaly, it is the only one in the European Union and it is changing very fast, it is not what it used to be. I think it will not form a hard core in the EU but I don't think that shifting coalitions necessarily lead to instability.

Now in addition to forming alliances, two other areas which determine a country's influence are the power of country's ideas and the capabilities of its people. On ideas – look how many good ideas Finns have put forward and how much impact it has had on the European Union. If you can come up with a solution to a problem, you can be very powerful. So where are the Poland's solutions to the Ukraine problem? I think that is going to be a very interesting question. If Poland can find a solution, then that idea will make Poland very powerful in the EU. And on people, the organisation and the quality of the people that a country sends to Brussels are very important. Not just the commissioners and ministers, but also the MEPs, and personally I think, looking at the party lists so far, both the candidates for commissioners and for Members of the European Parliament put forward by the new members are generally of a much better quality than those you get sent to Brussels from the old Member States. The question is: will this

continue in the next Commission and in the next European Parliament or is it just the first time round, is it an exciting thing to do and so people go in? Will they become disillusioned, will we find from 2009 onwards that it tends to be the same combination in the European Parliament of party loyalists, young politicians on the make and mavericks who tend to go to the European Parliament from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from the old Member States?

And finally on a very interesting question on the Vyshehrad co-operation. I don't think prospects for subregional co-operation are very good, partly because of this issue of shifting coalitions in the EU and the fact that the Vyshehrad countries don't have so much in common any more, but also because the Vyshehrad co-operation, frankly, was never very effective because it depended so much on the personalities of the heads of state and government who have never really got on that well, they don't now, they didn't in the mid 1990s. The only area where they had a really big impact was on Ukraine. Those were the Vyshehrad summits that really had an impact when they invited Kuchma and there was some discussion for example about visas or Schengen. To make that work in the EU it cannot just be the neighbours of Ukraine which raise it up the agenda because there are too few of them. There are a lot of countries that have policy with Ukraine but not many of them are members of the European Union. What the new members need to do on Ukraine is to engage Germany, which would make a huge difference to the pro-Ukrainian coalition in the European Union, because Germany has influence when it comes to allocation of resources, because it is the biggest paymaster into the budget, because Germany has huge influence when it comes to the border policies of the EU. If you want to persuade the EU to ease the visa requirements for Ukrainians for example, Germany's say in the Council of Ministers is absolutely critical. And also because Germany has influence with France and can try and persuade France that Ukraine matters. And that would make a big difference because it would mean that you could get the attention of policy makers who regard Ukraine as very far down the list of priorities for EU foreign policy. So I would

suggest that one coalition to form – that could be quite durable and very profitable for new members (and particularly the Vyshehrad four) – is with Germany for Eastern policy.

Timothy Garton Ash

I will confine myself to two short remarks. Just to reinforce what Heather Grabbe and Robert Cooper and many others have said – the strategic direction of the European Union depends not on what is written in the constitution but on strategic leadership being given by a group of states over certain period of time, the Franco-German couple is clearly not efficient any more to give leadership but nor is the Club of Three with Great Britain if that came about. There is therefore a real political opportunity for Poland specifically to be a member of a leading group which by the way will not necessarily – as Heather said – be the same group on all issues but nor can it be different on every issue. It has to be sufficiently the same on a sufficient number of important issues. There is a real opportunity for Poland to be a member of that leading group along with others, including France, Germany and Britain, if you will seize it.

My other remark is about Central Europe. Heather mentioned how many centres of Europe there are, actually this is a hobby of mine, I collect centres of Europe, or claimants to be the centre of Europe, I am up to seven so far but still hoping to find more, they are quite widely spread across the whole of Central and Eastern Europe and they illustrate just what a mobile concept Central Europe is. My favourite is the one in Ruthenia which is quite a strong claimant and this whole sight is based on a complete misunderstanding by the local Ukrainians of the Latin inscription on an Austro-Hungarian trigonometric point which the local people took to mean to say: 'This is the centre of Europe'. In fact it just said: 'This was placed here by the Austro-Hungarian military survey'.

