Polish Observation Mission
Tajikistan Presidential Elections
6 November 2006

FINAL ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

22-person strong Polish Observation Mission carried out the monitoring of Tajikistani Presidential elections in areas of Dushanbe and Khojand. Polish Observation Mission is a joint initiative of Polish NGOs and Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The present final assessment is based on reports of 20 short-term observers based in Dushanbe and Khojand, who visited 127 polling stations (76 in Dushanbe area and 51 in Khojand area) on the voting day, as well as on the monitoring of pre-election period by two long-term observers, deployed in Tajikistan three weeks before election day, and two more persons monitoring the campaign from Poland over media reports. The mission operated in 12 Territorial Election Districts, No. 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 26, 27, 28, 29, 36.

Since our monitoring was limited to only two regions, our findings may not be representative to the whole country. We did, however, make all necessary efforts to ensure quality of the final outcome by applying consistent methodology, which draws on OSCE standards of observation work, as well as the experience of other independent observation missions. We provide references to sample numbers of PSs and TECs where we noted particular cases, however the list of examples included here is by no means exhaustive.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Polish Observation Mission would like to express its gratitude to the authorities of Tajikistan for assisting in the preparations of the mission. We appreciate the openness toward international observers, hassle-free accreditation process, the readiness of election authorities and organs of local administration to assist both long and short-term observers. We are especially grateful to the members of the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda and the relevant Territorial Election Commissions, whose positive attitude to our work was of key importance to the quality of our work.

Election monitoring is an external audit of the country's achievements in the area of democratization, and thus it has to focus on shortcomings. Therefore, we hope that the

conclusions we offer in the present are considered a creative input to this work, rather than mere criticism.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

Elections were characterised by prevalent abuse of election procedures. These abuses included primarily proxy voting, inappropriate identification of voters and incorrect vote count. Irregularities that we observed in polling stations may have resulted from inadequate understanding of voting regulations as well as cultural and historical legacy of Tajikistan. The failure to meet international standards on democratic elections does not necessarily distort the expression of political preferences by Tajik people. However, the very high support for president-in-office Emmomali Rakhmonov results also from the limited choice of candidates and the absence of expressive opposition candidate, the root of the issue being the lack of effective political competition in Tajikistan.

We noticed visible commitment and determination of government (and apparent complicity of the opposition) to ensure peaceful, non-violent course of elections. We noted a genuine effort of election authorities to limit the impression of the privileged position of the current president. An example of that attitude was that many of his posters and portraits were taken away before election day.

We identified the following issues, which should require more attention from the relevant Tajik authorities in preparation of next elections:

❑ degree of genuine competition during elections has been limited due to marginalisation of opposition political parties and their inability to field candidates; pre-election campaign did not involve public debate on key political issues;

❑ in spite of considerable efforts by election authorities and international community the understanding of procedures for conducting elections is limited not only among the voters but also among the staff of election committees; furthermore, many election procedures are not sufficiently clearly explained from the onset;

❑ natural advantage of media presence, acting in favour of incumbent, has been exacerbated by the pro-government bias of state-media and the general underdevelopment of private Tajik media;

❑ local NGOs are not allowed by current legislation to field independent observers during election day;

❑ there exists a widespread practice of proxy voting, which might stem from the clash of traditional systems of authority with modern democracy and universal suffrage; it also reflects somewhat pragmatic and overtly flexible attitude toward legal procedures;

❑ inappropriate identification of voters and issuance of ballots;

❑ irregularities concerning vote count and the process of filling in protocols;

❑ insufficient quality of voters' registers;

❑ while election turn-out is undoubtedly high, the high incidence of proxy voting, and low reliability of voters registers raises doubts as to the precision of official turn-out data.

Furthermore, the following issues could be recognised as positive developments, however, we found them ambivalent:

❑ Campaign meetings were organised by Central Election Committee with four presidential candidates. While it may be credited as an attempt to provide better opportunities for them to campaign and create an atmosphere of genuine competition, the conspicuous absence of main contender deprives this practice of credibility;

❑ The elections are considered as a major national holiday and attract huge interest of the population as evidenced by the high turnout. At the same time it seems that for many, elections are not seen as a choice of a leader in a competitive process but rather to express support to the current leadership in power;

❑ Candidates were allotted free air–time in state electronic media, however this could not alter the overall preponderance of president in the media;

❑ Work of "agitators" visiting voters in pre-election period may be considered as a useful tool of voters' mobilisation but on the other hand it could easily be used for biased campaigning.

