POLISH-UKRAINIAN BORDERLAND IN A PERSPECTIVE OF POLISH INTEGRATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

CASE STUDY REPORT

I. PRIMARY GOALS OF THE RESEARCH AND ITS GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

Research was conducted on selected local communities from the Polish-Ukrainian borderland. Complying with the geographical representation criteria, we chose three pairs of towns along Polish-Ukrainian border. In each pair there is a village on the border, with border checkpoint and a nearby town connected with the border due to its socio-economic arrangement. According to above restrictions, we chose the following pairs: Przemyśl - Medyka; Chełm – Wola Uhruska; Tomaszów Lubelski – Hrebenne.

The research was conducted using qualitative method, based on in-depth interviews. In each pair of towns some 15 interviews were made. Interviewees were selected from the following social and professional categories and institutions:

- Local authorities
- Border guards and customs officers
- District Work Office officers
- Local entrepreneurs and economic organizations and institutions
- Police and courts
- Priests

In addition, 4 interviews in voivodships’ head offices were conducted (Zamość, Przemyśl, Lublin)

Completion to the research was gained thanks to interviews conducted in Warsaw with representatives of government institutions (Ministry if Foreign Affairs, Head Customs Office, Ministry of Interior Affairs, European Integration Committee Office, Border Guard). Also non-government institutions’ representatives, whose activities are related to borderland issues (especially eastern borderland), are present in the research.

On the top of that, 11 interviews with Ukrainians working in Poland (both legally and illegally) were carried out.

Primary Goals of the research

The main purposes of the research were: a diagnosis of contemporary relations on Polish-Ukrainian borderland and assessment of expected changes in the borderland connected with tightening Polish eastern border and entering the EU.

Detailed research fields:

- borderland inhabitants’ reactions towards Ukrainian minority in the borderland
- attitude towards Ukrainians migration in the borderland
• borderland inhabitants’ opinions on Ukrainians working in Poland (economic aspect of the phenomenon)
• social attitude towards anticipated consequences of tightening eastern border (including the latest intergovernmental arrangements)
• borderland inhabitants’ opinion on Ukraine and Ukrainians in the EU
• attitudes and opinions about Polish integration with the EU from the viewpoint of borderland communities

II. Basic information on the studied communities and basic problems concerning Polish-Ukrainian borderland according to their inhabitants.

EXAMINED CHARACTERISTICS OF BORDERLAND, LOCAL POLISH-UKRAINIAN COMMUNITIES AND BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE BORDERLAND COMMUNITY IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THEIR INHABITANTS – Mirosław Bieniecki

Chelm
Chelm has over 1000 years of multicultural tradition – until World War 2, Poles, Jews and Ukrainians (called in the area “Rusyns”) inhabited this town. Chelm is located in Lubelskie Voivodship, some 30 km from the Ukrainian border. Before 1999, Chelm used to be a capital of Chelmieckie Voivodship, since then it has had the status of powiat grodzki [urban county] and has been the residence of powiat ziemski [rural county]. Over 70 thousand people live in Chelm. Chelm’s development can be attributed to the location on the ancient trade route from Warsaw, via Lublin and Kovel to Kiev. Presently, its location, close to the frontier of future European Union, becomes an additional virtue. The closest road and railway border crossing point with Ukraine is located in Dorohusk (29km from Chelm). Also, convenient communication routes lead from Chelm to Hrebenne (border checkpoint with Ukraine) and Terespol (border checkpoint with Belarus).

Chelm’s economy is dominated by mineral industry, which is connected mainly with cement factory “Chelm”. This factory was founded in 1960 and remains one of the biggest employers on Chelm’s work market. Also other industries are present in Chelm, for example food industry, clothing industry, furniture industry, and glass industry. In December 2002, estimated unemployment rate amounted to 22,5% for powiat grodzki and 17,4% for powiat ziemski (13,554 registered unemployed) and unemployment rate is expected to keep growing.

In Chelm, there are the headquarters for the Transboundary Association Euroregion Bug (ERB), which was created in 1995 on the Polish and Ukrainian borderland by territorial, governmental and council authorities of the following voivodships: Chelmieckie, Lubelskie, Zamojskie and Tarnobrzeskie. Volynski Rajon [Volyn Region] was the Ukrainian partner in this venture.

Wola Uhruska
Wola Uhruska is a rural gmina, having a population of 4750 and has 15,000 hectares in the border area. Weak soil, the collapse of local firms and collective farms along with an increasing unemployment had already forced, in the early nineties, Wola Uhruska to rethink
its economic development potential. Tourism was viewed as an alternative to the agricultural economy.

Wola Uhruska boasts diverse flora and fauna, and the beauty of the River Bug. Difficulties faced related to tourism development include poor infrastructure - especially roads, lack of tourism services and attractions, limited possibilities for local investment, and the planned liquidation of the Chełm-Włodawa railway line. (http://www.lgpp.most.org.pl/ed19engwolauhruska.htm)

Chelm and Wola Uhruska – Contemporary problems and the meaning of location on the borderland

In Chelm, just like in all other towns, in which research was conducted, unemployment and “economy in general (…) in fields of development and creating enterprises” were mentioned as the biggest problem for the town. In eyes of respondents, these problems do not differentiate Chelm from the rest of Poland. Other problems mentioned by interviewees are debts and lack of big industrial plants, which “generate capital”. Some people, we talked to, named debt as the biggest obstacle in Chelm’s development after entering the EU by Poland. Debt will make taking credits to finance part of the town’s development projects impossible, moreover preventing Chelm from making use of EU structural funds. Worsening of the situation in Chelm is partly attributed to the liquidation of Chelmskie Voivodship.

Chelm’s location near the border enables trade with Ukraine and with Russia. Interviewees hope for an economic revival due to the Polish EU accession. As a consequence of Polish accession, the Polish eastern border will become a frontier of the EU and this may boost the border infrastructure development. Respondents also are counting on some sort of energizing pulse to stimulate the economy especially because of the location of Chelm being on the route from Berlin to Kiev.

Transboundary trade is rather well perceived. Its consequences for Chelm’s development were assessed very important, especially during the period of prosperity, which ended some 3 years ago after Ukrainian government had imposed duty on goods imported from Poland. In the years of intensive bazaar trading up to 10k Ukrainians were in Chelm at one moment. That was when food stores, furniture shops, commodity exchange housing industry and many illegal cigarettes and alcohol wholesalers were founded. Presently, a big part of them have been going bankrupt.

Tomaszów Lubelski

Tomaszów Lubelski was founded over 400 years ago. It is inhabited by some 21 thousand people, while Powiat Tomaszowski [Tomaszów County] –93,000, out of which 77% live in villages. Since 1999, Tomaszów Lubelski has been a base for the Powiat Tomaszowski. It is located 126km from Lublin and 95km from Lvov. There used to be a trade route from the Black Sea, via Lvov, to Baltic Sea, running through Tomaszów Lubelski. Presently, this town is regaining its position, as a result of being located near the road leading to the Polish-Ukrainian border checkpoint – Hrebenne-Rawa Ruska. Closeness to Ukraine has created an opportunity for indirect cooperation, potentially large possibilities for profiting from servicing international road and rail transport, as well as from agency and help with the East-West trade.
The Powiat is divided into 13 self-governing gminas. They are: Bełżeck, Jarczów, Krynice, Lubyczka Królewska, Łaszczów, Rachanie, Susiec, Tarnawatka, Telatyn, Tomaszów Lubelski, gmina miejska Tomaszów Lubelski, Tyszowce, Ułhówek. Powiat Tomaszowski borders on following powiats [counties]: Hrubieszowski, Zamojski, Biłgorajski i Lubaczowski.

There are 2200 businesses registered in Tomaszów Lubelski. Among them are: fruits and vegetable processing plants, dairy, mills, meat processing plants and an affiliate of Transport Equipment Factory. Apart from the above, there is also a number of industries: clothing, metallurgical and construction. Thanks to the developing trade with Ukraine, many wholesalers and stores (offering food or industrial articles) came into being.

**Tomaszów Lubelski - Contemporary problems and the meaning of location on the borderland**

Majority of interviewees points out unemployment as the biggest problem of Tomaszów. It is easily understandable in the town, where unemployment rate (including “hidden unemployment”) amounts to 50%. Most of workplaces are supplied by public offices, services, small trading firms and agriculture. According to respondents, big part of inhabitants smuggle for a living. This phenomenon negatively influences the development of legal trade, especially in excise goods. Another problem mentioned by interviewees is town debt, which prevents it from taking credits to finance further development.

Among positive examples, well prospering enterprises are enumerated: not only Marex, Natura, and Śląwex. Some of those firms profit from the trade with Ukraine. Numerous wholesalers and food processing plants try to take advantage of trade with Ukraine as well.

Many respondents talked about serious losses suffered by Tomaszów as a result of tightening Ukrainian duty regulations concerning merchandise imported from Poland. Presently, the best noticed goods imported from Ukraine are cigarettes, alcohol and illegally imported petrol. Agricultural products and foreign currencies – dollars and euros – go in the opposite direction.

As far as the borderland location is concerned, apart from the trade, cultural exchange is pointed out. For example, there is an agreement on cooperation with Zowkwa (oblast?) (referring to cultural and economic exchange) and cooperation between Tomaszów’s and Łuk’s museums.

In general, most of inhabitants expects positive changes in Tomaszów’s economy after the EU accession. Those changes are to be a result of the Polish-Ukrainian border development.

**Przemyśl**

Przemyśl is a town spreading over 44,1 km2, inhabited by 68,3k people. It is located in the eastern part of Podkarpackie Voivodship, some 12km from the Polish-Ukrainian border. The description of Chelm comes from the analysis of J. Kurczewska and H. Bojar entitled *Postawy grup opiniatwórczych społeczności lokalnych pogranicza wschodniego wobec granicy wschodniej II RP. Próba diagnoz i prognoz*, raport ISP, Warszawa 2002.
border. Before 1999 it used to be a capital of Przemyskie Voivodship. Presently, Przemyśl has a status of powiat grodzki [urban county] and is a base of powiat ziemski [rural county]. It is located on the international route from Zgorzelec (a Polish-German border town) to Medyka (a location of Polish-Ukrainian border checkpoint Medyka-Szegyni).

The presence of Ukrainian minority is a characteristic feature of Przemyśl. Estimates of its number are very vague. Until recently, it was valued at 2000-4000\(^2\) people and presently, respondents talk about 1500-2000 individuals.

Unemployment rate grows gradually. In 1998, it amounted to 9.9\%, year later it was 13.3\%, in 2000 – 15.3\%. Presently, 18-20\% of people in Przemyśl are unemployed. There are some 10000 entries in the enterprise register in Przemyśl. Even though, only 33.8\% of 22816 employed in Przemyśl work in private sector. Food processing industry dominate other industries in the town and in the region.

Due to the changes taking place in the east of Europe, location in the borderland became an asset of great importance. Przemyśl is a convenient place to manage commercial transactions with the East. That is why intensive actions were undertaken in order to create Duty Free Zone [Wolny Obszar Celny]. In 1990’s services infrastructure was developed, border checkpoint in Medyka was enlarged and modernized as well as rail border checkpoint on the railway station.

In 2000, 3.443mln people crossed border in Medyka, the closest border checkpoint to Przemyśl. Most of those crossing the border are foreigners, mainly Ukrainians. Asked for the reason for coming to Poland, 77.9\% of foreigners indicated shopping. Almost 70\% of individuals, who cross border in Medyka do their shopping not further than 20km from the border\(^3\).

Among international initiatives, in which Przemyśl takes part, one is really important, namely Euroregion Karpaty. Its activities are devoted to popularizing and exchange of economic information\(^4\).

Przemyśl/Medyka - Contemporary problems and the meaning of location on the borderland

Surely, poverty in Przemyśl is pointed out (…) dirt, negligence in the town along with the failures of town authorities. Apart from that, if anything else can be said about the problems, it is that everything goes around problems here (…) day-to-day survival of people living here. Because really, unemployment is huge, poverty is huge (…) People simply don’t have perspectives for the future (…) Some people after High School, leave for studies, they know they simply won’t come back, because there is nothing to come back to. This town lost its popularity [after Przemyskie Voivodship was liquidated]. Even though it is a borderland town, of great virtues for tourists. (…) It doesn’t attract inhabitants nor tourists. PrDM4210

This citation shows a typical opinion on the situation in Przemyśl given by the people that we talked to. Unemployment, economic stagnation, incompetence of authorities, lack of perspectives. Also level of culture – bigger events withdrawn, cancelled restricted to minimum… PrIK2911 It is difficult to assess to what degree those complaints are justified. However, it is certain that (like in whole country) unemployment rate skyrocketed and (like in

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\(^3\) Ruch graniczny i wydatki cudzoziemców w Polsce oraz Polaków za granicą w 2000 roku, GUS, Warszawa 2001

\(^4\) Miszczak, A. Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie a polityka zagraniczna III RP, maszyniopis
other borderland towns) trade with Ukraine fell down. Contrary to Chelm and to Tomaszów, in Przemyśl people do not blame Ukrainians for the decline in trade. There are some opinions that these were traders, who could not adjust to changing conditions, supermarkets, that overtook small traders (this is related to the change of law in Poland – Ukrainians buying in supermarkets in Poland can deduct VAT exporting purchased goods, what makes goods accessible in supermarkets even more competitive).

Location of the town used to play an important role in its development. And it still has potential to do so. People, we talked to, hope for improvement in their situation after EU accession. According to them, this will give them easier access to EU funds for the borderland development. Inhabitants also hope for promotion of the town towards tourist. However, majority of respondents is skeptical foreseeing the close future of their town. All of above can be summed up with the following comment: Although theoretically I’m not knowledgeable in this area, theoretically I think, we could make use of geographic assets, we have. And we could be a town living of tourism. Well, we are not. And for a long time, we won’t be. I think, taking Alps for example, if they had no tourism developed, it would be the most neglected region of Europe. Because who would go to the mountains, to the middle. I understand going somewhere to the edge, go for a trip and back, like Poles go to the Tatra Mountains. And Alps? It takes hours to go there. People go there, because there are attractions: ski lifts, swimming pools, parties on the glacier, you can see something, you’re allowed do a lot o things, you can’t do in Poland. Discos are on the glacier, and here you can’t do it, because you’d scare animals. In Sweden, where you have water, you have boat. And here? There is Zalew Soliński [Solina Reservoir] , but you can’t go there on a boat, because there is ‘quiet zone’. And when you go there with a tent, the riffraff hollers all night long, so you can’t sleep. Here, a lot of time has to pass, before it gets a little different here, I think

Often, respondents talked abort more and more provincial character of the town. Dziadziejemy [We become pauperised], as one of interviewees put it.

III. Reactions in regard to the presence of Ukrainian minority and attitude towards Ukrainian migration on the borderland - Hanna Bojar

Tomaszów Lubelski / Hrebenne

Ukrainian minority

Most of respondents are aware of the presence of inhabitants of Ukrainian origin in their region. However, due to the small size of this group, it is not considered an expressively distinct category of residents. According to interviewees, relations between Poles and people of Ukrainian origin are good. Lots of people do not consider this group distinct, because its members do not underline their ethnic peculiarity and there are no differences in the way of living compared to Poles. Religious separateness is more visible, due to the activity of orthodox churches and the common consciousness of the presence of orthodox believers, who
are especially perceptible during orthodox Easter and Christmas, when Ukrainians visit their families living in Poland. However, most of respondents consider an orthodox denomination just a sign of past ties with Ukrainian roots and origins.

There is a memory of ethnic diversification and cultural diversity of the region, alteration of borders and resettlements after World War 2. However, this memory has little influence on present relations with inhabitants of Ukrainian origin (or orthodox believers). Only those are perceived as Ukrainians, who moved in and settled down in the region after World War 2, for example as a result of a marriage with Polish citizen.

Newcomers from Ukraine

The presence of numerous newcomers from the East is one of the most characteristic feature of the borderland region. All interviewees claim that appearance of foreigners is connected with reduced control on the borders [rozszczelnienie granicy] after 1989. Asked about the nationality of people coming from the East, respondents point out Ukrainians, Russians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Moldavians, Armenians, all of them often described with a common term “Ruscy”. This term is used even though people, we talked to are aware, that most of the newcomers are Ukrainians (mostly from the Ukrainian borderland). Due to the expressive common lack of distinction among separate nations of origin, respondents are not conscious of categories enabling identification of particular nationalities.

Most Ukrainians come from the borderland, what can be attributed to economic factors. Among them are: the easiness of return to home (time and costs of a trip) and, as part of Ukrainians state, the feeling of cultural closeness, simplifying existence in foreign country.

As stated before, nationality of newcomers from the East does not matter as far as their perception in local community is concerned. What does play an important role is categorization of newcomers on the basis of the type of work executed in Poland (in local community) and the character of their stay in Poland.

First division of foreigners is made according to the character of work, they do in Poland:

- the most visible are people coming for trade purposes.

This category is diversified. Respondents name several groups. The first are individual traders, often met in the streets and on marketplaces. They usually trade in excise goods brought (smuggled) from Ukraine – cigarettes and alcohol. Among individual traders are people called “ants [mrówki]”. Although this term is widespread in other parts of Poland, our interviewees hardly used it. “Ants” usually enter Poland by bus, by train or on foot – that is their characteristic feature. They are usually perceived as representatives of the poorest social strata in the Ukraine.

The second category is constituted by people coming to Poland for trade purposes by car (sometimes with a trailer). People, we talked to say that most of the people from the mentioned group had begun from street trading. Presently, they run the trade business on larger scale, making use of the contacts with wholesalers.

It is worth to mention, that according to all interviewees the scope of the trade is much smaller than it used to be several years ago. This drop in trade is attributed mostly to tightening duty regulation by the Ukrainian side and prohibition to import food from Poland.
The third and the least numerous group in division of foreign traders are businessmen running businesses via duty stores [skład celný] or Polish-Ukrainian joint-ventures. Some of them run their businesses further east in Ukraine and visits to the borderland are just a passing by. They are seen as members of higher, richer social stratum. This perception can be attributed to the style of clothing, make of car or the way of spending their spare time.

- the second wide category is built with the people working in Poland, both legally and illegally.

In case of illegal workers, their sojourn in Poland has clearly seasonal character, due to the type of most commonly done jobs, such as in agriculture and construction. For the stake of the importance of foreigners’ work in Poland, this category will be referred to in the separate chapter of the Report

- another category is constituted by criminals.

It is important to stress that the image draw by respondents, who are not professionally related to crime detecting is quite general. People usually distinct organized crime (stealing and smuggling cars, smuggling merchandises on big scale and hold-ups) and occasional (small thefts, disturbance of the peace, littering in public places, driving under influence of alcohol). In big part, this category is recruited from people coming to Poland for trade purposes.

Policemen, courts’ representatives and border guards have much more complete understanding of criminal issues. According to them, 80% of all crimes (offences?) are fiscal-judicial [karno-skarbowe], connected with smuggling and excise goods trade. Other categories of crimes committed by newcomers are mainly of disturbing character: littering, traffic accidents, DUI and road robbery – assaults on fellow citizens. According to the policemen, there is no significant relation between the number of arrivals from the East and the number of level of crime.

- another category, enumerated only by policemen, are women from Ukraine, who work in Poland as prostitutes. It is difficult to establish whether the fact, that common people do not mention this category results from poor visibility of the issue or it can be attributed to unwillingness to talk about it.

In regard to the character of stay in Poland, respondents enumerate the following types of foreigners from the East:

- people having work permission and permanent residence (for 9 or 12 months). These are mostly foreign language and music teachers and artists. Despite the fact, that they represent only a small fraction of whole number of Ukrainian newcomers (a few dozens out of estimated several hundreds or thousands), they are usually well associated due to the public character of their work.

- individuals currently applying for permanent residence or citizenship. Most often, these are women, who married Poles. Interviewees claim that the number of mixed (Polish-Ukrainian) marriages grows constantly.

- people staying in Poland for 3 months long sojourns within the confinements of non-visa cross-border movement. Usually these are individuals working illegally, but having legally reported for temporary accommodation.

- people coming to Poland for short, one up to several days long stays. Usually they come for trade purposes.
According to the representatives of local elite, two latter categories of newcomers are the most numerous.

It is important to mention the group of people staying in Poland illegally. This category is not commonly noticed – information about it can be acquired from the public institutions, such as police, courts and border guard. These are individuals staying in Poland without valid passport or who exceed permissible time limit of the non-visa sojourn. In case of capture, they are expelled from Poland. This category includes also illegal immigrants, coming to Poland through the “green border” (i.e. illegally crossing the border).