I half agree and half disagree with Timothy Snyder. Where I disagree is to think that people in any significant number will start talking about

Serbia as Central Europe, or Ukraine as Central Europe, or anywhere outside the current European Union as Central Europe. People in those countries may so describe themselves but I don't believe it will take off, it takes quite a lot actually to launch a new piece of symbolic geography. I think that a few people inside the European Union will occasionally talk about central Europe with a small 'c' in the way they will talk about northern Europe, southern Europe, it may become a geographical denominator within the European Union. But it will not be a major operational concept of geopolitics. And this is itself a triumph, the ultimate success of the concept of Central Europe, whose purpose all along was its own extinction. If you remember, the concept was re-launched politically twenty years ago roughly speaking, in 1983, 1984, by Milan Kundera, Czesław Miłosz, György Konrad and others. Central Europe, they claimed, was a part of the West that was in the East. What was this Central Europe? It was a ferry, it was a political idea which was to ferry this part of the world from the geopolitical East to the geopolitical West. And on May 1, 2004 the ferry finally arrived at the other shore, mission accomplished. There is no longer need for the ferry because you are on the other shore. You are on the hard ground of the West and so perhaps ending this conference we should consider that this is a kind of funeral of the political idea of Central Europe as it has functioned for the last twenty years. But as you know funerals can be rather jolly affairs particularly in Celtic countries – what is called a wake where once the person is buried and a great deal is drunk and sung. And perhaps we could this evening start celebrating a wake for Central Europe and make it the merriest funeral in the world.



Closing remarks

Danuta Hübner

Member of the European Commission

I would like to start by saying that I have an impression that there is a fashion for scepticism in Europe. When I travel and participate in meetings of intellectuals and politicians I can actually sense not only scepticism, but indeed a pessimism about the possibility of EU functioning efficiently after the latest enlargement. There is a widespread belief that the post-May 1 EU is changing into an institution virtually unable either to govern itself or take decisions and that we are witnessing a beginning of the end of the European integration process. This pessimism horrifies me and I believe that it is absolutely necessary to restore a more balanced view of the enlarged Europe. Indeed, it is indispensable, because this pessimism is likely to negatively influence the public opinion, which poses a threat to Europeans' sense of community, their common purpose and common values.



I strongly believe that these negative, pessimistic feelings are unfounded. Let us take an impartial look at the Member States now: the undisputed advantages of the Internal Market, the fact that the borders have almost disappeared, the processes in the Euro zone, the progress in the public security and finally the last EU enlargement which would have been unthinkable only a dozen or so years ago. These are unprecedented benefits of European integration. Furthermore, if we compare the present situation of Central-Eastern Europe with what was happening in this area fifteen years ago, the epoch-making progress is evident. Few people in 1989 would have bet on the present achievements in Poland.

I have the impression that European pessimism is concurrent with certain phenomena and regularities of globalization. A new Eurostat report on public opinion was published yesterday, in which the division between the fifteen old Member States and the ten new Member States was made for the last time. I would like to emphasise the fact that we (together with my colleagues from the European Commission) took a very important decision concerning the abolition of this distinction in Eurostat polls. The report examines, *inter alia*, trust in public institutions. It is interesting to find that public opinion considers the radio as the most trustworthy public institution, more even than television; somewhere in the middle of the scale stand the European institutions, while political parties are indicated as the least reliable. Only 8% of respondents have declared to trust political parties.

I believe that the process of social development in Europe and world-wide has reached a particular moment: there has been a radical shift in the perception of the sources traditionally generating the feelings of security, certainty and trust. Although I dislike referring to transition periods, I have the impression that we are indeed undergoing a transition period, a period of imbalance and mistrust in traditional sources of certainty and security. Therefore I believe that the most important challenge for Europe now is to start a dialogue with the society, a public debate on the most important issues. Without a dialogue, a proper debate, we will not be able

to go through the transition period victoriously. The fact that a growing number of countries have declared the intention to choose referendum as a formula for approving the new EU 'constitutional treaty' may provide an excellent occasion for an unprecedented European debate that would disclose the public expectations vis-à-vis politicians and the UE and that could help restore confidence in European institutions.

I believe that one of the challenges that the unifying Europe is bound to face in the near future is to find a balance between the need of internal consolidation and the need of opening to external activities, and the readiness to face them. It would be most unfortunate if the enlarged EU focused on its internal consolidation only, without searching for new forces that could foster further European integration. Europe today is not only undergoing the process of unification but also has to become more efficiently involved in solving global problems – poverty, management of limited natural resources, climate changes and new challenges related to the need of further liberalization of international trade.

Migration is another problem that Europe will have to face in the immediate future. Too little attention has been paid to China and India, countries that create hundreds of thousands work places annually, to the disadvantage of European and American labour markets. This is an important issue related to insufficient competitiveness of the European economy. Another external challenge, which is crucial and necessitates efforts on our part, is the future of multilateral co-operation as a formula ensuring peaceful coexistence in the world. Global terrorism is another problem that comes to my mind. When we talk about US-EU relations and the necessity of enhancing the Euro-Atlantic dialogue, we have to remember that the USA and the EU constitute only a tiny part of the world. Almost 85% of the world population live outside the US and the EU, 65% of the gross national product originates outside this area and nearly 40% of international trade takes place outside of the EU and US territories. We are only a limited part of the world and we cannot consider the EU and the US as two empires or two global centres.