OBSERVATIONS

1. GENERAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Fair evaluation of presidential election in Tajikistan must take into account the broader socio-political context in which they were taking place. The election was conducted in the conditions of very limited political competition. It appears that there are three factors, specific to the Tajik political realm, responsible for the deficiency of pluralism and preventing the Tajik society from making a real choice. These are: the weakness of party system in Tajikistan and the interrelated political power balance; imprecision of the laws regulating the electoral process; and the way of conducting public debate in Tajikistan.

a) Tajikistan after the civil war

The power balance in Tajikistan is a result of the civil war, taking place in the years 1992-1997, and in particular the peace accord which ended it. The peace accord was the basis of creating the system of stability between different factions, the keystone to which became the current president, Emmomali Rakhmonov, who then was a leader of one of the factions. The system was shaken after 2002, when, due to Rakhmonov's growing influence, Islamic and democratic opposition was marginalized. The peak of this process was the parliamentary election in 2005, which the international community recognized as not free and fair. As a result of them, pro-government parties won practically all seats in the parliament (with the exception of two seats won by Islamic Revival Party) and the opposition lost direct influence on the government.

b) Political parties

Until the parliamentary election, which took place in spring 2005, there were six parties officially registered in Tajikistan: People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT), Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IPRT), Democratic Party (DPT), Socialist Party (SPT), and Social-Democratic Party (SDPT).

Two of the parties were heir to the Soviet Communist Party (CP TSSR): CPT, being her direct successor, and PDPT, which inherited most of CP TSSR's property and activists, and became the "ruling party". Two more parties (IRPT and DPT) had their roots in the anti-government opposition of the early 1990s and then became the core of United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the civil war. The SPT was established in 1997 and mostly supported president Emmomali Rakhmonov, whereas SDPT (registered in 2002) was merged from former Adolat party and the Congress of National Unity (among her members there are both persons with roots in UTO and ones not involved in the civil conflict). In 2005 two more parties were registered: Agrarian Party and Party of Economic Reform of Tajikistan, which the "old" opposition considered a "pocket opposition". None of the two chose to join the coalition "For fair and transparent election", established by the opposition in 2004, ahead of the upcoming parliamentary election.

Only three parties are represented in the parliament: the presidential party PDPT (majority in both chambers), CPT (ca 13% votes in the parliamentary election), and IRPT (2 deputies). PDPT is definitely the richest and strongest party in Tajikistan. It has regional structures and a developed logistical and organizational resource. Apart from PDPT only CPT and IRPT have a network of local branches around the country. Other opposition parties play marginal role in the Tajik politics.

c) Law on the election of the president of Tajikistan

The law regulating presidential election of 2006 is a result of many changes and amendments introduced to the Tajik constitution of 1994. The first presidential election based on the document were conducted in 1994 and Emmomali Rakhmonov was elected president. When running for the office, he had already been the chairman of the High Council of the Tajik parliament. He was elected president for a five-year term, until 1999. In September 1999, a constitutional referendum took place and the term of office was extended to 7 years. The election took place later in the same year and Rakhmonov was reelected for another 7 years. In June 2003 another constitutional referendum was conducted, this time letting Rakhmonov run for two more seven-year terms.

The way of introducing changes to the constitution was repeatedly criticized by both the opposition and international community. Controversies were raised both by the mode of changing constitution (relevant laws confirming the modifications were not accepted by the parliament in the proper, constitutional period) and by the inconsistency of the changes with democratic standards.

d) Public debate in Tajikistan

Tajikistan lacks independent media accessible throughout the country.

The two public TV channels do not distribute critical information about the present national leadership. Existing commercial channels cannot compete with them in the field of information, as they focus mainly on entertainment and none of them has national coverage.

The situation is similar with regard to radio stations. Although independent information radios exist (e.g. BBC and Asia Plus), they do not reach the rural inhabitants.

