# On the Future OF EUROPE

## Policy Papers 7

## An Overview
## of European (In)Security

Warsaw, June 2002

# Introduction

This report is the seventh publication in a series of policy papers outlining the position of Polish non-governmental organisations on issues important the future of Europe. While we aspire to open a public debate in Poland, we do not restrict ourselves to describing the Polish position and Polish interests. Our reports target an audience from both Western and Eastern Europe. We strive to make sure that our proposals account for their perception.

This project has been initiated by the Stefan Batory Foundation. We have invited interested non-governmental organisations to work with us on our reports. As a non-governmental community, unrestrained by the official position of governments in EU accession negotiations, we feel we can make an important contribution to the debate on the future of the EU and its foreign policy.

The report in this publication has been developed in co-operation with the Centre for International Relations with the participation of independent experts.

We extend words of gratitude and appreciation to all those involved in the drafting of this report. We thank them for their significant assistance and suggestions.

We hope that the report will open a wide debate.
*The Stefan Batory Foundation*

The process of gradually dropping the traditional definition of security (i.e., freedom from military threats) and of adopting a broader picture, taking account of aspects other than military issues, stared in the early 1990s. However, with the breakout of war in the Balkans and uncertainties related to developments in Russia, a decisive shift in the emerging direction was barred. It was only the determined political consolidation of Central and Eastern Europe enabling the enlargement of NATO and EU, the stabilisation in Southern Europe, and the full realisation of the scale of new threats after the September 11 terrorist attack on New York and Washington DC that necessitated the new approach to security in Europe and changed the work of relevant organisations.

While they are enlarging, NATO and the EU are also developing new institutional solutions and new forms of political co-operation as the function and mission of the two organisations is being adjusted to the changing security situation in Europe. NATO is clearly becoming a political organisation whose main objective and raison d'etre is to keep the Euro-Atlantic bond strong and to preserve the political presence of the United States in Europe. This does not mean that the military structure of NATO is fading away even as it is transforming. This process will most likely turn NATO into a provider of security services, an organisation lending its resources and capacity to countries willing and capable of pursuing specific tasks (the „toolbox" concept). NATO will continue to change as it opens up to closer co-operation with Russia, accepts new members, and has to work out a new formula for the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. As a new aspect of its policies and operations, NATO will co-operate with the EU, which is developing a military dimension. Although the process of pursuing the Common European Security and Defence Policy is very complicated and thorny, especially in terms of having to increase defence budgets, the EU will in a few years' time have significant capacities to cope with some European security issues. In the second decade of the 21st century, the EU could be the only organisation in a position to use different measures to prevent crises and to stabilise the situation in Europe, from joint strategies to political dialogue, to financial and technical assistance, to privileges and embargoes, to police and military measures including helping refugees, overseeing ceasefires, peace making or peace enforcement operations. While the military reform has to be stepped up, this capacity will also require good relations with non-EU NATO members as well as third party states, such as Russia or Ukraine.

As an inherent part of the process, ensuring its broad reach and facilitating progress, prospects of close-co-operation with Russia have emerged. It would certainly be premature to authoritatively conclude that under the presidency of Vladimir Putin Russia has finally made a turn to the West, but signals received so far have been promising. It must be borne it mind, however, that the new spirit of co-operation with Russia is in great part due to Russia's change of rhetoric and its waiver of those demands that the USA and Europe found unacceptable (e.g., to stop enlargement of NATO). Only time will show whether Russia's support to the fight against world terrorism translates to its readiness to discuss specific issues, and whether President Putin's foreign policy affects the country's internal policy to the extent that Russia will drive towards democratic change.

Irrespective of the above, rather optimistic, prediction, the new emerging picture of European security has a serious defect as it leaves out two important regions: the Balkans and part of the ex-USSR region. These countries are excluded from Euro-Atlantic co-operation and European integration, mainly by their own fault, due to internal conflicts and lack of democracy. In fact, the future of security in the Old World will depend on careful inclusion of these states into the mainstream of Euro-Atlantic policy.