The awareness of common threats but also of common values should foster the creation of a community of interests and enable us to bridge the Euro-Atlantic gap. I believe that we Europeans have not fully comprehended how deep a shock the September 11 events produced in the American society. Our ignorance in this aspect impedes us to understand the Americans. On the other hand, the Americans seem not to understand that exploiting a quarter of the world's natural resources implies also a number of particular obligations (I will only mention the Kyoto agreement here).

As for Russia, it is obviously changing, but I think that regardless of the internal processes in this country, the EU will always be interested in developing close relations with it. This neighbourhood is important not only in the political context. The EU will not be able to cope with the challenge of migration and the threat of international crime networks without good relations with its nearest neighbours. This is the framework in which we should develop our relations with the neighbours. The coming years will bring changes in the project of future EU enlargements. I mean here not only Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Croatia. The Western Balkans are likely to undergo rapid changes too. The EU New Neighbourhood Policy is maturing. Still, we have to keep in mind that, although the EU enlargement continues to be perceived as a geographic project, is actually a political project. We should be aware of the fact that it goes well beyond a mutual respect of partner's values and it implies participation in the creation of values.

The ability to cope with these problems will heavily depend on the economic situation and the competitiveness of the European economy. Only as an economic power will the EU be perceived as a partner by economically stronger countries. That is why the EU has to build a competitive economy and accelerate its growth. Enlargement may provide an impulse for a further restructuring and for the creation of a new division of labour in the European economy. Conversely, protectionist tendencies may have a devastating effect on the EU economy's competitiveness. The application of protectionist measures has already been observable within the labour market. There is no valid economic explanation for the restrictions that in

the recent months have been being imposed on the EU labour markets in relation to the enlargement. The ONLY possible explanation is fear which always generates projectionist tendencies. Should such tendencies prevail in the future, Poland could soon discover that it will need to protect itself from the cheap import from Ukraine, due to diminishing tariff barriers, while Portugal will have to protect itself from the Polish cheaper labour force. As a result of these attitudes Europe will start to consider its competitiveness in terms of the production costs rather than in terms of developing innovation capacities.

Another danger ahead of the European Union is related to the uncertainty as to how the EU itself will develop in the future, which may result in forming cosy clubs of nations which have known one another for many years thanks to their long membership; the idea of a 'two-speed Europe' is also a symptom of fear resulting from sense of unpredictability and at the same time an example of an inappropriate reaction to this fear. I am not questioning the idea of a 'two-speed Europe'; on the contrary, I think that some instruments of flexible co-operation in Europe are vital for fostering further integration. However, we should not mistake the creation of closed clubs with limited access possibilities for enhanced co-operation. I think that such ideas are rooted in the traditional European mechanism of consensus building. Voting is rare in Europe. In the last three years the Council has voted only in 15 per cent of cases, while in 85 per cent there has been a search for consensus. Mechanisms of consensus building which have so far been ensured by Franco-German co-operation, seem insufficient now; a new mechanism is being looked for. I believe that the project of a 'two-speed Europe' is one of the solutions being offered for how to build coalitions able to agree on common positions within the EU.

I would like to round up by stressing that the immediate future will be difficult for Europe. However, it will also be the time of unprecedented chances of an economic upturn, provided we are able to wisely benefit from the last enlargement. Moreover, I believe that the near future is

a great opportunity to modernise the social model in Europe and a chance for improving the political position of the EU in the world.

Last of all, I would like to pose a question which, however, remains unanswerable as yet: isn't the last enlargement a chance for sharing with the world this special model of community developed by the EU? We are witnesses to a crisis of the multilateral co-operation as a model of inter-state relations. However, the European model offers the principles of solidarity, loyalty to values and norms and the principle of majority rule (rare in other international organisations) which unifies countries and citizens as subjects within an international organisation. These solutions may prove to be useful in the process of 'healing' the multilateralism, in maintaining it in a condition that would help us avoid the threat of regional fragmentation of the world. Perhaps the EU should indeed be also perceived as a positive model of co-operation among countries that not only play games with each other (as can be observed in a number of international organisations) but have the sense of common purpose and want to share a common standpoint on the most important issues.

Conference Agenda New Geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe Between European Union and United States

Stefan Batory Foundation
in co-operation with
the German Institute for International and Security Affairs
of the Foundation for Science and Policy, SWP, Berlin
European Studies Centre at St Antony's College, University of Oxford
Warsaw, 7–8 May 2004

7th of May 2004

- 9:30–9:45 **Welcome Address**
Aleksander Smolar,
President of the Stefan Batory Foundation.
- 9:45–10:00 **Opening Speech**
Adam D. Rotfeld, Secretary of State,
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 10:00–13:00 **Session I:**
Between Germany and Russia, Europe and America:
historical points of reference of Central
and Eastern Europe.
Intellectual and political traditions and choices.