Tajik press are mostly government newspapers. Independent press is available but it is highly reliable on the authorities, e.g. through printing shops and the advertising market (most of advertisers are public companies). It must be emphasized that two opposition newsletters exist: *Nezhot* (IPRT newsletter) and *Adolat* (DPT newsletter). However, their geographical coverage is limited.

Effective pluralism of opinion exists only in internet media, which, naturally, are available only to the narrow group of readers in the largest cities. Moreover, shortly before the election the access

to some of them was blocked (the blockade was partly removed after opposition protests were publicized by international media).

2. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION AND PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

a) Candidate registration

Opposition SDPT and DPT did not take part in the election, as they believed they were held in violence of existing law and thus illegal. Charges related to the extra-constitutional mode of introducing changes to the election law.

IPRT, earlier announcing that it was going to participate in the election, changed its mind after the death (of natural reasons) of its leader Abdullo Saida Nuri in August 2006. In September the new leader Kabiri publicly informed that the party was not going to field a candidate. IPRT did not support any of the other candidates officially, either.

b) Electoral campaign

The electoral campaign seemed very passive, which must be considered in the context of both the underdevelopment of media as a forum of public debate, and the lack of effective political competition (none of the candidates was able to threaten the president-in-office.

President Rakhmonov took practically no part in the electoral campaign. Due to his office, however, he was constantly present in the media and propaganda materials (e.g. portraits on the public buildings). In the few TV campaign broadcasts, he was represented by members of his electoral board.

A unique phenomenon in the pre-election period was a common campaign of the other four candidates, organized by the CCER. Together, they held a number of meetings with voters in the regions of Gorno-Badakhshan, Rasht, Soghd and Khatlon. Symptomatic of the meetings was the absence of president-in-office Rakhmonov and the reluctance of other candidates to criticize him.

c) „Campaigners"

An important function in the pre-election period laid on the persons described as "campaigners" (rus. *agitatory*). They were employed to visit each eligible voter in order to hand to them the invitation to the election. While such tool of voter mobilisation may be considered a useful initiative, it could easily have been used for biased campaigning.

d) Atmosphere before election

It must be emphasized that while Tajikistan has the recent history of civil conflict and the opposition has not been satisfied with the election administration, the government's determination to ensure peaceful, non-violent course of elections was successful, and the campaigning did not result in any instances of public disorder, jeopardizing health, life, or property of the candidates, commissions nor ordinary citizens.

3. ADMINISTRATION OF THE VOTING ON ELECTION DAY

a) Opening of polling stations

Opening of PSs was generally well organized and timely. A common problem observed, however, was the improper sealing of ballot boxes, e.g. in PS 16 (TEC 4) the box was sealed with modeling clay; in PS 74 (TEC 5) and PS 5 (TEC 7) the boxes were not sealed at all.

An important shortcoming, resulting from the lack of relevant provision in the electoral law, was the inexistence of opening protocols, including the number of voters on the list, number of received ballots, number of ballot boxes in use, etc, duly signed by present PSC members. The lack of such protocols may limited the transparency of voting administration and determination of results further during the day, as well as reduced access of observers to the basic information about the work of PS.

b) Functioning of polling stations

In general, the work of PSCs and functioning of PSs was conducted in an orderly manner. The atmosphere inside PSs was peaceful and we did not observe any instances of major disorders or conflict. However, some of the premises were small and traffic management inside them was not proper, which led to serious overcrowding in peak voting hours, eg. PS

 PS 4 (TEC 11), PS 66 (TEC 5), PS 34 (TEC 8).

c) Campaigning inside polling stations

While it is disputable that the omnipresent posters of the president-in-office Rakhmonov were part of electoral campaign, they certainly created an atmosphere of dishonest competition, due to almost total absence of campaign by his competitors. Portraits of Rakhmonov were present inside some PSs in all TECs we visited, including such visible places as: right above the ballot box – PS 76 (TEC 5), PS 23 (TEC 11); or inside the voting booth – PS 71 (TEC 7).

Propaganda materials were also generally present outside most PSs (posters and quotes from the president-in-office).

d) Unauthorized persons in the polling stations

In most PSs there were persons other than PSC members participating in the work of PSC:

- Employees of institution, where the PS was located, e.g. school headmasters – PS 30, 109 (TEC 11);

- Police and other persons responsible for security, e.g. PS 20 (TEC 2), PS 80 and 43 (TEC 15); in PS 2 (TEC 11) there were firemen present, periodically peeking into voting booths (officially substantiated by security reasons);

- "campaigners" and other informal helpers to the PSC (practically all PSs we monitored) performing various jobs normally in the responsibility of PSC, e.g. issuing ballots, checking voter registers, counting voters for statistical reasons, etc.

