Poles and Ukrainians, Poland and Ukraine

The Paradoxes of Neighbourly Relations

Joanna Konieczna
Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University

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In searching for a context within which the present image of Ukraine and of Ukrainians in the eyes of Poles may be considered, recourse must be had to the history of these two people's relations. In Poland, the neighbouring nations are often thought of through a historical perspective; this is particularly true in the case of the Ukrainians, with whom Poles shared a single state for several hundred years. This fact may well account for the condescending, patronising treatment meted out to Ukrainians, an attitude usually accompanied by a staunchly negative view of the various currents favouring Ukrainian independence arising at different points in the two nations' joint history. This opposition towards Ukrainian independence prevailed even during the 19th century, when the Poles themselves were seeking allies in their own quest for national rebirth. While Polish political thought did posit the idea of Polish-Ukrainian co-operation at this time, the debate over the future shape of a newly arisen Polish Republic came to be dominated by incorporation rather than federation concepts for combining the two groups. In this way, an idea of brotherhood was transmuted into denial of the Ukrainians' entitlement to national identity and to their own state.

The same was true after World War I. Adolf Juzwenko writes that "neither historical, political, nor ethnic grounds were conducive to Polish-Ukrainian understanding. (...) In the Second Polish Republic, the concept of a national state gained the upper hand over that of a state nation". The newly emerged Polish state followed a policy of discrimination against ethnic minorities, with mutual antagonisms deepened further by the fact that, much of the time, ethnic divisions coincided with social ones. Ukrainians – or Ruthenians, as they were

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1 A synthesis of these ideas may be found in the essay by Aleksander Ziemny (1991); for a comprehensive selection of texts by proponents of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, from many years ago as well as from the present, please see the anthology Nie jesteśmy ukraińofilami edited by Paweł Kowal et al. (2002).

2 Also aired were ideas to the effect that Rusini were created by the powers which had partitioned Poland. Roman Dmowski, for instance, wrote that "long before the outbreak of the war, the Germans formulated the idea of organising the Malorusini [translator's note: Small Russians – a geographic designation] into a Ukrainian state and openly lent their support to the Ukrainian national movement" (quoted after P. Kowal, Przyczynki do dziejów „Sprawy ukraińskiej” w Polsce in: (P. Kowal et al. 2002) p. 10).
then referred to – were generally rural-dwelling peasants; the large rural estates, meanwhile, were most often owned by Poles or by Ruthenians who had become polonised.

Some publications from this period argue that Poles are culturally superior over Ukrainians, and also that Ukrainians are incapable of gaining independence (see, for instance, Kossak-Szczucka 1996). These, of course, were not the only writings on the subject, but it was they – concordant as they were with the idea of a Polish national state – which set the general tone towards Ukrainians.

The complex nature of Polish-Ukrainian relations was made even more difficult by the dramatic events of World War II; insofar as the collective Polish memory of the war and its immediate aftermath involves Ukrainians, the recollection is of what would today be called ethnic cleansing and of wholesale slaughter of Poles perpetrated by Ukrainian fighters. This issue is further complicated by the fact that, during communist times, the subject was banished from all official discourse; historians shunned discussion of it, no research was conducted, etc. Such knowledge as was passed on took the form of oral accounts by those who witnessed the upheaval and lived to tell their tale. Ukraine was a republic of the Soviet Union, and Poland was a Soviet satellite state; this circumstance predetermined and limited any discussion of shared history. This discussion could begin in earnest only in the year 1991.

In the meantime, books published in Poland after the war and assigned to schoolchildren as obligatory reading did their part to reinforce the stereotype of Ukrainians as war criminals; many young people were left with the conclusion that the sole purpose of the Ukrainian Insurgents’ Army lay in the murder of Poles.

For more than ten years now, Ukraine is an independent country. The Polish-Ukrainian border bears little resemblance indeed to the one familiar from Soviet times. Almost from the very beginning of political and economic changes in Poland, Poles have had quite intensive contacts with Ukrainians as well as with other nationalities once included in the Soviet Union. These contacts are significantly different from those pursued during communist times not only by virtue of their unprecedented intensity.

3 See the introduction to the anthology already cited, Nie jesteśmy ukrainofilami.
For many years, Poles were used to travel abroad, usually to Western Europe, to take up work – most usually unofficial – and to thus improved their material lot. Today, they encounter foreigners from further east who arrive in Poland for the very same purpose. This is an altogether new social phenomenon which is bound to exert its impact on the image of Ukrainians as perceived by Poles and on Polish attitudes towards Ukrainians as a national group and towards Ukraine as a state.

Ukraine is the largest European country which, following the next round of the European Union’s enlargement, will find itself outside the outer boundary of the EU. Since the first days of its independence, Ukraine has been occupying a prominent place in Poland’s foreign policy. Polish relations with Ukraine have been the object of considerable attention on the part of the mass media, and the ties being forged between the two countries are assuming a new importance with Poland’s imminent accession to the EU.

All these motives – the new role of Ukrainians as economic migrants, the social perception of the Ukrainian state in Poland – were taken into account in the survey discussed in the present paper. An important issue was posed in exploring the opinion held by society at large in Poland as regards the country’s policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. The first study to take into account almost all of these elements was carried out two years earlier - in January of 2001 - by the Institute of Public Affairs. On many points, the data published by the Institute of Public Affairs (see Konieczna, 2001) served as a point of reference for us, enabling us to formulate conclusions concerning tendencies and trends in the analysed phenomena.

1. Ukrainians as Migrants

Sociologists generally consider Polish society to be ill-disposed towards strangers, if not downright xenophobic. In the past, such attitudes had favourable conditions in which to appear because the average Pole had little

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4 While Russia is clearly larger, it can not be classified as an unqualifiedly European country.
5 The study presented in this paper was commissioned by the Stefan Batory Foundation and carried out by the Centre for Social Opinion Research (CBOS) on December 7-8, 2002. The sample comprised 1,000 people. The study constitutes part of the project pursued by the Stefan Batory Foundation and the Widrodzenlia Foundation, The Enlarged EU and Ukraine – New Relations; it was financed out of resources made available by the PAUKI Foundation.
6 See, eg, Paulo de Carvalho, Studenci obcokrajowcy w Polsce, IS UW, Warsaw 1990.
contact with foreigners. Foreign workers were an absolutely unknown phenomenon in Poland. For decades, Poland herself was a source of migrants seeking better livelihoods in the labour markets of Western Europe and beyond – certainly not a target of such travels. Those rare cases where foreigners did take up work or permanent residence in Poland were negligible from the statistical point of view, too much of an exception to have any impact on the awareness or outlook of the average citizen.

In the early 1990s, this situation began to change; the causes for this were manifold, the break-up of the Soviet Union and of the East Bloc being not the least among them. In the beginning, Poland became a transit country; in recent years, however, it has become a destination for immigrants in its own right (Iglicka, 2003). This fact has implications for Poland’s labour market as well as for the social perception of Poland’s neighbours to the east, whose representatives are now arriving in Poland in search of employment, whether legal or otherwise.

How is Polish society reacting to these phenomena? As it turns out, Poles are now taking a relatively friendly view of economic migrants, especially if the query about that view is couched in general terms. Asked about the preferred course of action to be adopted by the Polish government with regard to foreigners arriving in Poland from countries with a poorer economic situation, many respondents replied that such people should be allowed to work (a total of 46%). Only 17% of the respondents expressed definite opposition to migrants; 32% believed that the Polish government should seek to limit the influx of foreigners to Poland. For an illustration, please see graph 1.