- Chair: **Adam D. Rotfeld**, Secretary of State,
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Panellists: **Marcin Król**, University of Warsaw;
Jacques Rupnik, Centre for International Studies
and Research, CERI, Paris;
Timothy Snyder, Yale University.

15:00–18:00 **Session II:**
Europe in US policy.
*Is the United States interested in further European
integration? The US and the European Union
or Washington and ‘coalition of the willing’ in Europe?
The role of NATO.
‘New Europe’ in the US strategy towards Europe
and in the US policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
and Moldova.*

- Chair: **Andrzej Olechowski**, former Polish Minister
of Foreign Affairs.
- Panellists: **David P. Calleo**, Johns Hopkins University, Washington;
Pierre Hassner, Centre for International Studies
and Research, CERI, Paris;
Ken Jowitt, University of California, Berkeley;
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton University.

8th of May 2004

- 10:00–13:00 **Session III:**
European attitudes towards US and transatlantic relations.
*‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europes: Security preoccupations, attitudes
towards Euro-Atlantic community and prospects
of overcoming European divisions.*
- Chair: **Timothy Garton Ash**, University of Oxford.

Panellists: **Christoph Bertram**, Foundation for Science and Policy, SWP, Berlin;
Robert Cooper, Council of the European Union, Brussels;
Ivan Krastev, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia;
Dominique Moïsi, French Institute of International Relations, IFRI, Paris.

15:00–15:30 **Special Lecture:**
America and Europe, facing new challenges
Henry A. Kissinger, former US Secretary of State.

15:30–18:30 **Session IV:**
Central and Eastern Europe in search of a place in Europe
and worldwide.
From rejection of choice between the EU and the US to a search for a new strategy between conflicting values and interests. Looking for common interests and allies inside the EU. The future importance of US connection and the political consequences of EU further integration. Interests, aspirations and expectations of Central and Eastern Europe: divergent choices between Europe and transatlantic community.

Chair: **Aleksander Smolar**, President of the Stefan Batory Foundation.

Panellists: **Timothy Garton Ash**, University of Oxford;
Bronisław Geremek, former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform, London;
Elemér Hankiss, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.

O przyszłości Europy

18:30

Closing remarks

Danuta Hübner, Member of the European Commission.

Biographical notes of speakers

Christoph Bertram – studied law and political science at the Universities of Berlin, Bonn and Paris. In 1967 he joined the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (IISS), serving as the Institute's Director from 1974 to 1982. He left the IISS in 1982 to become a Senior Editor of *Die Zeit* in Hamburg writing on international and strategic affairs. Since April 1998 Mr. Bertram has headed the Foundation for Science and Policy (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin, a research centre on international affairs, which advises the German government and parliament. He is also a Contributing Editor of *Foreign Policy Magazine* in Washington, D. C. Among his books are *America's Security in the 1980s* (1982); *Europe in the Balance* (1995).

David P. Calleo – received his undergraduate and doctoral degrees from Yale University. Since 1968 he has been on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies as Director of European Studies. Over the years, he has also taught at Brown, Yale and Columbia Universities, the College of Europe, the Universities at Bonn and Munich, the Institute of Political Studies in Paris and the Institute of International Studies (IHEI) in Geneva. He has been an associate at the Center for International Studies and Research (CERI) in Paris and has also

served as a consultant to the US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Among his numerous books are: *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance* (1987), *Rethinking Europe's Future* (2001). His recent articles include: 'The United States and the Great Powers', *World Policy Journal*, Volume 16, no.3, Fall 1999; 'A Choice of Europes,' *The National Interest*, Number 63, Spring 2001; 'The US Post-Imperial Presidency and Transatlantic Relations', *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 3, July–September 2001; 'Old Bones for New Bodies: The Geopolitics of Franco-German Europe', in Patrick McCarthy (ed.), *France-Germany in the Twenty-first Century* (2001).

Robert Cooper – graduate of Oxford University (1966), he also studied at the University of Pennsylvania (US). He joined the Diplomatic Service in 1970. His Foreign Office career has been divided broadly between Asia and Europe, he has served in New York, Tokyo, Brussels and Bonn. From 1989 to 1993 he was Head of the Policy Planning Staff. Later in the 1990s he was Director for Asia and was then Deputy Secretary for Defence and Overseas Affairs in the Cabinet Office. He was Special Representative for the British government on Afghanistan. Since 2002, Mr Cooper has been Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. He has published a number of essays and articles on international affairs and, most recently, a book of essays *The Breaking of Nations* (2003).