- locally influential persons involved in the work; e.g. in PS 34 (TEC 8) representative (in rank of observer) of the local government directed the work of PSC; in PS 7 (TEC 8), PS 2 (TEC 11), PS 16(TEC 15) observers from NDPT party directed the work of PSC.

e) Issuance of ballots/identification of voters

We noticed widespread practice of issuing ballots exclusively on the basis of invitations to elections delivered to voters before the election day. Inappropriate identification of voters was an irregularity present in all TECs that we observed.

On some occasions, e.g. PS 44 (TEC 26), signatures in the voters register were seen as being made by a "campaigner" or PSC member, and in PS 66 (TEC 4) PSC member was seen casting several ballots himself. Such incidents raise suspicion that the phenomenon may have been more popular in the absence of observers.

f) Voters registers

In some polling stations (in Dushanbe Region) we observed additional registers which added 5-10% to the original number of voters which indicates inaccuracy of the original registers. Voters were added to those lists without presenting proper documents, e.g. PS 66 (TEC 4), PS 23 (TEC 11), PS 64 (TEC 15), PS 71 (TEC 7). We also noticed instances when a voter arriving in the station has found out that a signature was already put beside his/her name which may have been the result of proxy voting. Such voters were asked to put their signature into the next free place on the list or entered into additional register, e.g. PS 22 (TEC 4), PS 83 (TEC 15). Such practices undermine credibility of registers and put precision of turn-out data in question.

g) Confidentiality of the vote

Overall, the polling stations were properly equipped with voting booths providing secrecy of the voting and their use was a standard practice. We noted however some cases involving two or more persons entering booth jointly, e.g. PS 11 (TEC 4), PS 16 (TEC 5), PS 71 (TEC 7). Occasionally voters solicited help from PSC members or observers. E.g. in PS 13 (TEC 4) blind voter needed assistance, so PSC member approached him justifying the assistance by shouting "He wants to vote for Rakhmonov but he does not see!"

In many stations persons responsible for turn-out statistics was sitting very closely to the ballot box; in some cases there was another person next to the box, responsible for the security of cast ballots, eg. PS 11, 13, 14 (TEC 4), PS 3 (TEC 11), 109 (TEC 11). The proximity of such persons to the ballot box might compromise the confidentiality of casting vote.

h) Mobile voting

The rules applied for mobile voting were generally unclear. While the free access to the mobile box may have been an advantage to some voters, the lack of proper documentation of mobile voting process may have led to serious abuses of the election process:

PSCs in general did not possess written requests for mobile voting. The mobile box was taken to the households, where it was known that there are sick or immobilized persons, e.g. PS 60 (TEC 11), PS 23 (TEC 11).

Moreover, mobile voting was freely accessible to anyone present in the household, where the immobilized person was, which resulted in unclear situations: e.g. in PS 22 (TEC 4) head of the PSC ensured the observers that there were four persons supposed to vote by mobile voting, whereas the mobile box returned with over a dozen ballots inside, supposedly cast by family members of the sick persons.

i) Proxy voting

Our mission noted proxy voting to be a widespread practice in all election districts that we monitored. This was so in spite of trainings and written instructions provided to PSC members by Tajik election authorities and OSCE information posters clearly explaining the inappropriate nature of that practice (regrettably many polling stations did not have them on display).

In some instances it was clear that PSC members were not aware that this practice is illegal. Proxy voting was happening openly in front of the observers, e.g. PS 11, 13, 14 (TEC 4), PS 3, 4 (TEC 11), PS 66 (TEC 15). One chairwoman in a polling station in Dushanbe has explained to our observer that she had given her passport (ID) to her daughter so that she could vote on her behalf in the polling station (TEC 4).

