World Forum on Democracy

Mr. Bronisław Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland

ADDRESS TO THE WORLD FORUM ON DEMOCRACY

The concept of solidarity is weakly embedded in our view of international relations. When it appeared in the Polish events of August 1980 it was used to contrast with the ideology of class struggle and omnipotence of the state. The mainspring of the sense of that kind of solidarity was "the strength of the weak". National bonds also entered the picture but so, too, did some sense of human dignity and perhaps even brotherhood. In defiance of all political realism, the congress of the Polish Solidarity movement appealed for unity of action by workers in the whole of Eastern Europe, thus confounding Communism with its own slogans.

During the great debates on the Kosovo intervention one of the authorities cited was Ambrose of Milan, a Christian theologian of the 4th century, and his words: "He who does not keep harm off a friend, if he can, is as much in fault as he who causes it". Thanks to the power of the contemporary media we are made aware of the woes of others, and the tortured face of a child dying of hunger or struck down by a sniper's bullet arouses compassion. Indeed, universalization of compassion is emerging as one of the elements of globalization. This is contributing to spreading the feeling that humanitarian intervention is legitimate ¦ at any rate whenever it can be effective.

Obviously, the entry of solidarity into the domain of international relations raises awkward legal and political questions. It seems acceptable to say that solidarity epitomizes the idea of being prepared to act together on occasions when the purposes of the United Nations are challenged. It is then when the concept of international community or cooperation of people and nations becomes meaningful and can have legal force.
But, inevitably, we are then confronted by the problem of national sovereignty.

Sovereignty, defined as sovereignty of nation-states, and international order ¦ these two elements constituted, until not so long ago, a logically coherent whole. We know, too, what it was called: the Westphalia order.

The evolution of this Westphalia order in succeeding centuries did not change its essential nature, in particular the key role and primacy assigned to national sovereignty. Even in the Cold War period when it might have seemed that inter-bloc confrontation constrained the freedom of action of the states involved and limited their individual sovereignty the logic of the international system remained basically unchanged. The state ¦ now writ large ¦ was not only the political but also the theoretical frame of reference.

Nor was the situation changed by the onset of the decolonization process. The so-called "third force" which, starting with the Bandung Conference, the then newly emergent nations and the other countries which later freed themselves from colonial rule hoped to create was a notable addition to the Westphalia order, but in no sense a contradiction of the logic of its operation. Indeed, it could even be argued that it was precisely this "third force" which gave the system a new impetus and a new lease of life. In the clash between the possible and the theoretically desirable the emergent nations opted, willy-nilly, for the possible. But this denoted reinforcing, not challenging, rules not of their making. The dilemmas with which the United Nations system is currently wrestling are only a reflection of the immense difficulties involved in trying to go beyond principles according to which sovereignty of the nation state was all-important.

One may also speculate whether a similar process has not been set in motion as a result of the collapse of communism in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the break-up of the Soviet bloc. Might we find this sui generis decolonization also having the effect of consolidating the old-style international order?

For now, there is no clear-cut answer to this question. I would, however, like to draw attention to the appearance, still shadowy but clearly signalled, of a certain dangerous tendency. I refer to attempts to revert to what might be called classic forms and methods of interpreting national sovereignty, driven not so much by external threats as by the internal difficulties experienced by particular nation states. These difficulties ¦ and the word is a euphemism which masks acute conflicts, wars and even, in some countries, a resurgence of dictatorial regimes ¦ are transposed, as it were, to important, though still nascent, new elements in the international order which infringe the traditional formula of sovereignty. In such circumstances the watchwords of equality and sovereignty lose their liberating power and represent in effect an attempt to arrest the opening-up of the international system to the new impulses and ideas that appeared at the turn of the eighties and nineties.

If this dangerous tendency is to be understood, correctly interpreted and effectively counteracted we have to introduce two new concepts to our discourse: human rights and democracy. For these two concepts are, basically, the biggest threat to the traditional international order. They are also, whenever any attempt is made to give them concrete shape, a challenge to the inertia of institutions which evolved in the past as a two-pronged response: to threats arising from disruptions of the balance of power among nation states and to threats to the traditionally defined sovereignty of the nation state.

These assertions might seem, on the face of it, paradoxical. After all, we know that if the matter is reduced to the relationship between human rights and democracy, on the one hand, and sovereignty, on the other, it can be assumed that in normal situations there will be no collision between these two principles. It is after all states which bear the responsibility for ensuring conditions in which individuals and groups are free to enjoy the rights and liberties to which they are entitled in accordance with international standards. Security, freedom, equality of opportunity, economic and social rights and conditions, including access to education ¦ these are all areas in which the international community cannot substitute for the state. Though globalization, to use a piece of shorthand, is creating a new environment for performance of these tasks, it will not in the foreseeable future abolish the very idea of the nation state.