Timothy Garton Ash – holds two degrees in modern history from Oxford University, he studied also, *inter alia*, at the Free University in West Berlin, and at Humboldt University in East Berlin. Director of the European Studies Centre of St. Antony's College, Oxford University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. Among the topics his work has covered are the emancipation and eventual liberation of Central Europe from Communism, the eastern policy of Germany and German reunifica-

tion, the role of intellectuals in politics, and the relationship between the European Union and the larger Europe. Among his books are: *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, 1980–1982* (1983); *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (1993); *The File: A Personal History* (1998); *History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s* (1999). Timothy Garton Ash has also received numerous honors and awards including the Order of Merit from Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic, and an honorary doctorate from St. Andrew's University, the oldest University in Scotland.

Bronisław Geremek – politician, Professor of History, graduated from the Warsaw University and the Sorbonne. One of the founders of the Solidarity independent trade union and former adviser to Lech Wałęsa, in 1989 participated in the Round Table negotiations. Between 1989 and 1991 chaired the Constitutional Commission and between 1989–1997 chaired the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Between 1990 and 1997 head of the Democratic Union (Party) and subsequently Freedom Union caucus in Polish Parliament. Between 1997 and 2000 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland. Between 2000 and 2001 headed the Parliamentary Acquis Communautaire Committee. Currently Chair of European Civilisation at the College of Europe in Natolin (Warsaw).

Heather Grabbe – MA from Oxford University, Ph.D. from Birmingham University (Political Science), Research Director in Center for European Reforms in London. Her research is on EU enlargement, both the current accession process and its longer-term implications. Other research projects include the extension of Schengen eastwards, EU institutional development, British-German relations, and the impact of Europeanisation on governance in Central and Eastern Europe. She has been a Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (Paris) and the Centre for International Relations (Warsaw). Dr Grabbe is a member of, *inter alia*, the Council of the Royal Institute of

International Affairs, and the Governing Body of the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe. Her publications include the book *Enlarging the EU Eastwards* (1998), co-author K. Hughes.

Elemér Hankiss – sociologist, he has been Visiting Professor at various American and European Universities (Stanford University, Georgetown University, European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, College of Europe in Bruges, Central European University in Budapest, etc.). In the early 1990s, Elemér Hankiss was the chairman of Hungarian Public Television. Currently, he is Research Director at the Institute of Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Science in Budapest, and Chairman of Gallup Europe in Brussels. He has published about thirty books mainly in the following fields: the sociology of everyday life in state socialist countries, the sociology of values and beliefs, the sociology of contemporary European (East and West) civilization. Recent titles include: *East European Alternatives* (1990), *Proletarian Renaissance: Consumer Civilization Revisited* (1999), *Fears and Symbols. An Introduction to the Study of Western Civilization* (2001), *The Human Self in the Civilization of Consumption* (forthcoming).

Pierre Hassner – a philosophy graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure. He has lectured international relations and the history of political thought at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris and at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University, as well as many other universities in Europe and the U.S. He is Emeritus Research Director at the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI), Paris. Has written extensively on political philosophy and international relations, particularly on war and peace. Among his recent books are *La terreur et l'empire. La violence et la paix II* (2003); *Guerre et Sociétés. Etats et violence après la guerre froide* (R. Marchal, ed. 2003); *Washington et le monde. Dilemmes d'une superpuissance* (with J. Vaïsse, 2003). His articles include 'Les Etats-Unis, l'Empire de la force ou la force de l'Empire?', *Cahiers de Chaillot*, 2002 (Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité de l'U.E.); 'A New Type of Borders for a New Type of Entity', in J. Zielonka

(ed.), *Europe Unbound* (2002); 'Kosovo, Balkans, Europe : brève rencontre ou mariage durable ?', *Esprit*, 274, May 2001.

Danuta Hübner – graduate of Warsaw School of Planning and Statistics (now Warsaw School of Economics), Professor of Economy. In the years 1991–1994 Deputy Director of the Institute for Development and Strategic Studies. From 1994 to 1996, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Industry and Trade. As a Chief Negotiator she concluded the negotiations of Poland's membership in the OECD. In 1996, government's plenipotentiary for creating the Committee of European Integration (KIE) and subsequently its Secretary in the capacity of Secretary of State, and President of the Office of the KIE. In the years 1997–1998, Chief of Cabinet of the President of Poland. In 1998 she was nominated the Deputy Executive Secretary, and later the Executive Secretary of the UN European Economic Commission in Geneva. Since 2001, Secretary of KIE, President of the Office of KIE and Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since June 2003 – Minister, Member of the Council of Ministers. She was the government's representative in the European Convention. Since May 1, 2004, Member of the European Commission.