On many occasions, however, PSC chairpersons were aware that proxy voting is inappropriate but were apparently not willing to prevent it from happening. In many polling stations we could find evidence of this practice taking place. In several instances we eye-witnessed voters being issued several ballots or stuffing several ballots. Examining the content of ballot boxes from the outside, we have frequently seen a number of ballots folded together. Moreover, in many polling stations we noted high number of conspicuously identical signatures put against names of members of same family (e.g. in PSs monitored in TECs 4 and 8, as much as 30 to 40% of signatures in voter register were repeated in other spots). In particular cases our observers who understood Tajik, heard polling station staff instructing voters in the queue, who were holding several invitations, to come after observers leave the station, e.g. PS 3 (TEC 11).

While legitimate explanations can be made that those were cases of illiterate family members being helped by their next of kin to make signature on their behalf this is hardly probable to account for all such cases.

Proxy voting often involved men voting on behalf of the women, e.g. PS 69 (TEC 4), PS 71 (TEC 7). Some observers also reported significantly higher number of men in polling stations (in TEC 15).

As an alternative to one voter voting for several persons (*proxy voting*), the following practice was applied in a number of polling stations: When a voter came with IDs of other members of his or her family, the committee would issue to them only one ballot; however, their names would be marked (usually by a tick next to the name on the voters list). Such marks appeared to suggest that those persons were not coming to vote anymore. Importantly, in several cases the observers noted committee members (or "agitators") signing those marked spots on the voters list, the probable follow-up to which would be their voting for those absent persons. In fact in several instances we noted PSC members who stuffed several ballots, e.g. PS 23 (TEC 11).

In conclusion, it seems that the practice of proxy voting for the members of one's family is deeply entrenched in the electoral tradition of Tajikistan. Voters denied such possibility were visibly disappointed and surprised, e.g. PS 13, 69 (TEC 4). In an extreme case, one voter who came with five invitations and was turned down by PSC tried to make complaint to our observer that his rights were infringed (TEC 5).

j) Transparency issues

Polish observers were generally allowed to monitor election without serious hindrances. In several cases attempts were noted to distract the observers' attention from potential abuses but at their request monitoring was made possible.

On one instance, CIS observers were not allowed to move freely around the PS, which resulted in a verbal conflict between them and the PSC Head – PS 20 (TEC 2).

One must ponder, that while domestic observers were generaly present in most stations, their attitude was often excessively passive and they were not involved in monitoring the work of PSC. Also, in accordance with electoral law, opposition parties were not allowed to deploy their observers. In the case of future elections, we believe that participation of opposition/independent observers might positively influence the transparency of the vote, as well as the general observance of election regulations among PSCs.

4. DETERMINATION OF RESULTS AND PROTOCOL TRANSFER TO TEC

In most cases we did not observe major distortions in the vote count. In many cases, however, it was conducted in a simplified and hastily manner, without due attention to relevant procedures. It resulted in lack of transparency, as well as many inaccuracies, which PSC were often not able to resolve. The following are some examples:

- Contrary to the provisions of election law, several PSCs during vote count considered votes cast against all candidates invalid. Some examples were PS 66 (TEC 4), PS 4 (TEC 11), and PS 71 (TEC 7);

- In several cases of divergent interpretations concerning validity of the votes: votes marked only by "ticking" a family name or with two names left were in some cases considered valid (e.g. PS 16 in TEC 5).

- In PS 44 (TEC 5) the total number of ballots in the ballot box was not calculated, which resulted in inability of judging the potential error. This is especially important, as in other – although rare – cases, the number of ballots in the box was not compliant with the number resulting from voters protocol. E.g. in PS 66 (TEC 4) the box contained 115 ballots more than were formally issued to the voters.

- On some occasions there were other people than the PSC and observers present during the vote count: police person, representative of local administration, school headmaster (e.g. PS 44, TEC 5; PS 3, TEC 11).

- Vote counting was sometimes non-transparent and observers were not able to see whether the ballots actually contained the data they were accounted for. An extreme example of that was PS 22 (TEC 26), where counted ballots were immediately placed upside down, so their content was impossible to verify.

The process of filling protocols and transferring them to the relevant TECs seemed equally troublesome, and reflected lack of understanding of the proper procedures by members of particular PSCs. In a number of TECs we witnessed a practice whereby PSC was presenting blank or filled with pencils protocols, duly signed by PSC members, e.g. PS 66 (TEC 4), PS 69 (TEC 36).