The problem has to do with exceptional situations which, judging by the frequency with which they occur, are not in fact so very exceptional. In particular it concerns:

large-scale and gross violations of human rights by governments;
drives for self-determination and other forms of national emancipation;
the phenomenon of so-called low-intensity states or, simply, implosion of a state (Somalia, Sierra Leone, etc.).

In each of these cases the connection between the sovereignty principle and the situation to which it applies disappears. Firstly, the state, instead of protecting its citizens and population, becomes a threat to them. Secondly, a part of the population rejects the state, which it sees as an enemy, and presses for establishment of its own state or sub-state structures (broad autonomy). Thirdly, the state simply ceases to exist and external actors have to assume responsibility for performing some of its functions with respect to the population thus "orphaned" (that is, left without a state of its own).

In each of these instances the international community cannot stand by and watch; in each of them we have to be able to say, paraphrasing a certain president, "Human rights, stupid!"
We still have no answers to the far from trivial problem of the mechanisms of response, encapsulated in the ongoing debate in the following series of questions. Who takes the decision? in what circumstances do they take it? who takes part? what means should be employed by humanitarian assistance or intervention operations? I have made clear my views on this matter, not least during my term as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE.

Mechanisms aside, there is also the important matter of politics, that is, the presence of the will to take the right decision, however difficult, on launching an operation. In every situation there is a need of courage. Also crucial is consistency. In a nutshell, what is required is leadership. Let us take just four instances of very different reactions by the international community to humanitarian catastrophes in just the past few months: Kosovo, East Timor, Chechnya, and Zaire.

Inconsistency on the part of democratic governments ¦ or, as it is more bluntly called, double standards and hypocrisy ¦ is the very thing that, to the delight of despots, undermines the moral foundations of the international order and weakens the legitimation of our actions in situations which cry out for such intervention. Here one cannot put too high a premium on the role of non-governmental organizations, civil society, the media and independent public opinion in making it impossible for governments to retreat into double standards, hypocrisy and fence-sitting in the name of a misconceived "realpolitik".

Humanitarian operations and action to put an end to conflicts, violations of human rights or genocide are only the first step. The lesson of Kosovo is that it is easier to stop people fighting than to ensure a lasting peace and establish foundations for a democratic order. Operation Allied Force proved more successful than the Pact for Stability in the Balkans. Or so, at any rate, it looks today.

Here, too, there is enormous scope for non-governmental organizations in a variety of areas ¦ humanitarian aid, social and economic development projects, promotion of human rights and democratic standards, consolidation of conditions for an equitable and lasting peace, etc. By various estimates, some two-thirds of the humanitarian aid distributed world-wide passes through the hands of non-governmental organizations. The money spent by them for these purposes now amounts to more than World Bank loans. The personnel resources of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are, we know, larger than those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Here the role of non-governmental organizations is unique and they should be allowed to pursue their activities truly "without frontiers".

A chance of genuinely laying to rest the human rights-sovereignty dilemma is development of democracy. Democratic governance ensures respect for human rights within the framework of sovereign states. Sovereign because they reflect the will of the societies which form them. However, the dynamic of social processes is such that human rights and issues of democracy tend remarkably quickly to lose their inwardly-oriented nature and to become international factors. I emphasize the word factors because it would be unduly optimistic to claim that the outlines of a new international order are already clearly in place. This is a task that is still down the road and will in my opinion be the greatest challenge of the coming century.

If democracy is to survive and develop it will require not only determination and steadfastness but also good judgement from democrats. To be effective we must always be one step ahead, but not in isolation.

Democrats are to be found ¦ and this may come as a shock to some of my audience ¦ not only within the ranks of non-governmental organizations but also in governments. We must, remembering the different conditions in which we are operating, seek more and more often to create a common front.

Lastly, advancement of the prospect of a democratic world order requires democratic nations to work together, including in all international institutions. Emergence of a democratic caucus transcending the differences of interests dividing democratic nations will be the first step towards setting the stage for international debate and for action aiming to bring us closer to establishment of a new world order. You can be sure that Poland as the host of the ministerial conference and founding member of its Convening Group will be among the nations which decide to embrace a whole-hearted commitment to creation of such a democratic caucus and consensus.

Last but not least, I shall not now say goodbye because in a few hours I will have the pleasure of hosting the Forum participants and the delegates to the ministerial conference at a reception at the Royal Castle.

Thank you.