Ken Jowitt – has taught at the University of California at Berkeley in the Political Science Department for the last thirty–five years. He held the Robson Chair in that department and was awarded every distinguished teaching award the university conferred. He has written numerous books and articles on topics ranging from Communist and post-Communist studies, to American Foreign policy, and organizational behavior. He is a frequent guest on TV news and radio programs. His dynamic and entertaining speaking style has made him a sought after lecturer for business, professional, and governmental organizations, both in the US and abroad. In addition, in 1998, he was named Senior Fellow at the prestigious Hoover Institution at Stanford University. In 2002, he joined Hoover fulltime as the Pres & Maurine Hotchkis Senior Fellow, becoming an Emeritus Professor at UC Berkeley.

Henry Alfred Kissinger – received MA (1952) and PhD (1954) degrees from Harvard University. From 1954 until 1969 he was a member of the faculty of Harvard University. He was Director of the Harvard International Seminar from 1952 to 1969. In the years 1973–1977 US Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 1969–1975. In July 1983 he was appointed by President Reagan to chair the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America until it ceased operation in January 1985, and from 1984 to 1990 he served as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. From 1986 to 1988 he was a member of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy of the National Security Council and Defense Department. He is currently a member of the Defense Policy Board. At present, Dr Kissinger is Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm, and holds a number of positions in many national and international bodies. His numerous publications include: *Diplomacy* (1994); *Years of Renewal* (1999); *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (2001); *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises* (2003). He has also published numerous articles on United States foreign policy, international affairs and diplomatic history. Among the awards Dr Kissinger has received was the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973.

Ivan Krastev – a political scientist. In the last decade he has been Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford; Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington; Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Switzerland; Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna and Remarque Forum, New York. Currently he is Chairman of the Board of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria. Since October 2003 he has been Research Director of the project ‘Politics of Anti-Americanism in the Beginning of the 21st Century’, co-ordinated by the Central European University, Budapest, and since January 2004 he has acted as Executive Director of the new International Commission on the Balkans installed on the initiative and with the support of the Robert Bosch Stiftung, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, King Baudouin Foundation and

chaired by former Italian Premier Minister Giuliano Amato. His latest publications include: 'De-Balkanizing the Balkans: The State of the Debate', *The International Spectator*, Fall 2000; 'The Balkans: Democracy Without Choices', in *Journal of Democracy*, July 2002; *Nationalism after Communism, Lessons Learned* (eds. Allina Pippidi and Ivan Krastev), (2004), 'The Anti-American century?' *Journal of Democracy*, April 2004. Forthcoming is his book *The Anti-Corruption Trap* (2004).

Marcin Król – graduate of Warsaw University (1966), he has taught at Warsaw University, Polish Academy of Sciences, Catholic University of Lublin, Yale University, Princeton University, Tulane University, Harvard University, Sorbonne, College de France, Georgetown University and collaborated with University of Texas; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris; Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. Currently he is Professor of History of Ideas at the Warsaw University and Dean of the Department of Applied Social Sciences, as well as the editor of 'Res Publica Nowa', an independent intellectual quarterly. Also, he is a member of the Council of the Stefan Batory Foundation and of the Board of the Catholic weekly 'Tygodnik Powszechny'. His publications include a number of books, *inter alia*, *Dictionary of Democracy* (1989), *Liberalism of fear or liberalism of courage* (1996), *Romanticism-The Hell or Heaven of Poles* (1998) and about 60 scholarly essays on the history of political ideas, many of them published in English, French, German, Spanish and Italian, as well as about 500 publications in cultural weeklies and monthlies in Poland and abroad.

Dominique Moïsi – graduate of the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (1967) and of the law faculty of the Sorbonne (1969); PhD in Political Science from the Sorbonne (1975). He was Visiting Lecturer in International Relations at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem (1972–1975); Associate Professor of International Relations, Université de Paris–Sud (1976–1978); Professor at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) (1981–1986); Professor at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University (1983–1984); Professor at the Insti-

tute of Political Studies in Paris (1994–1999). Currently he is Deputy Director of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) in Paris; Professor at the College of Europe in Natolin (Warsaw); Member of the Board of the Aspen Institute, Berlin; Chief Editor of the quarterly review *Politique Etrangere*; columnist of *The Financial Times*. His publications include *L’Amerique: un empire ‘provincial’* (1997); *France in an Age of Globalization* (with Hubert Védrine, 2001); *Liberty, Risk and Responsibility. New Perspectives on Globalisation at the Time of International Terrorism* (with Bertrand de La Chapelle, eds., 2002; title in French: *Liberte, risques et responsabilites. Nouveaux reperes a l’heure de la mondialisation et du terrorisme international*).