The rough data was verified by TEC staff in order to make sure that all numbers add up properly and only later were the figures written down with pen (observed while monitoring the work of TECs No. 4, 5, 11, 15).

RECCOMENDATIONS

The development of adequate legal and political framework allowing for effective political competition in Tajikistan seems key to the further democratization of the country, as the present regulations, full of ambiguities, result in numerous misunderstandings of electoral procedures among election officials. With that aim, we believe that in the coming period, the Tajik election authorities should consider changes in the following areas:

1. **Lowering the existing threshold for candidate registration**. The threshold of 160,000 signatures is highly difficult to achieve and raises doubts as to the possibility of achieving it without support from the state administration, which, in turn, may lead to only government-accepted politicians to become candidates in elections.

2. **Introducing more rigorous procedure of vote counting**, which would oblige the commission to verify the results through at least one repetition of ballot counting. The presently applied method of singular ballot count results in the lack of transparency, as well as chaos in the TECs, when protocols are received with mathematic errors.

3. **Redesigning the voting ballot**; the present design, where a voter must cross out all candidates except the one he supports seems not clear for voters and further complicates the counting procedure for PSC members, who must calculate both votes for and against each candidate. Instead the voter should indicate his choice in a positive manner putting mark next to the candidate of his preference. Moreover, a separate line should be added on the ballot, for voters who whish to express lack of support for all candidates.

4. **Independent observation should be allowed to representatives of domestic non-governmental organizations and civil groups**. While limiting the number of observers in one precinct is comprehensible, efforts should be made that they represent not only government supported organizations, as is the case now.

Moreover, Tajik authorities and other domestic political forces, with the assistance of international community should focus on:

5. **Raising the competence level of Election Commissions members**, aimed at developing a better sense of respect for the existing law. This is crucial, due to high incidence of electoral law violations. One proposed way of achieving that would be to prepare more detailed instruction on how to organise voting in details and especially how to proceed with vote counting to eliminate errors and manipulation for both commission members and domestic observers.

6. **The development of genuine public debate and civic education**, emphasizing the nature of election as a form of competition of political parties, visions and personalities. Such debate should be promoted through *inter alia* developing pluralistic media, representing the different political options in the country.

FINAL RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS

Candidates - Nominating parties	%
Emomali Sharifovich Rahmonov - People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan	79.3
Olimzon Boboyev - Party of Economic Reform	6.2
Amir Karakulov - Agrarian Party of Tajikistan	5.3
Ismoil Talbakov - Tajik Communist Party	5.1
Abdualim Gafforov - Socialist Party	2.8

GLOSSARY

The Tajik electoral system is three-layered. We use the following abbreviations to describe them:

CCER – Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (top level)

TEC – Territorial Election Commission (mid-level)

PSC – Polling Station Commission (lowest level)

PS – Polling Station

POLISH OBSERVATION MISSION

The monitoring of presidential elections in Tajikistan was supported by a grant from Polish Foreign Ministry development program (Polish Aid). The mission was officially recognised by the Tajik authorities. Monitoring was conducted in two regions: Central (Dushanbe) and Sogd (Khojand), and their vicinities by 20 short and 2 long term observers.

Polish Observation Mission was organized by Stefan Batory Foundation, a leading Polish non-governmental organization. Recruitment of observers was highly competitive and made on a fully transparent basis with public announcements (including media). We credited not only direct election related experience but also good knowledge of regional context and track-record of involvement in voluntary activities. The observers underwent comprehensive training including a day in Warsaw before departure (Tajik elections' law, politics and culture of Tajikistan, the role of international election observer) and half day on the spot (briefing by LTO on the situation, logistics, observation procedure).

The monitoring was based on methodology developed on the basis of OSCE standards as well as experience of ENEMO and Polish Observation Mission in Ukraine. The teams of two short term observers participated in the opening of a selected polling stations, then followed with a number of 20 to 40 minutes visits to polling stations during the day and accompanied vote tabulation in one of them until all election materials were transported to Territorial Election Commission and results were duly reported. The observers filled standard forms and produced additional extensive reports containing their impressions and evaluation to report their findings. The present final report, published in English, Russian and Polish aims to conclude the experience and contains our evaluation of the proceedings and administration of Tajik Presidential Election.