Good and bad aspects of Ukrainian newcomers presence in the region

Among negative phenomena connected with the presence of Ukrainians in Poland, interviewees tend to mention:

- certain troubles connected with Ukrainians presence in public places: gathering up and crowding in particular places, traffic congestion, traffic accidents, littering in the streets and alcohol abuse;

- trade in excise goods (cigarettes and alcohol), which is criticized in two dimensions: as a criminal phenomenon (losses for public budget caused by unpaid taxes, lower sales of those articles realized by legal producers and traders in Poland) and as a negative social phenomenon (easy access to cheap cigarettes and alcohol for youngsters and possibility of poisoning with alcohol of unknown origin).

- from the interviews, a conclusion can be derived that despite noticing problems connected with numerous Ukrainian newcomers’ presence, people generally realize, that positive aspects predominate. Among positive phenomena connected with Ukrainian attendance in the region, economic benefits and positive social effects are enumerated:

  - advantages for the region inhabitants derived from the trade: possibility of buying goods cheaper than in the store, opportunity for running small hotels, food courts and sleep-over places for Ukrainian newcomers,

  - establishing and building positive social relations on the basis of new social experience, crushing the stereotype of an “alien” and uninfluenced by historical prejudices.

According to interviewees from Tomaszów, relations with newcomers from Ukraine are rather good and no serious conflict has been noticed.

Opinion on Eastern newcomers treatment on border checkpoints

Judgments in this regard are not unanimous. Some respondents claim that average newcomers from the East are treated properly, in accordance with the rules and only those, who break the law may have trouble. Several people, we talked to point out that similar trouble can be made by Polish and Ukrainian guards and generally, there is a tendency to treat the rich more politely and nicely. On the basis of interviews, we have grounds for claiming, that respondents do not consider newcomers treatment on the border checkpoints a serious problem or negative phenomenon.
Ukrainian minority

Ukrainian minority is not a visibly existing category in the consciousness of Chelm interviewees. Some of them make themselves aware of the existence of people from Ukraine through their own experiences – contacts with a person claiming to be Ukrainian or having Ukrainian roots. Other interviewees from Chelm appeal to their knowledge and memory of ethnic and cultural diversity of this region. However, there is no thinking about Ukrainians in terms of a distinct social category. According to respondents, Ukrainian minority amounts to 100-300 people. Somewhat wider knowledge on the issue can be noticed among people, who have something to do with Ukrainian minority in their workplace (orthodox priest, Voivodship Office employee). Frequently, it is said that these are not Ukrainians, but people of Ukrainian origin (local people and individuals, who came from the East in 40’s and 50’s). Lack of clear social status [wizerunek] can be partly attributed to the existence of orthodox believers minority, which is much better recognized. However, interviewees underline that denomination does not unambiguously indicate national membership (orthodox priest talks of 150 orthodox families, underlining that this number includes also Poles). As far as older generation is concerned, ties with Ukrainian origins are more clearly visible through the local dialect and attachment to folk tradition. For the younger generation, everyday lifestyle in local community does not distinguish individuals of Ukrainian origin. Ukrainians living in Poland for a long time do not create neither publicly noticeable organizations representing their interests nor distinct enclaves – they live and work among Poles. According to interviewees, Ukrainians do not hide their nationality, but they do not underline it either. One person, we talked to said “they live like Poles and they have the same kind of problems”. That is why they resemble rather Poles than Ukrainians coming from Ukraine. Finally, it is necessary to underline, that the memory of past events and conflicts between nations still exists within the older generation and even though present relations are generally good, it happens to notice stereotypy attitudes and dislike resulting from past experiences.

Newcomers from Ukraine

Ukrainians constitute the most numerous group among newcomers. Apart from them, also Russians, Byelorusssians, Lithuanians, Moldavians, Armenians, Mongols, Vietnamese and Siberians occur in the local community, but less often than in past years. Non-Slavic nations are easily distinguishable due to their specific physical type (as one of interviewees put it “kind of dark skinned groups”). Two groups are especially well distinguished, namely Armenians and Vietnamese. The latter group has clearly set position – they sell fast-food. Armenians appear in the interviews as a well known and positively perceived group. They are distinguished due to their dark complexion, characteristic appearance and funny way of speaking Russian. They usually know Polish better than Russian, they are gifted traders (they trade in electronic equipment). Armenians are associated with artistic professions and they are dressed better than other foreigners. One respondent claims that there is an opposite tendency concerning marriages than in regard to Russians and Ukrainians – these are Polish women, who marry Armenians.
As far as Slavic nations are concerned, all newcomers are described with one term – “Ruscy”. They can be distinguished by language, modest clothing, car number plates and… golden teeth. As respondents notice, these differences used to be much more visible in early 1980’s. Presently, representatives of younger generation and middle-aged are hardly distinctive from the local community – they are well-dressed, they drive good cars. The only distinctive feature about them is accent, even though knowledge of Polish among Ukrainians is more common than knowledge of Ukrainian in Poland. Also, Ukrainians know Polish better than Russians. Sometimes, Ukrainians are called “Szoszoni”, because they say “szo” instead of Russian “szto”. However, it seems, that differentiation between Russians and Ukrainians does not play any role in the structure of relations between local inhabitants and newcomers.

On contrary, categorization of newcomers in respect to the type of work done in Poland (local community) does play an important role:

- the most visible is the group of people coming to Poland for trade purposes. This a diversified category. Interviewees enumerate three groups among them.

First, the most visible in the streets – these are people trading in public places. Their characteristic feature – checkered bags. They come to Poland by bus or by train carrying trading goods with them. This sub-group includes “ants” and “dresowcy” (traders wearing track suit trousers), who usually trade in excise goods – cigarettes and alcohol. They work and live in quite primitive conditions, making use of so called sleep-over places. They take earned money back to Ukraine. This is the group referred to as the poor and bad-treated on border checkpoints.

Individuals trading in non-excise goods built the second group. Often, they specialize in certain range of goods. More and more often, they trade in merchandise bought from wholesalers from all around Poland. Thanks to this maneuver, they avoid paying taxes in Poland and they can sell goods cheaper than Polish traders.

Third group is called “car-man” – they buy merchandise from associated stores and wholesalers in the center of Poland and export it to their stores and wholesalers in Ukraine. For them, Chełm is just a transit town.

- second, numerous category of newcomers are people working in Poland, generally illegally. Legal employees constitute only little percentage of all Ukrainian workers in the region (the issue concerning legal and illegal employees is expanded on in the part of the report concerning Ukrainians).

- professionals, chairmen of companies, commerce representatives constitute another category of newcomers. They usually travel in business; they have special cards enabling them passing the border without waiting in the line. As far as their appearance is concerned, they do not differ from Polish professionals at similar positions.

- next category includes Ukrainians (usually women) coming to Poland for matrimonial purposes. Getting married (what happens increasingly often), they receive permanent visa. After that, they usually apply for Polish citizenship. Respondents claim that people like that do their best to integrate as fast as possible with the community and they avoid underlining their Ukrainian identity.

- another, clearly visible group are Ukrainians studying on Polish universities. They are described as open-minded and intelligent.
there is also a small group of people coming to Poland to visit their families and “real” tourists – people coming to Poland for tourism. Some respondents notice the rise in the number of Ukrainians spending holidays in Poland, for example in Polish part of Tatry Mountains.

last group is referred to as “banditierka”. Its representatives commit crimes and offences in Poland and that is their reason for coming here. Unfortunately, we lack closer characteristics of this group.

In the end of this general characteristics of different categories of newcomers from the East, it is important to mention one more group, referred to with a collective term “the rich”. This category is not numerous, but socially visible, especially during the period of economic crisis and growing poverty in the borderland society. This category has not built up due to the type of work done, its distinguishing feature is rather lifestyle and visible signs of wealth. The rich come to Poland in expensive cars, they are well-dressed and they run an intensive social life living in expensive hotels and spending time in regular places (restaurants). They buy expensive (in the eyes of respondents) goods and services. This group includes as well individuals perceived as businessmen as smugglers, artists and representatives of Ukrainian border guard and customs officers (sic!)

There is yet another, somewhat less important division of newcomers from the East. It is made on the basis of the official character of their stay in Poland. The following categories are distinguished:

- permanent residents in Poland without work permission or trade permission and people, for whom crime is the profession (mainly assaults, robberies, car thefts, extraction by force).
- people staying in Poland illegally (without valid passport, exceeded permissible length of stay, loss of validity of temporary stay card.
- people crossing border illegally (illegal immigrants). These are usually Afghans, Chinese, Indians and Vietnamese)

Good and bad aspects of Ukrainians presence in the region

Ukrainian presence seems to be an obvious element of the local community’s social landscape. There is a vivid memory of “migration of peoples” from late 1980’s and early 1990’s, when newcomers used to come in large numbers to trade on the marketplaces and sleep in the railway stations. Presently, the scope of this phenomenon is much smaller and, as respondents say, these trade migrations gained a lot in terms of stabilization and order. None of interviewees indicated any serious conflicts between newcomers and Poles. All of people, we talked to, described Polish-Ukrainian relations as good.

Naming positive aspects of the presence of Ukrainian in the region, interviewees pointed out mainly economic considerations: revival of trade (stores, wholesalers), possibility for buying cheap products. Due to the fact that a majority of newcomers is far from the status of the rich, an important market for cheap housing and food services occurred. There is a number of people renting flats to Ukrainians working or trading in Poland.

Everyday contacts and visible benefits from the eastern newcomers’ presence result in the fading of past conflicts and negative experiences, which lose their crucial status. They still exist in peoples memory, but seem to be inactive [uśpione]. Indirect contact is conductive to
establishing deeper, regular contacts. It is important to mention in this place that many
interviews suggest that relations between Poles and Ukrainians are not made in the mood of
partnership. Judgments are clearly marked with emotions. This attitude of Poles towards
Ukrainians can be described as a mix of superiority, understanding and compassion (it goes
far enough to arouse acceptance for illegal work of Ukrainians). Often the situation of
Ukrainians is compared to the position of Poles traveling to Western Europe in the past to
work illegally and trade. Only one interviewee talked directly about his negative impressions
connected with the presence of eastern newcomers. He used offensive expressions such as:
disgusting, poor, stinky, awfully-dressed, however, straight after, he added that it is a result of
their way of life in Poland (bad housing and working conditions)

Respondents point out the following phenomena connected with the presence of
Ukrainians in the local community:

- alcohol and cigarettes smuggling; selling fake brand-name products (so-called
  “przestępstwa karno-skarbowe” – “crimes against duties and excise tax”)
- alcohol and cigarettes smuggling for sale
- disturbances, fights and small thefts
- crime within their own ethnic group, for example extortions
- taking workplaces from Poles (this opinion is not commonly shared, what will be
  expanded on in the part of the Report devoted to Ukrainians’ work in Poland)

Opinion on the way of treatment of newcomers from the East on border checkpoints

Contrary to Tomaszów, where respondents did not mention any important problems
related to the treatment of newcomers on border checkpoints, most of Chełmians notice that
people coming from the East are treated much worse than Poles crossing the border. They
talk about unkind or even contemptuous way of referring to foreigners by Polish customs
officers. According to interviewees, this attitude is not based on national but on economic
status of newcomers, who often make impression (with their behavior and appearance) of
poor, less cultural, less disciplined and “somewhat more primitive”. Whereas for a few
interviewees this can be certain justification (“Poles used to be treated like this on the
Western border”), most of respondents judges this attitude of Polish customs officers very
negatively. They say that the change in this unfair situation does not depend on improvements
in border infrastructure but only on the culture of customs officers.

Przemyśl / Medyka

The Ukrainian minority

In contrast to Tomaszów and Chełm, the category of Ukrainian minority in Przemyśl /
Medyka is a significant social category. All the respondents are aware of the presence of a
populous Ukrainian minority (although as always the estimated data are not consistent).

The visibility of the Ukrainian minority in the region is influenced by various types of
factors of historical and social nature. Multiple material evidence, such as Greek Catholic
churches, schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, testifies to their presence.
The existence of Ukrainian enclaves – villages inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians – speaking Ukrainian in everyday life and sustaining traditions of Ukrainian culture is the second factor. Yet another – meaningful testimony of the presence of the Ukrainian minority is a Greek Catholic church strongly connected to Ukrainian-ness. Participation in religious holidays (Jordan) is taken as a free, sincere declaration of belonging to the Ukrainian minority. The social visibility of the minority in the region is also influenced by activities of the numerous organizations of the Ukrainian minority (including various types of cultural initiatives organized by these organizations, in which visitors from Ukraine take part). Many respondents, including a representative of the Ukrainian minority, stress that over the recent years there has occurred a clear change – members of the Ukrainian minority do not hide their Ukrainian origin, and their open declarations do not provoke at present so negative reactions as it used to be in the past. The greater visibility and approval gained by the minority were encouraged both by changes of the domestic character – new policy of the state towards national minorities, and external – building and developing economic and cultural relationships at the level of border region local communities, presence of a populous group of arrivals from Ukraine in the local community.

Following the earlier period when quite strong national animosities appeared (circumstances connected with the organization of the Festival of Ukrainian Culture, the controversy concerning one of Przemysl churches, or crosses built in memory of victims in the East), at present the relationships are considered correct, while tensions which can appear are attributed to activities of a small group of people “trying to build political capital” on references to the past conflicts. Statements made by the majority of the respondents on the topic of the relations between Poles and members of the Ukrainian minority visibly reveal an impact of the “policy of political correctness”, which enforces certain standards of referring to these relations and certain standards of behavior. It becomes manifest in particular in the case of representatives of local authorities- “There are many things from the past which loom over the town, which are hostile, xenophobically oriented regarding the minorities. We are trying to have the image changed” (PRUM4004). The memory of the past experience is however stuck in the consciousness of the inhabitants – particularly of the older generation. Many respondents recall traumatic experience known from familial recollections, although the majority are trying to “neutralize” the experiences placing them in the past which should not affect contemporary relations. Some statements prove however that despite the standards of “political correctness”, stereotypical perception of Ukrainians have an impact on current relations: “many Ukrainians in the area are nationalists and if they came to power, their demands would even grow”; “single persons are diversified, as a mass they rather constitute an unbending lot” (PrUM4509).

Arrivals from Ukraine

Among the numerous arrivals from the East, Ukrainians decidedly form the most populous group. The majority of them arrive – as the respondents define it – from the territories belonging previously to Poland. A less numerous group, from more distant territories – the neighborhood of Kiev or even Crimea. Apart from Ukrainians coming to Poland, Russians, Armenians, citizens of Moldova, Asians (the Vietnamese) and Rumanians also arrive. Currently, the arrivals (with the exception of Ukrainians) constitute a considerably less numerous group as compared to the end of 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.
Owing to physical characteristics, the Vietnamese or Armenians are well distinguished. The Vietnamese are perceived as a well organized and internally integrated community. In contrast to Ukrainians, their activities are conducted on a permanent basis and are well organized. Other groups of Asians are not well identified – they are generally associated with illegal immigrants for whom Poland is not a country of destination.

The other nations are frequently described by a common term of “Ruscy”, although the predominant majority of the inhabitants are aware that the majority of the arrivals are Ukrainians (ca. 60% of the Ukrainians, 10-15% of Russians). The respondents – asked about details – are able to name various features which distinguish a Ukrainian from a Russian. Russians use the Russian language more often than the Ukrainians do, they know less Polish. They are more often of the Orthodox denomination, in contrast to the Ukrainians who are Greek Catholics. The Russians are slightly better dressed, whereas Ukrainians are not but they are more open and hospitable (this trait is stressed particularly by these respondents who had an opportunity to be hosted by Ukrainian families in Ukraine (“poor but incredibly hospitable”).

The distinction between a Ukrainian and a Russian is however not important from the vantage point of social relations which are shaped primarily on the basis of every day contacts of a functional character (employment – mainly unregistered and trade).

The most frequently noticed differentiation among Ukrainians concerns social position and material status. The majority of the Ukrainians staying in the borderland are people coming from the most poor and low social strata. An image of a Ukrainian in Poland is primarily built on the basis of references to this very social category. They most often deal with street trade (bazaars) and work illegally.

Among the most frequently repeated features of the group of the arrivals the following are named:

- characteristic, poor way of dressing (among others training suits), distinguishing the arrival on the street;
- low level of hygiene and gold teeth;
- crammed baggage in checkered bags (this relates to people dealing with smuggling and trade – primarily cigarettes, alcohol, cheap clothes from Asia but also goods from Polish wholesalers);
- permanent places where they trade – so called Polish and Ruski market;
- lack of emotional attitude to the place where they stay – cheap accommodation, sleeping at railway stations;
- inclination to drink “bad” alcohol.

At the other end of the pole there are the arrivals from Ukraine which are perceived as people belonging to intellectual and economic elites. In this group – decidedly less numerous – there are: businessmen interested in large, organized economic activity (including persons who have got rich by means of the so called “bazaar trade” and currently conduct activities on a bigger scale), representatives of Ukrainian local authorities, of self-government and of associations dealing with cross-border co-operation, representatives of artistic elites. In contrast to the previously mentioned category, such people are characterized by higher personal demeanor, education, knowledge of foreign languages and symbols of a higher
material status – clothes of a better quality, good cars, accommodation at top quality hotels and stays of a tourist character – at Polish spas.

The third category distinguished by the respondents contains people who had settled in Poland or have inhabited the local community for a long time. This category includes persons of mixed marriages with Poles or working legally for longer periods of time in Poland. A change in the way of being is typical of these persons. They become similar to the inhabitants of the community – they learn the language, imitate the way of being typical of Poles. The change does not constitute a full assimilation (change of denomination or rejection of origins) but a change in the life style – including dressing standards, conduct (one of the respondents expresses it concisely saying “the ones staying for short are infected with Ukraine, the ones that stay assimilate – they use different cologne water and different soap”). The respondents stress that such people, due to every day life problems, such as work or education of children, are becoming similar to the other members of the local community.

Other way of categorizing the arrivals amounts to differentiating them by the aim of their arrival in Poland. In this respect, the following are listed:

- persons who arrive in Poland to do trade and business or look for jobs (legal or illegal);
- persons who visit their families living in Poland;
- persons arriving to marry (the number of people interested in settling down in Poland rose recently, doubtless in connection with the process of integration of Poland with the EU and a change in visa regulations. Economic (instrumental and not sentimental) reasons are decisive in this case, and looking for Polish roots is motivated by a wish to increase one’s own chances to legalize the stay);
- persons arriving for tourist purposes (tourism does not however have the character of visiting but spending one’s free time in spas in summer and winter, it concerns people of high material status);
- criminals (according to many respondents, people who deal with “planned” criminal activities constitute a narrow margin among the arrivals from Ukraine).

Advantages and disadvantages of the presence of arrivals from Ukraine in the region

According to the respondents, the arrivals from the East distinguish clearly from Ukrainians living in Poland for a long time (since they were born), who are similar to Poles in the way they think and behave. The differences are primarily caused by the environment in which they were raised (“they are something of a Soviet man”). There exist familial ties among the arrivals from the East and the members of the Ukrainian minority, however – as it seems on the basis of the respondents’ statements – the contacts between the arrivals and the local Ukrainians are not visibly closer than with local Poles. Three remarks included in the collected data throw some light on the complex relationships between the Ukrainian minority in Poland and the arrivals from Ukraine. The first is related to the fact that the image of the poor Ukrainian from the East may negatively affect the image of Ukrainians in general (including the Ukrainian minority). The second remark concerns the fact that the arrivals from the East noting the level of living of the members of the minority “wish they could live like the Ukrainian minority in Poland. And the last statement: “each country has its minorities
abroad and this country helps the minorities. It is a paradox that we, being a Ukrainian minority abroad, are helping Ukraine” (PrIK2911).

The inhabitants of the local community and the arrivals live in a “symbiotic relationship of a kind” which consists in mutual benefits resulting from the contacts (work, retail and wholesale trade, accommodation facilities, food facilities, transportation agents). Moreover, the border traffic as well as currently implemented and planned expansion of the infrastructure at the crossing points is a hope for new jobs in the region. High hopes are related also to – with an increased interest on the part of wealthy Ukrainians in Poland as a place where they could spend free time (winter sports in the Bieszczady, the popular swimming pool in Ustrzyki where Ukrainians already constitute 80% of the clients).