Andrzej Olechowski – politician, PhD in Economy, Advisor in Central Europe Trust Polska, Director of Studium Generale Europa, President of the Association ‘Obywatele dla Rzeczypospolitej’ (Citizens for Poland). Co-founder of the Civic Platform (Party), member of the Council of the Stefan Batory Foundation. President of the Central European Forum, member of executive boards of: Trilateral Commission, Arrabida Meetings, as well as of Baltic Development Forum, member of the National Council for European Integration. In the years 1985–1987 he worked as economist in the World Bank; from 1989 to 1991 he was first Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland. From 1992 to 1993 Senior Advisor in EBRD. In 1992 Minister of Finance, in the years 1993–1994 – Minister of Foreign Affairs. Author of numerous publications on international trade and foreign policy.

Adam D. Rotfeld – studied international law and diplomacy in Warsaw, PhD in international law at Jagiellonian University, Cracow (1969). In 1984–85 Resident Fellow of the Institute of East-West Security Studies (IEWSS), New York; since 2001 Professor at the Warsaw University. Between 1961 and 1989 member of the staff of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Since 1989 Leader of the Project on Building a Co-operative Security System in and for Europe at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Director of SIPRI from 1991 to 2002. Member of, *inter alia*,

the Royal Swedish Academy of War Studies, the Governing Board of the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), the Advisory Board to UNESCO Studies on Peace and Conflict, Advisory Board of Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Since 2001 member of the National Security Council of Poland. Since June 2003 – Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Published and edited more than 20 monographs and over 300 articles.

Jacques Rupnik – studied at the Sorbonne and the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, graduate of Harvard University (1974); PhD (History of International Relations) from the Sorbonne. Research Associate at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University (1974–1975), specialist in Eastern Europe at the BBC World Service (1977–1982) and Professor at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (1982–1996). Executive Director of the International Commission for the Balkans at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1995–1996). In the years 1990–1992 advisor to Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel. He is currently a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges and one of the editors of the quarterly *Transeuropeennes*, and researcher at the Center for International Studies and Research (CERI). Among his numerous publications are *International Perspectives on the Balkans* (ed., 2003), *The Road to the European Union: The Czech and Slovak Republics* (with Jan Zielonka, 2003).

Anne-Marie Slaughter – graduated *magna cum laude* from Princeton, she received her MPhil and PhD degrees in international relations from Oxford University in 1982 and 1992, respectively, and her law degree from Harvard Law School, *cum laude*, in 1985. She was the J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of Law and Director of Graduate and International Legal Studies at Harvard Law School. Currently she is Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. She is also president of the American Society of International Law, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Slaughter has written or co-edited four books and more than 50 articles for scholarly and legal journals. Recent publications include: 'Building Global Democracy', 1 *Chicago Journal of International Law* 223 (2000); *Legalization and World Politics* (with Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, and Robert O. Keohane, co-editors 2001); 'An International Constitutional Moment' (with William Burke-White), 43 *Harvard International Law Journal* 1 (2002).

Aleksander Smolar – publicist, politologist; studied sociology and economy at the Warsaw University. Between 1971 and 1989, a political émigré in Italy, Great Britain and France. In 1974–1990, founder and editor-in-chief of the 'Aneks' political quarterly; in the years 1989–1990 Political Advisor to Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In 1992–1993, Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka. Since 1990, President of the Board of the Stefan Batory Foundation. Scholar at the French National Scientific Study Centre (CNRS). Member of the Political Council of the Freedom Union. His publications include *Władza i przywileje* (1984), *Le rôle des groupes d'opposition à la veille de la démocratisation en Pologne e en Hongrie* (eds. with Peter Kende, 1989) i *La Grande Secousse. L'Europe de l'Est 1989–1990* (eds. with Peter Kende, 1991) oraz *Globalization, Power and Democracy* (eds. with Mark Plattner, 2000).

Timothy Snyder – received his BA from Brown University in 1991 and his PhD from the University of Oxford in 1997. Assistant Professor of History at Yale University, specializing in the political history of ideas in modern Eastern Europe. He has held fellowships in Paris, Vienna, Warsaw, Prague, and at Harvard. He is the author of *Nationalism, Marxism, and Modern Central Europe: A Biography of Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz* (1998), and the co-editor of *Wall Around the West: State Power and Immigration Controls in Europe and North America* (2001). His most recent book is *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (2003). He is presently completing a study of espionage in Polish-Soviet relations in the 1920s and 1930s, forthcoming from Yale University Press in 2005.

Selected publications in the series 'On the Future of Europe'

O przyszłości Europy. Głosy polityków [On the Future of Europe. The Voices of Politicians] (2000), a selection of articles by European politicians expressing their opinion in the public debate in the EU about the future of the continent. Available in Polish.