**Graph 1**

What course of action should the government take with regard to economic migrants arriving in Poland?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course of Action</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All should be permitted to work</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May work provided there are jobs for them</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit immigration</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar immigration</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Batory Foundation, 2002
Three years earlier, in 1999, almost one-third of the respondents (31%) took the position that foreigners should not be permitted to work in Poland at all; the proportion of respondents voicing such a view today has fallen by half, down to 17%.

More than any other factor, the attitudes presented here were dependent on age. This dependency was almost linear in nature – the younger the respondents, the better disposed they were towards immigrants. In the lowest age category, comprising persons aged between 18 and 24, a total of 60% of the respondents expressed the view that all immigrants should be permitted to work or that immigrants should be able to work provided that there are jobs available for them.

Map 1
Regional differentiation in attitudes towards economic migrants

Older respondents were more keen to limit the influx of economic migrants to Poland.

It should also be noted that the degree of openness towards immigrants varied significantly among different regions of the country. The greatest number of persons favouring limits on arrivals by foreigners is to be found in the south-eastern regions of Poland abutting on Ukraine (map 1). By contrast, inhabitants of western and northern Poland – i.e. regions where practically all the residents are, in a sense, immigrants or descendants of immigrants – are the most open towards immigration.

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7 See the CBOS study from October 1999 discussed in the article by Sławomir Łodziński (2002)
8 For an explanation of the geographic division of Poland adopted for purposes of this study, please see the Annex.
The data presented here might be taken as suggesting that Poles, while generally willing to accept immigrants in their midst, harbour some particular antipathy towards migrants from Ukraine. More thorough analysis of the results, however, demonstrates that, although some negative sentiments certainly do occur, the nature of Polish attitudes towards Ukrainians is much more complex. Any interpretation of attitudes towards Ukrainians as compared to the overall view of economic migrants must take account of the fact that Ukrainians are the most numerous and most visible group among the foreigners trying to search for earning in Poland.

Contacts between Poles and Ukrainians

One of the important factors influencing the image of Ukrainians in the perception of Poles is presented in the frequency of contacts between the twin nations as well as in the nature of such contacts.

It is a known fact that no personal experiences or contacts are needed for the entrenchment of a stereotype; rather, stereotypes belong to the cultural tradition and system of values in force within a given societal group (Nawrocki 2001). The stereotype of a Jew exists despite of the fact that there are very few Jews to be found in Poland. As a matter of fact, "live" interaction actually serve to modify stereotypes and prevent them from taking root in some simplified and schematised form. The images of other ethnic groups shaped through constant contact with that group’s representatives have a cognitive function rather than an ideological one and tend to carry less emotional freight (on the different functions of stereotypes, see Kofta, Jasińska-Kania 2001).

Contacts between Poles and Ukrainians are rather frequent. More than half of the respondents (53%) admitted to first-hand contact with Ukrainians. It nonetheless appears that, in recent years, the circle of people interacting with Ukrainians has not expanded, with exactly the same result obtained in the Institute of Public Affairs study executed two years ago (Konieczna 2001). In other words, the stereotype-modifying influence of personal contacts extends to only a portion of the population.
There is one more important intervening factor to be borne in mind when studying Polish attitudes towards Ukrainians, one which is hard to capture using qualitative research methods – it appears that many Poles do not differentiate between Ukrainians, Belorusians, and Russians, subsuming all three groups under the dismissive term *Ruscy* ("Russkies"); on occasion, the *Ruscy* rubric is expanded even further so as to include Kazakhs and other nationalities from the Central Asian countries which once formed part of the Soviet Union. The criterion which determines membership in the *Ruscy* group seems to be comprised in use of the Russian language⁹. Accordingly, we can not know to what extent the stereotypes analysed in our study refer to the generalised *Ruscy* and to what extent they apply to Ukrainians in specific. Logically enough, it seems that the more direct the contacts, the more facile the accurate differentiation of nationalities.

Graph 2 demonstrates that encounters between Poles and Ukrainians take place predominantly within Poland and are chiefly of a commercial character (trade, services); spare time pursuits such as tourist travel or social gatherings, on the other hand, account for a scant percentage of these contacts. This becomes particularly manifest when the number of encounters with Ukrainians is used as the percentage base (right-hand side of the graph¹⁰).

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⁹ The situation is further complicated by the fact that Poles, for the most part, are incapable of differentiating between the Ukrainian, Belorusian, and Russian languages; to the untrained Polish ear, they all sound like Russian.

¹⁰ NB: The right-hand side of the graph presents the structure of Polish-Ukrainian contacts. The percentage base was the total number of different types of contact declared by respondents, not the number of respondents. For example, if a single respondent stated that she/he employs Ukrainian workers and buys goods from Ukrainian sellers, this would be counted as two contacts.
The number of Poles who have travelled to Ukraine following the break-up of the Soviet Union is so small as to preclude analysis of whether visitors to that country depart in any way from the attitudes of Ukraine and Ukrainians prevalent among the other respondents. In light of this, affirmations made by 21% of the respondents that they would travel to Ukraine even if 40.00 USD for a visa was required of Polish citizens (the current price of a Ukrainian visa) come as something of a surprise.

It is worth recalling at this point that, since 1996, Poland and Ukraine are bound by an agreement concerning visa-free travel. Citizens of both countries may sojourn in the territory of the other for up to three months on the basis of a valid passport only. This notwithstanding, travel to Ukraine clearly is not popular among Poles; therefore, one can’t help but wonder how the introduction of visa formalities and the attendant expense might have an encouraging effect. The younger respondents – those from the 18-24 and 25-39 age groups - professed a greater interest in travel to Ukraine, with 26% of them declaring a willingness to go there even if visas are instituted. Also discernible was the small difference in
interest in travel to Ukraine among inhabitants of different regions; interestingly enough, respondents living in the eastern regions of Poland declared less interest in such a trip (16%-18%) than those whose residences are further from the Polish-Ukrainian border.

In my opinion, these declarations of the respondents should be treated more in terms of interest in Ukraine sparked by the study itself rather than an actual readiness to travel there. Incidentally, this in itself is an interesting result which suggests that the general public’s interest in Ukraine may be simulated by simply raising the subject in a manner different than that usually seen in the mass media. So, perhaps, a spontaneous increase of interest in things Ukrainian can be increased merely by changing the tone of media coverage?

**Ukrainians as Employees**

As I had already mentioned, Poland has recently become a destination for economic migrants, first and foremost from countries bordering it to the east. The available data indicates that, when arrivals from the east take up employment in Poland, this employment is most frequently illegal, although it should be added here that nationals of the countries to the east of Poland – mostly Ukrainians - also constitute a majority among foreigners holding legitimate Polish work permits (Iglicka 2003). No accurate data concerning employment of Ukrainians in the grey economy is to be had. Estimated numbers of foreigners working in Poland illegally vary depending on the institution, from approximately 100 000 – 200 000 persons (State Labour Inspection) to as much as 1 000 000 persons (State Labour Office) (Łodziński 2003).

Our own research indicates that 14% of the respondents have had contact, whether direct or indirect, with Ukrainian workers; 2% have stated that they have personally employed Ukrainians. These results coincide with those obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs two years earlier; thus, it would appear that the situation is stable11.

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11 It should also be borne in mind, however, that a result of 2% falls within the margin of error adopted for both the surveys under discussion; accordingly, the estimates of illegal Ukrainian workers in Poland derived from these figures should be regarded with caution.
There are approximately 12.5 million households in Poland. If 2% of these have employed at least one Ukrainian, there would be some 250 000 Ukrainian citizens working in the country at various times. This, of course, is a rough estimate only. On the one hand, many Ukrainians work in more than one Polish household, meaning that the estimates just cited may be inflated; on the other, it seems reasonable to assume that at least some respondents who do employ Ukrainians did not admit it, resulting in a decrease of the figures. The last potential source of error is constituted in the fact that our survey was a representative study, meaning that the results obtained are burdened by a certain error by their very nature (and it is impossible to say whether that error increases the result or lessens it).

Our respondents were of the belief that foreigners working in Poland most frequently occupy themselves with commerce (70% of replies), work construction or refurbishment jobs (39%), or agriculture and gardening (17%). Other pursuits of immigrants mentioned by the respondents include physical labour (8%), household help (6%), prostitution (6%), catering (3%), and assorted criminal activity – smuggling, theft, and robbery (3%).

Only 16% of the respondents expressed the belief that Ukrainians somehow stand apart by virtue of the work engaged in by them; the remainder either believed that there is no such difference to speak of (55%) or did not have an opinion on this issue (29%). It turns out, however, that the list of jobs taken by Ukrainians formulated by those who regard them as distinct did not vary materially from that drawn up for immigrants in general, with the only difference lying in the order – construction and refurbishment was mentioned slightly more often than commerce.

As it turns out, Ukrainians are generally perceived to be good workers. An opinion to this effect was voiced not only by those respondents who have personal experience in this regard; this question has been put to all those participating in the survey. Thus, there are grounds for concluding that Poles have a positive opinion of Ukrainians in their capacity as workers; for a more detailed illustration, please see graph 3.

The majority of people who have dealt with Ukrainian workers expressed satisfaction with their work (with the combined proportion of "satisfied" and "rather satisfied" respondents standing at 58%). Only 5% were not satisfied with the work of Ukrainians; the remainder did not have an opinion. Such
indecisiveness may mean that there have been no conflicts between Ukrainian workers and their Polish employers; it may also suggest lacking knowledge, in that we have also asked people who have had indirect contact with Ukrainian workers (through neighbours or relatives).

**Graph 3**
Assessment of Ukrainians as workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are Ukrainians good workers?</th>
<th>(question posed to all the respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably yes</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably not</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessments by employers**
(question about satisfaction with Ukrainians’ work posed only to people who have had indirect or direct contact with Ukrainian workers)

Data: Batory Foundation, 2002

Opinions varied among our respondents as to whether Ukrainians take away the jobs of Poles or, rather, move into niches in the job market by taking up jobs shunned by Poles. This latter view had more proponents (50%) than that which has it that Ukrainians take away the jobs of Poles (44%). At the same time, however, well-nigh every fourth respondent believed that both these phenomena occur in parallel, ie that Ukrainians take jobs which Poles do not want and, at the same time, take away the jobs of Poles (table 1).
Table 1
Do Ukrainians take away the jobs of Poles?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukrainians take up jobs shunned by Poles</th>
<th>I disagree with the proposition that Ukrainians take up jobs shunned by Poles</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians take away the jobs of Poles</td>
<td>23% of all respondents</td>
<td>21% of all respondents</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I disagree with the proposition that Ukrainians take away the jobs of Poles</td>
<td>27% of all respondents</td>
<td>10% of all respondents</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: This summary does not include people who replied "I don’t know" to at least one of the questions (19% in total).

The frequency with which the various views concerning the impact of Ukrainian immigrants upon the Polish labour market arose was independent of the demographic characteristics of the respondents as well as of their place of residence. To some extent, these views were influenced by the material standing of the respondent’s family, with those who assessed their own financial situation as bad being more likely to perceive a competition for jobs between Poles and Ukrainians (every third respondent from this group believed that Ukrainians take away the jobs of Poles rather than picking up those which Poles do not want).

In analysing these views expressed by Poles about Ukrainian workers and their role in Poland’s job market, one can conclude that, in general, there is no problem here – there are no grounds for potential conflict, and the competition for jobs is not likely to engender hostility or antipathy. The percentage of people wont to view the situation in terms of a Polish-Ukrainian competition for jobs is comparatively small; at the same time, Ukrainian workers are valued, with the majority of employers expressing satisfaction with them.
In light of these results, it comes as some surprise that most of the respondents (53%) consider the fact that Ukrainians work illegally in Poland to have a negative impact on the Polish economy (graph 4).

It could be that such a distribution of the replies results from our use of the term "illegal work" in the survey question; this designation may have suggested to the respondents that, if the law does not accept the phenomenon under discussion, then they should not accept it either.

Graph 4
Assessments of the impact of illegal work by Ukrainians on the Polish economy

As it turns out, persons who consider Ukrainians to be good workers perceived their labour as beneficial to the Polish economy slightly more often than others, although also in this group did the view that work by Ukrainians brings negative consequences predominate. The conviction of Ukrainian labour’s harmfulness was connected to the age of the respondents, with the younger among them (aged 40 or less) being more likely to view it as detrimental than those aged over 40. This result could well have been influenced by the situation prevailing in Poland’s job market; the younger respondents either had not commenced work yet or still have a precarious position in the job market, causing them to fear all competition. There is also the possibility that the respondents aged 40 and above have recollections of their own trips to Western Europe in search of work and, accordingly, are less hasty in condemning those who are now arriving in Poland for the same reasons.

Logically enough, negative consequences of the Ukrainians’ work for Poland’s economy are most frequently perceived by those respondents who believe that Ukrainians take away the jobs of Poles. In this group, no less than 77% of those
The position adopted by this latter group is particularly interesting in that it presents one of the contradictions in Polish perceptions of Ukrainians. We have here quite a sizeable group of people who do not perceive any problems as regards Polish-Ukrainian competition in the labour market in that they believe that Ukrainians attend to those jobs which the Poles don't want, thus filling out a significant gap in the market. At the same time, however, almost every second member of this group thinks that the work of Ukrainians – of the very same people who fill a gap in the job market – brings negative consequences for the Polish economy. This, by the way, is not the only paradox persisting in the Polish view of Ukrainians.

It appears that the contradictions brought to light here resulted, to a large extent, from lack of knowledge or from insufficient consideration by the respondents of the issues raised in the study. Ukrainians taking jobs in Poland have never become the subject of sustained debate in the mass media, and the issue is not a frequent topic of social discussion; on a day-to-day basis, therefore, the respondents – even those who employ foreign workers in their own households or businesses – are not obliged to dwell on the matter and to formulate some opinion. This conclusion arose from the fact that a positive view of the Ukrainian worker’s impact was particularly manifest among those Poles who are aware of the existence of contentious issues presently existing in Polish-Ukrainian relations and capable of pointing them out; these would be people who have a general interest in Polish-Ukrainian relations and take the time to reflect on their different aspects. This reflection has brought the majority of these people to the conclusion that the fact of Ukrainians’ work in Poland, even in the grey economy, is not harmful. The remainder, meanwhile, do not devote much thought to these issues, leaving their views somewhat incoherent.

12 In this group, 13% of the respondents thought that the work of Ukrainians is beneficial or probably beneficial (among the remaining respondents – 7%); another 26% believed its effect to be neutral (among the remaining respondents - 20%).
The issue of visas for Ukrainians

The final aspect of Polish attitudes towards Ukrainians arriving in Poland relates to visas. This issue has been receiving considerable coverage in the mass media, and the position that Poland must begin requiring visas of Ukrainian citizens as a prerequisite to its own accession to the EU (all countries party to the Schengen accords enforce a visa requirement for Ukrainians) has been clearly expounded.

Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the anticipated introduction of a visa requirement for Ukrainian citizens enjoys the support of Poles (graph 5). Exactly half of those surveyed believe that the introduction of visas for Ukrainians will be a favourable move for Poland; the contrary view was expressed by 24% of the respondents. The same results were obtained in the Institute of Public Affairs study from two years ago (Konieczna 2001).

Support for the imminent institution of visas for Ukrainians has a very stable base in Polish society. This support is slightly lower than average among those who believe that Ukrainians working in Poland fill out gaps in the labour market, taking up jobs unwanted by Poles. The relation between support for visas and opinions about Ukrainians as workers, meanwhile, is rather surprising. Persons who responded "definitely yes" to the question whether Ukrainians are good workers support visas slightly less often than the remainder, yet those who consider Ukrainians to be "rather good" workers express support for visas decidedly more often than the remainder.
Thus, it appears that, from a general perspective, opinions about the quality of work performed by Ukrainians in Poland does not have material bearing on support for the imminent institution of a visa requirement for Ukrainians, with the observed differences being of a more incidental nature. Support for the introduction of visas is, to a certain degree, correlated with the attitude towards Poland’s accession to the EU. Persons supporting accession tend to favour visas more than Euro-sceptics, although this inter-relationship is not a particularly pronounced one.

The education level of the respondents has also a slight influence on attitudes towards visas. Only one group of respondents had a different view than the rest of population: those who had completed post-secondary or higher education opposed visas more frequently than members of other groups. In this group, every third respondent believes that the introduction of visas for Ukrainian citizens would be unfavourable for Poland.

Poles’ expectations with regard to the introduction of visas for Ukrainians centre on security and law enforcement considerations, with 40% looking forward to a decline of crime levels in Poland and 39% hoping that the long queues and disorganisation prevailing on the border will be remedied. Similar expectations predominated two years earlier, at the time of the Institute of Public Affairs study. Table 2 below juxtaposes respondents’ expectations concerning the introduction of visas for Ukrainians at present and two years ago.
Table 2
Expectations concerning future introduction of visas for Ukrainians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 Expectations concerning future introduction of visas for Ukrainians</th>
<th>January 2001</th>
<th>December 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime rates in Poland will fall</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queues at the border will disappear, more efficient operation of the border crossings</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visas will impede commercial contacts between Poles and Ukrainians</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-abiding Ukrainians will find it easier to travel to Poland</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-abiding Ukrainians will find it harder to travel to Poland</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The financial situation of my family will deteriorate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: 2001 – Institute of Public Affairs, 2002 – Batory Foundation

It is worth noting that, while the percentage of people expecting a fall in crime has declined somewhat, there has been a marked increase (by 6 percentage points) of those who worry that visas will impede commercial and business dealings between the two countries. On the other hand, however, there are now more people who believe that visas will facilitate travel to Poland for the "decent Ukrainian citizens" while weeding out less desirable visitors in the screening process. Also, it turns out that there are very few respondents afraid that their own material standing will deteriorate because of the introduction of visas for Ukrainians. Results yielded by the Institute of Public Affairs study two years ago were very similar. It appears, then, that despite the fairly developed Polish-Ukrainian trade and the mutual exchange of services, there is but a small group of people for whom these services are of vital economic importance (or, alternately, that few people are aware of such a significance); the foregoing of such services in the future is not expected to result in major consequences for households.

The issue of visas for Poland’s eastern neighbours (not only Ukrainians) has been taking up a considerable amount of space in the press; the Rzeczpospolita daily alone has carried more than 1000 pieces of varying size and importance in the
space of the last ten years. Polish politicians have also weighed in on the issue. The official policy of the Polish government, which adopts the premise that visas for Ukrainians ought to be comparatively easy to obtain, enjoys the support of only 40% of respondents to our survey. Another 40%, meanwhile, would like the visas to be granted under a more restrictive regime, expensive, and requiring many formalities, thus making them a more daunting barrier to potential visitors.

It is quite difficult to pinpoint factors determining our respondents' view with respect to visas for Ukrainians. Their assessment of Ukrainian workers or of their impact, whether negative or positive, on the Polish economy do not seem to be of much importance here. A restrictive visa regime received more support among those respondents who believe that Ukrainians "steal" Polish jobs; meanwhile, those who did not perceive a problem of Polish-Ukrainian competition for jobs were more likely to favour visas which are easier to obtain. All things considered, however, these interrelations were tenuous. The same applies to the relation between views on the subject of visas and the degree of support for Poland's perspectives for European integration. Those in favour of Poland's integration with the EU are more receptive to the idea of easily available visas for Ukrainians than those holding anti-integration views. This inter-relation, however, was likewise weak.

Visas regulated by a stringent regime received decidedly more support among respondents harbouring dislike towards Ukrainians. Many more in favour of easily available visas – obviously enough – were to be found among respondents who profess a liking for Ukrainians. It is surprising, however, that almost every third respondent declaring positive feelings for Ukrainians also favoured strict regulations governing the issue of visas to them.

The relation between views on the visa issue and feelings towards immigrants in general was similar. Those who took a positive view of immigrants expressed more support for easily obtainable visas than those calling for limits on the influx of immigrants. This relation, however, has turned out to be surprisingly weak. Also, persons adopting the most positive outlook on work by immigrants favoured a restrictive visa regime with relative frequency; this last phenomenon is illustrated in graph 6.

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13 See the back issues of *Rzeczpospolita* available on-line at [http://www.rp.pl](http://www.rp.pl).
14 In a joint statement, the Presidents of Poland and of Ukraine announced that the visas required of Ukrainian citizens entering Poland as of October 1, 2003 shall be free of charge and that Ukraine will continue allowing Poles to enter the country without visas.
The proverbial other end of the stick, however, is worth dwelling upon for a moment. Even those respondents who would be happy to see economic migrants barred from Poland relatively often express themselves in favour of easily available visas for Ukrainians – one fourth of those who believe Poland should be interdicted to economic migrants simultaneously support readily available visas for Ukrainians.

Persons aged 40 to 59 account for the largest age group among proponents of easily available visas for Ukrainians; also, men were better disposed towards Ukrainians with regard to visas than women.

Visas for Ukrainians are yet another aspect of Polish attitudes towards their eastern neighbours fraught with paradoxes and inconsistencies. These probably arise to a large extent from the fact that immigration, illegal work, and all and sundry activity by foreigners in Poland (criminal activity included) are all new elements of the social reality with to which the respondents have been exposed to for ten years at the most, usually less. Hence the paradoxes; these new phenomena yet have to establish themselves in the social perception and to accrue stereotypes. There is no conventional wisdom on these subjects, and those respondents who do not deal with the issues at hand on a regular basis do not have fully formed opinions on the subject.
2. Ukrainians as "ours" and as "strangers"

For some time, the regular research into Polish sentiment towards various nationalities carried out by CBOS (the Centre for Social Opinion Studies) has been displaying a tendency towards greater positive feeling for Poland's neighbours to the east (Strzeszewski 2003). This tendency can also be observed when juxtaposing the results of the study carried out in 2001 by the Institute of Public Affairs with the most recent research discussed in this paper.

Table 3
Polish liking for selected nationalities (juxtaposition with January 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Strong liking</th>
<th>Liking</th>
<th>Neither like nor dislike</th>
<th>Dislike</th>
<th>Strong dislike</th>
<th>Difficult to tell</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorusians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The average values do not take account "difficult to tell" replies. Given the scale used, the greater the average value, the stronger the average dislike towards the given nationality.

Pausing over the shifts in average positive sentiment during the two years intervening between the Institute of Public Affairs study and the present one, we find that the greatest changes in plus have occurred with regard to Russians, Belorusians, and Ukrainians. As regards this last nationality, the increase of good
will among Poles has been significant to the degree that Ukrainians are no longer the least liked among Poland’s neighbours\textsuperscript{15}.

**Ukrainians as neighbours – liking and distance**

More thorough analysis of replies given to the questions concerning liking for various nationalities indicates that the respondents divide the nationalities enumerated in the above table into two basic groups\textsuperscript{16}. The first of these encompasses the Czechs and the Slovaks, who seem to enjoy unequivocal good feeling among Poles. While this group also includes the Germans, they are something of a borderline case, with the attitude towards them being less than the across-the-board liking displayed towards Poland’s neighbours to the south\textsuperscript{17}.

The second group, more uniform as regards the respondents’ feelings towards them, consists of Poles’ eastern neighbours – the Belorusians, Russians, and Ukrainians. Their subsumption into a single group means that the respondents’ attitude towards these nationalities is internally correlated. Persons who adopt a positive approach with regard to, for instance, Belorusians also display an above-average to take a similarly friendly view of Russians and Ukrainians.

One aspect characteristic of Poles’ attitudes towards their eastern neighbours is that they significantly depend on the overall optimism of the respondents, as testified to by the correlation between a friendly attitude towards Ukrainians, Russians, and Belorusians and the subjective assessment of the station of one’s own family. Persons who, in their own opinion, are making their way in life are better disposed towards these nationalities than those who complain of a bad material situation. No tendency of this sort is to be observed in the attitude of Poles towards their remaining neighbours.

\textsuperscript{15} This list does not include Lithuanians, but it is known from other sources that this nationality is much liked in Poland (see, for instance, the CBOS study document no BS/1/2003 from January 2003, *Czy Polacy lubia inne narody*, edited by M. Strzeszewski (http://www.cbos.com.pl)).

\textsuperscript{16} The positive and negative feelings towards the nationalities named in the list were subjected to factor analysis. This has yielded two factors which provide for 68% variance in their constituent variables. The first, and more cohesive, factor comprises Poland’s eastern neighbours (Belorusians, Russians, Ukrainians), the second – Slovaks, Czechs, and Germans.

\textsuperscript{17} While Polish attitudes towards Germans lie beyond the scope of this paper, we might note on its margin that these attitudes have undergone a dramatic shift during the last ten years, with Germans “promoted” from the group of least-liked nationalities to those which Poles view with the greatest warmth. Such a development is an exceptional one as regards Polish views of other nations; it was brought about through persistent effort on both sides of the Polish-German border.
Positive feelings towards Ukrainians is associated, if only to a limited degree, with the respondents’ age and, to a larger extent, with their education level. The least antipathy towards Ukrainians is to be observed among persons aged 25-39 and 40-59 as well as among those with higher education. The oldest and the youngest respondents, meanwhile, display a similar amount of mistrust and dislike towards Poland’s eastern neighbours, although the reasons informing these views are different. The research conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs two years ago has demonstrated that older respondents’ views of the Ukrainians are influenced most strongly by memories of the past and by historically rooted prejudice. The younger respondents, meanwhile, tend to rely more on present-day experience; many of them regard Ukrainians as a "second class" group of people, scrounging around Poland for meagre earnings – an altogether unappealing group.

There is little regional differentiation in the attitudes taken towards Ukrainians. The northern and western parts of the country do not differ significantly in this respect from the central regions. The south-eastern portion of Poland abutting on the Ukraine does stand out in this respect on account of the higher dislike towards Ukrainians; again, however, the regional differences are not very large.

An interesting measure of the distance adopted towards different nationality is presented in the bloc of questions comprising what is known as the Bogardus Scale. The Bogardus Scale has first been applied in social research during the 1920s; with modifications designed to take into account new social realities, it remains in use to this day. This means of assessing psychological and emotional distance has been used in the Institute of Public Affairs study, and we have applied the exact same formulation in the study being discussed here\(^\text{18}\).

In analysing the social distance adopted with regard to Ukrainians, it is difficult to ignore the significant shift which has occurred during the past two years. In January of 2001, Ukrainians were, on the whole, accepted rather than rejected in two capacities only – as tourists and as co-workers. Today, the situation is reversed – there remain only three roles in which the respondents reject Ukrainians, namely management of a company, sitting on a municipal council, and joining the family through marriage. Ukrainians in this last role, it might be added, meet with decidedly less opposition than in the previous two.

\(^\text{18}\) Factor analysis has confirmed that all the questions used in constructing this scale constitute indicators of a single attitude which, to follow Bogardus, may be dubbed social distance.
Table 4
Distance felt by Poles towards Ukrainians (January 2001 and December 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you agree for a Ukrainian...</th>
<th>Yes 2001</th>
<th>Yes 2002</th>
<th>No 2001</th>
<th>No 2002</th>
<th>Hard to tell 2001</th>
<th>Hard to tell 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To visit Poland as a tourist</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To work with you</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be your next-door neighbour</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To take up permanent residence in Poland</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To become one of your close friends</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To receive Polish citizenship</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To join your family by marrying your son/daughter</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To manage the company in which you work</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To sit on the municipal council of your town</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: 2001 – Institute of Public Affairs
2002 – Batory Foundation

The distance felt with regard to Ukrainians depends strongly on age\(^{19}\) and on education\(^{20}\). For both these factors, the relation is close to linear – the higher the education level and the lower the age, the lesser the distance felt towards Ukrainians.

The regional differences in distance felt towards Ukrainians, as illustrated by the map appearing below, is also worth noting. More distance towards Ukrainians is felt in those districts whose residents stand the greatest chance of direct contact with representatives of that nationality, ie in the south-eastern region of Poland. Interestingly enough, in the western and northern parts of Poland, home to the largest Ukrainian minority communities, the feelings of distance towards natives of Ukraine is significantly smaller (for a discussion of attitudes towards the Ukrainian minority in Poland, please see below).

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\(^{19}\) Pearson correlation coefficient \(r=0.27\).
\(^{20}\) Kendall’s Tau rank correlation coefficient =0.19 (with the “education” variable being an ordinal variable; it is for this reason that measurement of the relation between distance felt towards Ukrainians and education made use of the ranking correlation coefficient).
The most widespread opposition is engendered by the idea of Ukrainians participating in the local government. This statement applies to the entire body of respondents, only every third of which was willing to contemplate the proposition that a Ukrainian could sit on a local council in her/his place of residence.

The feeling of distance being discussed here is significantly correlated with the conviction that Ukrainians take away the jobs of Poles\(^{21}\) - the stronger this conviction, the smaller the willingness to accept Ukrainians in the roles mentioned in the survey questions. The same applies, needless to say, to the feeling of distance vis a vis positive feelings for Ukrainians; here, the correlation coefficient is no less than -0.47 (the stronger the positive feelings, the lesser the distance).

As was to be expected, the feeling of distance is also related to opinions concerning the introduction of visas for Ukrainians. The idea of instituting a visa requirement receives more support among people who do not accept Ukrainians in most of the societal roles specified; it actually appears that the question of visas being readily available or difficult to obtain constitutes another measure of the distance felt by Poles towards Ukrainians.

\[^{21}\text{Pearson correlation coefficient 0.29.}\]
Much like the other indicators of attitudes towards neighbouring nationalities, the feeling of distance probably depends to a large extent on information. It is well known that we are more likely to fear and reject that which is unknown to us. The fact, odd upon first glance, that a slightly lesser feeling of distance towards Ukrainians is harboured by Poles who are aware of contentious issues between the two nations can be explained in these terms. These Poles were more willing to accept Ukrainians in those roles in which the remaining respondents tended to reject them – as managers of businesses, members of municipal councils, or as social acquaintances.

**Ukrainians as an National Minority in Poland**

In the analysis set out above, there are frequent references to the attitudes towards the Ukrainian national minority in Poland as an element of the view taken of Ukrainians. The attitudes towards Ukrainians who are Polish citizens are sometimes difficult to separate from the perception of Ukrainian newcomers.

In this section, we will focus on Polish attitudes towards the Ukrainian minority on Poland and juxtapose it with the view taken of Ukrainian citizens.

**Graph 7**
**Frequency with which ethnic minorities were indicated**

![Graph](image)

Data: Batory Foundation, 2002

Awareness of the existence of national and ethnic minorities in Poland is fairly widespread, even though every eleventh respondent (9%) was unable to specify any minority group. The most frequently indicated minority group were Germans (64%), followed by Ukrainians (63%). These are the two most numerous ethnic
minorities in Poland. That said, the frequency with which individual minority groups were named probably depended more on their public presence and media coverage than their actual size; according to the source already cited, the number of Belorusians resident in Poland is approximately equal to that of Ukrainians, yet the former were mentioned by significantly less respondents (see graph 7).

The responses concerning acceptance for Polish citizens of Ukrainian stock in different societal roles indicate that the respondents feel less distance towards these people than to Ukrainian citizens freshly arrived from their home country. The structure of this distance, however, is similar for both groups; they engender the least objections as neighbours and as co-workers, the most – as members of the local government and as superiors at work.

It turns out, then, that the respondents are more wont to accept Ukrainians in roles which give them comparatively little influence on their own lives. Neighbours and co-workers usually remain "on the side" – one needs not maintain contacts with them unless one feels that inclination, and they usually don’t exert much of an influence on one’s life. In the case of the local government or the management of the company in which one works, matters are different, with decisions made by these bodies directly affecting our lives; our own fate depends on these decisions, and the respondents were unwilling to accept such dependence on foreigners.

It is worth noting, however, that only membership in a city council for Ukrainians had more opponents (48%) than proponents (42%). For the remaining roles, even the most frequently rejected ones, those who would accept a Ukrainian in the given capacity still outnumbered those who would not. The table set out below contrasts all the results concerning distance felt towards the Ukrainian minority in Poland with analogous data for "Ukrainian Ukrainians".

\[\text{\footnotesize\cite{22 The results of the census, which should yield some concrete figures concerning the size of various minority groups in Poland, still have not been published. According to estimates by the Rzeczpospolita daily, there are some 300 000 – 500 000 Germans living in Poland and between 200 000 and 300 000 Belorusians and Ukrainians; taken together, the remaining ethnic groups number not more than several thousand (Rzeczpospolita, 12-13.01.2002). Data differing significantly from the Rzeczpospolita figures is given by Zbigniew Kurcz (2002).}}\]
Table 5
Distance felt by Poles towards the Ukrainian minority in Poland and Ukrainians arriving from Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you agree for a Ukrainian...</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Hard to tell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian from Ukraine Minority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To work with you</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be your next-door neighbour</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To become one of your close friends</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To join your family by marrying your son/daughter</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To manage the company in which you work</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To sit on the municipal council of your town</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some interesting results are yielded by comparison of the regional differences in distance felt towards the Ukrainian minority. Much as with sentiment towards Ukrainian immigrants, as discussed in the preceding sections, the south-eastern region of Poland stood apart by virtue of a strong feeling of distance. The south-east, it should be remembered, is home to many more representatives of the Ukrainian minority than, say, central Poland. Yet the largest Ukrainian communities are to be found in the west and north, and it is these parts of Poland which are distinguished by their exceptionally positive attitude towards Ukrainian immigrants, Ukrainian citizens as a whole, and towards the Ukrainian minority alike. It should also be noted that it is in this region that the difference in perception of "own" and "foreign" Ukrainians is the smallest (map 3).
Unfortunately, we do not have at our disposal data which would enable determination of the reasons for the more negative view of Ukrainians taken in a region which, historically, is the homeland of this minority group. It may be that day-to-day contacts with Ukrainians to the other side of the border and the problems arising in their context lead to conflicts which, in their turn, engender a general dislike for all Ukrainians irrespective of their citizenship. Another possibility would be that history remains more of a living presence in this region, casting a shadow on present-day perceptions of the Ukrainian people. The present-day inhabitants of south-eastern Poland are, in most cases, the descendants of those who took part in, whether actively or passively, in the fighting with Ukrainians during World War II and in its aftermath. It is hard to say to what extent these old tales impact upon the attitudes taken towards Ukrainians today. Various studies suggest that this influence is waning, can we go so far as to say that it disappeared altogether? The south-eastern region of Poland is home to the greatest percentage of people who consider Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation to be impossible (I will discuss this issue in more detail below), a fact which lends support to the hypothesis about the greater meaning of history in shaping present-day attitudes towards Ukrainians.
The strong current of pro-Ukrainian feeling in Poland's north and west may be bemusing. During the post-war migrations, these regions witnessed an influx not only of Ukrainians, but also – and perhaps primarily – of Poles hailing from areas incorporated into the Soviet Union after World War II – Galicia, Volhynia, and the remaining regions which now constitute the western Ukraine. The residents of Poland’s north and west, therefore, may have had negative experiences with Ukrainians just like those of the south-east, so a stronger-than-average dislike for Ukrainians among these respondents would not be surprising.

Expectations to this effect also rely on other studies of relations between neighbouring nationalities. Renata Siemieńska (2001) has found that, in all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe studied by her, there subsists a tendency to ascribe negative characteristics to those nations with which the respondent groups have plenty of contacts, or with which they had intensive contacts in the past. The grievances cited in this context usually refer to past territorial conflicts, discriminatory national policies, etc.

As far as the residents of Poland’s north and west are concerned, meanwhile, the influence of these mechanisms on their view of Ukrainians appears to have been a limited one. More than fifty years spent in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic environment have borne fruit in the shape of greater tolerance for "the other" than is the norm in other parts of the country. The mechanisms of social integration in these areas and the attendant emergence of open attitudes towards other cultures and nationalities is described by Wojciech Łukowski (2002). The experience of being uprooted and forcibly sent to another place, shared by almost all new arrivals in the region, was so strong as to preclude the cultivation of antagonisms from a time bygone – from almost another world. The research by Łukowski, then, makes the positive feelings towards Ukrainians observed in the north and west of Poland more understandable.
3. Perceptions of the Ukrainian State

Up to this point, I have sought to convey to my readers the impression that Polish-Ukrainian contacts are fairly intensive. Well-nigh half of Poland’s population have had some manner of interaction with Ukrainians, most usually of a commercial nature. Contacts of this sort may provide a basis for, and certainly an important factor in, opinions concerning Ukrainians as people (individuals) and, possibly, as a nation (collective); as regards formulating an opinion concerning the country these people come from, however, their usefulness is limited. Opinions about a country may rely on trips there, especially if such trips are frequent; if, for one reason or another, we do not travel to a given country, our opinions are, out of necessity, based on information provided by the media.

The study under discussion here demonstrates that, as far as Polish perceptions of Ukraine are concerned, we are dealing almost solely with the latter case, for the simple reason that Poles do not travel to Ukraine. In the past ten years, a mere 4% of Poland’s inhabitants have visited that country – not many, especially if one considers that, according to other studies, 61% of Poland’s citizens have left the country at least once in 2001. Slightly more than half of the respondents, meanwhile, stated that they have read articles about Ukraine in the press or seen television programmes about it. In analysing the image of Ukraine prevailing among our respondents, therefore, it should be borne in mind that it is determined first and foremost by media coverage.

It is probably this fact which accounts for the somewhat odd image of Ukraine which appears to have taken root among Poles. Our respondents were convinced that Ukraine is dominated by corruption (69%) and by high crime levels (71%); at the same time, most of them could not reply whether that country has instituted a parliamentary system (with 60% answering “I don’t know”) or a market economy (58%). In like spirit, many respondents believed that Ukraine is a bureaucratised country (46%) which does not guarantee civil freedoms (47%) and is overcome by economic stagnation (49% did not agree that Ukraine is experiencing "rapid economic growth").

On the one hand, the image which emerges from these replies is a negative one; on the other, as Bogumila Berdychowska notes, it does not depart significantly from what the Ukrainians themselves think of their country. What may be seen as disquieting in the replies given by Poles is not so much their unfavourable perception of Ukraine as a country, but the high incidence of "I don't know" answers, even for queries on neutral subjects such as the parliamentary or economic systems. These replies point to lack of even the basic knowledge, resulting also from the fact that most Poles do not take any interest in Ukraine and its affairs.

**Polish-Ukrainian Relations, Polish Policy vis a vis Ukraine**

During the Institute of Public Affairs study of the image of Ukraine among Poles carried out two years ago, a total of 63% of the respondents found relations between the two countries to be rather good (60%) or very good (3%). Every eighth respondent, meanwhile, believed that Polish-Ukrainian relations are rather bad (Konieczna 2001). We do not know whether the perception of Polish-Ukrainian relations has change since that time. What we do know is that 38% of our study’s participants are aware of the existence of contentious issues between the two neighbours; the remainder believe that there are no controversies between Poland and Ukraine (31%) or do not have an opinion on this subject (31%).

Respondents replying in the affirmative when asked whether there are contentious issues between Poland and Ukraine were most likely to cite the conflict surrounding the Łyczakowski Cemetery in Lvov as well as other Polish memorials in Ukraine (18%); another frequently cited concern was "issues relating to history" (13%). The other problems, each one mentioned by only the occasional respondent, included "present-day economic and political relations" (4%), "territorial disputes arising from the post-war definition of borders" (3%), "relations between people" (3%), and "the situation of the Polish minority in Ukraine" (2%). The awareness of contentious issues between the two countries depended on the education level of the respondents – the more educated a respondent, the more likely she/he was to answer that controversial issues

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24 Speaking at a presentation of this study’s results organised by the Stefan Batory Foundation on January 23, 2003.
between Poland and Ukraine do exist. Relations to the respondents’ age, meanwhile, did not arise, with one notable exception – members of the youngest age group knew decidedly less about contentious issues than the remainder of the study’s participants.

A glance at the regional differentiation of opinion concerning existence of controversies between Poland and Ukraine yields some interesting observations. Respondents from the region characterised by highest dislike towards Ukrainians – the south-east one – most often had a clear opinion on such disputes. This region returned the least number of "difficult to say" answers; also, more residents of this district were convinced as to the existence of disputes or to the lack thereof than respondents from other regions of Poland.

An issue related to Polish-Ukrainian relations is provided in support for Polish policy towards Ukraine. The Institute of Public Affairs study carried out in early 2001 frequently recalled in this paper has demonstrated strong grassroots support for the active Ukrainian policy pursued by Poland since the early 1990s. As it turns out from analysis of our own data, this tendency has not only continued unabated, but has actually increased in selected areas.

**Graph 8**

Opinions concerning Polish policy vis a vis Ukraine (percentage of people supporting the given type of co-operation*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In its policy vis a vis Ukraine, Poland should</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...develop economic co-operation</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...develop political co-operation</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...provide Ukraine with economic assistance</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...support Ukraine in the international arena</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...Avoid devoting excessive attention to Ukraine because that might harm Poland's contacts with the West</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For complete data, see the table in the Annex.

Data: 2001 – Institute of Public Affairs
2002 – Batory Foundation

As was the case two years ago, the respondents supported economic and political co-operation with Ukraine. More than half (48% to be exact) were willing to provide Ukraine with economic aid. The percentage of people who believe that Poland should provide Ukraine with support in the international arena increased from 59% in early 2001 to 67% in late 2002.
Support for political and economic co-operation with Ukraine has proved to be universal, remaining without relation to the age of the respondent and dependent only slightly on the place of residence and on the education level (with more educated respondents being more open for co-operation). Opinions concerning the possibility of providing Ukraine with economic aid did vary among the regions, but they seemed to depend more on the financial standing of the region in question than on the prevailing sentiment towards Ukrainians. And thus, residents of the poorest areas to the north-east of Poland were least willing to provide Ukrainians with aid; those inhabiting the more well-to-do regions in Poland’s centre and south-west were more eager to lend a hand. Pro-Ukrainian policies also found more support among Poles aware of the existence of disputes between the two countries than among those who believed that no such disputes exist.

The Place of Ukraine in Europe

To consider the generally negative – or, at best, undecided – view of the Ukrainian state taken by our respondents as well as the fairly popular sentiment that a "visa barrier" should be put up between the two countries, one would expect that most respondents would be loath to see Ukraine joining the same international organisations as Poland. As it turns out, however, there are more paradoxes revealed here.

Graph 9
Opinions concerning Ukraine’s place in Europe

The majority of the respondents were convinced that it would be a positive development for Poland if Ukraine were to join the European Union as well as...
NATO as well as frowning upon Ukraine’s possible accession to the Union of Belorus and Russia. For more details, please see Graph 9.

Support for the pro-European aspirations of Ukraine was stronger among those respondents who, come Poland’s accession referendum, intend to express themselves in favour of Poland joining the EU. In this group, 66% believed that it would be a good development if Ukraine joined the EU, and 69% supported Ukraine's membership in NATO. These results aside, Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO would be most welcomed by the best-educated respondents and by those residing in the central districts of Poland. Interestingly enough, the prospect of EU and NATO membership received more support among those Poles who are aware of the existence of contentious issues between the two countries; in this group, 70% favoured Ukraine's membership in NATO and 65% - in the European Union.

The arguments cited in favour of Ukrainian membership in the EU were rather general in nature. Most of the respondents spoke of benefits for Polish-Ukrainian relations (44%\textsuperscript{25}) or for the Polish economy (36%). The next argument on the list, and a more practical one – that "the outer boundary of the EU will move and there will be greater convenience" – was cited by only 5% of respondents favouring Ukraine’s membership in the EU. Those, meanwhile, who oppose Ukrainian membership usually stated that "it is not a fitting partner" (50%\textsuperscript{26}) or that such a development would occasion "losses for the Polish economy" (27%).

Of the points mentioned in support of Ukraine’s membership in NATO, the foremost included improved security in the region (42%\textsuperscript{27}) and strengthening of the alliance (26%). Furthermore, 24% of the respondents favouring Ukraine’s membership in NATO believed that it is better to be within the same alliance as Ukraine than to have her as an adversary. The opposite position whereby Polish interests would not be served well by Ukraine’s membership in NATO appeared to be much more difficult to substantiate. Only the occasional respondent was able to give any reasons for such a position; those that did usually resorted to

\textsuperscript{25} These are the percentages of people who considered Ukrainian membership in the EU to be favourable for Poland (N=530).
\textsuperscript{26} Percentage of those opposed to Ukraine’s membership in the EU, totalling 142 people among our respondents.
\textsuperscript{27} NB: percentages of people who considered Ukrainian membership in NATO to be favourable for Poland (N=567 people).
the general assertion that "Ukraine is not a fitting partner" (8%\(^\text{28}\)). Other grounds for a negative position were cited by individual respondents only.

Final Remarks

The most striking feature of the perceptions of Ukraine and Ukrainians prevailing among Poles, as they emerge from this study, is the differentiation in attitudes towards the Ukrainian state and towards its people. Piotr Kościński has summarised this sentiment as follows: Ukrainians – we don’t think so, Ukraine – yes\(^\text{29}\). A high degree of approval for Ukraine’s eventual membership in the political and military structures of Europe and support for the active, pro-Ukrainian policy of the Polish government do not prevent Poles from regarding Ukrainians with, at best, reserve.

It nonetheless appears that there are grounds for optimism concerning Polish-Ukrainian relations in the future. The study carried out by the Institute of Public Affairs in early 2001, recalled at many points throughout this paper, has pointed to a similar dichotomy in attitudes, a separation between the generally cold attitude towards the Ukrainian nation and the engaging, pragmatic stance adopted vis a vis the Ukrainian state. Also, the degree of hostility towards Ukrainians was higher two years ago. Thus, it would seem that Poles believe that it is in their country’s interests to support the pro-European ambitions of Ukraine and are willing to persevere on this course in spite of the fact that the Ukrainians themselves do not arouse much good feeling among them.

It should be pointed out here that Poles are hardly an exception in this differentiation of attitudes towards a neighbouring state and its people. Poles and Poland as seen from the Ukrainian side are – or, at any rate, were – regarded in a similar fashion. This phenomenon was described by Mikola Riabchuk (1998) in his article Polish, Poles, Poland – An Attempt at Philological Sightseeing. In this piece, Riabchuk describes the connotations borne by these words for himself and for his compatriots. For him, the name Poland carries

\(^{28}\) These are the percentages of people who considered Ukrainian membership in NATO to be unfavourable for Poland (N=114).
almost exclusively positive emotions; he reminisces about various consumer goods arriving from Poland during Soviet times (providing Ukrainians with a vestige of the West), the music of Czerwone Gitary (not quite the Rolling Stones, but at least available and comprehensible without much difficulty), etc. The word Poles, meanwhile, is laden with much more negative emotion, being redolent of stories told by older Ukrainians about open hostility and conflicts between Ukrainians and Poles in the past.

It should also be borne in mind that this general dislike felt by Poles towards Ukrainians is not an immutable given. The attitudes of Poles towards various nationalities are subject to constant change which is tracked by successive rounds of CBOS research\(^{30}\). As it turns out, the structure of these attitudes has undergone material transformation over the past few years; warm feelings towards the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, once at the very bottom of Polish popularity lists, is clearly on the ascendant. While these changes may be slow in coming, it nonetheless seems that we are witnessing rediscovery of affinity with these nations.

The attitudes of Poles towards Ukrainians conform with this general tendency. A comparison of the present study’s results with those obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs two years ago leads to the conclusion that antipathy towards Ukrainians is decreasing and positive feelings towards them are becoming more common; while the situation is a highly complex one, these tendencies are unequivocal. The complexity derives from the fact that Poles harbour old, as it were "mummified" stereotypes towards Ukrainians, the by-product of a long history of problematic relations. During the communist periods, there was no chance for these stereotypes to receive a good airing by way of critical reflection, debate, or verification; in that period, Ukrainians as a distinct entity were just about banished from public discourse, and if the subject did surface occasionally, then only in the worst possible aspect. In the 1990s, Ukrainians entered the Polish public discourse in an entirely new context, and in new roles – as immigrant tradesmen, seasonal workers, or tourists. The Ukrainian minority in Poland also regained its voice, demanding recognition of their rights and of their own take on Polish-Ukrainian relations.

\(^{29}\) Rzeczpospolita, January 24, 2003.

\(^{30}\) See, for example, the CBOS research publication Czy Polacy lubi inne narody already cited above; it includes a table setting out the results of research into the attitudes of Poles towards various nationalities conducted over the years 1993-2003 (http://www.cbos.com.pl).
As a result of this, Polish attitudes towards Ukrainians were recast all over again – certainly under new circumstances. The issue is no longer one of attitudes towards some vague phantoms from the past, towards the "historic Ukrainians" who are abhorred as rezuni (slaughterers) – fortunately with ever-decreasing frequency. The Ukrainians of today are as real and specific as can be – individuals who have something to offer and await something in return, people whom one can see and shake their hand, talk with them, quarrel with them or do business. Needless to say, these new Ukrainians are also competitors in the scramble for scarce benefits, such as low-skilled jobs.

These various new elements, new stereotypes, and new views of Ukrainians mingle with the old ones which, while certainly established, no longer have much bearing on real life. This accounts for the many inconsistencies, contradictions, and paradoxes observed in the attitudes described above. It is no accident that the greatest amount of inconsistencies arose when we sought to gauge attitudes towards Ukrainians as immigrant workers – it is this role which is entirely new.

In the image of Ukraine and of Ukrainians drawn up by us, one can easily discern echoes of the message being disseminated by the mass media, which combine positive coverage of the international standing of the Ukrainian state and of Polish policy vis a vis Ukraine with a spiteful perception of Ukrainians as smugglers, illegal workers, petty criminals and big-time mobsters. This media-derived image is confronted with the first-hand experiences of the respondents, many of whom employ Ukrainian baby-sitters for their children, Ukrainian household help, or Ukrainian construction crews. This situation is too new for any cohesion and uniformisation of outlooks; there are, nonetheless, grounds for believing that such a process is underway.

By its very nature, a questionnaire-based study "captures" a static image frozen in time, hence this hodgepodge of attitudes and sentiments. Further research will reveal what this indefinite haze will give rise to; for the present moment, the image remains ambiguous and shaky.

jkonieczna@wp.pl
Bibliography


1. Polish Regional Subdivisions

The analysis of regional differences in the attitudes and opinions described in this paper relies on the following regional division of Poland:

REGION 1 – The west and north\textsuperscript{31}. Following WWII, this region experienced a population exchange to the magnitude of several dozen percent (with the exact figure different for each województwo, or district). These regions have concentrations of ethnic minorities, including Ukrainians, which exceed the national average (Czech 1991).

REGION 2 – Central Poland and the areas bordering on Ukraine. People with strong roots in their place of residence predominate in these areas; while a section of Pomerania belongs to Poland’s

\textsuperscript{31} This region has occasionally been referred to as the “Regained Lands”. I, for my part, choose to avoid this term so as to escape its ideological connotations; I follow Wojciech Łukowski (2002) and other researchers and adopt the term “western and northern areas”.

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Poles and Ukrainians, Poland and Ukraine. The Paradoxes of Neighbourly Relations
"Regained Lands"

[translator’s note: designated as essentially Polish areas which had been lost through historical injustices but have since been reclaimed], this distinction was hard to make for purposes of this analysis, the smallest unit used being the **województwo**.

REGION 3 – Frontier regions abutting on Ukraine. Also includes the Małopolska area which, while not sharing a physical border with Ukraine, has strong historical ties with it as a part of Galicia.
2. Opinions concerning Polish policy vis a vis Ukraine

Table __

Opinions concerning Polish policy vis a vis Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In its policy vis a vis Ukraine, Poland should</th>
<th>Decidedly yes</th>
<th>Probably</th>
<th>Probably not</th>
<th>Decidedly not</th>
<th>Hard to tell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...develop economic cooperation</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...develop political cooperation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...provide Ukraine with economic assistance</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...support Ukraine in the international arena</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid excessive involvement with Ukraine because this might harm Polish relations with the West.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: 2001 – Institute of Public Affairs  
2002 – Batory Foundation