Alongside the economic advantages mentioned above connected with the presence of the Ukrainians in Poland, the respondents also draw attention to the benefits of social-cultural nature. It is worth mentioning the developing co-operation and frequent contacts at the level of local authorities, self-governments, exchange programs, co-operation between schools or parishes as well as ever more numerous cultural initiatives (such as exhibitions, concerts) and contacts between associations of Polish and Ukrainian entrepreneurs. The opportunity to make direct contact favors breaking stereotypes and faults from the past as well as making closer acquaintances. There appeared also opinions that “the opening of the border” and the presence of the various nationalities recreates the climate and color of the old borderland (Kresy) and the cultural mix typical of them. The contacts with Ukrainians “also teach humbleness” in relation to one’s own situation, the every day observations of people for whom life is so difficult makes one realize that one’s own situation is not that bad, that one could live in more difficult conditions.

Every day experience of the inhabitant of the local community consists in contact with the poor. It gives rise to mixed feelings – sympathy and resentment at the same time. Among the negative phenomena pointed to by the respondents, the following were named most often:

- manifestations of low culture/demeanor, such as littering public places, abusing alcohol, brawling, petty theft, sleeping at railways;
- trading with smuggled alcohol and cigarettes;
- crime and prostitution (It needs to be noted that the respondents think crime is a small social problem if compared to the number of Ukrainians residing in the region).

Poles appreciate the fact that arrivals from Ukraine try to help each other – they inform one another about jobs, accommodation and other issues which facilitate orientation of the arrivals in the foreign territory. According to the respondents – the majority of the inhabitants of the local community have a neutral attitude towards the arrivals. Decidedly satisfied with their presence are those who maintain trading contacts with them and derive economic benefits from their presence as well as people who – owing to their public functions - are interested in reinforcing the cross-border relationships. On the other hand, a negative attitude might be displayed by people who do not derive direct benefits from the presence of the Ukrainians (they perceive their presence as burdensome because of the lower culture of being, lesser orderliness and cleanliness) and people whose attitudes are determined by the memory of the past harms done by Ukrainians. Only very rarely however, in contrast to the relations concerning the Ukrainian minority, appears there a problem of the past and past conflicts between the nations as an important factor deciding on the shape of the relations of the arrivals from Ukraine and Poles. It is worth quoting a statement of one of the respondents: “I think that Poles here are on the whole friendly. The issue of the past reckonings concerns
rather the local community, and not the arrivals. The arrivals are totally a little differently treated. These past reckonings are not transferred onto them” (PrIM5502).

An evaluation of the manner in which the arrivals from the East are treated at the border crossing points

None of the respondents evaluated the way in which border crossings function unequivocally positively. Regarding the Ukrainian side, both the border crossing infrastructure, organization of work (chaos, mess, unclear regulations, the rules applied at whim at the border crossing), and the level of conduct of the border services. In a few cases there appeared an accusation of corruption of the border service officers and of the Ukrainian police. In relation to the Polish side they stressed primarily low level conduct on the part of the border service officers and the manner in which people crossing the border were treated – arrogant attitudes towards people from the East.

It could be concluded on the basis of the collected data that a “rule of reciprocity” of a kind is applied in this case – the Ukrainian services treat Poles worse (“they treat Poles as a milking cow”), while the Polish services – people coming from the East. The attitude to the arriving people depends however on their position and material status – specially impolite are treated as the poorest persons, most frequently crossing the border at foot crossings’ with the purpose to do trade, attempting to smuggle excise goods.

Two opinions are manifest in the evaluations of the behavior of the Polish border services. First – expressed most frequently by people crossing the border as tourists or on duty – it is connected with a very strong criticism and lack of approval of such behavior. There appear numerous postulates to have the representative of the border services trained in personal culture and a conviction is manifest that the problem is rooted primarily in social relations and the investments in the border infrastructure are not sufficient to change the situation seriously.

The second approach – represented most often by people professionally connected with the border and administrative officers representing state authorities – does not deny the existence of the negative phenomena at the border and the necessity of changes, however they point out the various sources of the state of affairs. Among the most frequent causes of the negative phenomena at the border, the following socio-economic factors are named:

- existing differences in the economic level of the two state systems encourage the phenomena of widespread smuggling and trade;
- the necessity of conducting detailed controls due to the frequent inconsistency between the real and the declared purpose of travel;
- differences in the culture of demeanor, observing order in public places which put the people coming from the East at the disadvantage, provoking reactions of impatience and tiredness of the border employees, especially when the intensity of the border traffic is taken into consideration (2-3 thousand people daily);
- the fact that border infrastructure is not adapted to the scale of the current border traffic.
The representatives of the other approach more often declare that the investments in the infrastructure at the border crossings have impact on the improvement of the conditions in which the border is crossed.

III. Work of Ukrainians in opinions of the borderland communities— Mirosław Bieniecki

Chelm/Wola Uhruska

According to the information from the Chelm office of the Lublin Voivodship Bureau, there were 33 work permits issued to foreigners in 4 neighboring counties [powiat] Włodawa, Chelm and Chelm City, and Krasnystaw. Out of these 33 permits, 24 were issued to Ukrainians, mainly English teachers (but also a massage therapist, a dentist and a ‘businessman’). These 24 permits were issued to 12-15 people as some of them work in more than one place and a foreigner has to have an individual permit for each workplace. Up until March 20, 2003 4 permits were issued (2 for Ukrainians, one for Belorussian and one for a Canadian citizen). During the same time, in 2002, 70 temporary residence permits were issued to Ukrainians (72 people applied, but in 2 cases permits were not issued because of “lack of [documented] financial resources and unclear purpose of the visit.” Some of the applicants from Ukraine (11) were claiming Polish nationality. There was also a small number of people applying for permanent residence.

Ukrainians working in Chelm can be divided into 2 basic categories: legal workers and those who work illegally and/or deal with trade. The first category concerns only 12-15 people. It is difficult to say what is the scale of illegal employment of Ukrainian citizens in Chelm and the surrounding areas. This number varies according to season and present shape of the job market. Our respondents estimate that the peak of Ukrainian employment was in the mid 1990s when even several thousand Ukrainians could have been working in the area. They say that decrease of this number was caused by the implementation by Ukraine of a stricter duty regime concerning goods imported from Poland and a drop in demand for products offered by Ukrainians. Among other factors contributing to a smaller number of Ukrainians in the region, they name a slow-down of economic growth in Poland and following it a growth in unemployment in the Chelm area (more difficult to find work for Ukrainians). Also, now it is easier for Ukrainians to travel to Western Europe, USA and Canada. It must be considered that the total number of Ukrainians crossing the border did not change as much as the number of Ukrainians who arrive in Chelm. It shows that the character and scale of trade run by Ukrainian entrepreneurs who gain wealth (i.e. because of border trade with Poland) has changed.

While speaking about Ukrainians working legally in Chelm and the surrounding areas, the interviewees first point to English teachers. Some also notice highly qualified workers (i.e. working in the glass foundry) and managers and private entrepreneurs. Two Ukrainian professors from Lviv lectures in Chelm site of Bogdan Jasiński’s Warsaw Higher. The most common are opinions considering Ukrainians who teach English, physical education (athletics) and music. They appear everywhere and especially where no qualified English teachers or Poles want to work because of the offered salary/conditions. At this moment, there are English teachers, even though their job market is shrinking due to the growth of
qualified Polish English teachers. Considering legally employed Ukrainians, there are no greater divisions in assessing their influence on the job market in the region. As one of our respondents said, “Those, who came to schools were first of all foreign language and physical education teachers. It was related to the location of schools and their [poor] offers to teachers from Chelm, who had to commute there. And then it turned up that some of the teachers did not want [to commute], so if they did not, then Ukrainians were coming in their place. Often people who graduated from a Physical Education Institute did not see a problem in 8-10 km commute and for whom living in a village was not a problem considering the dollar equivalent of their salary. Considering foreign language teachers, they were employed, because there were no qualified Poles. Music teachers (...) who were educated in cities, did not find it attractive to go to a province like Chelm. So, accordingly, I would not say that [Ukrainians] are taking someone’s job away. ChUM5909. There were, however, also some doubts concerning the quality of their teaching since there has been various teachers coming here: better and worse. There were some who wanted to be employed but wanted to deal mainly with trade and teaching as a side job ChUM5909.

The second category are Ukrainians working and/or trading in Poland illegally. I consider them one category, although people in Chelm do not consider Ukrainians selling things on the local market as illegal workers. Very often, however, these are the same people, who come to Poland, sell a few things and then go to work.

Ukrainians selling goods they carried through the border have been an important element of social landscape of Chelm and the surrounding villages since the beginning of 1990s. As mentioned, the interviewees asked about the illegal workers rarely mention those who deal with trade, and only sometime they point their vocation in context of breaking the excise laws. Meanwhile the vast majority of Ukrainians crossing the border declare tourism as a purpose of their visit in Poland and risk deportation in case of a control by Polish authorities. The another side of this coin is that Police ‘closes their eyes’ for the small traders and declare that they monitor them in search of ‘bigger fish.’

According to our respondents and own observations, Ukrainians sell practically everything, although the most visible are those, who sell alcohol and cigarettes. They stay nearby market places, bus stations and other busy places. It is a common view to see cars approached by groups of Ukrainians offering their goods; we even met the local names for this phenomenon: “Ukrainian drive thru” or McDrive”. Besides the excise goods, our respondents named such goods as: screws, curtains, handicrafts, rough made goods, simple tools, bad quality but cheap, food, agricultural products, concrete, nails, batteries, furniture, cameras, binoculars, cloths, everything that you could not buy in Poland or was very expensive they were selling for pennies...

Aside from trade, Ukrainians in Chelm are very often employed for various, generally simple jobs in construction, agriculture, different kinds of renewals, cleaning etc. Generally, these are tasks that Poles do not want to perform, or do not want to perform for the offered price. There are some cases of doctors working illegally, goldsmiths, and other highly qualified workers. There are also prostitutes. Some people mentioned child care and elderly people care however, underlining that these kinds of jobs are more common in bigger cities.

When asked whether or not Ukrainians working in Poland deprive Poles from work, our respondents most often answered that Ukrainians perform jobs Poles do not want to perform, and/or do not want to perform for the price offered. Most of respondents were saying that this is not a significant problem. Some, especially those who had their own business, stressed however that Ukrainians impair the job market for Poles and this ‘dumping’ prices practice
creates a problem for those who await legal employment. Many pointed too high taxes and Social Security duties as reasons for this pathology.

Those who commented the quality of work performed by Ukrainians differed in their opinions. They commented mostly positively on the quality of work performed by skilled workers and professionals. Considering the others, it means the largest group of Ukrainians working in Poland, some were saying that the quality of their work depends on the level control, others complained about ill-preparation and lack of qualifications. The most common opinion was however that Ukrainians are a cheap labor force; they may not satisfy their employer, but the quality of their work is not worse than the quality of Polish workers.

The influence Ukrainians have on the local economy is considered not to be significant; positive in the scale of entrepreneurs and private individuals who employ them, and rather negative for the region and the state. Very often we heard the opinion that as much as the “black market employment” is a generally negative phenomenon, the problem lies not in this illegal employment itself, but in high taxes, absurd employment regulations and the social security duties. The criticism considered not as much Ukrainians who were working in Poland (most of the people in Chełm seems to agree that foreigners should have possibilities of working in Poland) but the negative influence of the gray zone of economy on the states economy as a whole and reasons for the existence of this zone.

Tomaszów Lubelski

According to the information from the Zamość office of the Lublin Voivodship Bureau, there were 182 temporary residence permits issued in 2002 to foreigners in Biłgoraj, Tomaszów Lubelski, Hrubieszów and Zamość counties [powiaty]. 153 of those were issued to Ukrainians. According to our interviewee in Zamość, the number of Ukrainians working legally in the region grew since 2001 (136 permits issued to Ukrainians compared to 53 permits in 2000), and was related to the education reform that established institution of Junior High (Gimnazjum) and a need for English teachers it created. According to the same source, vast majority of Ukrainians applying for temporary residence permit are teachers and spouses of Polish citizens (mainly women).

There are approximately 28-30 Ukrainians working legally in Tomaszów Lubelski Powiat [county]. They are mainly English and German teachers. Besides the language teachers in Tomaszów Lubelski, there is a music teacher in the school and a co-owner of a photo-shop. In the consciousness of the inhabitants of the town, English teachers are present most often. Small numbers of Ukrainians result first of all from a complicated procedure of applying for the necessary work permit. Before hiring a teacher from abroad, school must announce the job offer to the Work Office. This offer must lie there for some time and if a Pole responds to it, the school has an obligation to give him a priority ZaUKxx01. Aside of this, there is a high unemployment among graduates of various universities and colleges who are qualified English teachers. This causes shrinking of a job market for Ukrainian teachers. In the cities, teachers [Ukrainians] admit that it is more and more difficult. Young women after college come and compete for work. And they too want to teach in towns. And they have priority because they are Polish. And then schools have to give up their experienced Ukrainian teachers ZaUKxx01.

Those Ukrainians who work in Tomaszów Lubelski illegally do mainly unqualified, seasonal jobs on construction sites and in agriculture. The scale of this phenomenon is visible in statements we heard from our respondents. They were expressing opinions, that if not
Ukrainian labor, there would be hardly any construction in the town, and many peasants would give up agriculture. Aside of construction, where one can meet also qualified Ukrainian workers such as brick-layers, plaster-layers, and agriculture, Ukrainians work as house-help, doctors, gardeners. For cleaning, fruit picking, on construction sites (...) We know women who clean house, clean in church, what was surprising for us, because one woman could not come to clean the church herself, so she hired an Ukrainian to replace her there (...) she sent her because she could not go TLPK25M2412. These are temporary jobs, physical, cleaning, construction, but they are not steady jobs (...) Generally, these are quite circumstantial occasions, when someone needs somebody to work for a few hours, because he wants to do something cheap. These are mainly illegal jobs TLUM5310. I think [Ukrainians work] as physical workers on construction sites, in agriculture. It concerns spring and summer seasons. And there are prostitutes among women [But it is not a significant problem] TLUM5706.

The quality of work performed by Ukrainians in evaluated rather as positive, although most of interviewees agree that they are hired more because of their price and availability than some special predispositions to perform certain jobs. The typical answer to the question about the quality of Ukrainians’ work was that if the worker is well supervised and knows something about what he is doing, he will do it well. Besides, these are not complicated tasks. No, I did not hear that they are doing better or worse job than others TLIM5007. We heard also a few negative opinions about Ukrainian English teachers, although the opinion of a person who issues residence permits in Zamość site of Lublin Voivodship Bureau denies it. My contacts with directors of schools [where Ukrainians work] show, that they are pleased with their work. They call our office, ask about their employees, announce their arrival... ZaUKxx01.

When asked if Ukrainians who work illegally deprive Poles from their workplaces, our respondents were admitting that to a certain degree it is the case, but next to the price of Ukrainians’ work, the major role is played by its availability, and easy access to it. It is well illustrated by one of our interviewees: It seems to me that on one hand Ukrainians deprive Poles from workplaces, and on the other – they perform work that local Poles do not want to perform. First, they really take a job, and secondly, the job they take could be done by Poles, if one could find them. There is nothing like job-market where you can go and hire a Pole, because you have to face all the formalities then. Should you hire him legal, or illegally, pay taxes,... etc. And if you want to hire a Ukrainian it takes you a minute. You jump to a car, go to the market, take an Ukrainian guy, bring him to workplace and in 5 minutes he is working. These are the organizational matters that decide that you take an Ukrainian not a Pole. TLUM4004. Many others agree with this statement: This is also a problem; that if wanted to hire somebody to wash my windows or clean the school I do not know where to find a Polish person who could come for three hours and do it. And there is no problem to find an Ukrainian. TLPK25M2412. There were also opinions that Ukrainians who work in the town illegally and for low wages destroy the job market for Poles. Both for those who look for legal employment and for those who also work illegally. They win a competition with construction companies and individual workers because they can afford to work for lower price – they spend the money they earn in Ukraine, where costs of life are lower, and even those Poles who work illegally have to manage life in Poland.

Not everybody agrees with this view of Ukrainian workers as a cheap labor force. There were some, who were saying that Ukrainians are not really cheaper, and their success is based only on their motivation and availability. The director of a state owned facility, i.e., said One thing I can say: they do not take job away from our citizens (...) and if any, they create a small competition in construction business. Because if someone wanted, really wanted to make
some money, he can go to the village, ask for work picking blackcurrants or potatoes or strawberries and the peasant would pay him as he pays for Ukrainians. (...) They pay up to 50 zloty per day, with a lunch, I heard. This is not a bad salary. Per month they make more than my employees make here TLIM5007

The influence of Ukrainians’ work on the local economy is considered to be minimal, having no significant meaning. Negative in a sense of impairing the local job market for unemployed, and a general bad influence over the gray zone economy in context of the state’s economy, and positive from the viewpoint of individuals, who use Ukrainian labor. Very unemployed, and a general bad influence over the gray zone economy in context of the state’s economy, and positive from the viewpoint of individuals, who use Ukrainian labor. Very

if one was to employ Pole or work himself [in agriculture], the costs would be higher than the eventual profits. TLUMMxx05. (...) I understand those employers who do not want to have any problems, deal with some abstract registration in Social Security Office (ZUS), revenue service, paying taxes... If I want somebody to wash my windows and pay few zlotys, I have to sign an agreement, go to tax office on the other side of town... It would take me less time to wash these windows myself than to run with all those papers work. TLPK25M2412.

Considering illegal trade, people were complaining about Ukrainians who sell cigarettes and alcohol to minors, and that the money they earn is not spent in Tomaszów, but in Ukraine (but on the other hand, Ukrainians exchange earned money into dollars, so they do in fact buy in Tomaszów ...dollars)

Most of the respondents agreed that the situation is uncomfortable from a legal point of view, though, on the other hand, they were stressing the fact that a lot of Poles, also from Tomaszów, do work abroad, legally and illegally, and that they understand Ukrainians. Many underlined a need for creating legal regulations concerning possibilities of opening the job market for foreigners, especially those from behind the eastern border (look also the attached article from Rzeczpospolita – in the final version of the report).

Examples of respondents’ opinions (in Polish):

Ja myślę, że uregulowanie tego było by pewną korzyścią powiedzmy sobie. Ponieważ rynek pracy, w szczególności na wsi tomaszowskiej jak do tej pory był dość duży. I na tym rynku brakowało tej siły roboczej, taniej. Taniej, bo nasi obywatele czasami wolą brać zasiłek niż pójść gdzieś tam za parę złotych robić u rolnika. I często rolnicy najmują Ukrainców, i to wiodą. To jest nielegalne oczywiście. Widać, wiosną zaczyna się oprócz tego targu, targ pracy. Tak to można nazwać. Bo podjeżdżają, w odpowiednich miejscach wyczekują ci ludzie i podjeżdżają rolnicy, biorą do samochodu 2, 3 osoby i jadą gdzieś. Uregulowanie tego, wydaje mi się, że byłoby w porządku bo tej pracy, którą oni wykonują nie podejmie Polak. Naprawdę, jestem przekonany, że za te pieniądze nie chcą ludzie robić. Proszę pana, oni nie są znowu tak wykorzystywani, bo oni sobie dniówkę ustalają na, powiedzmy, 30, 40 złotych, bo to w tych granicach ta dniówka oscyluje. I tego się nasi też nie podejmują. (...) choć u nas, jak mówię, też jest duże bezrobocie, i to w sumie za 30 dni pracy daje około tysiąca złotych, to dla tych, którzy nie mają pracy to powinno wyglądać na sprawę zachęcającą, prawda?, tysiąc złotych czy zasiłek 400. To są prace polowe, czy jakieś tam porządkowe czy prace budowlane. Bo i przy pracach budowlanych zatrudniają. I muszę panu powiedzieć, że rozmawiałem z ludźmi, którzy ich zatrudniali, że rzadko się zdarza, że narzekają na tych ludzi, że w porządku robią. Znaczy, zdarzy się lewus, któremu się nie chce, i który przyjechał tylko po pieniądze ale zazwyczaj robią to dosyć solidnie. Takie opinie słyszałem, bo sam nie zatrudniałem bo nie mam do czego TLIM5007
jest to niezgodne z prawem, jako legalista uważam, że to jest złe, zaś jeżeli ocenię to na innej płaszczyźnie, na płaszczyźnie gospodarczej, jeżeli to rolnikowi się opłaca, to można by próbować to zalegalizować i wtenczas by było wszystko w porządku. Bo nie skusi się naszych obywateli do niektórych prac, tak jak nie skusi się obywateli Niemiec do niektórych prac czy Francuzów. Nie skusi się i jadą tam nasi robić te prace. Więcej niż u nas zarabiają. Można by to było w jakiś sposób zalegalizować. Dlaczego ktoś ma się ukrywać z tym? Bo wiadomo, że kara grozi większa gdyby to zostało zgłoszone przez sąsiada. Gdyby przybyli funkcjonariusze zwalczający tę nielegalną pracę to kara grozi temu, który zatrudnia przede wszystkim. Dlaczego więc to ma być pokątnie robione, bo nie da się uniknąć tego, można to w jakiś sposób zalegalizować (...), żeby to było legalnie i wtenczas będzie ok. TLIM5007

**Przemyśl/Medyka**

In case of Przemyśl, we do not have the precise data about Ukrainians who legally work there. According to our respondents, there are maximum of ten legally employed Ukrainians in the region, and, similarly to the situation in other studied cities these are mainly English Teachers and specialists (i.e. doctors). According to our interviewee, there no other legally employed Ukrainians, because in all other fields there are Polish unemployed and there would be no agreement for such PrUM3905.

In Przemyśl, Ukrainians work mainly in areas of construction, agriculture and other simple physical works. Their number varies depending on season, but everyone admitted that it is a huge phenomenon. During a season there is something like a job-fare where every morning one can meet and employ Ukrainians for a day or more. The job-fare is located almost in the very downtown, and everyday in the morning (...) there is traffic there: people wait for something, cars come and take them somewhere to PrUM4008 Construction (...) all kinds of fruit harvest, it means all fruit harvests in the nearby villages, all county were done by Ukrainians. Ukrainians are hired to clean places, take care of gardens, dig, cut grass... PrUK4606 Many of them are seasonal workers; peasants hire them, private people take them for construction works. Mainly these kinds of work. But not only, there are others too, though not so common PrPM4807 Jobs that they take are agricultural jobs, construction, ... heavy, as digging basements, caring things. These kinds PrUM4008

The quality of work offered by Ukrainians varies according to our respondents. They say that some of them have great will to work and take any job there is very often having no qualifications for it. On the other hand, the respondents note that if the quality of Ukrainian’s work was really bad, nobody would hire them and they would not be working there. It seems then, that the deciding factor when it comes to employing Ukrainians is the price for their work [Ukrainians] are cheap labor force, exactly like we are in the Western countries PrPM4807.

Answering the question about competition among Poles and Ukrainians on the job market, the respondents agreed that on one hand Ukrainians do the same job for less money, and on another, that they do not deprive Poles of workplaces, because Poles would not work for this kind of money. They notice, however, that the growing unemployment squeezes Ukrainians out of the job market and Poles take jobs they would not take before. They stress the economic reasons for hiring Ukrainians and complain against the high costs of labor in Poland. According to many of the interviewees, the high costs of labor and lack of employment flexibility are the greatest problems of Polish economy. They do not perceive Ukrainians as a threat for the local legal job market, but they have a great influence on the
illegal job market. Such situation causes growing disproportions between those, who work legally and those, who work for the gray zone. This also influences a part of society to develop negative attitudes towards Ukrainians who work in Poland on one hand, and towards the law and work regulations at all.

These tendencies are visible in following expressions:
you too, if you did not have a job and someone offered: I will give you a job, but with no insurance, then you would be thankful to him for giving you such possibility. Believe me, people denunciate [illegally working Ukrainians] a lot. [They call and say] "in this orchard 12 Ukrainians pick cherries," “here and there 15 Ukrainians chaff something in the field”

Respondents say (in Polish):
To wynika ze stawki godzinowej czy tam innych ekonomicznych przyczyn.
Polak tej samej pracy za taką stawkę godzinową by nie wziął, a Ukraińc tak. Mał o tego, to jest problem w kosztach pracy. Gdyby koszty pracy w Polsce były inaczej skalkulowane, że pracodawca byłby zainteresowany zawarciu legalnej pracy, wtedy by w inny sposób tę umowę konstruował. A tak, bez umowy, na czarno zatrudnił. Czyli był to kiedyś poważny problem, tym bardziej, że on był dosyć powszechny w całej Polsce.

Nie sądzę, by Ukraińcy zabierali obywatelom polskim pracę. Często w prasie się spotyka taka opinii, moim zdaniem wyolbrzymioną, że tutaj jest takie bezrobocie, bo Ukraincy przyjeżdżają i za 100 złotych przez miesiąc pracują na budowie. Ja się często spotkałem z czymś takim, że owszem, utyskuje się na Ukraińca, który pracuje gdzie tam na budowie, ale osoba, która narzeka na takiego Ukraińca nie wyraża najmniejszego zainteresowania podjęciem pracy na tej samej budowie, często nawet za wynagrodzenie nieco wyższe, nieco, bo gdyby ono było znacznie wyższe, to być może. Prywatnie to mówię, że rozumie prawa rynku. Że jeżeli ktoś buduje ten dom, wiadomo, że budowa jest droga, i on ma zatrudnić, załóżmy Polaka za 500 złotych dziennie, a Ukraińca za 100 złotych. I dla tego Ukraińca to będzie prawie Ameryka, te 100 złotych, a ten ktoś te 400 złotych zaoszczędzi, to sama Pani rozumie, że to jest olbrzymia kwota. I ja to prywatnie rozumiem. On pomaga temu Ukraińcowi, ale on też ma 400 złotych zysku. Praca, którą zatrudnia pracownika na czarno, on tym samym mógłby zatrudnić innego pracownika, jedną osobę, która ma prawo do pracy – i powiedzmy, nie zatrudnia tej osoby i wybiera pracownika pracującego na czarno. No bo tak: mniej za niego płaci, nie płaci podatków, nie płaci ZUS-u i mu to się opłaca.

A czy zabierają pracę pracując na czarno? Pewnie tak, ale jest w końcu kapitalizm.

Attitudes and opinions towards the Eastern border of the Republic of Poland– the present and the future : Tomaszów Lubelski, Chełm, Przemyśl

No significant differences between the respondents in these three towns could be noted as far as evaluations of the current situation at the Polish-Ukrainian border and its near and distant future are concerned. In most general terms, the respondents employ a fairly
similar tenor speaking about the issues, the place of living does not differentiate their diagnoses and prognoses in a significant manner.

There are however in the diagnoses and prognoses some nuances. For instance in Tomaszów – the issue will be elaborated on in a moment – we are dealing with a greater than elsewhere sensitivity to the situation of the poor crossing the border, while in Chełm more attention is paid to technical shortcomings of the border infrastructure on the Ukrainian side; also a lot is said about a need to build new terminals there, they are worried “where the money for this given the Ukrainian poverty”. On the other hand in Przemyśl there are more pronounced differences between opinions about the situation at the border and the opportunities for change between administrative officials and entrepreneurs.

In all of the three localities – this is why I will be discussing them jointly, the tendencies visible in their opinions, evaluations concerning people, situations, the functioning of the border services form a similar pattern.

Broadly understood issues related to the Eastern border are for the respondents from Tomaszów L., similarly as for those from Chełm and Przemyśl, something very important. They speak a lot about it, give specific examples, much of what they are talking about results from their own experiences or information overheard in the neighborhood. In comparison to their opinions about general issues, for instance about Ukraine as a country and a society, these are formulated decidedly on their own behalf and without reservations: it is doubtless that at present the respondents in the town – as it is also the case in the other ones – vividly and in detail take interest in the border issues. What is more, their statements concerning the coming changes in the status of the border, emotional overtones of the statements as well as the multiplicity and diversity of expressions related to the issues such as what it should be like at the border, what is desirable and undesirable clearly point out that the interest is sustained or even will be reinforced. It could be claimed, comparing the styles of their statements with the equivalent statements of the respondents from Przemyśl and Chełm, that there are no significant differences in this respect between them; it may be supposed that this is caused by the fact that all respondents speak about the issues with which they are familiar and are able to express them not only in the “media” categories but also in categories of their own, resulting from their everyday experience.

The broadly understood issues of the Eastern border are constituted by the following types of opinions, remarks, evaluations and postulates. There are among them opinions:

A. concerning the current situation at the border (positive and negative, mixed, concrete and abstract, etc., of their own and overheard);

B. concerning mainly the approaching process of the tightening of the Eastern border, its conditions, development and what is very important – the various consequences it might produce, primarily for the borderland (we will devote much attention to the expectations declared in the matter by the respondents, especially to the fears they share.

C. directly referring to the ideal of “no borders and divisions”, (what is meant here are the opinions in which there could manifest visions of respondents related to the issue of borders and divisions in general, regarding the question whether political borders are needed at all and what they signify\(^5\).

**Ad A.** At the border – the current situation

\(^5\) Ze względu na potrzeby raportu szczególnej uwagę poświęcimy punktom a) i b).
The current situation at the border is characterized by the respondents quite extensively; the opinions belong to various categories, among others to ethical and social categories⁶. The following are the most important types of opinions:

Firstly, purely economic or economic-social opinions, refer to a wide array of phenomena from the spheres of economy, trade, economic exchange between private and state entities, transfer of goods, petty trade etc. These opinions are often declared and they occur not only among the respondents from Tomaszów (but also from Chełm and Przemyśl). The respondents voicing such opinions draw attention to the fact that at the Polish-Ukrainian border the movement had decreased in comparison to the previous years. It is related mainly to the economic effects of border restrictions (new duty customs regulations) on the part of Ukraine since the half of the 1990s. Both businessmen and administrative officers attracted attention to this. (The remarks in most cases concern both the Polish and the Ukrainian side).

The respondents not only diagnose the situation, compare it with what it used to be like, but also try to answer the question about the causes of the state of affairs. The following among the reasons given should be emphasized owing to their commonality and clarity:

a) many respondents think the reasons are related to the decreased trade. Some link it to a general impoverishment (they are more concerned with the impoverishment on the Polish side than on the Ukrainian one, bankruptcies of many wholesalers, loss of the jobs connected previously with servicing people arriving from Ukraine, etc.), others – to the loss of significance that petty market trade used to have (they speak about it as of a broader phenomena and compare it to the prosperity of the trade at the beginning of the 1990s). Still others – to the decreased movement of the “ants” [mrówki] which is caused primarily by the changes in the excise on alcohol; the trade is decreasing because it is no more profitable.

b) many respondents think it is also caused by the Ukrainian limits and duty customs restrictions, which affected negatively the movement across the border and the trade.

c) also, there comes into play a negative factor which is not connected with the situation at the very border – as the other two factors were - but with a general economic situation on the Polish side of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland. Many respondents claimed that at present in comparison to the past of the early 1990s, there was a smaller demand for Ukrainian labor (they spoke mainly about “black labor market”); they explained it in general terms with an increase in unemployment and some general processes of impoverishment but first of all with a notable deterioration of the economic situation in the personally known to them borderland area. They stressed significant decrease in the sense of life security resulting from the ever bigger instability in the labor market (high structural unemployment in these regions caused by close-downs of work-places – state and other).

This kind of factors led – according to the respondents from Tomaszów (the respondents from the other two towns made similar declarations) to the limitation of the movement across the border and were caused by the more general economic processes, such as a significant slowdown in the pace of the economic growth in Poland as compared to the first half of the 1990s.

Secondly – the opinions which focus not on the material factor (or economic one) but on the human factor. This concerns opinions in which - when trade, exchange, co-operation etc. are discussed – the manner in which people are treated by the various border services comes to the foreground as well as the way in which the travelers behave and how they react to it. To this category there belong these opinions of the respondents from Tomaszów which seem to distinguish them from the ones formulated by the respondents from Chełm and

Przemyśl: exactly these are particularly sensitive to the manner in which the border services treat at the border crossings people who may be perceived as poor, judging for example by their clothes (“As they see that some poor man is coming there, it is visible that he is coming to work rather and not in a good car, he is ... treated worse, it shouldn’t be like this” – TLUM4004) It does not mean that there are no such opinions in Przemyśl and Chełm). It means only that in Tomaszów they are both more frequent and more emotionally loaded (there is more sympathy in them).

The decisive majority of the respondents focusing on the human factor (it is, let us add, accompanied by some other factors, mainly economic ones but this one is the most crucial) criticize in detail the situation at the border and link it strongly and directly with this factor. What does the factor consist of? First of all it involves the inappropriate - for various, both moral and social, reasons - manner in which people crossing the border are handled.

The respondents draw attention to:

first - low – in their opinion – personal culture (demeanor) of the border functionaries or their code of ethics, which manifests in the inappropriate handling of people crossing the border that frequently hurts their dignity.

Some draw attention to it in a general way, they simply say that things are going bad at the border, others in turn stress that inadequate demeanor and conduct are exhibited by both Polish and Ukrainian functionaries. According to the majority of the respondents holding such opinions, Ukrainians sometimes treat Poles badly, and Poles – Ukrainians, sometimes – in their view – they treat equally badly both “compatriots” and “others”. Many of the respondents emphasize a “randomness” and “subjectivity” of such bad treatment; they say that they have difficulties in identifying some stable reasons why some are treated better than others at the border. In most general terms, in this kind of criticism directed at the bad situation at the border it does not matter whom it affects and who abuses, what matters is that both sides can behave unethically and lawlessly towards people crossing the border.

These respondents make also quite specific statements regarding the type of border services which is mostly to “blame for” the bad treatment; they predominantly mean officers of the customs duty (on both sides) and express complaints and criticisms concerning their inappropriate behavior. They speak more frequently about their caprices, bad moods etc. than they justify their inadequate behavior with over-tiredness or regulations which are not clear; let us add that sometimes they make excuses for such treatment mentioning inappropriate behavior of travelers, especially traders. The ones of the passports are also “run down”, although to a lesser degree, they also, according to the respondents, can be rude, for instance address elderly people with their first names [mówić per “ty”], shout at travelers or interrupt the working regime without a justification.

There are also respondents who – taking into account the human factor – are not that “egalitarian” as the ones mentioned above. Some pay attention to what is going on the Polish side, the others are more concerned with what happens on the Ukrainian side.

The first ones for instance draw attention to the fact that Polish guards favor Poles, businessmen in particular, and notice that on the Polish side some broader category of travelers is treated worse, the category including people arriving from the East (“it is enough to speak Russian ...”). These opinions concerning Poles are, let us add, often formulated with some hedging.

The others (and there are more of them) pay attention to mistakes and faults on the Ukrainian side. They stress for instance that it is particularly Ukrainians who expect to be given bribes (including the militia functionaries who can effectively demand those bribes). A few of the respondents characterizing the “Ukrainian specificity” drew attention to the fact that Ukrainian border services behaved as if nothing had changed since the 1970s. These Ukrainian overtones must be taken as some kind of specificity which is typical of the
respondents from Tomaszów (in comparison to Przemyśl in this respect). Speaking most generally, they stress the “faults” of the Ukrainian border functionaries more frequently. Among others, they point out that on the Ukrainian side corruption is more widespread, the functionaries demonstrate their superiority towards people crossing the border more often than on the Polish side, they are rude, impolite especially towards the poorer looking or the ones that look helpless; they point out that there are more there than on the Polish side manifestations of unbinding interpretation of legal and administrative regulations, and that in many cases people crossing the border are treated “according to their will” or according to their caprices [widzimisię], and in most frequent cases it is to the disadvantage of the travelers. Moreover, they draw also attention to the fact that the specially low level of near-border services on the Ukrainian side (especially lacking WC facilities) makes it difficult to behave properly for both Poles and Ukrainians. Many of the respondents who pay attention to the human factor remark that on the other side there are more (it happens also on the Polish side) cases of aggressive behavior towards people crossing the border. In their opinions, everybody is treated as if they were traders and smugglers who were breaking law.

The evaluation of the situation at the border – apart from the factors mentioned above - depends also on so to speak structural factors, that is on the infrastructure of the border crossings and the conditions in which people cross the border (it was already mentioned before). The majority of the respondents take the inadequate conditions of crossing the border and the shortcomings of the infrastructure as a target for radical and emotionally loaded critique. The respondents point out:

First – crowding or long lines at the border, both on the Polish and Ukrainian side, the fact that one does not always know why this occurs (there often appears an opinion like this: “duty customs officers and border guards have closed up, nothing happens”)

second – organizational shortcomings of all the border services – duty customs officers, and the Guards of the Border. A significant proportion of the respondents think so and link the low turnover across the border to the organizational shortages or even some chaos. These shortcomings, let us add, are used by the respondents to justify low motivation to travel as tourists.

third – lack of transparency of the law and administrative regulations, which in many cases may lead to drastic abuses (the crime of bribing [opłacania się] the duty customs officers or the Guards of the Border) or expose people crossing the border to capricious treatment on the part of the border services (will they today let in people with goods or not...). Also, they do not fail to notice the issue of the changing – for unknown reasons, in their opinion – interpretation of legal and administrative regulations; they see in it a significant cause of bribery and other symptoms of pathology in the borderland zone.

It does not mean however that the respondents perceive the current situation at the border in black exclusively. Although in the evaluations the black hue decidedly prevails, there are also many shades of grayness in it, it does not mean either that respondents are unable to identify anything at the border that could be praised. There occurred among the respondents from Tomaszów sporadic opinions about good work of the border services or conclusions stating that their behavior does not differ from the norm (“I didn’t notice anything inappropriate in the way travelers are handled”), or that it is appropriate by all means, (“the attitude to people who are breaking regulations is as it should be like”). In this kind of remarks one could include those (made by a few of the respondents) which refer to the improvement in the borderland/near-border infrastructure. In the opinion of some of them, new and technically better equipment for the already functioning cross-border points as well as building of the new crossing points or preparing a holistic programs of investing “in the borders” are symptoms or premonitions of changes to the better. This kind of positive manifestations, let us add, is frequently linked by the respondents with current attempts to implement the formal
requirements of the European Union addressed to Poland as a potential border state of the European Union. ("It is to be as it is in the Union"). Brevity and general nature of the statements do not allow however to decide on this basis if it is ultimately good for the whole Poland, for the borderland.

**Ad B. The border in a future**

All our respondents were interested and competent in answering the questions concerning nearer and further future of our eastern border. Their answers, although in various forms and level of competency, were similar in all three researched cities. All our interviewees tried to build a vision of a new situation on this border and spoke mainly of the language of necessities (“this must be done” “that should be” etc.)

When they spoke about necessary changes they meant first of all a) widely understood modernisation of border infrastructure, b) whole range of reorganizations of work at the checking points aiming at increasing border capacity and security of border traffic.

First of all, they all point the necessity of modernizing the existing border crossings and the necessity of building new border crossings, that would be adequate to the need of communication between Poland and Ukraine and satisfy transit traffic. They stress importance of modernization of technical infrastructure of the crossings and the equipment use by the border services. All of them expect a help from European Union in those respects.

Such modernization has to go together with professional training for the border services, and the respondents expect institutional support from EU agencies that specialize in border crimes (monitoring, fighting human and drug traffic, etc).7

While speaking about future situation on Polish-Ukrainian border and what should be done to improve it, the respondents also expressed their opinions concerning process of securing the border and its short and long distance implications.

Considering the negative implications for the local economy, our respondents were afraid of, among others:

1. further growth of unemployment in the border regions (on Polish side), including the area they live in
2. worsening of the level of life of inhabitants of border regions – mainly a growth of number of people seeking help (more unemployment benefits, etc)
3. worse conditions for local trade and services; especially in the fields related to border traffic (they expect lower number of travelers who create majority of the border traffic today)
4. liquidation of many companies which specialize in trade with Ukraine and other eastern countries (including producers that export goods to Ukraine, traders whose customers are Ukrainians, and importers)

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7 Warto zauważyć, że respondenci choć taka długo i z sensem mówili o tym, co może się dziać w niedalekiej przyszłości na tych granicach, nie wspominali o tym, że w przyszłości i na tych granicach może pojawić się zagrożenie zorganizowanego terroryzmu.
The second group of fears is related to the process of securing the border and new, more restrictive politics towards foreigners who come from the East, including Ukrainians, and these are:

1. general uncertainty expressed in words such as “we are afraid of the new visa regime”
2. fears related to the new situation related to reorganization of consulates in Ukraine, access to these consulates, their number. Many respondents were afraid that people may have a difficult access to consulates and it will impair their ability to cross the border (the strength of these fears is visible on the example of changing dates of conferences, business and school meetings, etc)
3. fears related to costs of visa for people coming from the east (notice that they paid attention to the situation of foreigners, as they themselves will not need visas at all). The respondents consider difficulties related not only to the cost of visa, but also costs of traveling to a consulate, waiting, staying over in Lviv or other places where the consulate is, etc.
4. fears related to limitation of small border traffic (especially concerning cultural and educational exchange, pilgrims, family contacts etc)
5. other fears resulting from lack of information (“we do not know how it is going to be”, “no one knows what will happen”, etc) and fear of practical results of new visa regime.

Summarizing, the type of fears expressed by the respondents show that the new visa regime is seen as troublesome. They fear that it will lead to negative for Poland and Ukraine, impairing transit and trade, closing of the border. The list of problems mentioned by our respondents show that they consider both situation of Ukrainians, but also various types of benefits they take from present contacts with Ukraine and Ukrainians (the opinions considering the influence of the changes on the border areas prevail, and only rarely respondents spoke from whole-Poland perspective).

Next to fears, less often and with weaker intensity (and less emotions), named by the interviewees are the positive implications of the process of securing the border. Among the positive implications they pointed:

1. possibility of a better control of border traffic and who is coming to Poland,
2. better regulation of job market in Poland (difficulties for illegal workers)
3. a chance that richer traders and entrepreneurs will take over the larger share of the market (fill the vacant space after detail –trade) and related to it economic development of the region
4. better organization of the border trade (today, according to the respondents it is too anachronic). They expect that the new organization of the visa regime will be followed by international agreements between Poland and Ukraine and it will increase the security of transborder cooperation, especially in the area of economic exchange. Some pointed that new visa regime, although restrictive, by implementing Schengen regulations will “civilize” the border relations and it will connect Ukraine to Europe.
5. some respondents were sure that the changes will be positive from economic viewpoint, organizational viewpoint (by modernization of the border facilities, better work of border services on both sides of the border). According to their opinions, new border regime will increase the demand for employment in border services, especially qualified.
6. expectation of limiting of pathologies, both ‘common’ and these related to the border. The respondents from all categories point this (policemen, entrepreneurs, local government) and they expect at least small decrease in small crimes,
smuggling. They hope that the sell of alcohol and cigarettes will go up, (“Polmos will finally make money”). At the same time they do not expect change in organized crime activities (“mafia will deal with that”). One of the interviewed policemen expects a new crime – falsifying visas.

7. expectation of a re-birth of ‘real’ tourism. Some predict that if there is no smugglers and ants traffic on the border crossings, the real tourists will visit the area more often

8. a kind of a positive change mentioned by some of the respondents … or no change. They say that considering the agreed visa regulations, “those who were to come will come anyway” and not much will change on the border.

Summing up these analyses, it has to be added that the respondents do not direct their projects of bettering the border situation to any particular political or social subjects. Excluding maybe representatives of the local governments who underline that they refer to local government system and/or its relations with the central government, the rest of respondents do not name the subject: they speak non-personally, without naming institutions i.e. “it should be done”.

Ad C. Could there be no border between Poland and Ukraine?

This question, which was meant to consider general matters: sphere of political and social ideals which stand behind the state borders and national state (erosion of national state, search for super-national order, etc) was treated by most of the respondents as a question of possibilities, practical solutions, dismantling the border between Ukraine and Poland on the basis of international politics of these countries. Such a reduction tells us a lot about those, who use it; that they think a lot about future of Polish-Ukrainian relations and that the division of Poland and Ukraine are problematic for them. Their answers can be divided into four groups:

1. answers that express surprise with the topic of the question, such as “I do not what you mean”, “this is difficult question”, “I have to think about that”. It is worth to notice that this answer was more typical for representatives of public sphere, the business people were much more open in this respect. The first group thought about facts related to existence of the border, the business group – about rules that stay behind them.

2. answers that relate the issue of disappearance of the border to strategies of its security; supporters of this view thought that the border between Poland and Ukraine is necessary, because of international agreements between Poland and EU, internal regulations etc.

3. answers that suggest a necessity of sustaining borders between Poland and Ukraine, as a way to avoid “Ukrainian mentality” (cultural denominator) or a chaos that could be caused by liquidation of this border (“it could be good, but it could cause Chaos”). It suggests that respondents are somehow afraid of this hypothetical situation. Supporters of this view present it in a dubious way, in a conditional form, dependent on situation in Ukraine and international politics. Those, who presented this view stress their attention to differences in development between Ukraine and Poland and, greater yet, Ukraine and EU. They justify their concerns with civilizational differences.
4. answers that allow for the possibility of dismantling this border under certain conditions. Ukraine would have to fulfill the EU criteria for accession and, first of all, show stability of its democratic and economic system.

The answers discussed above appear with various degrees of strength. Two first types appear more often than the following two, which on the other hand, give greater hope for development of views ‘open’ for different cultures and states.

Generally, respondents from Tomaszów Lubelski, Chełm and Przemyśl are mentally used to thinking in categories of borders (‘we are thought and used to the fact that states have borders’), now and in future. Vast majority of them wants concrete changes – such changes which are discussed in context of easy border regulations, short term politics. If they want to change anything on this border, they want to do it only in context of keeping the status quo or to open it ‘a little’ but not to liquidate in sense there are no borders between the EU countries.

Summing up, the opinions of our respondents are limited to

1. justification of border regulations
2. way of implementation of changes on Polish eastern border as the future border of the EU,
3. direct, countable results of these changes,
4. indirect results expressed in context of projects, i.e. borders, and social moods

All respondents agreed that the process of securing the border will take place and it is a historical necessity, unavoidable fact that will have significant results. Vast majority of them do not see the way they could influence this process.

IV. Opinions about Ukraine, Polish-Ukrainian relations and the role of Poland in EU-Ukraine relations

Chełm

All the respondents without an exception (social – professional categories did not play the role of a differentiating factor here) approved of their interest in Ukraine. The differences were expressed by means of the type of the interest (political or economic, political-economic, historical-cultural) and of the level of their intensity and references to the situation of Poland. In their own view, they believed they were intense; in many cases strong emotions – positive and negative were manifest.

In contrast to the respondents from Przemyśl, a significant majority of the respondents declared that they had visited Ukraine over the recent years; many stressed that they went there often and the visits were connected with their professions or vocations (for example an Orthodox priest, a businessman (a shipping agent), a representative of local authorities spoke about it).

Bigger differentiation and multiplicity of sources of information, as compared to the case of Przemyśl and even more to the case of Tomaszów is worth emphasizing. They derived information about Ukraine not only from the media (television is always, irrespective of which locality is concerned, the main source of this type of information, and Polish press and the radio), but also from personal contacts with people arriving from behind the Eastern
border, from frequent visits in Ukraine, not only to the borderland zone; only in Chełm – the respondents declared using the Internet and the Ukrainian press.

The respondents from Chełm – if the style of their statements about Ukraine is compared with the one of their counterparts in Przemyśl and even more in Tomaszów – spoke about their interest in Ukraine more and more frequently in their own language rather than the official language derived from the media. There were fewer cliches from the press and television, more references to their own reflections and experiences.

The interest in Ukraine was – which is evidenced by the majority of the statements of the respondents – motivated mainly by the relevance of what was going on in Ukraine to the situation in Poland; to a lesser extent by its impact on the life and career of the respondent (a respondent who stressed his little involvement in the political issues, states: “if because of the interest of Kuczma I have problems with transferring of some goods over the border, I’m interested then” (ChPM2814). The decisive majority of the respondents justified their interest in Ukraine with reasons such as, first: its close neighborhood, second – because it is an important or very important political and economic partner, (it is worth stressing that the respondents were linking the political factor to the economic factors strongly), third – because of the changes in the European geo-political arrangement and the fact that a new position for both Poland and Ukraine in the arrangement was being settled (especially in relation to Western Europe on the one hand and on the other – to Russia). Let us add that these two first reasons of the interest were most frequently linked with each other by the respondents; only marginally there appears a justification for the interest which is related to culture.

As it was the case in Przemyśl, the respondents, characterizing Ukraine spoke about it as of a certain complex, predominantly political-economic whole, less frequently only an economic one and marginally taking into account in the characteristics some cultural elements. In other words, they described Ukraine as a significant country, an important economic system; very rarely they formulated some opinions about any of its parts: the mention of Eastern Ukraine was made by only two respondents, in a strictly political context: the proclivity of Eastern Ukraine towards Russia.

Irrespective of the fact whether to depict Ukraine political or economic phraseology was used or the most frequent economic-political, the categories employed to this end were much more often abstract (system, economic, system of power, democracy, the state etc.) than concrete. (“This is a powerful country, big potential ... this is our most important partner in the East” – ChUK4711). While few respondents spoke of the concrete facts, these were a particular type of political concrete, related mainly to the figure of Kuczma and his style of governing (they talked about him more often than in Przemyśl) or specific politicians, Ukrainian and Polish who “disturb the economy”.

The respondents from Chełm – in comparison to the respondents predominantly from Tomaszów, but also from Przemyśl (the latter created quite a rich and diversified palette of the images) – created images of Ukraine which draw attention to, first – a diversity of elements, second – a mixed character (we face many compounds, especially political-economic and political-historical-cultural), third – contextually expanded upon (when one takes into account international contexts of economy and politics), fourth – stronger than in Przemyśl and Tomaszów references of the images of Ukraine to the active: positive or negative – role of Poland. Quite a few of the respondents viewed what was going on in Ukraine from the perspective of lacking capacities of Polish foreign and economic policy and its consequences for Poland. Fifth – the images are formulated by the respondents in a rich language, little standardized, using many descriptive phrases.

The most we have are the mixed images, political-economic (the ones with the political core are more complex and more perceptively interpreted) and economic-political;
there are also mixed images in which alongside economic and political elements there appear cultural elements related to mentality, system of education, especially to history and memory. The political images of Ukraine, both mixed ones and pure ones, concern primarily the current state of democracy and opportunities for its development. Supporters of these images view the Ukrainian democracy from the point of view of its connections with political and political-economic stability, internal and external; what is important, they note both its shortages and shortcomings or even pathologies and its developmental opportunities and chances, most frequently in the future. In contrast to the respondents from Przemyśl, the respondents from Chelm building the images of Ukraine paid in them attention to political and political-economic heritage, also related to the near past: what remained of the socialist economy and the socialist state (an element of negative characterization), they stressed the role of relics of the past, such as centralist tendencies, “bureaucratic inertia” (“on the co-operation, especially on the Ukrainian side, there weighted a syndrome of centralism typical of a Soviet republic...” – ChUM5909).

Apart from these images, the respondents declare also – admittedly to a lesser degree – political-economic and economic-political images and stress that politics and economy are in Ukraine tightly connected with each other (the problem of economic stability is conditioned by politics), (“in Ukraine at the moment there is lacking stability, both economic and political” – ChUM3302). Some draw attention to the relationship between economic issues in Ukraine and its functioning in political-economic arrangement in Europe (for instance they relate the level of living of the population and economic development of Ukraine with its position in the system of European economy), others in turn talk about various types of internal affairs, such as poverty of the inhabitants, corruption at various levels of political and economic authority. They emphasize internal affairs such as the level of living of the population, poverty (You go there as if to another world. A world so close to exhaustion. “That grayness...” – ChPM5601; “there is unimaginable poverty there...” – ChUP4805)

The images are replacing – similarly as both in Przemyśl and Tomaszów – mixed images in which cultural elements are visible. If, drawing their vision of Ukraine, the respondents speak about culture, it is predominantly said that it is a culture about which one knows little and which should be made known in Poland and in Europe. (They draw attention to films, the press, television and to the fact that it should be known and included in the heritage of European culture).

In the general characteristics of the images, remarks concerning their “balanced nature” may not be missing: the majority of the respondents try to build images which contain both positive and negative elements, present and future, descriptive and normative. It results probably from the fact that the respondents, displaying a tendency towards a holistic and complex creation of images, try to view Ukraine in many dimensions.

As far as the temporal orientation is concerned, among the images of Ukraine there prevail the mixed ones (as it was the case in Przemyśl) which refer to the present and the near future (but not definite). They do not pay attention to distant future nor situate in it political, economic or geo-political ideals. The present is the most important – good or bad, very often linked with the future, represented in the spirit of austere/crude realism with a chance of a change for the better.

Summarizing all the types of the images, one could say that Ukraine is perceived by the respondents in Chelm as a big country of enormous potential in the sphere of economy, which with the skillful use of resources “will be an important link both in European economy and community” – ChUM4812. In these images “slow progress in economy”, good resources, political changes for the better are usually balanced with images of poverty, political instability, economic insecurity and infringements on democracy.
The respondents without an exception declare that Ukraine – irrespective of what images of Ukraine they themselves create - is a “crucially important partner” of Poland. Among the reasons of the importance there dominate the following: first – it is a neighbor closest in geographical terms, second – it is an “absorptive market”, third – it is a partner reducing political danger coming from Russia. There happened among the respondents even a person who thought that Ukraine diminished dangers for Poland both from the Russian side and German side (if it were not for Ukraine, Poland would be lost between Germany and Russia).

Polish-Ukrainian relations are by the decisive majority of the respondents viewed predominantly in economic categories: a) current co-operation between Poland and Ukraine, b) future co-operation believed by them to be necessary (without it, according to many of them, we will be pushed out of the market); the respondents formulate also an admonition addressed to the authorities and entrepreneurs in Poland; in their opinion, one should not get discouraged in relation to Ukraine because of the current difficulties in Polish-Ukrainian economic contacts but take a risk in co-operation thinking about a better future. Let us add, what is important, that the present and (near) future Polish-Ukrainian contacts the respondents generally view from the vantage point of benefits.

The respondents have many interesting observations as far as the nature of the role Poland is playing and is to be played in the future as regards Ukraine. They refer not only to the narrowly economic aspect of the co-operation between the two countries but also to its political and cultural aspects. They are formulated in a language of the good and long-term interests of Poland, in a language of not only political evaluations but also moral judgment, which distinguishes the respondents from Chelm from the representatives of Przemyśl, and especially Tomaszów. In their statements Ukraine rises to the rank of the representative of the East and the vision of partnership with Ukraine – functions as a picture of partnership with Eastern Europe.

Only in Chelm there could be distinguished statements concerning the partnership with Ukraine as important for the Polish raison d’etat, for the Polish statehood and for a balanced foreign policy (“Who looks down upon Ukraine .... not only wishes ill ... but is not working for Poland either. .... in view of the strong Germany and Russia, Poland sooner or later will be deleted as a state” - ChUM4812; “We may not have our eyes fixed on the West only, with partners from the East [we can] be in close co-operation as well ...” – ChUM3302; “Poles so hastily turned their backs on the East and now maybe they suffered from this” – ChDM4610). In most general terms, the manner in which the respondents from Chelm refer to the role of Poland vis-à-vis Ukraine clearly points out that Ukraine is for Poland a strategic partner not only in the narrowly understood political and economic dimension but in a cultural-civilizational sense. It could be claimed that Ukraine plays the role of a litmus paper in the assessing of the strength of the position of Poland in the European political, economic and cultural-civilizational system.

There are also respondents who view Ukraine through the lenses of more specific and local advantages derived from this neighborhood for Poland. According to them, it is important for Poland to sustain good relations not only at the top level but to transfer the co-operation to the level of specific activities and not only declarations. Even some of them, aware of the unpredictability in the internal policy of Ukraine, encourage compatriots to “enter Ukraine”: “nature does not like void and if we do not enter... someone else already have! The West already has entered ... ” – ChPM5601.

The respondents speak also in a language of duty about co-operation with Ukraine as a task for the Polish state. According to the opinion of the majority of the respondents, it should be carried out on the basis of partnership and equal rights (a similar tenor of the statements
one could hear in Przemyśl as well). They stressed very frequently that Poland should be an advisor if Ukraine asks for it and not behave like a teacher vis-à-vis a student. The opinion that “we shouldn’t push our solutions down their throats” was quite common.

There were very few totally opposing opinions based presumably on the conviction about Poland’s mission and Polish superiority over the Eastern neighbors. Few respondents believed that we either used to be or could be for Ukraine a reference point or even a suit to be followed (“they used willingly, observing what we do ... – ChUK4711; “Poland was for a long time a role model for Ukrainians, as far as the things that could be changed”- ChPM2814; “Ukrainians must accept the fact that it was Poles in the XIX century who ... created such a movement of Ukrainian revival in Galicia...” – ChUM4812; “they learn a lot from us, it is without a doubt” – ChUP4805. “To support the means to teach, to demonstrate models” – ChUP4805; the didactic conclusion based on the feeling that we “are better” concerned not only the sphere of culture: “there is a poor country ... the richer could import goods, services ... our machines that are useless here there could be useful ... our equipment that still functions we could give it to Ukraine ... what is not worn here because it is out of fashion, could be sold there” – ChUK4706). This kind of observations – similarly as it was in Przemyśl – was an evidence of, admittedly relic, but clear symptoms of paternalism.

It is worth noting that the respondents from Chełm – in comparison to the respondents from Przemyśl and it refers even more to the respondents from Tomaszów – perceived Polish-Ukrainian relations and the role of Poland in them multi-dimensionally; they took into account, and in a very complex manner: abstract and concrete, Poland-centered and Ukraine-centered, state and group character of the presence of the memory of the common history in politics and educational systems of both countries. They not only drew attention to the necessity of “settling accounts” [rozliczenie] with the past in the Polish-Ukrainian relations in the case of Poland, but also suggested that compatriots should take into account not only Polish but also Ukrainian point of view on the history of the two nations. In other words, we are dealing here with a strong linkage between history, national culture and politics. They were handling the issue both in general terms and in a very concrete manner, for instance enumerating and commenting upon specific historical facts. In comparison to the respondents from Przemyśl, they spoke more and in a more insightful manner about moral responsibility for history, they saw in the reckonings with the past a necessary element of both international politics and a duty of individuals and groups of individuals.

In their conviction, political co-operation, including economic one requires removing of the “white spots”: (explicating the so far silenced historical events) and – what is no less important – national myths which do not serve reconciliation of the two nations. Such “settling of the historical accounts” and the issue of reconciliation – in the opinions of the respondents – could take place similarly as it was the case in the relations of Poles and Germans. (One of the respondents drew attention to the significance of the “Letter of the bishops” of 1966 and the lack of a similar gesture in the Polish-Ukrainian relations). They referred quite frequently to the French-German relation believing they constituted a desired model for the relations between Poland and Ukraine. (They stressed that the French and Germans were able to overcome the past preconceptions and the memory of the wars and conflicts and create good neighborly relations.).

A few respondents – which requires attention, because the respondents from Przemyśl and Tomaszów did not do it – stressed that not only the Ukrainian side but Polish side as well was to blame in the past for the wrongdoing. What is no less important, they believed (and this is specific to Chełm) that the common history is equally unknown to both sides – different elements to each of them, and the Ukrainian point of view is on equal footing with the Polish one. Only in Chełm, let us add, two of the respondents drew attention to the problem of the attitude of Ukraine to Poles and the Polonia [clusters of Polish minority] in
the territory of Ukraine and a certain lack of symmetry in the manner the Polish minority in Ukraine was treated in comparison to the way in which the Ukrainian minority was treated in Poland (“What attitude of the Ukrainian authorities to the Polonia is ... Ukrainians in Poland have incomparably more privileges than a Pole ... on the Ukrainian side” – ChUM4812).

The respondents from Chełm spoke also much and in an interesting way about the role of Poland in the relations of Ukraine and Europe. They attributed various roles to it: a passage room, a transit country (which was not connected with any special role) and an economic, political and civilizational-cultural intermediary, a helper and a dedicated ally in the contacts with Europe (which burdened Poland with many more tasks).

Poland could be, in their view, both an intermediary between Ukraine and the rest of Europe and something more: a reliable and loyal ally of Ukraine in their endeavors to secure a place in Europe. In their opinions there may be noticed a distance towards an image of Poland as a teacher of Ukraine. According to them, the role of Poland as a mentor or an older brother is clearly inappropriate: “we may not play a mentor to Ukraine. Not to occupy a position of an older, and especially wiser brother” – ChUM5909.

The conclusions in which the respondents seek epiphenomenona of “equality” and “partnership” of Poles and Ukrainians, Poland and Ukraine say a lot about the desired and appropriate role for Poland in the relations between Ukraine and Europe or an ordinary “intermediary for call”. A few respondents stress the significance of cultural exchange and mutual learning in order to have more in common with one another.(Only in Chełm – it is worth emphasizing – the respondents drew attention to the necessity of shared mutual education of Poles and Ukrainians and to the weight of the knowledge of language and Ukrainian culture in the truthfully good co-operation and reconciliation. (“Common trade, shared schools, some common actions ... to know the language” – ChPI3818; “Chełm will be a linking bridge of a kind ... I would like to see a Polish-Ukrainian university ... it would be possible to set up this kind of school or academy where a real assimilation of the young could take place” - ChUP4805.

However, when Europe and the European Union appear in the background, in the opinions of the respondents there manifests a specific kind of partnership: Poland is for Ukraine – they claim – a testing ground in the contacts with Europe, through Poland – they declare – all the information and European models pass and it passes them further on.

The majority of the respondents, when speaking about Ukraine in the context simultaneously Polish and European, stress that despite the fact that Ukraine is still strongly attached to Russia, (this concerns particularly its Eastern regions), it ever more intensely aims at the European structures and tries to balance the pro-Russian option with the pro-West option. (“Ukraine is trying to reconcile its pro-Western orientation with the necessity to be a neighbor of Russia” - ChPI3818).

The respondents from Chełm – and this needs to be stressed – more often and more strongly than their counterparts from Przemyśl and Tomaszów emphasize the importance and influence of Russia for the international policy of Ukraine and the basic geo-political orientation of the country. (“Ukraine stands with its legs stretched over the East and the West, it is difficult for them to cut the umbilical cord with Russia” – ChUM5909; “it is too big a country to be left to itself and allowed to return to Russia” – ChPM2814.)

Not only do they diagnose the current role and position of Poland and Ukraine in Europe but also design for Poland (it refers to near future) its tasks in the context of Ukrainian pursuit of a place in the European Union. According to them, this should be a positive role: a role of a loyal ally of Ukraine rather than an assistant or an advocate (only one respondent said so).
A few respondents from Chełm pointed out – and this is the next instance that differentiates them from the respondents from Przemyśl and Tomaszów – that “entrance to Europe” (in the sense of accession to the European Union) does not have to prove necessarily good and desirable both for Poland and Ukraine. In their conviction, Poland should first test itself what is it like to be in the Union and only later help the “Union” aspirations of its neighbor. (“I don’t know if it is beneficial for Poland to enter the Union ... it follows that I don’t know if it is worth it for Poland to help Ukraine to enter the Union” – ChPI3818; “if it is to our good we have to see first and not to pull our neighbor into the trap at once” – ChPM5601).

It is worth adding that the respondents asked about the conditions and effects of the lifting of the borders between Poland and Ukraine – it does not matter if they thought this was something positive or negative – spoke about it in the context of relations with the European Union. Supporters of the lifting of the border stressed similarity to Europe (“It may be as it is in the West of Europe” – ChDM4610), and those that feared the lifting of the borders between Poland and Ukraine, justified their fears with a difference between Poland and Ukraine: the first will belong to the Union, the second will remain outside its structures. They were convinced that the abolition of the border could take place in many years when Ukraine would find itself in the European structures or would mature to such a change (“No, if Ukraine does not enter the Union ... this is an idea verging on anarchy ... of the kind of the political science fiction” – ChUM5909). (It needs to be added that they justified it also with a fear of Ukrainians flowing to Poland, to Europe (“in the economic situation ...in Ukraine, this would be like opening the gates of the hell. We would be totally flooded by Ukrainians, by their mentality” – ChPM2814).

Let us add that in one, and very extended, statement a respondent spoke about a usefulness and significance of Ukraine for European culture; he claimed that: “the culture is very interesting, ... a serious contribution of Ukraine in the European family of nations” – ChPM4812).

Summarizing, the respondents from Chełm did not ignore the problem of images of Ukraine, Polish-Ukrainian relations, relations of Ukraine with the European structures: they presented not only many images but explicated them in an insightful and multi-dimensional way as well.

**Tomaszów Lubelski**

Respondents asked about the situation in Ukraine, relationships between the two countries and the position of Poland and Ukraine in Europe did not show – in comparison to Przemyśl and Chełm – a special interest in the issues; if they formulated their opinions–pressed by the researcher – they were only very brief (frequently limited to “yes” and “no”), very general, employing stereotypes functioning in the media messages. Their statements created an impression that the topics were to them rather “foreign”, and if they were

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8 The statements received from the respondents in this city in answer to the questions concerning Ukraine and Polish-Ukrainian relations are in comparison to their responses to other questions brief and/or reproducing opinions derived from the media. Also, if they are compared to the equivalent statements of the in Przemyśl and in Chełm, they turn out much poorer in contents. There are by necessity many reasons for the briefness or the repetition of the cliches but it could be supposed, on the basis of the whole interviews that they were rather indifferent in respect to the topic. They were much more interested in local issues, especially economic ones. A few interviews are incomplete, they lack statements concerning Ukraine.
important, they were so only to the authorities and to “others”, according to them. In most general terms, these were “not their business”.

Asked in more detail about the Ukrainian matters, they stated very often: “I’m not interested in it too much”; a decisive minority of the respondents spoke a bit more, more elaborately justifying their conclusions, only one person, active in the field of culture, responded to the question in a broader and more elaborate manner. (It was related to the person’s more frequent professional and personal contacts with Ukraine). In Tomaszów (there were no opinions of the kind in Przemyśl and Chełm) there happened respondents (there were three of them) who in answer to the question about the Polish-Ukrainian relations said it was only the business of the authorities.

Answers to the questions testifying to some interest in the issues but formulated in a very limited code were also frequent; they were expressed with a short “yes”, “good”, “one should” “one likes” – and without a justification. What this may be a sign of? Unfortunately we do not know deeper motivations of the respondents, however from the context of the statements one could suppose that the following reasons might be at play here.

- Firstly – there might be at play a conviction that these are the matters of the state, of the authorities or of administrative officers and not of ordinary people. Presumably a decisive majority of the respondents thought so, their social-professional status notwithstanding, (administrative officers, businessmen and teachers did not differ on the issue); for them the Ukrainian issues were something that was dealt with by “appropriate administrative officers”.
- Secondly – it might have resulted from a feeling of alienation as regards the issues, treating the Ukrainian issues as something very distant to local issues, foreign to the everyday life of Tomaszów and the neighborhood.
- Thirdly, – there were also those, much fewer than these who believed the issues were “not theirs”, who believed that it is a matter in which only these should be interested for whom politics matters. It is worth adding that in Tomaszów there happened to be one respondent (a clerk) who categorically expressed himself in the matter: “enough about Ukraine”.

The respondents from Tomaszów – although many of them declared that they know about Ukraine thanks to their own experiences (duty visits, business contacts, social contacts) – admitted that their information about Ukraine is derived mainly from the media: the television is the prime source, the second is the national press (“Rzeczpospolita” is a very important source of information; the respondents listed also (much less frequently) titles of weeklies – Newsweek, Wprost). Only three respondents stressed the role of contacts with Ukrainians in formulating the opinions.

What is Ukraine to these respondents?

- First – the most numerous opinions - Ukraine is to the respondents “simply a neighbor” (this is a fact so obvious to them that they say little what this neighborhood means). Let us add that both territorial neighborhood and a more meaningful neighborhood may be meant here, for instance the one leading to some forms of co-operation. There is little evidence that the neighborhood resulted for them from an affinity of culture, history or commonality of economic interests and similarity of political systems, for instance.
- Second – such opinions are fewer than the ones mentioned above – that Ukraine is a partner of Poland for some significant reasons, mainly economic ones. A conclusion concerning territorial closeness often leads to such a belief concerning the
The respondents perceive Ukraine predominantly as a specific neighbor, “cause for a partner” (we are partners because we are neighbors).

- Third – Ukraine is a significant partner not only because of geography but also because it is a big country and an economy that counts. This opinion is often accompanied by a conviction that it is necessary to take interest in Ukraine, because what is going on there may have a direct impact on Poland – bad and good.

- Fourth – (although there are few, but in comparison with the statements from Przemyśl and Chełm, they are clear and well formulated, often broadly justified) – the respondents speak of Ukraine as of a partner “because of culture”; if they speak about culture they talk about it as of an important element of co-operation. In one interview, there appears a statement “culture is the best ambassador”.

- Fifth – speaking about the neighborhood and partnership, they stress their historical background, mainly Polish-Ukrainian conflicts. It refers to the past legacies (“zaszłości”) of the II World War”, and primarily to the controversy about the Cmentarz Orląt. They think that these controversies do not concern young people any more and this is a matter for historians and appropriate authorities.

Images of Ukraine formulated by the respondents – in comparison to the images formed by the respondents from Przemyśl and Chełm – are poor in contents and in form. There are a lot of emotions and evaluations in them, mainly negative, although there happen “balanced” images among them in which bad present situation is mentioned but also future developmental opportunities, they are few and they are on the whole not elaborately justified.

Poverty is in the foreground, the respondents most often view what is going on in Ukraine through the lenses of poverty and its consequences (it is the cause of “bread migration”).

In the second place, there are images whose core is constituted by shortages and underdevelopment of democracy.

In the third place, the respondents speak generally of Ukraine as of a country where both in politics and economy things are going bad. Let us add that they rather do not talk about Ukraine in categories of its national culture (such an opinion is an exception); if they speak about culture at all they describe it when they characterize types of co-operation with Poland.

The majority of images have the nature of relatively simple, quite briefly presented statements; one may also distinguish among them the ones, so to speak, comparative (they do not from a majority): they depict Ukraine against the background of Poland. They refer to comparisons with Poland in various dimensions: political and political-economic, and point out that Polish democracy and economy are a positive frame of reference.

Let us add that asked about concrete Polish-Ukrainian relations – at present and in the future – they respond briefly and in general terms. They talk simultaneously about the present and the future, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish what refers to facts and what is only a postulate for the future and an ideal. In the relations, Poland is to play the role of a good and loyal partner.

Little attention is dedicated by the respondents to a characterization of the roles of Poland vis-à-vis Ukraine. For the majority of the respondents, Poland should be a partner but it is not known exactly on what conditions. It needs to be stressed that the respondents do not speak about a mission of Poland towards Ukraine or more broadly – the East resulting from the history and the closeness. Poland is to be for Ukraine “a window onto the West”, “a passage to the West”, and so a transit country one could say, in terms of ideas, people and goods. Also – there are fewer of them – there are opinions that Poland is a special type of a strategic partner which helps and should help Ukraine in building political and economic institutions which will make it possible for it to approach and then to enter the Union. The
respondents who voice such opinions, stress that (if any more elaborate justifications occur) that Poland should support Ukraine’s endeavors on the way to the EU because Poland is better prepared for the accession to the Union (higher stage of transformation, more democracy) than Ukraine. Let us add that in the conclusions drawing attention to the “superiority” of Poland and “inferiority” of Ukraine there are however no traces of a superiority complex or a sense of a mission. It so happened that we are doing better “and Poles should help Ukraine, of course in a subtle manner” (it is mainly about developing a sense of democracy and settling accounts with the past).

As far as the relations Ukraine-Poland-Europe are concerned, the respondents from Tomaszów - in comparison to the respondents from Chełm do not dwell on the topic – at the most they point to a direction of a geo-political orientation (without justifications), and most frequently in the form of an obvious statement. Only in two interviews do we have relatively “extended” opinions about international positioning of Ukraine: in one of them “Ukraine may not go in the direction of Russia, Ukraine will go in the direction of Europe”. In the second one “Ukraine in the Union – why not”, “it would be good”. The supporters of the view in contrast to the others took into account “sui generis” division of Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts, differences in mentality between the regions and the influence of the factors on geo-political choices of Ukraine.

In most general terms, the respondents are very parsimonious in speaking about Ukraine as a country, nation, economy and the question of its place in the European structures: one may suppose that these issues are not the most important to them. On this basis it seems that the Ukrainian issues are according to the respondents the issues of a “big world”, and not of “our local matters”. This is why in comparison to Chełm and Przemyśl in these issues, the respondents from Tomaszów appear decidedly less informed.

Making a general conclusion (with some simplification) concerning the interviews as regards this particular respect, one could perhaps say that Chełm views Ukraine, Poland and the rest of Europe in categories of international politics, a broader context of European relations, it has a broader outlook on the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations, which takes notice also of the Ukrainian point of view, Przemyśl is more focused on current issues, economic, although it does not ignore obviously more general matters, and Tomaszów is a bit “provincial”: the most important is what can be seen with a naked eye, we are in [county] powiat, and further on there is a “big world” ...

Przemyśl-Medyka

Respondents from Przemyśl, Medyka and Rzeszów (the last ones are employees of various Voivodship institutions responsible for the situation on the borderland) their social-professional status notwithstanding, derive their knowledge about Ukraine predominantly from the national mass media, less frequently from the local media - the least frequently from their own experience. An officer of Straż Graniczna (The Guard of the Border) is an exception, he stresses that he derived the information about Ukraine predominantly from conversations held on the border: with arriving people and “our businessmen”.

It is worth emphasizing that medium-rank and top officers of administration, in contrast to entrepreneurs, do not have their own life experiences which could help them create opinions about the situation in Ukraine: there are many among them who a) have never been to Ukraine (neither before or after 1989), b) have been only once, only in the borderland zone

9 Against the background of the presented statements, opinions of Ukrainians who reside in Tomaszów L. are decidedly more complex and insightful. They speak in quite a concrete manner and with justifications about the nature of the co-operation between Poland and Ukraine, about the place of Ukraine and about its geopolitical orientation (to quote ....
and only as tourists; entrepreneurs stress instead that the information was acquired on the basis of their own, most frequently costly and not very safe experiences (of their own and their collaborators’) – for instance a theft of a car, loss of capital, mugging, etc.

In the case of local administrative officers the fact that all types of information about Ukraine have a mediated nature is very consequential because it influences the contents and the form of the opinions declared by the respondents: it is visible among others in linguistic cliches derived from the media and political and economic documents formulated by central authorities. These respondents asked about the situation in Ukraine, what they think about it and about the nature of Polish-Ukrainian relations, respond in a voice of politicians and commentators who create and evaluate strategies of international policy of the III Republic of Poland in the context of uniting Europe. Only their reactions to questions concerning the situation on the borders – present and future – as well as their vision of the European Union allow to note more private images of Ukraine they nurture.

Almost all of the respondents are concerned with Ukraine; only one of them declared a lack of interest in Ukraine, however the contents of his other opinions, for instance on the subject of current Polish-Ukrainian co-operation reveal significant knowledge of the topic. Their interest in Ukraine – with the one exception of a person who declared familial and “sentimental” ties with the country – was motivated by them with geo-political concerns. They believed that knowledge regarding what was going on in Ukraine was a must of a kind. They frequently stressed that their knowledge about contemporary Ukraine, and especially its economic and political system, mentality or culture results from the geographical neighborhood and/or close inter-state co-operation conducted within the framework of foreign policy of the III Republic of Poland, i.e. the policy of strategic partnership or – less frequently than the first two factors – from cultural and civilizational affinity. (It is worth remarking that those, relatively few, respondents who were looking for justification for their interest in the Polish-Ukrainian affinity in the area of broadly conceived culture, were finding it in the shared distant past of the two nations but with a total omission of the period of the Soviet domination – political and economic).

Most frequently, the respondents offered more or less insightful grounds for their involvement in the broadly understood Ukrainian issues; only very few did not. Among the reasons justifying the interest the following are the most important:

First – Ukraine as a close geographical neighbor;
Second – Ukraine as the most important (or second important, following Russia) Eastern neighbor of the III Republic of Poland;
Third – Ukraine, basing on the strength of inter-state treaties and agreements from the beginning of the 1990s, as a strategic partner of the III Republic of Poland in the sphere of politics and economy;
Fourth – Ukraine, in terms of population and economic potential, is the biggest — immediate Eastern neighbor in respect of which Poland and Poles currently have or will have in the future special responsibilities as far as economic and political assistance are concerned (after accession to the European structures);
Fifth – Ukraine, due to involvement resulting from a cultural affinity (language, traditions, common difficult experiences), has a similar position in Europe (as a bulwark, a buffer vis-à-vis Asia and Russia).

It is worth stressing that in the decisive majority the respondents pointed out that their interest in Ukraine was a result of territorial neighborhood and its consequences for Polish-Ukrainian relations (inter-state relation in the fields of economy, politics and culture) and not of an interest in Ukraine as such – in its politics, economy or culture. In other words,
the interest is motivated most frequently by the geographical vicinity or similar geopolitical positioning and not by immanent features of Ukraine as a country, its economy or culture. The instrumental nature of the interest in Ukraine is also confirmed by the - quite frequently declared by the respondents – convictions that the quality of the neighborhood contributes to the characteristics of Poland as a country, its economy, society or culture. It needs to be added that among the reasons of interest in Ukraine mentioned above, two first ones are the most numerousy represented; the last one (cultural affinity) is the least frequent. The administrative officers of various levels more frequently than entrepreneurs, priests and teachers justified their interest with a conviction that Ukraine is a strategic partner of Poland (which is concordant with the policy of the state authorities).

The declared interest in Ukraine – its nature notwithstanding – in the case of the decisive majority of the respondents referred to Ukraine as a country seen in macro-social and macro-economic dimension. The opinions were formulated in the majority in respect of “the whole Ukraine” and not any of its parts (Eastern Ukraine, Western Ukraine or the Kievan Ukraine) or broader or narrower borderland zone. Exceptionally there happened opinions which took into account regional divides in Ukraine and their impact on the nature of Polish-Ukrainian relations and the position of Ukraine in Europe. The respondents asked about their interest in Ukraine – it must be stressed – did not narrow down their interest to the Polish-Ukrainian borderland about which they had more concrete information than about Ukraine. In most general terms, the image of Ukraine – it is irrelevant which factor: political, economic or cultural-religious formed its core – was formulated predominantly in abstract language (especially in the sphere of economy) rather than in a language of concrete. (Relatively scarce were mentions of President Kuczma, although a lot is being said about him in the Polish mass media).

The respondents presented a wide array of images of Ukraine. They could be divided according to a few criteria.

Firstly – the images differ from one another in respect of the nature of social reality to which they refer: there are political images (various features of the political system are taken into account), economic (various structural elements of economy), cultural (historical, religious factors, collective mentality).

Secondly – the images differ from one another regarding the level of diversity of the factors which they take into account: we have among them homogenous images (political or economic) or mixed ones (including all or some of the factors);

Thirdly – the images are holistic and partial (referring to the systemic whole of the state, economy or culture or to their components in respect of the present only and past or in relation to the future as well).

Fourthly – the images are divided as they are oriented towards the present and near future and are focused on the present and the past (the latter is as important as the present);

Fifthly – the images among them may be distinguished as those which have an immanent nature and those which – openly – have a comparative character with a reference to a) Poland, b) Europe, the West (the differentiation concerns first of all the present or the future).

Taking into account the criteria of distinction pointed to above, one may say that as far as the frequency of the choices of images is concerned: the most frequent are the homogenous economic images of Ukraine (but various economic factors are in the images taken into account), next, mixed images economic-political (the political factor determines advantages and disadvantages of the economic system), pure cultural images occur the least frequently. (It needs to be noted that cultural elements occur in the mixed politico-economic images whenever the respondents want to depict Ukraine as a whole).
Among the images – if the third criterion is taken into account - generally formulated, holistic images prevail; partial images formulated in a language of economic or political concrete are much less frequent.

As far as the temporal orientation is concerned, there prevails among the images of Ukraine these which refer to the present and near future (after accession of Poland to the European Union). The respondents from Przemyśl, in contrast to the respondents from other borderland centers, employ images of Ukraine in which Polish-Ukrainian relations from the past, especially from the distant past play an important role. These respondents, inhabitants of an old historical Polish-Ukrainian borderland are more than others sensitive to the role of Polish-Ukrainian conflicts in the past, or more broadly – the role of the memory of these relations in the Polish-Ukrainian co-operation.

If one takes into account the distinction: immanent – comparative, it is difficult to speak of a decisive prevalence of any type of the images: the respondents from Przemyśl built immanent images of Ukraine as frequently as they built the typically comparative ones (predominantly referring to Poland, less often to Europe). [Attention: the conclusion concerns the answer to the question about an interest in Ukraine and not the answer to the question about the role of Poland in the relations between Ukraine and Europe].

Predominantly, the respondents presented holistic, relatively homogenous images of Ukraine; the following could be distinguished: a) economic or broader – economic-civilizational, b) political or broader – systemic (taking into account the nature of political culture), c) cultural or cultural-civilizational (taking into account elements of moral judgment), d) one more specific image of Ukraine could be distinguished, namely the one in which everything that is going on in Ukraine is reduced to some kind of pathology (perceiving problems of Ukraine exclusively from the vantage point of pathology: economy, politics, power, collective morality, etc.).

Among the declared images, there prevailed macro-economic ones appearing in the three different versions:
- **positive** (the least frequently: big market, big economic potential in terms of resources and labor force)
- **mixed** (most often declared: negative evaluation of the structural changes in economy, economic bureaucracy, wastefulness, lack of financial security, pauperization of the society, low qualifications of employees, destruction of natural environment and linked to great expectations as regards future, especially in the field of resources management - for example, land, the widening of the export market, technical modernization under the influence of international co-operation, cheap labor force)
- **negative** (yielding to the mixed image, opinions of this kind concern predominantly an increase in the impoverishment of the society, legacy of the state socialist economy, inadequate system of management in industry, not taking advantage of land, bad banking system, financial insecurity, undue politicization of economic decisions, faults of financial policy, etc.).

Among the respondents who see Ukraine simultaneously through the economic and political categories, there comes to the foreground the phenomenon of economic and political instability and omnipresent corruption. The ones that code the phenomena occurring in Ukraine in a language of politics and state affairs and not in the language of economy, stress also the phenomenon of various forms of political instability. In their opinion, the instability is manifest in all spheres of life in Ukraine, it creates both external and internal danger and blocks the development of democracy. In the opinions of the supporters of “purely political” or “mainly political” view there dominate – as it was the case with the ones that viewed Ukraine through the lenses of economic issues – “black” images of the situation in Ukraine.
The respondents—in greater or smaller detail—speak of “blockages”, “threats”, “failures”, “faults”, “difficulties”, pessimist scenarios in general, only rarely (exceptional opinions) about political successes or political changes for the better. The few that see and emphasize successes of Ukraine in the sphere of the political, stress the fact of building its statehood by Ukraine, the capacity to maintain sovereignty and processes of broadly understood political normalization (despite everything else, bigger political and social liberties, a possibility for opposition to exist). They stress that the changes are heading towards the better and positive changes take time.

The most numerous category of the respondents focused on political affairs is constituted by these that voice a conviction that there are more difficulties and gaps of political nature in Ukraine than successes. They concentrate on: first—phenomena of corruption at various levels of authorities, second—various signs of weaknesses of the processes of political democratization (weak parliament, too strong president or weak opposition); third—unpredictability or even anarchy of the political system, fourth—unpredictability of geopolitical orientation of Ukraine—pro-European or pro-Russian.

In comparison to the respondents-supporters of the economic, political or mixed political-economic outlook on the phenomena occurring in Ukraine, only few drew attention to the state of culture, systems of values or collective mentality or a disappearance of moral authority; they stressed negative aspects of [changes] taking place in the state of social consciousness rather than pointing to positive aspects, for example freedom of creation, lack of censorship, etc. (more such references related to the cultural issues occurred in Chelm). They spoke of relics of the past (these however were not that important in respect to Ukraine as the opinions declared by the Przemyśl respondents about the role of history in shaping contemporary Polish-Ukrainian relations).

Looking at the opinions about Ukraine through the lenses of social-professional status of the respondents who declared them, it is worth noting that the various types local administration officers and entrepreneurs did not differ significantly as far as the nature of the voiced opinions; both among the first ones and among the second ones, the most numerous were those who perceived Ukraine from the point of view of economy or from the point of view of economy and politics at the same time. The focus on internal affairs of Ukraine and not on the international economic strategy and foreign policy carried out by Ukraine prevailed both among the first ones and the second ones. (Many respondents who drew attention to the political and economic issues—internal—noted their consequences for the international status of Ukraine).

The respondents from Przemyśl—all without an exception (in this respect there are no major differences between these from Przemyśl, Chelm and Tomaszów L.) declared that they have an opinion about Polish-Ukrainian relations. There were none among them who did not have an opinion in the matter or thought the relations were of little importance. The opinions on the issue varied, a few most distinct types of them could be distinguished. The decisive majority of the opinions referred to the level of state—its economic system, political system and the level of the society-nation, not to particular economic institutions, political institutions or persons and roles; only rarely were the relations presented as tantamount to the relationships between presidents (Kuczma–Kwaśniewski), governments or elites. (Those that drew attention to the latter dimension, stressed that “there is no translation” of the good Polish-Ukrainian relations at the state level into the local level). In other words, the respondents speak more of the relations between Ukraine and Poland than between Poles and Ukrainians (it does not include evaluations of people arriving from Ukraine).

The most common among the respondents is the conviction about mutual, Polish and Ukrainian, benefits related to the co-operation (economic and political), the conviction that the relations are necessary, resulting from the close neighborhood; such statements are
formulated by the respondents especially as regards the topic of the current Polish-Ukrainian relations and the ones that are possible in the near future. It needs to be added that the Polish-Ukrainian relations, narrowed down to current forms of co-operation (mainly economic) were positively evaluated by them despite the fact that they noticed certain faults and shortcomings.

In contrast predominantly to the respondents from Tomaszów L. (and also, admittedly to a lesser degree, to the respondents from Chełm, who do not ignore the role of historical conditionings in the current form of the Polish-Ukrainian relations), the respondents from Przemyśl and Rzeszów speak a lot – and in great detail - about the importance of the history of the past Polish-Ukrainian relations in the area of Galicia for the current Polish-Ukrainian relations. They focus on conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians, on their sources and significance; they point out that the past animosities play a role at present and for the relations to be good, the controversies concerning the history must be resolved and their results (historical settlements) approved by both sides. The respondents give examples of the controversies which still loom over the mutual relations: these are the issue of the Action “Wisła” [“Vistula Action”], “Wolyn massacre”, evaluation of the UPA (Ukrainian Uprising Army) and the monuments of soldiers of Ukrainian underground army formations and from the II World War. Although their perception of the Polish-Ukrainian relations is dominated by historical events which divide Poles and Ukrainians and gave rise to (and still can give rise to) conflicts and tensions, they do not think that co-operation (and even reconciliation) are absolutely impossible. They expect an improvement in the relations in the future when the evaluation of the past events in the Polish-Ukrainian relations is left to historians. (Such opinions are declared with conviction by entrepreneurs; administrative officers on the other hand, were more aware of the unavoidability the impact of historical memory on politics and human consciousness).

According to the respondents, who did not ignore the role of history, the relations with Ukraine should be good – trade is important, exchange, “frictions and resentments to belong more to history and the old generation” (or familial memory), “it does not matter to the young that much”. As the main example of the frictions (apart from the already mentioned ones) they named these that are connected with the Cmentarz Orląt (the Cemetery of the Eaglets) in Lviv; they believed this was a current and urgent issue, “a field for showing excellence by the authorities” on the occasion of resolving it, and as an urgent task for different than at present teaching of the history of both nations as well.

There are among the respondents also those (they are few) who looking at the Polish-Ukrainian relations perceive them also through the lenses of their own and others’ individual life experiences. Exactly these emphasize significant differences between the character of the Polish-Ukrainian relations at the state level and what is going on “at the bottom”, among people: (according to them) good relations at the level of state authorities are often accompanied by bad relations “at the bottom” and vice versa.

Speaking most generally, Polish-Ukrainian relations are important for the respondents from Przemyśl; their current or past concrete characterizations (political or economic) can be positive and/or negative, if they refer to the future (near and distant) they are exclusively positive, frequently enriched with an expression that “they should be so”. “Good relations with Ukraine in every area are needed” – they declared in Przemyśl every so often. More frequently than in Tomaszów they referred to economy as the foundation of the future good Polish-Ukrainian relations. (In Tomaszów they remembered about the need of cultural co-operation more often).

It is worth adding that in Przemyśl, where the respondents in comparison to the others were in general more focused on historical-cultural dimension of the various issues, only exceptionally – and rather by means of a footnote – they drew attention to the perceived
deficiency of cultural contacts, lack of films, books, good information and first of all – lacking memory of Ukrainian culture as an element of the history of the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Republic, and that it was worth changing it decidedly in the future.

The respondents from Przemyśl – both the ones who formulated their images of Ukraine in the language of comparisons with Poland and those that (there were more of them) who dwelt on “the very Ukraine” answered the question about the role of Poland as ‘a’ a country of the close neighborhood, ‘b’) as a mediator between Ukraine and the European Union.

In the case of the first question, the respondents have fewer difficulties in answering the question than they have in answering the second one whose understanding brought about many difficulties, which they frequently stated. (The question was not always understood, frequently understood as a question concerning easier transit for people and goods).

Speaking about the relations between Poland and Ukraine all of them without an exception stressed that everything that was going on in Ukraine was important for Poland as its immediate neighbor. For instance, they said that it was important “whether Ukraine is approaching democracy or Belarus”. The sense of the necessity to take interest in Ukraine was expressed in many ways. The most common among the respondents was an opinion that the relations should be ever more based on partner relations and on the principle of equality. Such an opinion was manifest in statements such as “we can help but what does Ukraine need an intermediary for – it is a big country”, or “you can but it is better not to interfere,” “Ukraine and Poland are like sister and brother”; for the supporters of the view, Ukraine is an equal partner of Poland because it is a large country, territorially and demographically, it possesses huge economic resources (not always used), it constitutes a bigger market than Poland, it has been for along time an important trading partner, “a place where you can do good business” (entrepreneurs complained mainly that it was not easy or safe because of corruption for instance) and that it was the state and the economic system which separated Poland from Russia.

It was also frequently stated that in bi-lateral relations Ukraine played the role of a “strategic partner of Poland”, “as important as Germany”. (Frequently, the importance of the relations was stressed in comparison to the role model of French-German relations).

Clearly ever less important (relatively recently this type of opinions dominated), in recession, was an opinion that in the relations between Poland and Ukraine, Poland should play a privileged role: a guide, a helmsman, “an older brother” … In other words, it is about the Polish mission in the East, including especially in Ukraine and Belarus. The respondents, who represented this receding point of view, justified it with various factors, but mainly with cultural-civilizational ones. Among others, they adduced the role of Poland as a traditional good mediator between East and West, Poland as an instance of a “better democracy”, a country that implemented most of economic and political reforms that took it closer to the West (Ukraine is a couple of tens of years lagging behind …) or a country which was less affected by the “domination of Russia and Asia”.

A view may also be distinguished – it occurs marginally, especially among the respondents declaring a decidedly negative political and economic opinions about Ukraine and among the migrants from Ukraine in Przemyśl - that in the representations of Polish – Ukrainian relations, Ukraine is an embodiment of various types of threats from the East (lack of economic and political stability, a “proclivity” towards Russia).

On the other hand in the declarations of the respondents from Przemyśl concerning the role of Poland in the relations of Ukraine with Europe and/or the European Union or other supranational structures the following stances might be distinguished:

Firstly – the conviction, which is the most frequent, is that Poland is an obvious and natural intermediary between the East and the West or Western Europe and the East or the
European Union and Ukraine. (It is formulated without justifications, in general terms, as something taken for granted, what everybody knows and agrees with);

Secondly – the conviction (common but less common than the one mentioned earlier) is that Poland is a representative of Ukrainian interests and expectations vis-à-vis Europe (or the European Union). The supporters of this view say that “Poland is an advocate of Ukrainian interests” or a mediator which “knows well – for the reason of similarity of the languages and experiences – what Ukraine wants from the West” and “being closer to the West it can effectively help Ukraine”. (Supporters of this view often speak of help, support). It is worth adding that the justifications of the Poland’s role are mainly cultural-civilizational in the nature.

Thirdly- the conviction, third in the order, is that Poland is an advocate or representative of the West in the relation of Western Europe (or the European Union) with Ukraine. Supporters of this view refer to cultural-civilizational factors of a different nature however (Poland as a country of Western civilization, a model of Western democracy etc.), but also to economic arguments (Poland knows Ukrainian economy better, its faults and shortcomings and this is why it may be useful for the West.

Fourthly- the conviction is that Poland, being a country applying for the European Union (it will be admitted soon) and simultaneously perceiving Ukraine as a strategic partner “has a political-moral duty” to support Ukraine on its way to the Union and at the same time to represent in Ukraine these political circles of the Union which are interested in enlarging the Union with Ukraine. It is worth adding that the loyalty of Poland in respect to Ukraine, resulting from the fact that Poland first recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine, is offered as a justification here.

As an exception there appear opinions according to which Poland in the role of the intermediary – whatever the understanding of the term – is not needed, first, in Ukraine because “Ukraine will manage it by itself”, for example because it is a big country; because “Ukraine may in the future dominate Poland [economically]”, second, in the European Union or generally in Western Europe, because “Western entrepreneurs and politicians are doing well without the Polish assistance”.

As an exceptional opinion – and formulated only as a footnote to the conviction that “it is closer for Ukraine to Europe and the EU” one may take also the conclusion that Poland should limit the role of the mediator between Europe, the EU and Ukraine because of the unpredictability of Ukraine, resulting primarily from its inclinations towards Russia “Ukraine will rather move towards democracy and Europe but it is not absolutely certain, there is the role of Russia, which might not “let Ukraine out”.

In most general terms – the respondents from Przemyśl first – are not alien to complex, one could say “rich” images of Ukraine, second – they commonly think that Polish-Ukrainian relations are important for Poland, third – they assume an improvement in the relations in the future, forth – they ascribe to Poland various type of the role of a link (mediator, partner, advocate, guardian ...) between Western Europe and/or the European Union and the independent Ukraine; fifth – last but not least – in various ways they ponder on the civilizational-cultural nature of Ukraine, employing comparisons of Ukraine and Russia or its place in the economic and political system of Europe, taking into account two geo-political orientations: pro-European and Euro-Asian.
V. Attitudes to and opinions about Poland’s integration with the European Union from the vantage point of a borderland community - Hanna Bojar

Chelm / Wola Uhruska

Respondents from Chelm and Wola Uhruska draw their knowledge about the integration of Poland with the European Union primarily from mass media. While officers of local institutions are quite well acquainted with thanks to centers and infokiosks of European information that are being established, local entrepreneurs are aware of the fact that such centers exist but the awareness is only general – they do not know where the centers are located or details about how they function. Not infrequently, there appears among them an opinion that such centers exist but they are too poorly equipped, they lack informational materials and the personnel of the centers, despite their enthusiasm have too little knowledge and experience (after a few days’ training) to inform well about the issues of the integration. Some officers representing local authorities have some experience related to participation in various types of training and meetings organized by the authorities. Their knowledge is however often visibly “profiled” - it is more in depth in areas of their professional activity, for instance: lawyers in the area of regulations concerning legal order, whereas duty customs officers in the area of regulations concerning border regimes.

It is typical of Chelm that a considerable proportion of the respondents feel they are not well informed about the issues connected with the European integration.

Among detailed issues pointed at by the respondents – which are not adequately presented or totally omitted in the information campaign – the following are mentioned:

- lack of details concerning the accession agreement, for example lack of information if and in which manner the European Social Charter, which is so advantageous for employees but has not been signed by Government, will be functioning in Poland;
- overly general information about the details of the negotiated conditions, which affects particularly local decision-makers who are to take certain decisions;
- lack of concrete information how is the integration with the European Union going to influence the life of particular social and professional groups - a single category of farmers is particularly strongly emphasized;
- lack of concrete information about potential funds – which will be available, how big and how one may take advantage of them.

Hopes and fears

The analysis of the most frequently voiced by the Chelm respondents fears related to the integration of Poland with the European Union reveals that in the consciousness of the local elite of Chelm, Poland appears as a clearly weaker partner so that in a direct confrontation threats such as the following become real:
lack of adequate potential to protect national culture, tradition and language (in contrast to stronger European countries which are able to defend their identity effectively (The French defend their culture, Germans are not satisfied [mają za złe] with the loss of their national currency – the Deutsche Mark)

lack of potential to protect internal market against an economically stronger partner (Germans will buy out the Western lands, Poland will become a garbage can for Europe – a market for cheap Western products in the situation of lacking competitiveness of Polish products)

The opinion about a highly developed bureaucracy in the European Union – which is perceived as a disadvantage and a difficulty in relationships – is widespread among the respondents. Lack of ability to swerve among the meanders of the bureaucracy is putting Poland at the disadvantage, among others as far as the possibility of successful applying and taking advantage of the European Union’s assistance funds.

Expected benefits resulting from the integration of Poland with the European Union are perceived in two perspectives: the perspective of opening and the internal perspective. As far as the first perspective, the clearest hopes are associated with an opening of a large market for Polish entrepreneurs and an opportunity for Poles to find legal jobs in the European Union. The internal perspective is associated with an expectation of raising the living standards to the European level, an opportunity to discipline Polish political elites owing to the Union’s standards of political culture as well as an improvement in the functioning of the state related to the fact that Poland will be inserted in the good, well tested structures of the European Union.

It needs to be stressed that none of the respondents has any doubts that in the first period after the accession of Poland to the European Union a radical improvement will not occur. Rather, a temporary deterioration of the economic situation, among others an increase in unemployment, is to be expected.

From the vantage point of benefits and losses of the region the representatives of the local elites are however aware that – in the long run – there are more opportunities than threats to their region. Among the most frequently mentioned opportunities, advantages related to the assistance funds of the European Union dedicated to the development of the regions in Eastern Poland appear, first of all funding for:

- regional development in the framework of pro-environmental policy and tourism (taking advantage of natural resources of the region);
- overcoming civilizational backwardness (development of roads, hotels, increased interest of foreign investors in the special economic zone);
- new jobs related to the increased importance attached to the border – expanding border crossing points, border and borderland infrastructure, the role of transit movement.

Indirectly, in the opinions expressed by the local elites a strong conviction about the principal role of the center (central authorities) as far as decisions concerning policies after integration became manifest. The fear (the phenomenon became even more evident in Przemyśl, which is analyzed below in the chapter) is that the integration with the European Union in the initial
period will not influence the region significantly “because the Eastern Wall is far from the center, where the money is distributed”.

Among the conditions which must be fulfilled so that the integration of Poland with the European Union proves a real opportunity for the region, the respondents mentioned the economic dimension of the process. An influx of investment capital is a necessary condition first of all. To make it possible it is necessary: first – to be very well prepared for the applying and implementing of the European Union’s assistance funds; second – encouraging foreign investors to treat the region as an investment destination and not a market for Western products, because this does not build a labor market.

Referendum

Despite the fears mentioned above and the widespread conviction on the part of the respondents that the initial period after the accession will be difficult for Poland – the respondents (with the exception of one person) declare participation in the referendum and a “support for” the integration with the European Union. The conviction that there is no alternative for Poland is the commonly shared motivation deciding in favor of the integration of Poland with the European Union.

According to the respondents from Chelm – the youth and people approving of the integration because of opportunities for their children will be found among the groups which will support the accession of Poland to the European. Among the institutions which have an influence on the decisions taken, the Church is named.

However, in the region of Chelm and Wola Uhruska, political divides come to the foreground as factors deciding about choices made. LPR (the League of Polish Families), Samoobrona (Self-defence) and PSL (Polish Peasants Party) as well as the listeners of Radio Maryja are named as opponents to the integration (quite strongly present in the local public life). As a result, the respondents expect that the city dwellers will rather be “for”, whereas the inhabitants of rural areas – low educated, more conservative, out of whom predominantly the supporters of LPR, Samoobrona and PSL are recruited, will be rather passive (low turn-out), and if they vote, the vote will be against the integration.

Many respondents point to bad social moods – a feeling of inertia, frustration which are not conducive to the integration with the European Union.

Tomaszów Lubelski

The main sources of information about the European integration are mass media, national television (albeit there appeared isolated opinions that the TV campaign – although visible, is not well prepared) and national press (Rzeczpospolita). The majority of the respondents are aware that there have been established and function centers of information, they were able to point to their location as well. The majority felt quite well informed about the issues connected with the accession of Poland to the European Union.
Hopes and fears

The integration of Poland with the European Union is most frequently perceived as a necessary choice for which there is no alternative (“Standing still is tantamount to going back”)

Among the most frequently mentioned advantages of Poland’s accession to the European Union the following issues appeared:

- opening of new opportunities for Polish entrepreneurs in the European market
- possibility to find legal jobs in Europe and to increase social mobility
- perspectives of professional development – especially for young people who are better prepared for jobs in the Western markets (among others owing to ever better education and knowledge of foreign languages)

Fears related to the integration of Poland with the European Union were most frequently associated with: an increase in unemployment, an outflow of the most gifted young people from Poland and the region.

From the point of view of benefits and losses of the region the respondents drew attention to the fact that the region was a typical rural region and predominantly from this vantage point they evaluated potential threats and advantages of the integration of Poland with the European Union.

- according to the respondents, ecologically unpolluted terrains which might become a foundation for the development of agro tourism are the main asset of the region.
- the closeness of the future border of the European Union may become an incentive for Polish and Western entrepreneurs who intend to co-operate with the East
- the rural character of the region makes it probable that the inhabitants could expect benefits in the form of subsidies from the European Union.

At the same time however, the rural character of the region might be the cause – especially in the initial period – of difficulties because the fragmented agriculture could have difficulties in competing with well organized, modern and grant-supported agriculture of Western Europe.

In a few cases, it was emphasized that the nature of Poland’s accession to the European Union may not amount to total subordination to the directives of the European Union and uncritical acceptance of the solutions implemented in the European Union.
Referendum

All of the respondents declared their intention to take part in the referendum and vote for the accession of Poland to the European Union. The respondents expressed hopes that the referendum would bring positive results.

All of them pointed to the youth as the “surest” group who will vote „for” in the referendum because of several factors: knowledge of foreign languages, most opportunities to find jobs outside Poland, good education, active attitudes and an interest in the issues of the integration.

All shared the opinion that farmers constituted a group of biggest euro skeptics. The respondents shared an opinion that it is a social group on which currently the biggest attention should be focused and to which adequate messages should be addressed, especially taking into account the susceptibility of farmers to the influence of groupings skeptical of the integration – i.e. the parties of the right, the Church and Radio Maryja. (“For it is very easy to frighten a farmer”).

Przemyśl / Medyka

Respondents from Przemyśl and Medyka – primarily representatives of local authorities and officers of local institutions – point to national mass media as the main source of information about the integration with the EU for the average citizen. They draw attention to a certain disproportion resulting from the fact that they themselves feel better informed owing to: access to various types of professional documents (for example related to the changes in law), participation in setting up of the information centers and participation in various types of meetings with representatives of the EU.

The majority of the respondents are aware of the existence of centers of European information but an opinion is often repeated that the functioning centers and points of European information are too passive, have too few materials, and the personnel employed in them is poorly prepared for their roles.

Among the three local communities covered by the research, the respondents from Przemyśl have decidedly the most critical opinion about the campaign associated with the integration with the European Union. They point to several gaps in the campaign. Among the most frequently voiced critical remarks, the following need to be named:

- the principal contents of the pre-accession campaign remain in the sphere of symbols and ideas and not concrete facts which are important to people;
- the campaign is characterized by lack of objective views in the evaluation of benefits and potential costs as well as by undue optimism [“Hooray-optimism”] – which is little convincing for the average citizen (“they are making people believe that the EU is some kind of a social benefit fund” (PrIM5502), “we will have cheaper flights but who ever flies, while for butter we will pay five times as much” (PrDM4210);
• public debates carried out in the media – these are political quarrels in which rational discussion is lacking, an impression of informational noise remains;
• the Campaign does not inform how the integration with the European Union will influence the life of various social groups (with the exception of farmers, about whom a lot is said) and everyday life of an average individual (for example on what could a single mother count)
• too little information on the internal laws of the European Union and the regulations which will be valid in Poland after the integration with the European Union;
• too few mentions about the real impact that the integration with the European Union will have on small local communities;
• inadequate knowledge about the opportunities to apply for funds from the EU (an average person knows too little about the financial opportunities related to the EU);

Hopes and fears

Among the positive changes to be brought about by the integration with the European Union, the following are named: increased security of Poland, increased order and transparency of structures and rules according to which the state and economy function, including – in the long run – opportunities to modernize Polish agriculture (better organization, productivity and rationalization of agricultural goods’ producers).

The fears related to the integration of Poland with the EU basically do not differ from the ones expressed in the other communities covered by the research. Treating Poland as a market for cheap Western products could be a threat. There appears also a fear of land buy-outs, although – as the respondents believe themselves – the problem affects exclusively the Western territory of Poland, neighboring Germany.

Other fears associated with the process of integration include a conviction that unemployment will rise in the initial period following the integration and social stratification will increase. Moreover, there is a danger of chaos and misinformation resulting from the fact that both Polish and EU laws will be valid simultaneously. The respondents are also aware that the opportunity to apply for the EU funds is to a large degree conditioned by an investment of Poland’s own means and the financial situation of the state is not conducive to creation of optimistic scenarios.

From the point of view of benefits and losses of the region, the most typical feature of the opinions formulated by the respondents is a strong contrast between the hope that the assistance funds from the European Union will enable the development of the region as a border region of the “new – enlarged European Union” and a fear that the means – centrally distributed, as it is the case at present, will be directed predominantly to better developed regions whereas Eastern regions will continue to be marginalized. This is the reason why an opinion also appears that Western regions will benefit from the integration more because the flows and investment of the means will be easier in the West of Poland. It needs to be
remarked, however, that opinions to the contrary appear as well – territories neighboring the Eastern border will gain more because it will become the Union’s border whereas the disappearance of the Western border will bring losses to the inhabitants of the border regions in the West of Poland.

Some respondents express hopes that a pressure for a change in the current policy of the central authorities in the direction of creating regional programs and overcoming the present divide into the center and the under-invested regions of Poland B and C will be one of the positive effects of the integration with the EU.

Similarly, as it was the case in the two other local communities, opportunities for the region are seen predominantly in: environmental protection, development of tourism and improvement of the infrastructure (roads, sewage systems). The respondents expect also an increased importance of the Eastern border, followed by means dedicated to the expansion of the border and borderland infrastructure, which will constitute a significant investment stimulus.

Owing to the high hopes associated with the opportunity for the region’s development created by the EU assistance funds, an ability to win and take a good advantage of the means is a condition of success according to the respondents.

Referendum

Irrespective of the many critical remarks concerning the pre-accession campaign, all of the respondents declare their participation in the referendum and voting for the integration of Poland with the European Union.

Apart from – a determinist to a degree conviction typical of Chełm that there is no alternative for Poland (some respondents claim that the process of the integration began already much earlier and it is not possible to stop it now) there appears a much more strongly stressed conviction that it is an opportunity for Poland. The accession of Poland to the European Union creates new perspectives and opportunities. At the same time it constitutes a decisive confirmation of the break with the Soviet sphere of influence in the previous period (“we don’t want to have anything to do with Ruskies, The EU is better that COMECON [RWPG].

As it was the case with the other communities covered by the research, the respondents name the youth, city dwellers, people well educated and able to handle the new socio-economic reality as decisively supporting the integration with the European Union. Some respondents draw attention to the fact that in Podkarpacie numerous families have relatives living abroad, whence they draw knowledge about what is life like “in the West.”.

At the same time however, Podkarpacie is a region of fragmented agriculture and farmers are a social group that is, in the perception of the respondents, most skeptical as far as the integration with the European Union is concerned. It is also to a large extent due to the impact of Radio Maryja, finding its faithful supporters among the poor, poorly educated and generally failing to handle the new socio-economic conditions. Opposing the integration are also people who are afraid of changes and novelties, who are poorly educated – a fear of losing one’s job dominates (they do not perceive the integration as an opportunity in the labor market but as a threat of losing it)
Among the institutions which exert an influence on decisions of the inhabitants of Podkarpacie, churches of various denominations are named, their attitudes to the idea of integration are perceived as rather positive, and local authorities. Some respondents draw attention however to the problem of trust in authorities. The central and local authorities which are in favor of the integration, enjoy currently a limited trust whereas political opponents of the integration with the EU are perceived as people who are not stigmatized by “sins” and mistakes of the ruling politicians.

VI. Summary and Conclusions

Reactions in regard to the presence of Ukrainian minority and attitude towards Ukrainian migration on the borderland

Ukrainian presence seems to be an obvious element of the local community’s social landscape of the studied towns. The majority of them arrive – as the respondents define it – from the territories belonging previously to Poland. A less numerous group, from more distant territories – the neighborhood of Kiev or even Crimea. Apart from Ukrainians coming to Poland, Russians, Armenians, citizens of Moldova, Asians (the Vietnamese) and Rumanians also arrive.

There is a vivid memory of “migration of peoples” from late 1980’s and early 1990’s, when newcomers used to come in large numbers to trade on the marketplaces and sleep in the railway stations. Presently, the scope of this phenomenon is much smaller and, as respondents say, these trade migrations gained a lot in terms of stabilization and order. None of interviewees indicated any serious conflicts between newcomers and Poles. All of people, we talked to, described Polish-Ukrainian relations as good.

Naming positive aspects of the presence of Ukrainians in the region, interviewees pointed out mainly economic considerations: revival of trade (stores, wholesalers), possibility for buying cheap products. Due to the fact that a majority of newcomers is far from the status of the rich, an important market for cheap housing and food services occurred. There is a number of people renting flats to Ukrainians working or trading in Poland.

Everyday contacts and visible benefits from the eastern newcomers’ presence result in the fading of past conflicts and negative experiences, which lose their crucial status. They still exist in peoples memory, but seem to be inactive [uśpione]. Indirect contact is conductive to establishing deeper, regular contacts. It is important to mention in this place that many interviews suggest that relations between Poles and Ukrainians are not made in the mood of partnership. Judgments are clearly marked with emotions. This attitude of Poles towards Ukrainians can be described as a mix of superiority, understanding and compassion (it goes far enough to arouse acception for illegal work of Ukrainians). Often the situation of Ukrainians is compared to the position of Poles traveling to Western Europe in the past to work illegally and trade. Only one interviewee talked directly about his negative impressions connected with the presence of eastern newcomers. He used offensive expressions such as: disgusting, poor, stinky, awfully-dressed, however, straight after, he added that it is a result of their way of life in Poland (bad housing and working conditions)
Respondents point out the following phenomena connected with the presence of Ukrainians in the local community:

- alcohol and cigarettes smuggling; selling fake brand-name products (so-called “przestępstwa karno-skarbowe” – “crimes against duties and excise tax”)
- alcohol and cigarettes smuggling for sale
- disturbances, fights and small thefts
- crime within their own ethnic group, for example extortions
- taking workplaces from Poles (this opinion is not commonly shared, what will be expanded on in the part of the Report devoted to Ukrainians’ work in Poland)

The scale of crimes committed by Ukrainians in consciousness of local people is not reflected by police statistics (besides of the “crimes against duties and excise tax”). According to Police reports, Ukrainians do commit very few crimes against Poles (more the less proportionally to their presence in the region) and the crimes committed by them are directed mostly towards other Ukrainians. On the other hand, almost 100 percent of the “crimes against duties and excise tax” are committed just by Ukrainians.

Work of Ukrainians in opinions of the borderland communities

Ukrainians who are working in the region and are selling goods they carried through the border have been an important element of social landscape of the since the beginning of 1990s.

Ukrainians working legally are mainly English teachers and other highly qualified workers, doctors and managers and private entrepreneurs. They appear everywhere and especially where no qualified English teachers or Poles want to work because of the offered salary/conditions. At this moment, there are English teachers, even though their job market is shrinking due to the growth of qualified Polish English teachers. Considering legally employed Ukrainians, there are no greater divisions in assessing their influence on the job market in the region; their number is not significant (probably less than 100 people in the scale of whole borderland).

Ukrainians who work illegally in the region do mainly unqualified, seasonal jobs on construction sites and in agriculture. The scale of this phenomenon is visible in statements we heard from our respondents. They were expressing opinions, that if not Ukrainian labor, there would be hardly any construction in the town, and many peasants would give up agriculture. Aside of construction, where one can meet also qualified Ukrainian workers such as brick-layers, plaster-layers, and agriculture, Ukrainians work as house-help, doctors, gardeners.

When asked whether or not Ukrainians working in Poland deprive Poles from work, our respondents most often answered that Ukrainians perform jobs Poles do not want to perform, and/or do not want to perform for the price offered. Most of respondents were saying that this is not a significant problem. Some, especially those who had their own business, stressed however that Ukrainians impair the job market for Poles and this ‘dumping’ prices practice creates a problem for those who await legal employment. Many pointed too high taxes and Social Security duties as reasons for this pathology.

Those who commented the quality of work performed by Ukrainians differed in their opinions. They commented mostly positively on the quality of work performed by skilled workers and professionals. Considering the others, it means the largest group of Ukrainians...
working in Poland, some were saying that the quality of their work depends on the level control, others complained about ill-preparation and lack of qualifications. The most common opinion was however that Ukrainians are a cheap labor force; they may not satisfy their employer, but the quality of their work is not worse than the quality of Polish workers.

The influence Ukrainians have on the local economy is considered not to be significant; positive in the scale of entrepreneurs and private individuals who employ them, and rather negative for the region and the state. Very often we heard the opinion that as much as the “black market employment” is a generally negative phenomenon, the problem lies not in this illegal employment itself, but in high taxes, absurd employment regulations and the social security duties. The criticism considered not as much Ukrainians who were working in Poland (most of the people in Chelm seems to agree that foreigners should have possibilities of working in Poland) but the negative influence of the gray zone of economy on the states economy as a whole and reasons for the existence of this zone.

None of the respondents evaluated the way in which border crossings function unequivocally positively. Regarding the Ukrainian side, both the border crossing infrastructure, organization of work (chaos, mess, unclear regulations, the rules applied at whim at the border crossing), and the level of conduct of the border services. In a few cases there appeared an accusation of corruption of the border service officers and of the Ukrainian police. In relation to the Polish side they stressed primarily low level conduct on the part of the border service officers and the manner in which people crossing the border were treated – arrogant attitudes towards people from the East.

Among the most frequent causes of the negative phenomena at the border, the following socio-economic factors are named:

- existing differences in the economic level of the two state systems encourage the phenomena of widespread smuggling and trade;
- the necessity of conducting detailed controls due to the frequent inconsistency between the real and the declared purpose of travel;
- differences in the culture of demeanor, observing order in public places which put the people coming from the East at the disadvantage, provoking reactions of impatience and tiredness of the border employees, especially when the intensity of the border traffic is taken into consideration (2-3 thousand people daily);
- the fact that border infrastructure is not adapted to the scale of the current border traffic.

**Attitudes and opinions towards the Eastern border of the Republic of Poland– the present and the future**

**Crossing borders**

In the opinion of some of them, new and technically better equipment for the already functioning cross-border points as well as building of the new crossing points or preparing a holistic programs of investing “in the borders” are symptoms or premonitions of changes to
the better. This kind of positive manifestations, let us add, is frequently linked by the respondents with current attempts to implement the formal requirements of the European Union addressed to Poland as a potential border state of the European Union. (“It is to be as it is in the Union”). Brevity and general nature of the statements do not allow however to decide on this basis if it is ultimately good for the whole Poland, for the borderland.

The evaluation of the situation at the border – apart from the factors mentioned above - depends also on so to speak structural factors, that is on the infrastructure of the border crossings and the conditions in which people cross the border (it was already mentioned before). The majority of the respondents take the inadequate conditions of crossing the border and the shortcomings of the infrastructure as a target for radical and emotionally loaded critique. The respondents point out:

First – crowding or long lines at the border, both on the Polish and Ukrainian side, the fact that one does not always know why this occurs (there often appears an opinion like this: “duty customs officers and border guards have closed up, nothing happens”)

Second – organizational shortcomings of all the border services – duty customs officers, and the Guards of the Border. A significant proportion of the respondents think so and link the low turnover across the border to the organizational shortages or even some chaos. These shortcomings, let us add, are used by the respondents to justify low motivation to travel as tourists.

Third – lack of transparency of the law and administrative regulations, which in many cases may lead to drastic abuses (the crime of bribing [opłacania sie] the duty customs officers or the Guards of the Border) or expose people crossing the border to capricious treatment on the part of the border services (will they today let in people with goods or not...). Also, they do not fail to notice the issue of the changing – for unknown reasons, in their opinion – interpretation of legal and administrative regulations; they see in it a significant cause of bribery and other symptoms of pathology in the borderland zone.

It does not mean however that the respondents perceive the current situation at the border in black exclusively.

Visas

The type of fears expressed by the respondents show that the new visa regime is seen as troublesome. They fear that it will lead to negative for Poland and Ukraine, impairing transit and trade, closing of the border. The list of problems mentioned by our respondents show that they consider both situation of Ukrainians, but also various types of benefits they take from present contacts with Ukraine and Ukrainians (the opinions considering the influence of the changes on the border areas prevail, and only rarely respondents spoke from whole-Poland perspective).

Next to fears, less often and with weaker intensity (and less emotions), named by the interviewees are the positive implications of the process of securing the border. Among the positive implications they pointed:

9. possibility of a better control of border traffic and who is coming to Poland,
10. better regulation of job market in Poland (difficulties for illegal workers)
11. a chance that richer traders and entrepreneurs will take over the larger share of the market (fill the vacant space after detail –trade) and related to it economic development of the region

12. better organization of the border trade (today, according to the respondents it is too anachronic). They expect that the new organization of the visa regime will be followed by international agreements between Poland and Ukraine and it will increase the security of transborder cooperation, especially in the area of economic exchange. Some pointed that new visa regime, although restrictive, by implementing Schengen regulations will “civilize” the border relations and it will connect Ukraine to Europe.

13. some respondents were sure that the changes will be positive from economic viewpoint, organizational viewpoint (by modernization of the border facilities, better work of border services on both sides of the border). According to their opinions, new border regime will increase the demand for employment in border services, especially qualified.

14. expectation of limiting of pathologies, both ‘common’ and these related to the border. The respondents from all categories point this (policemen, entrepreneurs, local government) and they expect at least small decrease in small crimes, smuggling. They hope that the sell of alcohol and cigarettes will go up, (“Polmos will finally make money”). At the same time they do not expect change in organized crime activities (“mafia will deal with that”). One of the interviewed policemen expects a new crime – falsifying visas.

15. expectation of a re-birth of ‘real’ tourism. Some predict that if there is no smugglers and ants traffic on the border crossings, the real tourists will visit the area more often

16. a kind of a positive change mentioned by some of the respondents … or no change. They say that considering the agreed visa regulations, “those who were to come will come anyway” and not much will change on the border.

Summing up these analyses, it has to be added that the respondents do not direct their projects of bettering the border situation to any particular political or social subjects. Excluding maybe representatives of the local governments who underline that they refer to local government system and/or its relations with the central government, the rest of respondents do not name the subject: they speak non-personally, without naming institutions i.e. “it should be done”.

Opinions about Ukraine, Polish-Ukrainian relations and the role of Poland in EU-Ukraine relations

Most frequently, the respondents offered more or less insightful grounds for their involvement in the broadly understood Ukrainian issues; only very few did not. Among the reasons justifying the interest the following are the most important:

First –Ukraine as a close geographical neighbor;

Second –Ukraine as the most important (or second important, following Russia) Eastern neighbor of the III Republic of Poland;
Third – Ukraine, basing on the strength of inter-state treaties and agreements from the beginning of the 1990s, as a strategic partner of the III Republic of Poland in the sphere of politics and economy;

Fourth – Ukraine, in terms of population and economic potential, is the biggest — immediate Eastern neighbor in respect of which Poland and Poles currently have or will have in the future special responsibilities as far as economic and political assistance are concerned (after accession to the European structures);

Fifth – Ukraine, due to involvement resulting from a cultural affinity (language, traditions, common difficult experiences), has a similar position in Europe (as a bulwark, a buffer vis-à-vis Asia and Russia).

The respondents presented a wide array of images of Ukraine. They could be divided according to a few criteria.

Firstly – the images differ from one another in respect of the nature of social reality to which they refer: there are political images (various features of the political system are taken into account), economic (various structural elements of economy), cultural (historical, religious factors, collective mentality).

Secondly – the images differ from one another regarding the level of diversity of the factors which they take into account: we have among them homogenous images (political or economic) or mixed ones (including all or some of the factors);

Thirdly – the images are holistic and partial (referring to the systemic whole of the state, economy or culture or to their components in respect of the present only and past or in relation to the future as well).

Fourthly – the images are divided as they are oriented towards the present and near future and are focused on the present and the past (the latter is as important as the present);

Fifthly – the images among them may be distinguished as those which have an immanent nature and those which – openly – have a comparative character with a reference to a) Poland, b) Europe, the West (the differentiation concerns first of all the present or the future).

Taking into account the criteria of distinction pointed to above, one may say that as far as the frequency of the choices of images is concerned: the most frequent are the homogenous economic images of Ukraine (but various economic factors are in the images taken into account), next, mixed images economic-political (the political factor determines advantages and disadvantages of the economic system), pure cultural images occur the least frequently. (It needs to be noted that cultural elements occur in the mixed politico-economic images whenever the respondents want to depict Ukraine as a whole).

Predominantly, the respondents presented holistic, relatively homogenous images of Ukraine; the following could be distinguished: a) economic or broader – economic-civilizational, b) political or broader – systemic (taking into account the nature of political culture), c) cultural or cultural-civilizational (taking into account elements of moral judgment), d) one more specific image of Ukraine could be distinguished, namely the one in which everything that is going on in Ukraine is reduced to some kind of pathology.
(perceiving problems of Ukraine exclusively from the vantage point of pathology: economy, politics, power, collective morality, etc.).

Among the declared images, there prevailed macro-economic ones appearing in the three different versions:

- **positive** (the least frequently: big market, big economic potential in terms of resources and labor force)

- **mixed** (most often declared: negative evaluation of the structural changes in economy, economic bureaucracy, wastefulness, lack of financial security, pauperization of the society, low qualifications of employees, destruction of natural environment and linked to great expectations as regards future, especially in the field of resources management - for example, land, the widening of the export market, technical modernization under the influence of international co-operation, cheap labor force)

- **negative** (yielding to the mixed image, opinions of this kind concern predominantly an increase in the impoverishment of the society, legacy of the state socialist economy, inadequate system of management in industry, not taking advantage of land, bad banking system, financial insecurity, undue politicization of economic decisions, faults of financial policy, etc.).