There is no doubt that European security issues are a function of many factors, including the strength of the Euro-Atlantic bond, and the situation in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Caucasus. Having said that, however, it is the extent of political and military co-operation and a coherent approach to security that will decide whether the New Europe can resolve conflicts taking place on the continent or - as in the early 1990s - fail in a number of ways. To make sure that the emergence of a new European security system provides important benefits, the change must not be limited to mere expansion of institutions or execution of new treaties. Otherwise, the new security framework will follow the unfortunate example of failed attempts in the early 1990s when the idea of overlapping institutions was to regulate the co-operative security system based on CSCE/OSCE. The new system must depart from qualitative change which will integrate all partners in a reliable way. It seems that three issues will be crucial to the development of a fairly coherent system of European security: (1) membership of European countries in both the EU and NATO; (2) division of tasks among European partners; (3) development of a new NATO and EU policy towards excluded states.

Each of these issues has a direct impact on the strength of the Euro-Atlantic bond, whose importance is too self-evident to be considered in this report.[1]

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[1] See: On The Future of Europe. Policy Papers no 3: *Pro-European Atlantists: Poland and Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe After Accession to the European Union*, by Stefan Batory Foundation and Centre for International Relations, Warsaw 2001 (http//www.batory.org.pl), and also: Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Olaf Osica, *Towards a New NATO*, in: *Reports and Analyses*, no 2/2002, by Centre for International Relations, Warsaw (http//www.csm.org.pl).

## *EU and NATO Membership*

Without the membership of all European partners in both the EU and NATO, effective co-operation between these organisations is unlikely to develop in the long term. Consequently, non-membership of the two institutions will have a negative impact on the future of European security and, equally important, Euro-Atlantic relations.

EU and NATO membership of European countries will put an end to what may justly be called political schizophrenia. In discussions between the two organisations, representatives of the same countries usually sit on both sides of the table, yet they often present divergent views and solutions to particular issues depending on whether they represent NATO or the EU in the negotiations. This situation makes difficult talks, concerning for instance access of the EU to the capacities and resources of NATO, unnecessarily complex. Double membership of European countries in both the EU and NATO will certainly help Europeans to develop a common position, even if it offers no instant remedy to all difficulties.

EU and NATO membership of European countries will also help to make discussions on security more rational, which in turn will make spending more rational. EU member states would be making a mistake were they to develop separate military capacities for EU needs and for NATO. This could happen if the two organisations continued to have different membership. Duplicating military capacities would be both a financial and a political mistake as it would heighten tensions between the EU and NATO. Even now units assigned by European NATO members to European rapid reaction forces are also available to NATO. This is most desirable and will become natural as EU and NATO memberships converge.

Double membership will also help to develop a strong European pillar of the North Atlantic community, one of the main conditions of good relations between Europe and the United States. NATO membership of all EU member states will not subordinate the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) to NATO; conversely, it will amplify Europe's voice in NATO, which will become a prime forum to discuss security issues between the EU and the USA.

Double membership will open the way to co-operation of the armaments industry throughout the North Atlantic region. The future of the industry is not that of consolidations in, respectively, Europe and North America, but rather of consolidation giving birth to several multinational corporations with roots on both sides of the Atlantic. The merger of Daimler and Chrysler is a good example from another sector, and it demonstrates that future mergers of European and American arms producers do not imply domination of the former by the latter.

Once again, it is important to remember that the convergence of NATO and EU membership will not solve all problems. Yet it will certainly calm down tensions among European countries, as well as tensions between the EU and the USA.

Paradoxically, Central and Eastern Europe seems to pose lesser problems on the way to such double membership than do some Western European countries. All ten EU accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe are NATO members or candidates. Eight of them (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) stand a chance of EU membership as of 2004. Only Romania and Bulgaria will stay outside the EU for longer; yet, just as Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, they are very likely to be invited to NATO at the Prague Summit in November 2002. In the middle of the decade, eight Central and Eastern European countries will get double membership. The two other countries, Romania and Bulgaria, will be NATO members and will have a chance of EU membership around 2010.

It will be more of problem to convince four EU member states (Finland, Sweden, Austria, Ireland) to NATO accession. Finland, Austria, and Sweden have decided to stay out of NATO mainly due to their relations with the USSR during the Cold War. The breakdown of the USSR offered these countries a chance of accession to the European Communities, which they promptly did. Yet their public opinion, as well as a great part of their political class, oppose NATO membership. Today, however, when Russia co-operates closer with NATO and NATO is becoming more of a political institution, thinking in terms of the Cold War is a dangerous anachronism. Two Mediterranean countries, Malta and Cyprus, should also become NATO members and are likely to join the EU soon.

In turn, NATO members should become EU member states. As indicated above, the process should be relatively smooth in Central and Eastern Europe (except Romania and Bulgaria). It is a real problem, however, how to encourage other NATO members - Norway and Iceland - to join the EU; although prepared for accession, they have so far refused to become EU members. The debate on EU accession in these countries should not only look at economic ramifications but also raise the issue of European security which in the future will be inseparably linked to both NATO and the EU. Refusing EU membership, these countries are confining themselves to marginalisation, due for instance to the growing importance of „soft security" covered by the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

Turkey is a separate issue. Its EU accession is much more problematic than that of Romania and Bulgaria. Turkey may be an exception to the rule and continue to stay out of the EU as a NATO member. But the EU will have to pursue a special policy towards Turkey since many problems in Europe and its vicinity, including the Middle East, will remain unsolved without Turkey's contribution to security. Following the example of its relations with Norway or Switzerland, the EU could co-operate closer with Turkey by signing new association agreements, and so give Turkey a substitute of EU membership without decision-making power. Yet Turkey may reject this option: with growing significance of the European Security and Defence Policy, knowing its strategic importance to the EU, Turkey will probably make more insistent demands of EU accession.

The outstanding problem is that of the position of Ireland and Denmark in the EU. Ireland, not a NATO member, does not want to fully participate in the CESDP. Denmark, in turn, while a NATO member, also rejects the CESDP. The political class of the two countries should realise that their position implies marginalisation in the institutions, just as is the case of Norway and Iceland.

## *Specialisation as a Condition of Solidarity*

It is of utmost importance to be able to identify actual threats and to adjust the security and defence policy accordingly. It is one of the fundamental qualities of modern security that there is no clear dividing line between internal and external security of the state. As a consequence, many different political institutions (the police, the army, the immigration service) need to co-operate and to set up specialised services (gendarmerie, hit force, chemical and biological defence units). On the other hand, with such a broad approach to security and the need to be constantly alert in order to react to new developments, the state may be overburdened with both financial and administrative responsibilities. In other words, the only effective though imperfect and slow process that can ensure security of the state is international co-operation whereby each country has a specialised responsibility and contributes to European security.

Given the foregoing, insisting on a model of, for instance, heavy territorial forces based on universal conscription is not only unjustifiable but also serves to preserve the divide between allies. Reluctance to increase military budgets has the same effect. Solidary alliance does not mean that all countries need to have significant military capacities, but it makes them try to come up with ways to contribute an added value to the capacities of NATO and, in the future, also the EU. Countries with limited potential, both in Western and Eastern Europe, unable to single-handedly develop significant capacities, have to get involved in international projects and find their specialisation there. Even such European powers as the United Kingdom, France, or Germany are not and will never be able to develop independent capacities to react to all possible conflicts.

Specialisation is a condition to ensure solidarity among European partners in the future. The EU will certainly have a hard core of countries with the largest military potential (UK, France, Germany). There is a risk that these countries might take action on their own and ignore the opinion of other EU member states in the case of threat. This would be the end of an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Consequently, it is desirable that strong members refrain from developing some military capacities that will become the specialised focus of weaker members, as mutually agreed by all EU or NATO members. Importantly, countries with a weaker military position may offer a significant contribution to soft security, e.g., Poland, Lithuania, and Slovakia will be responsible for the common Eastern border of the EU.

In this context, Europe should trigger a process to replace several national armies with pan-European military capacities and, in a longer term, a European army as a pillar of the North-Atlantic Treaty. National armies were formed to protect countries from their immediate neighbours. Today, EU and NATO member states face no risk of conflict with neighbours - other members of the same organisations. There is now no risk of aggression on the part of European countries which remain outside the enlarged EU and NATO. It is thus anachronistic to stick to national armies in today's Europe.

The formation of a European army, alongside European border guards for joint protection of EU borders, should be the final aim of European integration in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Creating a European army is the only way to prevent renationalisation of security policies in Europe whereby some countries would only concentrate on threats to their security while

ignoring threats common to all partners. It is also the only way to preserve and to reinforce political coherence both in NATO and the EU.

The formation of such an army would probably not imply that there would be European soldiers falling outside national jurisdiction, but it would put in place a common European command while European countries would develop specialisation. This would, however, require that all countries follow the same direction in developing their military force, e.g., by abolishing or restricting universal conscription in order to form fully professional armies. Although the concept of a European army is strictly political and cannot be successfully implemented in the long term unless political integration of European security advances, yet this direction seems a requirement of sound reason as it is a way to stop the drifting apart of two continents: Europe and America. Since European societies are visibly tired of European integration while politicians are not ready to deepen the process, the concept should be put in practice on a step-by-step basis, by using opportunities to combine capacities (e.g., common strategic transportation) or to divide capacities functionally (specialisation).

This specialisation should not be understood to imply concentration on a narrow area, e.g., developing a single kind of military forces or their single component. Each country has a specific geographic location, history, and military tradition. Specialisation is a matter of emphasis, of setting several (rather than several dozen) priorities for each country to contribute an added value to the capacities of NATO or the EU. Today, added value consists not in quantitative potential (headcount, hardware) but in qualitative potential, i.e., the ability to deploy resources (transportation, logistics) and/or use them more effectively (precise munitions, in-flight refuelling systems). Most importantly, all these measures should enhance the common potential of the European pillar rather than support capacities advancing national interests only.

Specialisation starts with regional, or international, co-operation enabling more rational deployment of resources and avoidance of an overlap of existing capacities. Although the issue typically appears in the context of the CESDP discussion between the EU and NATO, or between Europe and America, yet this is an exclusively European issue, as demonstrated by the development of a joint Czech-Polish-Slovak brigade, joint international battalions, and the planned formation of a European strategic transportation command unit. Such co-operation has far-reaching political ramifications as it offers each and every country the opportunity to participate in solving problems of international security.

The perception of threats is still a differentiating factor of those European countries which in the future will be part of the enlarged EU and NATO. More eager than some Western European countries to be good allies of the USA, Central and Eastern Europe countries consent to the USA's exceptional approach to world-wide security. They accept the use of force as a tool to defend one's interests even if the international law does not provide explicit grounds for such action. Hence, among others, their determination to become members of NATO which they see as the only way to protect their sovereignty thanks to the US leadership.

With their experience of being close neighbours of Russia and remaining in the zone of Russia's influence for many decades, these countries are very cautious about plans of broad opening up of Euro-Atlantic institutions to Russia. Unlike some European capitals, as well as Washington whose position has visibly changed in the wake of September 11, these countries make their support to Russia's efforts to establish closer relations with NATO and the EU contingent on real change in Russia's policy rather than mere declared change. In other words, they are much less willing to give Russia political credit.

As a result of these two factors, Central and Eastern European countries tend to see NATO as the American tool of protecting European partners against military aggression from third party countries, mainly Russia. This vision is far removed from reality. New members come to NATO with beliefs that

often differ from the actual evolution of the organisation, as well as interests that may contradict those of NATO's older members. The reaction of Central and Eastern European countries to ongoing politicisation of NATO and closer co-operation with Russia may give rise to serious trouble in the organisation and undermine its position. The same may affect the EU. To ensure that this does not happen, all members of both organisations, including their existing and future members, need to carefully handle their own doubts and those of their partners. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe must realise that there is more to NATO membership than being a partner of the USA. The organisation can only work if it is seen as a value in its own right; its survival should be the priority, more important than desired development of relations with one or several partners.

With their greater political experience and, usually, greater capacity for action, Western European partners must make sure that new members feel they are being treated equally. This is a question of consultation and representation of opinions even (or especially) if, for instance, its objective military weakness would exclude a country or a group of countries from playing an important role. Active participation in plans and actions of the largest players in European or Euro-Atlantic policy should be available not only to Central and Eastern European countries but also to those Western European countries whose size or power are too small to make them decision-makers in international policy.

# III.

### *New Policy Towards Excluded Countries*

Both NATO and the EU should take action to minimise the number of excluded countries. Some states can quite easily be included: Croatia, for instance, has recently became an official NATO candidate.

However, most countries of both the ex-USSR (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova) and the Balkans (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania) are likely to remain excluded for longer. This is due, on one hand, to the policy of the EU and NATO which keeps them at a distance and offers little opportunity of accession. On the other hand, the excluded countries bear responsibility for their position: they tend to isolate themselves by undertaking little, if any, reforms necessary to adjust to the standards of modern states and societies.

In order to prevent future crises, the EU and NATO need to adopt an open policy towards the group of (self-)excluded countries; both the EU and NATO should offer realistic prospects of accession once these countries implement necessary reforms. This is particularly important for those countries, which aspire to join structures of the Western world, e.g., Ukraine or Macedonia. A positive example of an emerging open policy came in April 2002 with the initiative of the UK and Swedish governments within the EU framework concerning a new policy towards Ukraine, Belarus, and Macedonia. The authors of the policy have advocated a special neighbour status for these countries.

There is no doubt that the guiding principle of the new policy towards Eastern neighbours of the enlarged EU must rely on direct dialogue with these countries rather than indirect mediation. The same principle pertains to NATO's policy. The dialogue is particularly needed in the case of post-USSR countries, still perceived by some Western European and US politicians and experts as an area of Russia's influence or responsibility. When both NATO and the EU are starting to closely co-operate with Russia, it is only natural that closer relations should be established between NATO and the EU and the countries located between their territory and Russia. Aiming at best possible co-operation with NATO and the EU, Russia should also be interested in closer links between these two organisations and Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. It may be stipulated that the real test of the new partnership with Russia will look at its willingness to adopt a new quality approach, for instance on the issue of Belarus.

In the case of the Balkans, the main issue is the inclusion of Serbia in the process of European integration and North Atlantic co-operation. Although the new people in power in Belgrade are looking more favourably to the West, Serbia is still far from opting for full integration with the Western world. Another issue is that of failed states: countries which are in fact under international protectorate (notably, Bosnia and Herzegovina, but to some extent also Macedonia). Kosovo is a similar case: clearly, the international community has no concept of the future of the region.

Although the countries at stake can be grouped under the common category of (self-)excluded states, they must be approached on a case-by-case basis. Their future is largely dependent on internal growth [development] which should, as much as possible, be encouraged and fostered from the outside through adequate policies.

Thinking of the countries of this category, there are hardly any spectacular results of large-scale political projects on security. After all, had those projects been successful, there would be no (self-)exclusion. A step-by-step strategy seems most appropriate. As part of this policy, joint battalions could be set up to undertake joint action within the EU and NATO framework. This would help to initiate or sustain a dialogue between these countries and the North Atlantic and European Union structures. Co-operation between Poland and Ukraine which started in the 1990s is a good example: the two countries have established a joint battalion currently engaged in the KFOR; they are also planning to set up a joint brigade and a Polish-Ukrainian air force transportation squadron.

What (self-)excluded countries need is a broader perspective on security issues. Pull action should be taken not only with regard to hard security but also other issues, including those falling under the third pillar of the EU (Justice and Home Affairs). Co-operation should support excluded countries in building an effective and efficient state. Though neither EU nor NATO is in a position to implement major transformation in excluded countries without these countries' own involvement, thoughtful use of financial assistance and political pressure may produce desired results. This, however, requires a critical analysis of the existing methods of economic assistance as well as the ways in which it is used: it is too often the case that a lot of money is wasted either by local politicians or due to international rivalry, also among many non-governmental organisations.

*Notes:*

# On the Future
# OF EUROPE

## Reply Sheet
Stefan Batory Foundation's Policy Papers

Dear Sir/Madam,
The attached documents provide an independent opinion of Polish NGOs on important international issues relevant to the process of European integration. Stefan Batory Foundation, which launched the series of Policy Papers is one of the leading Polish foundations, which since its establishment in 1989 has supported civil society in Poland and stimulated public debate on important policy issues.
If you are interested in receiving our reports on a regular basis, please fill in this reply sheet and send it back to us:

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