Policy Paper 1: Overcoming Alienation; Kaliningrad as a Russian Enclave Inside the European Union (January 2001); edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki and Andrzej Wilk; published in association with the 'Borussia' Culture Society and the Center for International Relations. Available in Polish and English.

Policy Paper 2: The Half-Open Door; the Eastern Border of the Enlarged European Union (March 2001); edited by Jakub Boratyński and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Institute of Public Affairs. Available in Polish, English and Russian.

Policy Paper 3: Pro-European Atlantists. Poland and Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe after Accession to the European Union (June 2001); edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki and Olaf Osica; published in association with the Center for International Relations. Available in Polish and English.

Policy Paper 4: The Forgotten Neighbour – Belarus in the Context of EU Eastern Enlargement (September 2001); edited by Anna Naumczuk, Eugeniusz Mironowicz, Grzegorz Gromadzki and Paweł Kazanecki; published in association with the East-European Democratic Center – IDEE. Available in Polish, English, Russian and Belarusian.

Policy Paper 5: The Common Challenge. Members and Candidates Facing the EU Future Migration Policy (December 2001); edited by Krystyna Iglicka, Sławomir Łodziński, Dariusz Stola, Jakub Boratyński and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Institute of Public Affairs and the Institute of Social Studies – Warsaw University. Available in Polish and English.

Policy Paper 6: New Neighbourhood – New Association. Ukraine and the European Union at the beginning of the 21st century (March 2002); edited by Bogumiła Berdychowska, Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Faculty of International Studies and Political Science – University of Łódź, and the Polish-Ukrainian Forum. Available in Polish, English, Russian and Ukrainian.

Policy Paper 7: An Overview of European (In)Security (June 2002); edited by Olaf Osica and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Center for International Relations. Available in Polish and English.

Policy Paper 8: Between Need and Dependency. Russian Gas in the Energy Balance of the Enlarged EU (December 2002); edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki. Available in Polish, English and Russian.

Poland in the World: Challenges, Achievements, Threats (September 2003); address by the Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, and the records of discussion featuring Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Jerzy Jedlicki, Maciej Łętowski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Dariusz Rosati, and Aleksander Smolar. Available in Polish and English.

The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (2003); the proceedings of a conference organised by the Foundation in co-operation with the Polish Foreign Ministry; the publication includes the keynote addresses by Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Foreign Minister Włodzimierz

Cimoszewicz, a summary of all sessions, and the Polish non-paper with proposals on the future policy of the enlarged EU towards its new Eastern neighbours. Available in Polish and English.

Poland's Foreign Policy: Continuation or a Break with the Past? (2004); publication containing record of the debate organised by the Stefan Batory Foundation. The debate featured, among the others, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Andrzej Olechowski, Dariusz Rosati and Aleksander Smolar. The publication also contains the results of questionnaire on the today status and priorities of Polish foreign policy carried out among the politicians. Available in Polish and English.

Other publications on international relations

More than a Neighbour – proposals for the EU's future policy towards Ukraine (2003), edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki, Olexander Sushko, Marius Vahl, Katarzyna Wolczuk. Available in English and Ukrainian.

Polska–Ukraina. Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych [Poland–Ukraine. Co-operation of Non-Governmental Organisations] (September 2003); a presentation of Polish organisations' experience of co-operation with Ukraine, a description of activities and major institutions; published in association with the Education for Democracy Foundation. Available in Polish.

Belarus. Reform Scenarios (2003); a comprehensive study by Belarusian experts featuring proposals of political, economic, social, and educational reforms of the country. Available in English, Russian and Belarusian.

More than Neighbours. The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine – New Relations. Final Report (2004). Proposals dedicated to relations between the enlarged European Union and Ukraine elaborated by the group of ex-

perts from EU, accessing countries and Ukraine. Available in Polish, English and Ukrainian.

More than Neighbours. The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine – New Relations. Policy Paper (2004). Recommendations related to relations between the enlarged European Union and Ukraine elaborated by the group of experts from EU, accessing countries and Ukraine.

Belarus Catching up with Europe (2004); summary of the study elaborated by Belarusian experts featuring proposals of political, economic, social, and educational reforms of the country and the record of discussion on possibilities of realisation of the reforms in Belarus. Available in Polish and English and Ukrainian.

Droga do Europy. Opinie ukraińskich elit [Road to Europe. Opinions of Ukrainian Elites] (2004); collection of 30 interviews with politicians, scientists, journalists, entrepreneurs and artists on the status of Ukraine in Europe and perspectives of European choice. Among the speakers are Leonid Kravchuk, Oleksandr Moroz, Yulia Mostova, Myroslav Popovych, Petro Symonenko, Yulia Tymoshchenko, Viktor Yushchenko and Taras Vozniak. Available in Polish.

Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes