

# **EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy**

**Stefan Batory Foundation**  
Warsaw 2003






STEFAN BATORY  
FOUNDATION

# **EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy**

Proceedings of the conference  
held by the Stefan Batory Foundation  
in co-operation with  
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of Poland  
on 20-21 February 2003  
in Warsaw



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ISBN 83-89406-18-7  
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Warsaw 2003

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# Introduction

The conference on the *EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy* held on 20-21 February 2003 in Warsaw reflects the importance attached in Poland to our relations with the countries that for now remain outside of the European Union. Poland's EU accession does not imply that we are turning our backs on our eastern neighbours; quite the opposite: it is a good opportunity to effectively support positive transition in East European countries and to support the pro-European aspirations of their people.

The two-day conference was a time for reflection about the role of the new Member States in the EU's policy towards its eastern neighbours; to share the experience of the present Member States which have taken advantage of their close ties with particular regions in order to develop a coherent policy of the Union; and to discuss the possible and desired neighbourhood policy of the EU.

The co-operation between the Stefan Batory Foundation and the Polish Foreign Ministry that made the conference possible underscores the authentic interest of the public administration and many non-governmental organisations and grassroots initiatives in day-to-day communication and collaboration with communities in Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The conference is a follow-up to other projects of the Stefan Batory Foundation, including long-term international projects *The Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations* and *Belarus – the Hidden Potential*, as well as other activities of a group of NGOs active internationally.

This publication brings the record of the key-note addresses by the President of Poland and the Polish Foreign Minister delivered at the conference; a summary of all sessions and discussions; and the Polish non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement. For the publication *The EU Neighbourhood Policy. Lessons Learned* (Polish version only) and the extensive bibliography which attests to Poland's great interest and vigorous debates on eastern policy, please see the Batory Foundation's web site at [www.batory.org.pl](http://www.batory.org.pl) under Publications.

*Jakub Boratyński  
Director, International Co-operation Programme  
Stefan Batory Foundation*

# Opening of the Conference

**Aleksander Smolar**

President of the Stefan Batory Foundation

The long process of Poland's EU accession has covered several stages. At one stage, we negotiated with EU representatives and the Commission in an asymmetrical situation: the Union set forth the conditions that we had to meet before accession. This was a period of interrogations or confessions, as a Western observer ironically remarked. It was followed by a short period of negotiations on specific conditions of our accession; all of our attention was then focused on those conditions, including financial ones. At that stage, we were a partner striving to ensure good conditions of our full EU membership.

A new stage is now ahead. Although Poland is not yet an EU member state, we are now assuming the obligations of a member such as the responsibility for foreign policies. This conference is best proof that this is the case. Poland, the Polish government



and non-governmental organisations are making joint efforts to reflect on the future eastern policy of the European Union.

Poland is no Arabian stud or a Percheron of La Perche in Normandy, nor is it a Trojan horse. Poland will soon be a fully-fledged Member State of the European Union and, as such, it is ready today to discuss the issues at stake.

I declare the conference on the *EU Enlargement and Neighbour Policy* open.

**Address by Mr Aleksander Kwaśniewski  
President of the Republic of Poland**

Ladies and Gentlemen,  
Your Excellencies,


I am very happy to participate in today's conference. As it is, the attention of the general public has been captured mainly by the problems related to the situation in Iraq and the threat posed by the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Poland is actively involved in this world-wide debate; nevertheless, we need to talk about other issues as well, issues to which this conference is devoted, and we must not neglect important affairs shaping the future of our continent and the future of Poland due to our geographic location in the continent and our neighbourhood.

The conference on *The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy* responds to today's needs very well. I congratulate the organisers, as this conference is best proof of the fact that we can think not only in day-to-day terms but also in a more serious long-term perspective. I want to thank the Stefan Batory Foundation, which has focused on the issue and organised this conference in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In my opinion, it is a good example of a modern approach to foreign policy where, in addition to governments and traditional diplomacy, an increasing role is played by international organisations, non-governmental organisations, intellectuals and cultural organisations, churches and employers.

We all need the energy, the expertise and the talents of all those who want to be engaged in this activity. I am happy to see a gathering of politicians and experts who represent EU institutions and EU Member States, candidate countries and the soon-to-be eastern neighbours of the European Union. I believe this is a great forum for joint reflection on the outlook of integration and a vision of European co-operation.

The enlarged European Union will move considerably to the east. It will for the first time reach with its eastern frontiers up to the line where the Roman civilisation had for centuries bordered on the Byzantine civilisation. It will cross the borders of the former USSR. The enlarged Union will need to redefine its relationships with those countries, which will become its new eastern neighbours. Poland may and indeed should play a major role in defining the eastern policy of the European Union.

The European Community is right now defining its Common Foreign and Security Policy, a process not without difficulties, hurdles or controversies. This area is subject to a natural division of responsibilities. It is understandable that France and Italy have much more to say with regard to the Mediterranean region than Finland or Germany. It is often pointed out that with the accession of Spain to the EU, the entire united Europe acquired new competencies in its relationships with the countries of South and Latin America. I am certain that the membership of Poland in the Union will contribute new competencies of the entire European Community in its relations with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. It is hard to imagine that the eastern policy of the European Union which bears strategic weight or the Eastern Dimension of the European Union a vast network of regional co-operation, could be developed without Poland or over the heads of Poles. It is here, after all, that the East will meet the united Europe as of 1 May 2004.



If there are western opinion-makers or politicians who would confine Poland to the periphery, they should now note a new dimension of the periphery, which is not a problem but an opportunity to the entire uniting Europe.

Development of lasting, friendly, trust-based relationships with all our neighbours is one of the greatest achievements of the Polish foreign policy after 1989. Even where painful historical wounds were wide open, we have managed to embark on the path of reconciliation towards a joint future. What Poland and its neighbours, also those in the east, took efforts to build is a great success of Europe – the whole of Europe. If questions are raised today about what we, Poles, can contribute to the eastern policy of the European Union, we say: trust that our eastern partners have in us, experience of co-operation, and expertise concerning transition underway in those countries.

May I make another comment to outline the change of the past years and where we are now? This conference is being held in Warsaw, the capital of Poland, whose borders have not shifted an inch over the past several years. In the meantime, all neighbours of Poland have changed. None of our pre-1990 neighbours are in existence: there is no USSR, no German Democratic Republic, and no Czechoslovakia. We have seven new neighbours, well known to all of you: Germany, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, Lithuania. We have signed bilateral treaties and built trust and good co-operation with all our neighbours, best proof that our region is a beacon of European stability. We know that many parts of the continent abound in instability, violence, tensions and conflicts, including ethnic strife. I am proud to say that and to make an offer to all those who would like to follow our example of building co-operation, trust and dialogue under changing circumstances.

Today we also need to reflect on the borderline of the European Union. It is not unlikely that in a more distant future the continent will be integrated to a much greater extent; some eastern countries, for instance Ukraine, have already signalled their intention to become associated with the EU and later to become full members. The EU will review its common strategies towards Russia and Ukraine this June and July, after four years of implementation. The

European Commission and the EU High Representative for the CFSP will this year present their proposed actions in the framework of the New Neighbours Initiative. We are happy that the proposals will be consulted with the future EU Member States. Poland will offer new initiatives in this regard.

This mutual rapprochement must be helped. The European Community needs to invest in overcoming the economic and legal gap between the European Union and its eastern neighbours. The specificities of these new countries have to be taken into account, and the countries must be supported in further transition, fostering democracy, rule of the law, effective open-market economies and civic society. The conference *Ukraine in Europe* held four months ago in Warsaw was a good example of such an initiative recognised internationally.

Poland strives for best possible understanding, trust and co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea and to the Black Sea. The countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, both those aspiring to EU and NATO membership and those who will remain outside these organisations, should strengthen mutual relations and share experiences. This was the philosophy behind the Riga Initiative, which I presented last July. The main goals of this extensive regional co-operation include support for transition and joint fight with international terrorism and crime. This initiative will also prevent a sense of alienation in those countries, which remain outside Euro-Atlantic structures and preclude their marginalisation in European relations. I want to announce that seventeen countries interested in the Initiative will attend a consultative meeting in Warsaw this March.

As the time of EU enlargement approaches, we must become more attentive to the expectations of our eastern neighbours. They have serious concerns that the EU enlargement will divide the continent with a new curtain, be it a velvet one. Countries such as Ukraine are concerned that the new EU Member States will be focused on reaping the benefits of EU membership while turning their backs on their eastern neighbours who are coping with a plethora of problems. We understand those concerns and we try to be responsive. At a recent meeting, the President of Ukraine and myself, in communication with

the Polish government, agreed that Ukraine will not introduce visas for Polish nationals as of 1 July 2003 while Poland will waive fees for visas issued to Ukrainian nationals\*; that we will continue to improve the network of consulates and border crossings; that we will make best efforts to ensure that our border is secure and effectively protects against negative phenomena, such as terrorism and organised crime, while making the border a friendly one.

The experience of Poland over the past several years leads to a banal but nonetheless important conclusion: one must not forget one's neighbours or turn one's back on them. We need to get them involved as much as possible in partnerships and co-operation, to encourage them to implement necessary reforms, and to support them on that difficult route, often much more difficult than the one we have covered. But first and foremost, we must have trust in them and have faith in a common future in the united Europe. We live in difficult times when tensions abound and harsh words are spoken unnecessarily; yet I believe that once the dust settles we will see that we are working for a worthy cause: a real unification of Europe to offer our nations, countries and the entire continent security, fruitful co-operation and an optimistic outlook.

I am certain that once we take this approach and seek fundamental values different from ad hoc issues which grasp our attention today, we will build a united Europe to accommodate the West and the East, the South and the North, a home for all people who want to live in security, peace and hope for themselves and their children.

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\* Visas were finally introduced as of 1 October 2003. (editor's note)

## The Eastern Dimension of the European Union.

### The Polish View

**Speech by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz**

**Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs**

Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to this week's conference, convened at the joint initiative of the Batory Foundation and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And here, let me salute the Foundation and its President Mr. Aleksander Smolar, for their immense effort made in preparing this conference.

Ladies and Gentlemen, as we meet, truly fundamental changes are taking place on the international scene, including in Central and Eastern Europe. The NATO and the European Union enlargements are underway. When all new and prospective members have been embraced by the two organisations, the infamous post-war division of Europe will become a distant memory, a mere footnote in the history books, and our continent will be more prosperous and more secure place to live.

I do hope that the conference, which has attracted such an excellent and distinguished audience, will foster positive thinking and provide a strong impetus to initiate dialogue with our Eastern neighbours in the wake of enlargement.

As regards enlargement, the timing of the conference is perfect, too. The accession negotiations have been brought to a successful conclusion. The finishing touches are being given to the Accession Treaty. Poland and other candidate states are getting ready first for the observer status, and then for full membership of the EU. Poland's foreign and security policy has for several years now been in line with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and we shall soon be directly participating in shaping the Union's external policies.

We look forward to assuming this new responsibility which will certainly provide us with new opportunities. Our contribution to the discussion on the future of the EU, which has been conducted within the framework of the Convention, testifies to this commitment.



mind when he called for a creation of an Eastern Dimension of the EU in 1998 in his speech inaugurating Poland's accession negotiations.

That is also why Poland welcomed the discussion launched within the EU a year ago on the British and Swedish initiative, followed by contributions of the Secretary General and High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, and Commissioner Chris Patten. I was pleased when the EU encouraged candidate states to make similar contributions of their own.

Almost two months ago I put forward the Polish proposals on the future relations of the enlarged EU with its Eastern neighbours to my colleagues in the EU, in the candidate countries, and in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

I believe that most of you, Ladies and Gentlemen, have by now become familiarised with the Polish Non-paper. Let me only briefly outline that proposal.\*

Europe does not end at the EU's Eastern borders, nor will it end there after enlargement. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are deeply rooted in Europe — with their culture, history, tradition and science. Over the last few years they all, except Belarus, have established intense contacts with

Poland attaches particular importance to relations with neighbouring countries. While getting ready for EU membership, Poland has spared no effort in ensuring that no new division lines emerge along our Eastern borders which, as we know, are soon to become the Eastern borders of the enlarged Union. My distinguished predecessor, Professor Bronisław Geremek, had precisely this in

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\* The full version of this document can be found on pages 85-98. *Non-paper* with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement was published in January 2003 (editor's note).

the EU in the political, economic and social terms. Nevertheless, their relations still do not meet expectations of both sides for the transformation process in Eastern European countries is far from being over.

There are several arguments in favour of a more active Eastern policy of the EU. The stabilising role of the EU is not confined to the Member States, it extends also to the Union's neighbourhood. This is due to political dialogue based on common values, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), economic co-operation, assistance and people-to-people contacts. Moreover, co-operation with Eastern European states driven by common interests and values, is mutually beneficial. The European Union and the Transatlantic community need Eastern European allies to combat common threats like terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and organised crime.

The EU and Eastern European economies, which are to a great extent complementary, need each other — modernising industries in Eastern Europe need EU investments, technologies and know-how, while the growing Eastern European market attracts European companies.

Therefore the forthcoming enlargement, which will result in the EU having common borders with the Eastern European states, shall provide enhancement of co-operation with Eastern neighbours. It should enable us to seize the existing opportunities and create new ones by accelerating transformation in these countries.

The countries of Eastern Europe face a lot of similar problems and challenges due to their common historical experience in the 20th century. Moreover, their economies are still dependent on each other and strong political connections exist between them. Therefore it seems reasonable for the EU to have a coherent, comprehensive framework of its Eastern Policy. It should be flexible enough to enable individual development of relations with each of the countries concerned without prejudicing their final formula.

Poland suggests that this framework should constitute the Eastern Dimension of the EU. It should allow for co-ordination and synergy of the activities of the EU and other regional as well as international structures and organisations, particularly assistance projects.

The Central European Initiative, in which Poland holds presidency this year, could contribute to the development of the Eastern Dimension of the EU. We hope to discuss it next month with partners at the European Commission and with the EU Presidency. Last, but not least, the Eastern Dimension formula would facilitate greater involvement of international financial institutions and private capital in assistance projects.

The Eastern Dimension would be complementary to the Northern Dimension of the EU. I believe that it can use the experience of the Northern Dimension as well as other policies of the EU towards adjacent regions.

The Eastern Dimension of the EU should have a strong non-governmental pillar and enable using the expertise of NGOs and the unique instruments they have at their disposal. We highly appreciate the role of Polish NGOs, including our host, the Batory Foundation. They have been involved in various assistance projects in Eastern Europe. Let me also use this opportunity to express my thanks to the NGOs for their co-operation and contribution to our Non-paper.

The mid term objective of the EU Eastern Dimension could be the establishment of a European space of political and economic co-operation within the area of Wider Europe. Relations with the countries concerned should be individually shaped according to their readiness, progress in transformation process and the will to have closer co-operation with the EU.

The new concept of the Union's relations with its Eastern neighbours should not prejudice their final formula. The situation in Eastern European states is still evolving. The expectations of those countries regarding their relations with the EU are also changing. This is clearly visible in the discussions between the EU and Russia on the concept of the Common European Economic Space, as well as in the significant change of approach towards the EU in the Ukrainian and Moldovan foreign policies over the last 2 years.

For Ukraine and Moldova, which aspire to the European structures, a prospect of future membership can provide necessary incentives for the political elites and for the societies to carry out further reforms. A prospect, not a promise of EU membership, should be conditional on reforms and

meeting strict criteria. Such a prospect should also be open for Belarus, provided it initiates democratic reforms. Poland will advocate the further strengthening the EU's strategic partnership with Russia, which does not aspire to the membership of the Union.

The evolving European space of political and economic co-operation should comprise a wide scope of collaboration with Eastern neighbours.

Political dialogue should be enhanced. It should be comprehensive and focus on issues of interest as well as concern for both sides, including human and minority rights, democratic reforms, resolution of regional tensions and conflicts in accordance with international standards. It should also cover fighting terrorism, trans-national crime, non-proliferation and other global problems. Another area to be explored is the EU co-operation with third countries in the field of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), including possible contribution of Eastern European states to EU missions.

Over the last few years the co-operation in justice and home affairs within the EU as well as with third countries has greatly expanded. Particularly after September 11th, 2001 security ranks high in EU priorities and its external relations. As a result of the EU enlargement, the importance of co-operation in justice and home affairs with the Union's Eastern neighbours will increase even further due to the common border.

There are several common problems, especially terrorism, organised crime, money laundering, illegal immigration and corruption. They can be tackled more effectively if the EU and its Eastern neighbours join efforts and if the EU provides Eastern European states with assistance. This concerns a variety of areas from joining as well as observing international agreements, adopting and enforcing relevant internal laws, establishing effective border control regimes with third countries, to fighting corruption and strengthening judicial capacity.

However, it would be a mistake to perceive the common EU borders with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as a factor posing a threat to the Union's internal security. Poland has committed herself to meeting the Schengen standards. A surge in international criminal activity is a side-effect of

globalisation on the one hand and of transformations on the other, therefore it is our common interest to co-operate and counter it. If we succeed, and if Eastern European states meet appropriate standards, for example of border and immigration controls as well as travel documents, the EU might consider some flexibility in the visa regime. It would be helpful for the local communities in the border regions if a solution could be found, in conformity with the Schengen *acquis*, making possible local traffic in border areas.

If abolishing divisions in Europe is to become a reality, the EU co-operation with Eastern European states should have strong social and human dimensions. Rapprochement between the EU and its Eastern neighbours cannot be achieved only by high level political decisions, without an extensive involvement of the public. It is sometimes much more difficult to achieve mutual understanding and respect between societies or nations than between their leaders. In the process of Poland's accession to the EU we have had to face a lot of prejudice, therefore we are perhaps more aware of sensitivities in mutual perception of Eastern and Western Europe. Additionally, the problems people in Eastern Europe have to cope with in the transformation processes are probably more familiar to us due to our recent experience in this respect. Therefore we believe that the social and human dimension of the EU Eastern Policy needs strengthening. It should aim at enhancing people-to-people and cultural contacts, access to knowledge and information, and know-how sharing.

The fact that I mention economic co-operation at the end of my presentation does not mean that I find it the least important. I fully agree with my Swedish colleagues, as well as with Mr Patten and Mr Solana that trade and investment, development of private sector and economic growth are the major factors of the transformation process in Eastern Europe. They facilitate the modernisation and necessary restructuring of the economy, including the labour market. Thus, economic co-operation should be one of the EU priorities as both sides can benefit from it.

Energy co-operation is of particular importance for Europe, seeking stable and reliable energy supplies. Other obvious areas are the infrastruc-

ture, environment protection and space technologies. Economic co-operation of the EU with Eastern European states should involve substantial assistance in improving the regulatory and administrative framework for enterprises, while meeting WTO membership criteria. Market economy status, for example in the case of Ukraine, would allow its exporters to be treated fairly. After the accession of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus to WTO, free trade should be established gradually with free trade agreements facilitating harmonisation of business law in Eastern European states with the *acquis communautaire*. As a further stage, integration in some other sectors of the Single Market could be explored.

Assistance has proved to be an effective instrument of the Union's external policy, and its relations with Eastern Europe. Respective programmes should be adjusted to the changing needs and priorities. The TACIS programmes have provided Eastern European states with valuable assistance. Presently they cover a vast area of countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, which have diversified needs.

In our opinion the ongoing review of EU Eastern Policy should be used for constructive evaluation of the present assistance programmes, taking into account the opinion of the countries concerned, and making necessary adjustments.

Assistance should concentrate on priority areas that are essential for further reform process, for example democratic reforms, development of civic society including local governments, improvement of regulatory framework and administrative capacity as well as establishment of civilian control over the armed forces. Much effort should be taken to help Eastern European countries cope with the problems that pose threat to reforms and society, such as corruption and crime. Assistance instruments should be tailored to the stage of development of co-operation and the progress in the reform process. Increase in assistance would obviously be welcome, though particularly after Copenhagen we are aware how difficult it can be to discuss finances within the EU. Effective use of the available resources should be a priority. This requires improved access to information and advice as well as simplification of procedures.

In its Non-paper Poland has proposed several important measures. Let me start from the most evident, which results from our experience — better co-ordination and synergy of the INTERREG and TACIS CBC programmes. A significant part of the EU assistance is provided by non-governmental organisations. They should concentrate on their core activities, avoiding excessive bureaucratic work and cumbersome procedures. There are examples of solutions proving how public money can be efficiently used, which could in my opinion be introduced in the EU assistance programmes for Eastern European states, ensuring necessary flexibility. This was the reason behind our proposals to establish the European Democracy Fund, or the European Freedom Fund and the European Peace Corps.

Investment in human capital always pays off. Europe should not hesitate to extend this kind of assistance to its Eastern neighbours. I have proposed launching a special scholarship programmes for Eastern Europe — the European Scholarship Programme and the European Internship Programme for university graduates, young professionals and people with professional experience wishing to acquire new skills. These programmes would enable them to gain experience in companies and institutions in the EU countries and later use it in their home countries. Other initiatives, like supporting European chairs or European programmes at Eastern European universities as well as joint projects carried out with EU universities would also make a difference. If administrative capacity is the main obstacle for reforms in Eastern Europe, let us strengthen assistance programmes in institution building, through study visits, twinning projects and advice on specific reforms. If properly tailored, such assistance should bring substantial effects while being cost-effective. We should share with our Eastern neighbours the experience concerning local government, its role and effective management at the local community level, so that they gain necessary know how and incentives to pursue reforms.

Small and medium sized enterprises are a major driving force of economic development and further reforms in Eastern European states. They need assistance, even more than the their counterparts in the EU. They usually lack basic information, know-how, capital, management and marketing skills.

Some form of business incubators or the European Investment Fund for Eastern Europe would help, not only facilitating access to a start-up capital, but also offering necessary advice, information and assistance.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasise the great role of access to information for real rapprochement of the Union with its Eastern neighbours. People are often indifferent or scared because they lack knowledge. Fears exist both in the EU and in Eastern Europe. In the latter, they concern border traffic, access to markets and risk of isolation. There is certainly a need for a more vigorous promotion of the European Union. More light needs to be cast on the Union's forthcoming enlargement and opportunities it will furnish, as well as on benefits that can be drawn from closer co-operation with the EU.

As a result of their transformations and preparations for EU membership candidate states, including Poland, have developed unique know-how and experience that can be useful for our Eastern neighbours in their transformation process. Poland is ready to share her experience with interested Eastern European countries. Our track-record of co-operation with Ukraine is a case in point. I am confident the EU could incorporate our experience into its own assistance programmes.

I would like to conclude by referring to the concept of an EU Eastern Dimension Action Plan. Our own experience in dealing with the EU has proved that without a time table, or a road map, progress in co-operation can be much slower and more difficult to carry forward. A clearly designed road map would be of great help. It should set dates and highlight both the conditions that have to be met for a project to move on the next stage, and benefits its progress is expected to deliver. In getting ready for co-operation with the East, the EU would be well advised to draw up such a road map in close dialogue with its Eastern neighbours. It is action not words that can bring together the East and the West of Europe. I very much hope that we can look forward to substantial progress in this area.



# **Session I**

## **Visions of EU Policy**

### **Toward New Neighbours**

Chair:

**Bronisław Geremek**, former Foreign Minister of Poland,  
Professor with the European College in Natolin, Warsaw

Speakers:

**Dumitru Braghis**, former Prime Minister of Moldova, Chairman  
of the parliamentary fraction Social-Democratic Alliance, Kishinev

**Józef Oleksy**, Chairman of the European Committee of  
the Polish Parliament, Member of the European Convention, Warsaw

**Sergei Rogov**, Director of the US and Canada Studies  
Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

**Jacek Saryusz-Wolski**, former Secretary to the Polish Committee  
for European Integration, President of the European Centre Natolian  
Foundation, Warsaw

**Boris Tarasyuk**, Chairman of European Affairs Committee,  
Ukrainian Parliament, Kiev

**Vincuk Vyachorka**, Chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF), Minsk



### **Bronisław Geremek**

former Foreign Minister of Poland,  
Professor with the European College  
in Natolin, Warsaw

Professor Geremek said that the process of European integration must not alienate those countries, which remain outside the enlarged Union. Both candidate countries and the EU should act to prevent their alienation. Therefore, the European Union should make the Eastern Dimension subject to a broad European debate.

Professor Geremek asked the following questions:

- How can EU enlargement open better opportunities to the new eastern neighbours?
- How can the new EU Member States, including Poland, contribute to the new eastern policy of the EU?
- What can the future eastern neighbours of the EU, from Russia to Moldova, be offered in the context of their specificities?

### **Dumitru Braghis**

former Prime Minister, Chairman of the parliamentary fraction  
Social-Democratic Alliance, Kishinev, Moldova

Mr Braghis said that Moldova has always been a European country though it may not always have pursued an open European policy. He asked the question where Moldova stands in terms of European integration ten years into its independence, what helps the country to move ahead towards the European Union, and what the stumbling blocks are.

Speaking of the assets of the country, Mr Braghis said that Moldova is a small country with an open economy; over the past years, it has implemented a series

of reforms, only, some of which were successful. Moldova is a multiethnic country, which had both its advantages and disadvantages; in this context, the Transdniestre conflict is a major hurdle in Moldova's drive towards Europe.

Mr Braghis emphasised that his country has applied for EU membership, has joined the Council of Europe, and has been the first country in the region to sign a co-operation and partnership agreement with other CIS countries. At the same time, when the Communist Party came to power in Moldova, proposals were made for the country to join the Russia-Belarus Union.

On the question what Moldova could do to approach the European Union and why it was never successful to the same degree as other Central European countries, Mr Braghis said that economic and political reforms lacked determination: once introduced, they were undercut after the change of cabinet. He stressed that although 70% of Moldavians are in favour of European integration, the public debate has not clearly defined the country's place in Europe, i.e., whether it should aspire to membership of the EU, the CIS, or the Russia-Belarus Union. Mr Braghis regretted the fact that Moldova has not developed a national strategy towards the EU; he hoped a policy would be drafted in 2003.

Mr Braghis pointed to several issues, which need to be solved in order to help Moldova to approach EU membership; the prospect of EU accession may itself be a strong incentive to resolve such problems. First, improved economic co-operation with the EU should overcome trade barriers in relations with candidate countries, such as Romania, which used to trade freely with Moldova. Second, the Transdniestre conflict. Third, problems specific to Moldova as a future neighbour of the EU, including illegal arms transfers, drug dealing, trafficking in people; these will require close co-operation with the EU.

The prospect of EU accession can be an important incentive to solve serious problems faced by Moldova.



Finally, Mr Braghis called for a revision of EU assistance programmes in view of enlargement; programmes like TACIS should be replaced by PHARE-type programmes helping to implement investment projects in Moldova.

### Józef Oleksy

Chairman of the European Committee of the Polish Parliament,  
Member of the European Convention, Warsaw

The candidate countries are joining the EU in the hope that the Union will be a driver of their social and economic growth.

Mr Oleksy said that the upcoming enlargement of the EU to ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe is a process qualitatively different from any earlier enlargement as the acceding countries have quite different historical experience from the West European countries. The candidate countries suffer from weak economic growth as a result of the Cold War divide of Europe. "These countries join the EU hoping that it will be a driver of growth and will help to fulfil social aspirations." Mr Oleksy emphasised that some of the countries to the East will remain outside the Union but the EU will be a strong factor driving their transition. Mr Oleksy regretted that such issues were hardly ever discussed in the Convention and stressed that the Polish delegates to the Convention try to draw the attention of other delegates to issues of the Eastern Dimension of the future enlarged Union.

Mr Oleksy said that although the EU is perceived by most candidate countries and non-member states mainly as an economic organisation, it should indeed pursue a coherent policy towards its new eastern neighbours and promote important political and social values, primarily respect for human rights, democratic standards, and effective governance.

Mr Oleksy said that Poland is well prepared to contribute to the development of the Eastern Dimen-



sion of the Union and hopes that the Community will want to draw upon this experience. Regional co-operation structures, such as the Vyshehrad Group, could play an important role in developing the EU's eastern policy.

Mr Oleksy concluded by calling on the EU to talk to its eastern neighbours about common global threats and the position of Europe in the world. Institutions must be founded to provide for the exchange of views between the youth and opinion-makers so as to stimulate the vast potential of the EU's eastern neighbours.

### **Sergei Rogov**

Director of the US and Canada Studies Institute  
of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Mr Rogov said that the EU has no strategy of integration with Russia and Russia has no strategy of integration with the European Union. Although several instruments have been signed and many declarations made, they were not followed by any in-depth discussion or thorough studies of Russia's potential EU membership. Meanwhile, on-going integration and enlargement of the European Union may isolate and alienate Russia from Europe.

Mr Rogov said that while he did not want to promote Russia's accession to the EU, he wished to present his views on the prospects of development and institutionalisation of mechanisms of close co-operation between Russia and the EU. This is an open process, which may but does not have to lead to Russia's accession to the EU. First, Mr Rogov said that an EU co-operation mechanism similar to the NATO-Russia Council should be put in place. Second, the foundations of common economic space should be developed, for obvious reasons centred on energy co-operation. Mr Rogov pointed to serious problems in economic relations between Russia and the European Union concerning Russia's WTO membership. Mr Rogov said that the EU's demand of higher energy prices in Russia was groundless as Russia suffers 8 months of winter each year. He said that some of the EU's demands on Russia are



justifiable while others are not. He argued that as a European and Asian country, Russia should participate in the economic dialogue between the EU and East Asia; for instance, Lithuania can participate in such discussions. Thirdly, Mr Rogov said that the introduction of barriers to free movement of people is an impediment to the citizens. Although illegal migration and other potential threats must be prevented under the Schengen *acquis*, yet the introduction of the Schengen regime could have adverse effects.

"I no longer need the permission of the Com-

Frankly speaking, communist Party to come to Poland, but the European bureaucracy will soon replace the bureaucracy of the Communist Party and KGB who used to control the movement of Russian nationals."

has no strategy to integrate with Russia and Russia has no strategy to integrate with the EU. Mr Rogov called for close military co-operation between Russia and the EU as real partners, for instance through participation of Russian troops in joint military initiatives of EU Member States, joint manoeuvres of EU Member States and Russia in Poland, co-operation in anti-ballistic, military and air defence. He also called for the participation of Russian troops in the NATO corps in Szczecin.

Mr Rogov pointed to possibilities of closer co-operation through modernisation of some types of Soviet-made weapons in the possession of the armies of the ex-Eastern bloc or ex-USSR countries. After EU enlargement, 40% of weapons in the possession of EU armies will be USSR-made. This opens an alley of close co-operation between the EU and Russia, which could have strong positive geopolitical implications and help to reduce illegal transfer of Russian arms to third countries.

Referring to the USA-Russia agreement concerning the reduction of Russia's foreign debt in exchange for the containment of weapons (Lugar-Baiden Bill), Mr Rogov said that a similar agreement could be made with the European Union whose Member States are the creditors of 70% of Russia's

foreign debt. This solution would be very beneficial in the context of Russia's serious involvement in facing various global challenges, including terrorism and terrorists' access to nuclear and chemical weapons.

In conclusion, Mr Rogov again called for the development of a strategy of Russia's integration with the European Union.

### **Jacek Saryusz-Wolski**

Former Secretary to the Committee for European Integration,  
President of the European Centre Natolin Foundation, Warsaw

Mr Saryusz-Wolski addressed two questions asked in the session about the outlook of an eastern policy and the contribution of the new member states. He introduced his intervention as an “open letter to the European Commission copied to Poland’s eastern neighbours.”

Mr Saryusz-Wolski discussed the prospects of an eastern policy from the perspective of an enlarged European Union. The policy should be very ambitious and based on three tenets. First, the EU should integrate its security policy in the second and the third pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. Second, Poland’s eastern border should be treated as a “*de facto* security policy of the entire Union according to the definition of soft security,” which requires a combination of political and economic tools. Third, economic co-operation should be developed. “I believe it’s time many West European politicians buckled up the belt. We have seen that in recent weeks. We have to remain calm, keep the right perspective, and get ready for a change of the gravity field of Europe. Our eastern neighbours are part of that change.”

Speaking about a vision of the EU’s new eastern policy, Mr Saryusz-Wolski stressed that it should offer prospects of closeness and partnership. The policy of closeness is more than a neighbourhood policy; it implies enhanced economic co-operation; a free trade area, a “unified market, not unlike the European Economic Area;” support for civic society; participation in infra-

structure and transport networks; cross-border co-operation; energy security; migration and labour market policies. The demographic profile of the enlarged EU in the next 20-30 years must be considered. Instruments for the policy of closeness include: a new generation of agreements patterned on strategic economic and political partnership in the Mediterranean; assistance programmes moving away from technical assistance towards assistance in investment (from TACIS to PHARE).

Mr Saryusz-Wolski proposed three instruments of the policy of partnership. First, structural political dialogue, as practised by Poland under the EU Association Agreement; Mr Saryusz-Wolski pointed to the principle of different treatment of different partners and the principle of contingency. Second, economic, non-economic and sectoral co-operation strategies. Third, establishment of “vibrant institutions of co-operation” at different levels.

The European Union's new eastern policy should offer prospects of closeness and prospects of partnership.

Mr Saryusz-Wolski enumerated some of the threats to the development of the Eastern Dimension of the EU, including the gap between the goals and the capacity to deliver due to lack of resources and political will. He was concerned that the idea for a new Eastern Dimension could remain a sort of wishful thinking; he warned against a patronising approach to the eastern neighbours.

On the potential contribution of the new EU Member States to the development of the Eastern Dimension, Mr Saryusz-Wolski stressed that it required a toolbox approach, whereby declarations and concepts are followed by specific instruments; “those instruments of regional development policy that proved effective in Poland should be transposed and implemented there, mainly to grow SMEs and small infrastructures of civic society.” In addition, Poland and other new EU Member States should effect a change in the approach of their partners in EU institutions and political class towards the new eastern neighbours.



In conclusion, Mr Saryusz-Wolski said that Poland as an EU member state should help its eastern friends and neighbours to better understand the European Union.

### **Boris Tarasyuk**

Chairman of European Affairs Committee, Ukrainian Parliament, Kiev

Mr Tarasyuk focused on two issues: Ukraine's perspective on European integration and Ukraine's possible contribution to the EU.

Taking the first issue raised by Professor Geremek in his introduction, Mr Tarasyuk said that European integration offers to Ukraine a "return to its natural cultural habitat and a chance of participation as a subject rather than an object of the process. It also helps to learn from the experience of other countries, including Poland, how to develop a democratic political system, necessary resources, social welfare, civil control of the army, a free market economy." Referring to a 2002 statement of the Chairman of the European Commission Romano Prodi and Commissioner Gunter Verheugen, Mr Tarasyuk said that Ukraine expects that EU representatives will not make negative or offensive statements about Ukraine.

Regarding the second issue, Mr Tarasyuk stressed that Ukraine can offer a dynamically growing market, advanced airspace and ballistic technologies, and a vast human potential of qualified professionals, in particular computer scientists. He also said that Ukraine has taken a responsible position on the issue of nuclear weapons, pursues a reasonable policy towards ethnic minorities, and serves as a conduit for energy supplies from Russia and the Caspian Sea to the EU and Poland.

Mr Tarasyuk emphasised that EU enlargement will have both positive and negative implications to Ukraine. The upsides include the fact that Ukraine will border upon the European Union, a beacon of democracy, political stability and welfare; Ukraine will also learn, especially from Poland, about the process of integration with the EU. The disadvantages include



barriers to interpersonal contacts due to the introduction of the Schengen *acquis*; Mr Tarasyuk quoted the case of Slovakia where the number of Ukrainian visitors fell three-fold after the visa regime was put in place.

On the question of a European outlook for Ukraine, Mr Tarasyuk welcomed the non-paper drafted by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said the non-paper contains very encouraging ideas; yet he regretted that the EU lacks a strategy towards Ukraine. The status of neighbour is not a good prospect for Ukraine; Mr

The European Union has no strategy towards Ukraine. Tarasyuk reminded that the EU named Ukraine its strategic partner. The best scenario for Ukraine is to sign an association agreement with the EU opening up prospects of full membership.

The status of neighbour is not a good prospect for Ukraine; the European Union has named Ukraine its strategic partner. Asking what the new EU Member States could contribute to the development of the EU's new eastern policy, Mr Tarasyuk referred to the interventions of Mr Cimoszewicz and Mr Saryusz-Wolski and added that "in addition to a strong eastern policy in line with the guidelines proposed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we expect the visa regime to be relaxed." Polish President Kwaśniewski had offered that visas will be issued to Ukrainian nationals free of charge; Poles will not be required to hold visas to enter Ukraine. Mr Tarasyuk said that Ukraine expected the new EU Member States to help economic co-operation with Ukraine and to develop cross-border co-operation.

In conclusion, Mr Tarasyuk pointed to effective co-operation and exchange of experience in the framework of the Polish-Ukrainian Standing Conference.

European integration gives Ukraine an opportunity to return to its natural cultural habitat and a chance of participation as a subject rather than an object of the process.

**Vincuk Vyachorka,**

Chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF), Minsk

Mr Vyachorka welcomed the fact that discussions on the new Eastern Dimension of the EU do not exclude Belarus, although the country is a “special case”. Belarus should seriously consider its potential contribution to the Eastern Dimension initiative.

Mr Vyachorka said that Belarus is not a free country: the media are oppressed, the freedom of assembly, religion and expression is stifled, there are no free democratic elections, the State promotes an anti-Western ideology. Mr Vyachorka said that Mr Lukashenka’s statements to the tune of “No one is waiting for us in Europe” are particularly discouraging to the general public. Moreover, President Putin makes all efforts to praise the opportunities open to Belarus through integration with Russia while he fails to support democratic transition in Belarus. Mr Vyachorka said that the issue of democratisation in Belarus is closely related to its independence. In his opinion, the new EU Member States can play a key role in affecting the EU’s eastern policy towards Ukraine and in helping the country’s democratisation by differentiating between the regime and the citizens, offering various programmes supporting civic society, helping to form independent media, developing cross-border programmes, co-operating with private companies in Belarus. Mr Vyachorka emphasised that “the people have to be convinced that economic reforms will be supported and assisted by the West.” In conclusion, Mr Vyachorka said that if the EU pursues an active policy towards Belarus “after the demise of the Minsk regime,” this will greatly mobilise the society.

The people in Belarus have to be convinced that economic reforms will be supported and assisted by the West.



## DISCUSSION

### Katarzyna Żukrowska

*Warsaw School of Economics*

Professor Żukrowska mentioned possible economic instruments of co-operation between the future enlarged Union and its new eastern neighbours: symmetrical and asymmetrical liberalisation of economic relations. She also stressed that economic liberalisation is now taking place on a global scale, determining the orientation of the ex-USSR countries and our relations with those countries.

### Leszek Moczulski

*Warsaw*

Mr Moczulski said that the European Economic Area could serve as a model of co-operation for the enlarged European Union and its relations with the new eastern neighbours. It should encompass the countries of ex-Yugoslavia and Albania.

Mr Moczulski called for a message to be given to Belarus, as strong as the message to Ukraine or Moldova, encouraging Belarus in its drive towards Europe.

On the issue of EU-Russian relations, Mr Moczulski said that Brussels and Moscow hold similar views: “neither wants to integrate.” Possibly, however, European integration could involve the Russian Federation.

### Genowefa Grabowska

*Senate of the Republic of Poland,*

*Member of the European Convention, Warsaw*

Senator Grabowska pointed to the fact that the draft European Constitution includes an Article entitled “Special relationship with close neighbours.” Senator Grabowska said that the Convention wants the Union to treat the close neighbours as its most preferred partners. Polish delegates to the Convention should make best efforts to retain this provision and give it substance. Referring to Mr Saryusz-Wolski’s statement concerning the neces-

sary “toolbox for the close neighbourhood formula,” she called for new legal mechanisms to be established in the relations between the EU and its new eastern neighbours.

Senator Grabowska also referred to issues of borders, the Schengen *acquis*, and the solidarity principle. She said, “We must put up a wall but only against negative developments, always considered marginal and prevented jointly... The solidarity in protecting the Polish border as an external border of the Union must be leveraged, paradoxically, in order to ensure stronger relations and communication both within and outside the Union.”

### **Zbigniew Kruszyński**

*Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw*

Mr Kruszyński pointed to the importance of cross-border co-operation; although only a part of the relations between the enlarged EU and its close neighbours, it remains crucial. “Cross-border co-operation provides a robust framework for mutual understanding between peoples, helps to fight prejudices and to promote common European values, including democracy, human rights, and self-government.” Mr Kruszyński called for the participation of Euroregions in the implementation of the INTERREG Community programme.

Mr Kruszyński reminded that the Carpathian Euroregion inaugurated by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski celebrates its tenth anniversary this year while the Euroregion Baltic inaugurated by Minister Bronisław Geremek celebrates its fifth anniversary.

### **Heinz Timermann**

*German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin*

Mr Timermann said that the EU and its Member States should prepare for the change that will sooner or later take place in Belarus. Belarus was forgotten for years; the EU was not ready for its independence in 1991. “We remembered Poland, Russia, Ukraine, but Belarus was virtually unknown. This should not happen again”.

Mr Timermann was surprised by Mr Rogov's intervention concerning Russia's membership in the EU; he asked whether Russia has changed its position and referred to Russia's 1999 mid-term strategy towards the EU whereby Russia did not aspire for EU membership or association. Mr Timermann said that accession aspirations of Russia may however have to be considered in the nearest future.

In conclusion, Mr Timermann commented on Mr Rogov's intervention concerning the write-off of Russian debt in exchange for Russia's commitments in the containment of weapons; he said, "Americans tried to do it at our cost. We have 50% and the US 5% of the debt; how can Americans say debt should be written off in exchange for commitments of weapons containment? This was done over our heads. Of 8 billion dollars, 500 million was cancelled in Weimar last year; that's already a lot. Now Americans claim the debt should be written off completely at our cost. I find it unacceptable".

### **Heather Grabbe**

*Research Director, Centre for European Reform, London*

Ms Grabbe asked whether the EU should keep special relations with failed states; she mentioned failed states in the Balkans. She also asked whether the EU should develop an approach to failed states as part of its new Eastern Dimension, which should also include pre-emptive instruments. Ms Grabbe asked whether the EU should consider possible interventions in the region or conversely, rule this out altogether.

### **Rastislav Pavlenko**

*Professor with Kiev-Mokhylev University, Kiev*

Mr Pavlenko said that the policy of the enlarged EU should focus on three social groups: decision-makers, opinion-makers, and the general public, in order to improve attitudes to Ukraine and its EU accession. The Union faces three kinds of tasks. It should develop a road-map and define an outlook in its approach to decision-makers; it should follow up with its present activity targeting opinion-makers; and it should win the general public by reinforcing

ing the networks of exchange of experience and information among the countries of the region.

### **Sergei Rogov**

Addressing interventions and questions, Mr Rogov reiterated his concerns that



Russia may be isolated in Europe: "Russia is not a member of the organisations, which play the leading role in the social, economic and military life in Europe." He said that the interests of Russia are not always sufficiently protected. If Turkey is bound to become an EU member state, why not Russia? Mr Rogov stressed that "on the one hand, we should not be saying that the accession of Russia to the EU is the goal; on the other hand, we should not rule it out." He said that issues of relations between Russia and the EU fall into three categories: issues where the EU makes decisions without consulting Russia; issues where the opinion of Russia should be considered before the EU makes a decision; and issues which should be considered with full participation of Russia.

In conclusion, Mr Rogov said, by way of provoking his friend Mr Tarasyuk, that it would be absurd to expect Ukraine to become an EU member state unless Russia is a member too.

### **Boris Tarasyuk**

Referring to Mr Rogov's intervention, Mr Tarasyuk said that the accession of Ukraine to the EU would not change the nature of the Union, unlike possible accession of Russia. He said that it is a hypothetical question since Russia, according to its official position, is not interested in EU membership whereas Ukraine has declared its interest in accession.

### **Vincuk Vyachorka**

Referring to the interventions of Mr Moczulski and Mr Timermann, Mr Vyachorka said that the government of Belarus has to be consulted on practical issues but great care should be taken as the government lacks legitimacy.

### **Józef Oleksy**

Mr Oleksy wrapped up the discussion on the policy of the enlarged Union towards its new eastern neighbours and said that the task ahead is ambitious: new mechanisms, relations and infrastructure should be put in place, the economy should be stimulated, democratic standards must be promoted.

### **Jacek Saryusz-Wolski**

With reference to Professor Żukrowska's intervention, Mr Saryusz-Wolski said that while symmetrical and asymmetrical instruments of economic liberalisation are well known, the problem lies in lack of political will. Referring to Mr Moczulski's intervention about the European Economic Area as a possible model of co-operation with the new eastern neighbours of the European Union, Mr Saryusz-Wolski said that the mechanism is insufficient and inadequate for the region. "The European Economic Area (EEA) is a rich men's club," he said, calling for the development of new legal instruments.

### **Bronisław Geremek**

Professor Geremek recapitulated the discussion and revisited the question of what the EU can do for its future eastern neighbours. He mainly pointed to a prospect of co-operation that must be offered both to countries aspiring to EU membership, like Ukraine, and others, like Belarus. Concerning Russia and its hypothetical EU membership, Mr Geremek asked who would be joining whom. However, he seconded Mr Rogov's statement that neither the EU nor Russia have a mutual strategy.

Professor Geremek also said that the Schengen *acquis* is exceedingly demanding: "It pains me to think that the dreams of the former dissenters in Central Europe are now in conflict with our policy."

Referring to Ms Grabbe's question about the relations between the EU and failed states, Mr Geremek said that pre-emptive military action should only be a measure of last resort after all other means are exhausted and legitimacy is sought; the EU lacks mechanisms to take such action and its foreign policy is too weak. In this context, the EU should ask a question about its relations with and position among other international institutions.



## **Session II**

### **Lessons of EU Neighbourhood Policy**

Chair:

**Tadeusz Mazowiecki**, former Prime Minister of Poland, Warsaw

Speakers:

**Victor Martins**, former Vice-Minister for European Affairs  
of Portugal, Lisbon

**Fernando Moran Lopez**, former Foreign Minister of Spain, Madrid

**Hermann von Richthofen**, Plenipotentiary of the Prime Minister  
of Brandenburg for co-operation with Poland, Berlin

**Antti Satuli**, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland,  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki



## Victor Martins

former Vice-Minister for European Affairs  
of Portugal, Lisbon

Opening the second session, Mr Martins made it clear that Portugal's accession to the European Union had a strong positive effect on the overall foreign relations of the Community. Portugal also benefited as it further developed its relations with non-European countries thanks to the mandate of EU membership.

Mr Martins outlined his country's geography

If a Member State wants to determine the foreign policy of the European Union, it should define an agenda, take advantage of Council Presidency, become a leading actor, and communicate with the general public.

and history and referred to Lisbon's links to Latin America, Africa and Asia. This legacy has enabled a great contribution of Portugal into the EU's foreign relations. Lisbon has been active in this field since the time of accession: Mr Martins pointed out that the Accession Treaty included a declaration emphasising the special importance of the EU's relations with Latin America as one of Brussels's priorities.

Mr Martins emphasised that the EU's approach to the Western hemisphere was deepened with Portugal's involvement in several dimensions: the Union acknowledged the importance of its relations with Latin America and decided to start institutional involvement. The dialogue engaged both individual countries and regional organisations, in particular Latin America's important body ECOSUR. Portugal was the driver of many initiatives, especially those promoting the Union. Mr Martins said that it was during the Portuguese Presidency in 1992 that the first MERCOSUR meeting was organised; a year later, also on Lisbon's initiative, MERCOSUR started to draft a framework agreement with the EU. It was also due to Lisbon's initiative that the European Union signed its first framework agreement with Brazil. Mr Martins said that it would not have been possible without informal relations, especially available to Portuguese politicians: it is not irrelevant that Portugal and Brazil share a common language. Other initiatives mentioned by Mr Martins

include the Europe–Latin America Forum co-founded by the Portuguese Institute. The Forum helps to bring non-governmental organisations into co-operation and has become the proponent of new important steps, including a review of the Common Agricultural Policy in the context of negotiations between MERCOSUR and the EU. Mr Martins stressed that the issues of agricultural policy continue to play a key role in negotiations of market liberalisation; now that the debate is taking place at the Forum, a non-governmental, non-State institution, new prospects are opening up and governments are relieved from having to explicate particularly sensitive issues.

Mr Martins spoke in favour of active development of the EU's foreign policy, especially where EU Member States have extensive expertise. Mr Martins also identified a special challenge of demonstrating the prospects and experiences of each country to the other EU Member States. "How to make national interests interesting to Europe?" asked the speaker, pointing to scientific research, reasonably challenged assistance, measures supporting dialogue, and in particular promotion of economic co-operation. He quoted Lisbon's impressive achievements: in 1998-1999, Portugal became the largest foreign investor in Brazil. Mr Martins added that such involvement should stem from the position of each country in the EU structure: a Member State wishing to be actively engaged in shaping foreign relations must have a success story too. At the same time, EU membership helps to raise the profile and the position of the country world-wide: resolution of the East Timor conflict and peace in Angola, where Portugal's role was key, would not have been possible without the country's strong position in the EU.



### Tadeusz Mazowiecki

former Prime Minister of Poland, Warsaw

Mr Mazowiecki fully agreed with Mr Martins's conviction of the importance of traditional relations of EU Members States with other countries. He also put forth the question to what extent relations with non-EU countries enrich the Union and to what extent they may dilute available resources. Should initiatives of countries boasting a special legacy, such as Portugal, be perceived as centralising or decentralising?

### Fernando Moran Lopez

former Foreign Minister of Spain, Madrid

Mr Moran Lopez outlined the relations of the Kingdom of Spain with neighbouring countries, including France and Portugal, but also Morocco as well as Gibraltar and its sovereign, the United Kingdom, an issue often overlooked by the commentators of Iberian politics.

Mr Moran Lopez described the Spanish accession negotiations at the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s. In his opinion, the agricultural policy was the major issue of contention in the negotiations between Madrid and Paris. Mr Moran Lopez stressed absence of mutual territorial claims; in his opinion, tensions and rivalry in Spanish-French relations were mainly a matter of prestige and dissipated in time. Historical wounds were successfully healed in Spain's relations with Portugal. Mr Moran Lopez emphasised the economic growth of both countries (Spain is the second largest foreign investor in Portugal) and lack of any mutual claims; he also pointed to phenomenal Portuguese cultural boom in today's Spain. Translations of great Portuguese writers and growth of university departments studying Portugal's culture are just as important in good neighbourly relations as regional co-operation.

In this context, the lack of progress in resolving the status of Gibraltar is of some concern. Mr Moran Lopez described the controversy between Madrid and London over the peninsula dating back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century and the War of Spanish Succession. However, he stressed that both countries declared that they were ready to discuss the future of Gibraltar and to accept all possible solutions. Mr Moran Lopez said that Spain deliberately decided not to debate the issue at the forum of the EU: the future of the peninsula is a question of bilateral relations.

While Mr Moran Lopez did not explicitly say so, yet he seemed to imply that this model should be applied to all controversies between EU Member States. The relations between Spain and Morocco also suggest that Spain seconds such an approach: Mr Moran Lopez said that despite political and territorial sensitivities, both countries are in negotiations and continue close working relations, as was the case with the 2002 crisis over temporary take-over of a disputed Mediterranean island by Morocco troops.

Mr Moran Lopez also enumerated the instruments available to those EU Member States who wish to actively develop good neighbourly relations, including in particular cross-border co-operation of regional authorities in border regions.



One of the main instruments available to those EU Member States who wish to actively develop good neighbourly relations is co-operation of regional authorities in border regions.

### **Hermann von Richthofen**

Plenipotentiary of the Prime Minister of Brandenburg  
for co-operation with Poland, Berlin

Mr von Richthofen mainly discussed the advantages of regional co-operation, drawing on his personal experience as a Brandenburgian politician responsible for co-operation with Poland (the German land and Poland share more than 250 kilometres of border).

Mr von Richthofen outlined the history and practice of regional co-operation and put forth a range of solutions which could help to better define the EU's future eastern policy. In his opinion, new innovative measures should be used in the EU's relations with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. This is particularly relevant given the many challenges ahead: safeguards to be put in place along the Polish-Belarus border and the complex issue of the Kaliningrad enclave which must be offered solutions in line with the Schengen *acquis* yet far from isolating the population.

Speaking about possible transit solutions for the population of Kaliningrad, Mr von Richthofen pointed to a similar situation experienced until recently by the city of Berlin. He also made the important declaration that the EU's eastern policy should strive to strengthen the security and stability in Europe. Mr von Richthofen referred to NATO's Partnership for Peace formula which was very effective in Eastern Europe in the mid-1990s. He said this model of stabilisation could continue with European democracies still outside the EU, especially since NATO has more experience in the region than the EU.

Mr von Richthofen outlined the relations between Brandenburg and Poland and emphasised their multi-tiered nature: they are maintained at the local (municipal), regional, and central level. He also called for improved compatibility of assistance programmes as a necessary condition of success of cross-border projects.

Mr von Richthofen listed four major areas of horizontal co-operation: co-operation between small and medium-sized enterprises (and necessary development of the transport network); cross-border co-operation (from municipalities to Euroregions); co-operation in the field of security (including the police force); co-operation between educational institutions. He advocated support for the knowledge-based society, which requires institutional co-operation, staff training and exchange, and regional planning of educational initiatives.



Mr von Richthofen also called for a transfer of experience acquired in German-Polish co-operation to the countries east of the new EU border. He stressed that the transfer is crucial to the “Partnership for Security,” as all initiatives averting new dividing lines in Central and Eastern Europe may be called.

### **Antti Satuli**

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland,  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki

Mr Satuli outlined the Northern Dimension of the European Union, initiated and co-founded by his country. There are many parallels between the development of the Northern Dimension and the present efforts made to define the EU’s eastern policy. Thus, Mr Satuli welcomed the non-paper presented by Poland as a contribution to a new dimension of EU policies.

Mr Satuli quoted the fundamental principle of the Northern Dimension, namely that the northern policy of the European Union should derive from the interests of the EU in the region, primarily the goal of ensuring peace and stability. The northern policy concept developed by Finland in the late 1990s has been integrated with other EU policies.

Mr Satuli pointed to a new challenge facing the Finnish political class after EU accession: the task of expanding the range of activity so as to take position on issues previously perceived as remote, such as Mediterranean politics. The meeting of Mediterranean ministers held in Finland was a breakthrough as southern EU Member States acknowledged the need to develop a northern policy. It is symbolic that the first Northern Dimension Action Plan was adopted at a meeting in Santa Maria di Feira, Portugal; Spain also proved a strong ally.

Mr Satuli warned against blocking of mutual initiatives by regional coalitions. The challenge of large investment necessary for the reconstruction of the West Balkans was an acid test to the EU’s solidarity. The Union lived up to the challenge; however, it was more difficult to encourage other part-

When Finland joined the European Union, we soon realized that Barcelona process posed challenges to the entire Union, not only to the Mediterranean countries.



ners, especially Russia, to join the initiative.

Mr Satuli spoke in favour of the EU-Russia Co-operation Agreement which came into force in December 1997. Although some opportunities afforded by the agreement were left unexplored, yet the formula provides a stable legislative and legal framework. Mr Satuli said that Poland and the Baltic states were concerned that the Northern Dimension mainly focused on the relations between the EU and Russia; yet in the course of time all parties appreciated the merits of the mechanism.

We in Finland count on reciprocity: the EU has interests both in the South and in the North.

Mr Satuli listed the priorities of the Northern Dimension: co-operation in environmental protection, nuclear security, the Kaliningrad issue, combatting crime. In his opinion, "the European Council has never before taken such a concrete and comprehensive approach to co-operation in Northern Europe." This was possible thanks to the efforts of regional co-operation councils (including the Barents Council) and the Directorates General.

With its understanding of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Poland will be a cherished partner in the EU.

Mr Satuli admitted that the introduction and development of the Northern Dimension did not bring about immediate changes in the EU budget. However, available resources and budget instruments (including co-financing of TACIS and INTERREG projects) are now used more effectively. In his opinion, the new and future EU Member States will contribute their expertise and experience as well as political know-how to the future Eastern Dimension of the EU.

## DISCUSSION

### Kataryna Wolczuk

*Birmingham University*

Ms Wolczuk said that simple parallels with the experience of Portugal as a bridge between the European Union and Latin America are not directly applicable to the relations with the EU's eastern neighbours: unlike East European countries, Latin American countries are not planning to join the Union. Ms Wolczuk also pointed to the Member States' differing views on the future Eastern Dimension of the Union and asked a question about the prospects of Ukraine's future EU membership.

### Krzysztof Bobiński

*Editor, "Union & Poland" Magazine, Warsaw*

Mr Bobiński asked the speakers to outline the EU's position on the Middle East: Is it reasonable to speak of a co-ordinated Middle East policy of the EU? Is such a policy likely to be developed in the future?

Other questions from the audience included the following: Is it possible to use prospects of EU membership as an instrument of pressure or a tool promoting democratic evolution of government in a country? Was democratisation of Spain and Portugal prior to accession only accidental?

### Antti Satuli

Mr Satuli said he is ready to accept the EU aspirations of Ukraine and the country's European character. Without prejudging the outcome of the process, he said that the EU is developing a common policy towards Ukraine; Poland's contribution in this regard could be crucial.

Mr Satuli also said that Middle Eastern issues continue to be discussed by EU Member States. Yet he refused the possibility that the EU should single-handedly resolve Middle Eastern problems; this would require broader international involvement. This region is more of an area of continued interest; it would be



premature to propose the principles of an EU Middle East policy.

Mr Satuli stressed that the political criteria, including real democratisation and respect for human rights, are a necessary (though insufficient) condition of EU mem-

bership. In this sense, democratic standards could be perceived as real instruments of pressure, which continues beyond accession since it ensures on-going enforcement.

### **Hermann von Richthofen**

Mr von Richthofen spoke in favour of development of Polish-Ukrainian cross-border co-operation and a formula of their historic reconciliation as a precondition of further discussions on EU-Ukrainian relations. Cross-border co-operation and Euroregions can also be very effective as an instrument of democratisation in Belarus.

### **Fernando Moran Lopez**

Mr Moran Lopez discussed the position of the EU on Middle Eastern issues and conflicts. He said that the EU's Middle East policy is part of a broader security and defence policy and part of a Mediterranean policy well defined within the Barcelona process. Mr Moran Lopez was however very sceptical about measures available to the EU: in particular, alleys for dialogue between the EU and Israel seem very narrow.

Mr Moran Lopez was much more optimistic about using the prospects of accession as a tool of democratisation. He referred to the situation of Spain and Portugal where EU supporters helped the peaceful evolution

of the countries. Mr Moran Lopez also called for further improvement of such instruments of pressure; this could be advanced by the work of the European Convention on constitutional formulas and Treaty sanctions triggered automatically in the case of any breach of democratic standards by an EU Member State.

### **Victor Martins**

Mr Martins was the strongest supporter of a concrete proposal to be offered to Ukraine, including specific conditions and prospects of EU accession. This does not mean that the Union can now accept the accession of all countries which fulfil the conditions of membership or are interested to meet them. Nevertheless, the Union should take more conclusive steps in its relations with a country as important as Ukraine.

Mr Martins also called for the Union to deepen its relations, including economic relations, with East European countries. He pointed out that Portugal's membership of EFTA, an organisation promoting free market economy in Europe, was a gateway to the country's EU accession. Mr Martins called for further gradual economic integration as one of the most effective instruments conducive to in-bound and pro-European orientation of countries on the continent's periphery.

Mr Martins stressed the importance of prospects of EU membership to the evolution of each country. This was the incentive that helped Portugal to implement a range of reforms in government, fiscal and administrative systems, and to modernise the country. Moreover, EU democratic standards are an effective tool which can impact even those countries which do not aspire to EU membership. Mr Martins referred to negotiations between the EU and Brazil: the framework agreement, mainly economic in nature, was signed only when Brazil fulfilled a number of political criteria, among others respecting the human rights of "street children."

Mr Martins emphasised that Portugal's accession to the EU had no adverse effect on its capacity to pursue its own foreign policy taking advantage of historical relations with the countries of the Western hemisphere.

“Our foreign relations capacity increased after accession,” said Mr Martins referring to his earlier intervention.

### **Tadeusz Mazowiecki**

Mr Mazowiecki followed up on Mr Martin’s final statement. The Portuguese case and the fact that the country can now more effectively pursue its own foreign policy should dispel any remaining doubts of Poles as to whether Poland will be able to continue its foreign policy after accession.

# **Session III:**

## **Neighbourhood: Traditional and New Problems of Security**

Chair:

**Aleksander Smolar**, President of the Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

Speakers:

**Heather Grabbe**, Research Director, Centre for European Reform,  
London

**Bronisław Komorowski**, former Minister of Defence of Poland, Warsaw

**Antonio Missiroli**, Senior Research Fellow,  
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

**Dominique Moïsi**,  
Deputy Director, French Institute of International Research (IFRI), Paris

**Andrey Zagorsky**, Deputy Director,  
Institute for Applied International Research (IAIR), Moscow

Presentation:

**Jacek Cichocki**, Deputy Director, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw

## Aleksander Smolar

President of the Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

Mr Smolar said at the beginning that issues considered to be the traditional most serious threats to security have been outpaced by new factors in today's world: demographics, trafficking in people, drug trafficking, new types of terrorist attacks.

Mr Smolar discussed the role of EU decisions, including the Schengen *acquis*, in defining borders and cross-border security: in addition to their real significance, they are often perceived as symbols.

Mr Smolar recalled the fundamental dilemma, later discussed by all speakers and guests: How to strike a balance between enforcing border regime as an important part of the security system and the drive towards increased freedom of movement.

## Antonio Missiroli

Senior Research Fellow,

European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Unlike the OSCE or the Council of Europe, the EU must not water down its nature as it would lose its clout and its attraction to the candidate countries.



Mr Missiroli said that the protection of borders is one of the main functions of each State. The European Union is special in that it applies a unique combination of means: incorporation/enlargement (by request of those interested) and stabilisation of the border areas by way of exerting pressure, signing trade agreements, regional treaties, exporting models. Since the end of the cold war, enlargement has outweighed stabilisation.

Mr Missiroli said that the present enlargement is the most important one, after the ac-

cession of the Mediterranean countries in the 1980s; it will probably lead to the accession of the Balkan countries, which lie between Central Europe and the Mediterranean. Hence, the external borders of the European Union have to be clearly defined and the different status of full EU members and associated countries must not be confused.

Mr Missiroli shared his doubts concerning the preservation of the EU's identity in the course of enlargement, not so much due to the present accessions but rather the prospective enlargement to Turkey and the Balkan countries. On the other hand, the process offers greater diversity and flexibility inside the EU.

Regarding the outlook of the EU's evolution, Mr Missiroli pointed to another paradox: the EU calls on candidate countries to reform as a precondition and a goal of accession. Mr Missiroli asked whether those countries, which are the source of certain threats (including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Morocco and Algeria, as well as Turkey with its Kurd issue) could indeed be stabilised without clear prospects of membership.

Mr Missiroli also discussed the directions of potential EU enlargement: while the conference was focused on Eastern Europe, there was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to consider, the accession of Malta and Cyprus, and the increasing dialogue with the Maghreb and the Middle East as well as the Sub-Saharan Africa. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is both an area of hope and of concerns; it may also be the locus of traditional and modern threats.

The future of the European Union will depend on the capacity of the Member States to juggle all the dimensions in order to play a non-zero-sum game.

## Aleksander Smolar

Mr Smolar said that Mr Missiroli brought to relief the complexity of internal architecture of the European Union, which is decisive to its unique "neoimperialism". It is important to find a formula to export stability without formal enlargement.

Mr Smolar also said that the new model of the EU which the previous speaker thought was a far prospect is indeed developing right now; integration at different speeds discussed by EU analysts may take shape really soon.

## Heather Grabbe

Research Director, Centre for European Reform, London

Ms Grabbe mainly discussed the challenges faced by the drafters of the EU's eastern policy. After September 11, 2001 such as terms as "threat" and "security" have had to be redefined. Threats now include new phenomena, such as trafficking in people, mass migrations, or transnational terrorist organisations which cannot be dismantled with traditional defences. Moreover, the threats have decentralised: they are posed not only by states or organisations, but also by individuals. Hence, the growing importance of borders to security. Meanwhile, the European political class aims to dismantle borders as barriers; yet the majority of the European public see borders as walls protecting them from danger.

States cannot guarantee their citizens security with military means.

Ms Grabbe said that this perception of borders is not unique to West Europeans: sociological research in Poland suggests that the future EU Member States are also prone to build barriers around them. This is a particular European paradox.

Another paradox stems from the Schengen formula: while it enables free movement of people in the EU, it clearly differentiates between people legally residing in the EU and "aliens." Is it possible to soften the Schengen formula? Unfortunately, rigorous formulas are facts. This dilemma will have to be faced by new EU Member States as soon as they are fully bound by the Schengen *acquis*.

Ms Grabbe strongly criticised the political class of the EU for their focus on border controls rather than integration, especially in regions to be covered by the EU's eastern policy. This is mainly a consequence of the EU politicians' unwillingness to incur financial costs and to develop formulas for integration. Enlargement of the free trade area, for instance to Moldova or Morocco, requires a revision of the EU's economic policy, which Ms Grabbe believes is strongly protectionist, at least in agriculture; yet that calls for both courage and vision.

Migrations are increasingly perceived as a threat to security rather than an opportunity of economic growth.

Ms Grabbe put forth recommendations for EU officials: for instance, isolationism which is the root cause of EU Member States' rigorous application of the Schengen *acquis* could be softened by issuing Schengen visas valid in all EU Member States. Such visas could be issued by EU consulates to be

established in neighbouring countries; the consulates would also be responsible for assistance and information programmes. “The people of Western Ukraine would have more exposure to the EU than just by the fact of queuing for a visa,” said Ms Grabbe.

Finally, Ms Grabbe discussed the concessions and the flexibility of the EU in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Can a compromise be reached on such issues? How can the EU take responsibility for failed states? Ms Grabbe welcomed the results of recent interventions (especially the EU’s presence in the Balkans) but called for hard-ly realistic albeit much more effective pre-emptive actions. Yet, such humanitarian interventions and long-time presence in “humanitarian protectorates” would require determination which the EU’s politicians and general public lack. However, humanitarian protectorates are the only reasonable alternative to the stability-driven EU enlargement *ad infinitum*.



The EU won’t be willing to enlarge indefinitely; yet how many protectorates will it want to have, and for how long?

### Bronisław Komorowski

former Minister of Defence of Poland, Warsaw

Mr Komorowski discussed the impact of enlargement on the external security of the entire EU, and pointed to different experiences of the border states of the EU due to their history and present location.

Speaking of double loyalties – to NATO and the EU, Mr Komorowski described a door with two locks: the NATO lock gives so much hard security that similar EU structures would not be necessary. It is much more important for Brussels to develop a common foreign policy open to new experiences and threats. Such a policy is a necessary condition for a real sense of security among the new EU Member States, especially its border states. Po-

Borders are becoming tighter as we speak, what's more, they are turning into real barriers.

land and other candidate countries would welcome a common defence policy even before formal accession. Further discussions, especially in view of the rift between the policies of the EU and the USA, place an uncomfortable dilemma ahead of the candidate countries.

Mr Komorowski argued with previous interventions as he pointed to the importance of hard military means of security. A civilian crisis (like September 11) can easily turn into a military one (US interventions in Central Asia and the Middle East).

Mr Komorowski criticised the EU politicians' lack of consistency in their "phi-

losophy of borders": declarations of increased integration are coupled with new barriers to the movement of people; what previous speakers called a paradox, Mr Komorowski said was hypocrisy. Its implications hit the candidate countries: tighter borders may hinder the process of overcoming mental barriers and negative stereotypes through personal contacts; due to their historical experience, this is particularly important to Central European countries.

If a door or a window is kept open in the common European house, Poles will have a running nose from the draught because of the geographic location we've had for a thousand years. Mr Komorowski emphasised the close correlation between democratisation of a country and its long-term political stability. This correlation, witnessed also in the neighbouring countries, justifies the "limited sense of security" of Polish politicians. Lack of civilian control of the military or the presence of offensive armies in some neighbouring countries inspire Poland's

strong interest in a common defence policy of the European Union, a coherent and consistent policy that would rely on NATO's military capacity which offers guarantees of security.



## Dominique Moïsi

Deputy Director, French Institute  
of International Relations (IFRI), Paris

Mr Moïsi argued against the imperial metaphor evoked by other speakers: EU structures and the logic of EU expansion are nowhere like the Roman Empire – the comparison would be more apt in the case of the USA.

Mr Moïsi was far from an enthusiastic appreciation of the EU elites. He criticised French politicians who are unwilling to discuss the Eastern Dimension. Many in the Brussels elite are leaning towards neo-isolationism, building Fortress Europe.

According to Mr Moïsi, the main reason for this confusion is the lack of conclusions in the debate on the European identity opened several years ago. As Europe has no definition, EU members are discouraged to discuss the eastern policy. The main dilemma, whether Europe is a geographical or a political notion, remains open. Hence the lack of EU position on potential future membership of Russia.

Mr Moïsi criticised the recent trend among EU Member States to found a counterweight for the USA within the European Union; the political construct is to rely on the reconstituted Paris-Berlin-Moscow triangle. This seems to attest to both nostalgia and lack of realism. The alternative solution is to strengthen and promote European identity. This position was proved correct by the success of the EU stability mission in the Balkans; yet, the policy can only be effective if “old Europe” gives up on the defensive and on short-sighted anti-Americanism. Both the defensive position and the lack of conclusions from the identity debate may push the candidate countries to strong pro-American involvement with prejudice to the identity of the new Europe.



[We, the EU Member States] want to be a kind of big Switzerland: rich, selfish, and in fact unimportant, whose selfishness protects it from the wind of history.

You are forcing us to say which is more important: the value of geography or the geography of values.

## Andrey Zagorsky

Deputy Director, Institute for Applied International Research (IAIR), Moscow

I think I will live to see not so much Russia in the European Union as a situation where this issue will matter no more.

Mr Zagorsky stressed the need for new visions and goals now that the pro-EU efforts of the democratic elites of Central European countries are being crowned with success. The main tasks ahead include the redefinition of the EU's common defence policy in view of new challenges. The proposed goal to "make the EU borders flexible" is particularly difficult to achieve with the onset of new threats: organised crime, migrations, and hard terrorism.

Visa requirements for Russians, Ukrainians and nationals of other countries had an adverse effect ... but they also helped to curtail mafia activity.

Another issue discussed by Mr Zagorsky was that of relations between Russia and the European Union. Russia may join the EU structures (or the borders between Russia and the EU may diminish) only if a regime is put in place whereby Russian nationals could freely cross the Schengen borders.

Mr Zagorsky called for visa-free movement of people between the European Union and those neighbouring countries, which meet specific criteria. These include effective prevention of organised crime and regulated borders of Russia (especially southern and eastern borders) or the adoption of a quasi-Schengen regime of semi-borders or even lack of clearly demarcated borders in lieu of today's free movement of people. The presence of large Russian minorities in neighbouring countries and a need for another identity debate – on the identity of Russia, the CIS, and the post-Soviet countries – remain open issues.

We [in Russia] do not have to accept the entire package of requirements imposed by the Schengen *acquis* but we must ensure tight controls on our borders.

Mr Zagorsky stressed the priority: to clearly define the area subject to the EU's eastern policy and possible liberalisation of cross-border movement of people: the "east" of Europe should include Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Otherwise, the Schengen regime will be put in place along the borders of Russia with these countries, involving huge financial and political costs.

Mr Zagorsky criticised the slow progress of work on a "broader European vision"; both Brus-



sels and Moscow at present tend to take an *ad hoc* defensive position on issues of the EU's eastern policy. The alternative is to create a common pan-European economic area and to find an open-minded solution to the issue of visas for non-EU nationals.

## DISCUSSION

### **Artur Hajnicz**

*Poland in Europe Foundation, Warsaw*

Mr Hajnicz followed up on the issue of confusion among new EU members considering the usefulness of NATO, US, and EU guarantees of security. He quoted opinion polls, which suggest a clear turn of the Polish general public towards the EU. The anti-war sentiment of Poles will help them identify with the EU defence policy. Mr Hajnicz questioned the alleged pro-US orientation of Poles; even politicians traditionally allied with Washington are likely to change their position.

### **Vaclav Zak**

*Editor, "Britske Listy", Prague*

Mr Zak questioned the division between "old Europe" and "new Europe" made in the months preceding the Iraq intervention. A variety of behaviours including wide scepticism about the governmental policy on the Middle East issue point to a common European identity, be it doubted by the "old Europe."

### **Krzysztof Bobiński**

*Editor, "Union & Poland" Magazine, Warsaw*

Mr Bobiński offered his definition of the EU identity: the EU is not so much a union or federation of states as a set of procedures for the resolution of conflicts between countries and nations without violence. This formula may become a fundamental criterion in the accession of new EU members.

## **Zdzisław Najder**

*Professor with Opole University, Warsaw-Opole*

Mr Najder referred to several interventions and pointed to the military dimension of contemporary anti-terrorist campaigns and their limited effect in eliminating the root cause of international crises. Quoting the “door with locks” metaphor coined by Mr Komorowski, Mr Najder stressed the limited validity and effect of NATO guarantees. This implies that the EU capacity should be used to prevent environmental disasters, demographic or political instability. Mr Najder emphasised the advantages of existing definitions of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy: the present and future EU members (including Poland) already benefit from it. This also helps the irreversible process of identity building. As a result, in the coming years Poland will be in a position to combine its two loyalties as an ally of the USA and an important part of stability in Central Europe.

## **Zdzisław Lachowski**

*Analyst, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stockholm*

Mr Lachowski stressed the different position of “old Europe” and “new Europe” on issues of security: Eastern Europe tends to be more serious about military guarantees. Development of the EU’s eastern policy would benefit from the ratification of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty by all European countries. Mr Lachowski called for a redefinition of the Northern Dimension in view of the fact that the Baltic will become the EU’s internal sea and given the need to regulate the status of the Kaliningrad enclave (also in military terms).

## **Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski**

*Łódź University, Łódź*

Despite many preceding sceptical comments, Mr Żurawski vel Grajewski said that the European Common Foreign and Defence Policy is a fact; the only question is what position the EU should take on specific issues. He said that the EU’s eastern policy will not (and will not need to) cover military issues. Both the Polish non-paper and further proposals to expand it include peace-

ful instruments of international policy. Mr Żurawski vel Grajewski questioned the EU's capacity to make humanitarian interventions in the ex-USSR, even in order to help failed states, such as Moldova. The EU has never defined itself as a military alliance; it would be a misunderstanding to expect Brussels to make far-reaching concessions. The EU's extensive capacity to pursue an eastern policy should not be combined with its limited military capacity.

### **Włodzimierz Mokry**

*Jagiellonian University, Cracow*

Professor Mokry emphasised the need to expand the understanding of the new EU neighbours, an issue related to the opening up of borders. He shared his concern about the ignorance of most students on Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Lithuanian relations, which is staggering if unreciprocated. Professor Mokry also called to initiate and co-ordinate educational projects to promote information about the neighbours of Poland. This is indispensable as on-going European integration will give rise to reactions defending national identity; historical ignorance may foster xenophobia.

### **Jakub Boratyński**

*Director of the International Co-operation Programme,*

*Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw*

Mr Boratyński said that the need to develop an eastern policy, especially in view of the crisis caused by the Iraq conflict in Europe, offers an opportunity to make joint efforts among present and new EU members. Yet Mr Boratyński was far from optimistic. It is paradoxical that such countries as Ukraine have fallen victim to their own success. As their politicians managed to avert serious crises or conflicts, frequently suffered at times of transition, they dropped off the EU agenda altogether.

Mr Boratyński also pointed to the implications of the commitment of the new EU members, including Poland, to protect the EU borders. Apart from the Schengen *acquis*, there is a space where the Polish government could pursue a policy of openness and integration of the neighbouring nations.

Examples include the proposal to grant free-of-charge visas to Ukrainian nationals or to enable “small border traffic” for citizens of non-EU neighbouring countries. Such solutions are important for at least two reasons: they help Poland (and the Schengen system) to win trust and they work as a test of the autonomy and effectiveness of the Polish diplomacy now in the EU.

### **Andrey Zagorsky**

Mr Zagorsky was the first speaker to address questions. He first defined the position of Russia in view of NATO’s internal conflict caused by the Iraq crisis. Russia’s foreign policy should strive to keep good relations with the USA and to maintain the prime role of the UN Security Council in important decision-making.

Mr Zagorsky seconded those speakers who were sceptical about fast development of the EU’s common defence policy: tokenism and loyalties to particular dimensions (Eastern Dimension, Mediterranean Dimension), though benefiting the EU in the long run, could in the short term delay the EU’s common position, also on the eastern policy which is the most important to Russia.

Mr Zagorsky also discussed specific challenges of the Common Defence Policy: the ratification of the CFE by the EU is not hindered by the often discussed issue of weapons in the possession of Georgia or Transdniestra but by Brussel’s expectations that Moscow will meet the requirements of the Treaty.

Mr Zagorsky agreed with those speakers who talked of “reciprocal ignorance” among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. He said that his Institute has started a project to facilitate dialogue between Russia and the countries of the region.



## **Dominique Moïsi**

Mr Moïsi commented on President Jacques Chirac's statement on the position of the countries of "new Europe" on the Iraq crisis, criticised by several speakers. While far from praising the statement, Mr Moïsi admitted that it expressed the sentiment shared by many in France concerning the implications of EU enlargement; especially that the "Letter of the Eight" which provoked Mr Chirac's reaction was in breach of the EU's customary political practice.

Mr Moïsi stressed that despite temporary differences in the positions of EU members on the Iraq intervention, all Europeans share experiences that make them unwilling to resort to military solutions; in the long run, this offers a way to reach an agreement or foster a European sensitivity. Mr Moïsi warned that the sensitivity may prove flawed due to escapism.

Mr Moïsi also warned against self-complacency with the formula that Europe stands for a set of rules to effectively resolve international conflicts. We must urgently recall the axiological fundamentals of what Europe means; otherwise, seemingly effective means to resolve conflicts may become futile.

## **Bronisław Komorowski**

Mr Komorowski argued with the previous speaker: he said that the German-French-Belgian initiative prior to the "Letter of the Eight" could be considered an act against the spirit of European co-operation. Such behaviour may be caused by fear of change and by the diminishing importance of European powers. Mr Komorowski warned against projecting such fears onto the debate about the EU's foreign policy.

Mr Komorowski discussed developments in German politics and new solutions proposed by the opposition party of Christian Democrats. It is in Poland's interests to highlight needs and interests shared with Germany, Poland's closest neighbour.

Mr Komorowski's main comments concerned the "international security formulas" offered to new NATO and EU members by the USA and the EU. Mr Komorowski stressed the difference between the two: NATO is a safeguard against military threats while the EU gives protection against civilian crises.

However, civilian crises can easily turn into military ones. The EU security system is geared to protect markets rather than States. The difference between these two formulas may cause serious problems.

Mr Komorowski pointed to the absolute superiority of the NATO security system in terms of military capacity. Hence, the pro-American orientation of the new EU members is an important political fact.

### **Heather Grabbe**

Ms Grabbe addressed the division between “old” and “new” Europe. In her opinion, this does not imply a crisis in the EU; moreover, the EU is not likely to grow its own “eastern bloc”: even now in a vast majority of issues voted at the UN, the EU members take a common position as fundamental to unity.

Ms Grabbe pointed to the risk to the Community if politicians concerned with the position of the “new Europe” try to block enlargement. However, only an enlargement referendum in the Benelux or in France could halt the process; this seems very unlikely.

Ms Grabbe was sceptical about NATO’s success; as NATO remains largely a cold war institution, it carries the historical burden that stops it from evolving. NATO is not fit to fight terrorism. Hence, EU structures need to shoulder a new responsibility, unforeseeable several years ago: they have to develop means to prevent terrorism, which has a strong (and often adverse) impact on the EU’s eastern policy.

Ms Grabbe said that the rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine over the past decade was a great success. The model of reconciliation that proved successful on the Rhein could be adopted along the Bug.

Ms Grabbe was less optimistic about the model of EU enlargement: EU members are still afraid of enlargement and have not worked out an attractive alternative to accession. As a result, candidate countries risk complete rejection, which may cause strong negative sentiments.

Ms Grabbe quoted the formula of confederation proposed by François Mitterrand in the early 1990s: a model of close relations with countries half-way to accession may become France’s important contribution to the EU’s foreign policy.

## **Antonio Missiroli**

Mr Missiroli said that the paradox of “tightening and opening” tackled by the speakers in the session could only be resolved by promoting cross-border trade while keeping up the requirements of security policy. The solution for countries in economic transition is not to adopt the *acquis* but to find a springboard in European markets. Future relations between Romania and Moldova may be an opportunity to test this formula.

Mr Missiroli discussed the neoimperial model as a formula of stability. Two important positive aspects of the model, guarantees of security and development of infrastructure, are too strongly divided in today’s world between the USA and the EU. The “American legions,” to use an analogy, ensure military security while the EU is expected to promote new legal and economic solutions, especially in areas of instability, such as the West Balkans. This strong division of responsibilities is not conducive to stabilisation, although both the USA and the EU proved effective when they had to step in to run the post-Yugoslavian legacy.

Mr Missiroli spoke against simplification abundant in both media reports and serious political debates. Despite the opposition of Germans against the Iraq intervention, Berlin’s logistic support for Washington’s operation was worth more than the declarations of pro-American EU members.

## **Aleksander Smolar**

Mr Smolar summarised the session. The notion of borders turned out to imply many different meanings. The debate proved that borders were more than technical or social notions: they also construct a relationship of power and pose a challenge to politicians and linguists.

Mr Smolar said that despite the drive to integration, new borders are being drawn. While EU’s external borders are made tighter, new borders appear inside the EU: regardless of similar positions on military intervention, the division into “old” and “new” Europe may become a fact, additionally fuelled by efforts to preserve own identity.

**Presentation  
of the Centre for Eastern Studies  
Jacek Cichocki**

*Deputy Director, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw*

After closing the third session, Mr Cichocki outlined the history and the activity of the Centre for Eastern Studies. Established by decision of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1990, this oldest think-tank in post-communist Poland is focused on widely understood eastern policy. Its current three major research programmes cover the EU's eastern policy, NATO's relations with the countries of the ex-USSR, and Islam in post-USSR regions.

Mr Cichocki was optimistic about the prospects of the EU's eastern policy. Despite the problems brought about by the Iraq crisis, the European partners have demonstrated the will to develop the EU's foreign policy. Exchange of opinions provoked by the "Letter of the Eight" helped to clear the ground and to clarify mutual expectations. Once again, a direct expression of emotions had positive results; the track record of previous internal crises overcome by the EU suggests that they are a means of reaching a compromise.

# **Session IV**

## **Supporting Changes in Neighbouring Countries. The Role of the EU Policy**

Chair:

**Krzysztof Lis**, President, Institute of Business Development, Warsaw

Speakers:

**Pavel Daneyko**, President, The Institute of Privatisation and Management, Minsk

**Marek Dąbrowski**, Chairman of the Council, Research Foundation of the CASE Centre for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw

**Yuriy Yechanurov**, Head of the Committee on Industrial Policy and Entrepreneurship, Ukrainian Parliament, Kiev

**Christoph Jessen**, Commissioner for EU Enlargement, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin

**Alistair MacDonald**, Head of Unit, Directorate E (Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asian Republics), European Commission, Brussels



### Krzysztof Lis

*President, Institute of Business Development,  
Warsaw*

Mr Lis stressed that all speakers are directly engaged in the process of developing mutual relations between the European Union and its eastern neighbours. The speakers are most competent to address the issues discussed in the session, including: How to best support positive transition in the countries east of the EU?; What is the role of the EU assistance programmes?

How can Brussels contribute financially and politically?

### Pavel Daneyko

*President, The Institute of Privatisation and Management, Minsk*

If political transition and radical reforms are to take root [in Belarus], this will happen thanks to the private sector.

Mr Daneyko, a democratic opposition activist, briefly outlined the balance of power shaping the Belarussian political scene. There are no organisations that could affect the decisions of the authorities headed by Alexander Lukashenko; opposition movements are mainly focused on human rights; informal fractions in government are powerless. The situation in Belarus is determined by the structures run by Mr Lukashenko and by Russian businesses which compete for control of privatisation. The standing of the local economy is very weak: Mr Daneyko quoted cases of discrimination against the private sector in the centrally controlled economy.

Mr Daneyko discussed the efforts made by neighbouring countries and the European Union to help democratisation in Belarus. The country can only evolve through privatisation and the formation of civic society (also as a consequence of the emergence of the private sector). The impact and the example of Poland may be instrumental. Mr Daneyko was critical about sup-

port given to democratic groups in Belarus by the EU. Most of the assistance programmes are designed to support reform-oriented governments. The programmes should be adjusted to fit the political specificity of Belarus where support should be offered to civic society; the existing programmes (TACIS) should be reoriented to follow the PHARE formula whereby NGOs could work as partners to the EU.



In my opinion, the European Union's support for Belarus is unconvincing.

## Marek Dąbrowski

*Chairman of the Council, Research Foundation of the CASE  
Centre for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw*

Mr Dąbrowski outlined the profile and the activity of the CASE Foundation. Drawing upon his experience, Mr Dąbrowski made comments on the transition in Central Europe, the Balkans and ex-USSR countries over the past several years.

These countries include a group of beneficiaries who implement effective reforms and head towards EU membership; others, mainly CIS countries, have not gained this status. What was key to the success of reforms was commitment to transition rather than historical experience (the beneficiaries include both ex-USSR republics and countries of the Warsaw Pact as well as the successors to Yugoslavia who were independent from Moscow). EBOR studies suggest a clear correlation between political reforms and positive economic transition. Commitment in the early years of the reform process was decisive to the evolution of these countries; other factors include the impact of international organisations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, and the prospects of EU accession, particularly topical to this conference. The importance of these factors is attested by a comparison of the present status of Moldova and Romania.

Even where transition has been successful, political will is not enough to make reforms; external assistance is indispensable.

The border  
between Poland  
and Germany...

or the border  
between Hungary  
and Austria are  
Schengen borders  
yet they remain  
open.



Mr Dąbrowski called against the *a priori* exclusion of any European country from EU membership: accession prospects should be offered both to Turkey and Russia. This does not mean that the accession process should be triggered immediately but long-term strategic plans must be drafted. Given difficulty in modernisation and the ambivalence of several countries vis-à-vis accession, the plans could provide for transitional periods. In economic terms, candidate countries should be offered prospects of WTO accession and later on engaged in free trade negotiations.

Mr Dąbrowski criticised the “demonisation” of Schengen which misleads and confuses. Schengen borders, for instance the border between Poland and Germany, remain open despite the Schengen *acquis*. It will be possible to keep the Schengen borders with Ukraine, Russia or Moldova just as open. Mr Dąbrowski called for the definition of boundary conditions to be met by countries applying for assistance programmes.

### **Yuriy Yechanurov**

*Head of the Committee on Industrial Policy and Entrepreneurship,  
Ukrainian Parliament, Kiev*

Mr Yechanurov discussed the outlook for Ukraine: either the country finds its position in European structures or the Kiev oligarchy prevails.

Mr Yechanurov pointed to several reasons for Ukraine's slow growth, including: excessive optimism of the local elite in evaluating the pro-European potential of the country, as well as Europe's unwillingness to open up to Ukraine. Sadly, Brussels is not ready to develop a road map for integration that would account for the specificity of Ukraine, or to prioritise (security vs. enlargement of markets) in its relations with Ukraine. Mr Yechanurov said

that Ukraine's neighbours, including Poland, could advocate for Ukraine in the EU as a friendly "go-between" since they have a good understanding of the country's situation.

Mr Yechanurov pointed to inconsistencies and double standards at work whenever Kiev is blamed for promoting illegal migration to the EU: in fact, Ukraine is a buffer as it intercepts a vast majority of illegal migrants from the east. However, the EU's visa regime works against Ukrainian nationals. Although understandable from the point of view of EU interests, the visa regime generates the risk of strong negative anti-EU sentiments in Ukraine.

Mr Yechanurov called on the EU to negotiate with Kiev on the priorities of EU relations with Ukraine. Otherwise, Brussels may ignore Ukraine's most acute problems. Like other speakers, Mr Yechanurov called for modification of assistance programmes: Ukraine should have a bigger say in defining the programmes. Equally important are real benefits of particular projects as well as the participation of Central and East European experts who are more competent on issues of economic transition.



Ukraine overcame one threat only to face another... there is still the risk that Ukraine may remain outside the borders of democratic Europe.

**Christoph Jessen**  
*Commissioner for EU Enlargement,  
 German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin*

Mr Jessen emphasised the importance of the conference to the position, currently developed by Germany and the EU, on co-operation with new EU members and neighbours. The EU concept of integration is an innovation in international relations: resolving international controversies in the EU and drafting relevant legislation has helped to turn Europe, a continent of war, into a region of peace and stability. Mr Jessen agreed with Mr Dąbrowski

Integration means  
that we are all  
coping with  
problems,  
differences and  
conflicts of interest,  
but we discuss them  
in Brussels, form an  
opinion, and draft  
legislation.



concerning the clear correlation between legislative enforcement and political democratisation on the one hand and social and economic growth on the other.

Mr Jessen discussed the prospects of EU accession which are open to each country that meets the basic boundary conditions. Where integration is a promise for relatively remote future, it is difficult to make it attractive. Responsibility for future membership is clearly defined: prospects of democratisation and market reform among the EU's neighbours are a responsibility of the local

political class while the EU only acts as co-ordinator and evaluator. Particularly illustrative is the case of Turkey which first applied for accession in 1963.

Mr Jessen called for a strong integrated Union, fit to face the challenges ahead, mainly integration with the east. The EU's framework concept must be retained: excessive widening of the EU criteria to make them accessible to as many countries as possible could dramatically dilute the EU's identity.

### Alistair MacDonald

*Head of Unit, Directorate E (Eastern Europe, Caucasus,  
Central Asian Republics), European Commission, Brussels*

Mr MacDonald offered several definitions and clarifications to structure the debate.

Mr MacDonald said that the EU's policy towards eastern neighbours is more than assistance funds shared through TACIS; equally important are political decisions, investments, and development of trade relations, as illustrated by a comparison of TACIS funds transferred to the four eastern neighbours (EUR 300 million per year) with investments (EUR 1 billion per year).

Mr MacDonald said that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova received an

estimated EUR 3.5 billion under TACIS and other assistance programmes in 1991–2002. These international transfers were very effective as they helped institutional reforms, the emergence of civic society, and nuclear security. The programmes were no panacea: one of the most acute trends of the last decade, witnessed across the region, involved falling standards of living. This must be taken into consideration when designing future assistance programmes.

In Mr MacDonald's opinion, the eastern border of the EU should be considered an opportunity rather than a threat or a challenge: while the borders must be secure, the EU's eastern neighbours will gain access to dynamic markets of half a billion consumers. The EU should support economic reform and overall transition bringing the EU's neighbours closer to the rule of law and democracy. Particularly important is cross-border co-operation at the EU level. Major tasks ahead include: secure borders; legal movement of goods and people; promotion of prosperity in border areas; strengthening contacts between local communities across the borders.

Mr MacDonald announced intensification of cross-border initiatives, both within existing institutional frameworks (e.g., Small Projects Programme) and by expanding the interoperability of TACIS and INTERREG to be followed by the introduction of a single instrument merging these two programmes with PHARE.

Mr MacDonald emphasised the role of the new neighbours in the initiatives of the European Union: they can help Brussels to gain a better understanding of East European countries and contribute their experience, primarily the human factor, by bringing the attention of EU citizens to the situation outside the EU.

Enlargement is a task for experts, for politicians, and for the entire population.



## DISCUSSION

### **Andriey Sannikov**

*Member of Charter '97, Minsk*

Mr Sannikov argued with the position presented by Mr Daneyko. Mr Sannikov said that the Belarussian opposition is not in the defensive: its elites are increasingly young people; the Belarussian youth are bitterly opposed against the regime; in addition, history has its parallels in that the direction of the transition in Central Europe in the late 1980s was difficult to predict.

Mr Sannikov called for the European Union to develop a coherent policy towards Belarus; he quoted several facts which suggest that Western Europe has little understanding of the situation in Belarus or is too willing to make concessions to Mr Lukashenka's government. Mr Sannikov referred to the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly's recognition of the Belarussian Parliament (which was elected undemocratically) and the requirement to obtain the government's endorsement for TACIS projects, very controversial in the case of Ukraine where the names of Belarussian authors of projects are erased from official documents where they are members of the democratic opposition contested by the regime.

### **Bogdan Borusewicz**

*Deputy Marshal, Pomeranian Region, Gdańsk*

Mr Borusewicz quoted a resolution of Polish Parliament condemning the abuse of the Belarussian regime against the country's legally elected Parliament. Mr Borusewicz then discussed the economic implications of the visa regime introduced by Poland vis-à-vis its eastern neighbours.

Mr Borusewicz emphasised the importance of innovative initiatives of Polish and Ukrainian governments. Despite understandable negative sentiments in Ukraine caused by the introduction of the visa regime by Poland, Kiev decided not to reciprocate and refrained from introducing visas for Polish nationals. This unprecedented decision gives a new quality to Polish-Ukrainian relations.

nian relations. The model could be used in the EU's future relations with its neighbours, e.g., between Romania and Moldova. Mr Borusewicz wished the same solution (unilateral waiver of visa requirements) had been possible in Polish-Russian relations.

### **Anatol Godym**

*Centre for Strategic Studies, Kishinev*

Mr Godym discussed the probability of the EU accession of four East European countries who are new EU neighbours. Moldova's prospects of "fast Europeanisation" are greater than generally believed due to the advancement of legislative harmonisation as well as practical aspects: the country and its population are relatively small (which helps to implement new solutions); Moldavian migrants in EU Member States are very numerous (over half a million people); Moldova has European and multinational traditions. The key condition of Kishinev's potential success is to drop too demanding accession claims ("Give us a date!") in favour of enlargement as a long-term process.

### **Krzysztof Lis**

Mr Lis stressed the importance of assistance programmes taking account of the specificity of East European countries and acknowledged the critique raised by other speakers concerning co-operation with the Minsk government under TACIS. Mr Lis called for a clear message to be sent to the Belarusian people regarding the country's prospects of EU accession as a powerful and effective tool of exerting pressure. Mr Lis encouraged the participants of the conference to address the issue of the potential role of the European Union and its new members in democratisation and emergence of civic society in the new neighbours.

### **Olka Shumylo**

*Programme Director, International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev*

Ms Shumylo put forth several arguments attesting to the importance of EU assistance to EU accession prospects of particular countries. It is borne out by

a comparison of the experience of Poland and Ukraine in the 1990s: Poland was successful thanks to its position at the time of downfall of the communist bloc, different from the position of Ukraine, and due to well organised assistance and financial commitment of the West. Ms Shumylo applauded the ongoing democratisation in Ukraine: even radical critique of successive governments raised in Kiev bears witness to freedom of political debate.

According to Ms Shumylo, due to long-time isolation of the nations of the ex-USSR, many Ukrainians failed to understand how important it is to introduce standards necessary to participate in assistance programmes. Potential launch of PHARE in Ukraine must be discussed; Polish solutions need not be transposed in minute detail.

Ms Shumylo said that the success of transition depends on a combination of well organised technical assistance, advanced financial instruments, and clear goals; it was the absence of these factors that hampered the effectiveness of TACIS and the initiatives of other donors active in Ukraine. Mr Shumylo emphasised the importance of the implementation of standards in Ukraine, even if the general public considers such standards to be too demanding: too much leeway would dilute the planned transition and reform.

Ms Shumylo said that subsequent assistance programmes in Ukraine should be preceded by the identification of major technical needs: goals and priorities of reforms should be defined prior to the implementation of TACIS and PHARE. The kind of available programmes is of secondary importance provided that necessary conditions are met, including co-financing, transfer of know-how, and consistent management.

### **Ales Ancipenka**

*Director, Belarusian College, Minsk*

Mr Ancipenka regretted that the governments of the new EU Member States made no declarations concerning the EU's new eastern policy at the conference. He welcomed the only exception: the presentation of the Polish government's non-paper on enlargement.

Mr Ancipenka called for a two-pronged approach to co-operation between

the EU and Belarus involving both governments and NGOs. He also called for Brussels to take a consistent position on its co-operation with Minsk.

### **Jakub Boratyński**

*Director, International Co-operation Programme,*

*Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw*

Mr Boratyński raised the important point of programmes financing co-operation with the NGO sector; drawing upon recent experience, he called for increased flexibility. This has been possible in Central and Eastern Europe thanks to co-operation with private donors from the USA.

Mr Boratyński stressed the special importance of the flexibility of programmes in Belarus; he also called for the formation of a European democracy fund based on similar principles as the US initiatives.

### **Thomas Gulbinas**

*Head of the Common Foreign and Security Policy Division, European*

*Integration Department, Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vilnius*

Mr Gulbinas announced that the Lithuanian government is drafting a non-paper with Vilnius's position on the EU's new eastern policy. Such documents by new EU members could make an important contribution to the development of the policy.

Mr Gulbinas said that the Schengen formula, necessary for reasons of international security, is not designed to put in place new iron curtains or other divides. Effective borders can and must be friendly borders.



According to Mr Gulbinas, the new EU Member States must address the issue of how EU programmes can help to reform the economy and the society in the Kaliningrad district.

### **Alistair MacDonald**

Mr MacDonald said that the EU has the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights which is not unlike the European democracy fund promoted by several speakers. The Initiative helps to finance NGOs, also in unfavourable conditions, such as in Belarus. Directorate E of the European Commission will draft a strategy of co-operation with Belarus.

Mr MacDonald discussed the outlook for the Kaliningrad district: most responsibility is borne by Russia and the solutions adopted by Moscow will set a precedent for other regions. Mr MacDonald announced a forthcoming launch of a Kaliningrad district promotion programme.

Mr MacDonald was sceptical about the prospects of EU membership as an incentive for reform. Transition can be successful without such prospects, as in the case of Vietnam.

### **Yuriy Yechanurov**

Mr Yechanurov stressed the importance of effective exchange of information between the political and economic elites in Poland and Ukraine, helping Ukrainians to better understand the nature of Poland's transition on the way to EU accession and to follow positive behaviour and models. The process involves co-operation of Ukrainian businesses with the Polish Confederation of Private Employers.

Mr Yechanurov pointed to potential negative implications of the introduction of visas for Polish nationals: if customs regulations are amended, Polish exports to the east will suffer.

Mr Yechanurov called for closer co-operation with the Polish mass media. Polish-Ukrainian projects focused on exchange of information will help to enhance cross-border co-operation and to build civic society in Ukraine.

### **Marek Dąbrowski**

Mr Dąbrowski argued against the idea of replacing TACIS with PHARE proposed by several speakers: despite technical differences, the programmes are equally effective; their outcome depends on the political commitment and technological capacity of the beneficiaries rather than mere packaging.

Mr Dąbrowski disagreed with Ms Shumylo and reiterated the importance of political reform to economic and systemic transition: the pace of transition in Romania and Moldova in the late 1990s suggests how important political reform is to European integration.

### **Aleksander Smolar**

Mr Smolar summarised the discussion in the conference by quoting Henry Kissinger's phrase: "epistemological breakthrough." The two-day debate has given West European participants a better picture of the Polish and East European specificity as well as the challenges and issues involved in EU integration. This epistemological breakthrough brings this region of the world into the mainstream of European thinking.



# **Non-paper**

## **with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of Poland,  
January 2003**

Poland has welcomed the initiation in spring this year of the discussion on the EU New Neighbours initiative, its development under the Danish Presidency and the EU's intention to involve into it the countries that will soon join the Union.

Since the beginning of the process of transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland has always sought good-neighbourly relations with all its eastern neighbours and has advocated EU's active policy towards these countries as well as the Union's assistance in the reform process in Eastern Europe. Only by eradicating divisions between the enlarged Union and its eastern neighbours can stability, security and prosperity be secured at the Union's eastern borders. Poland would like to contribute to shaping Union's policy towards its future eastern neighbours understanding that, however important, this is only a part of the EU external relations and the Union's neighbourhood policy. This commitment was already expressed by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs in his statement opening the accession negotiations in 1998 and has been confirmed later in the paper of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of June 2001 on the EU eastern policy. The EU eastern policy should have as its main objective abolishing the existing division lines through assistance and closer co-operation with the adjacent countries that should be based on common values and interests. Though this paper focuses on the enlarged Union's relations with its direct neighbours – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and

Russia, there is also an evident need of strengthening the EU policy towards countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Many of the ideas presented in the joint letter of the High Representative, Secretary General Javier Solana and Commissioner Chris Patten of 7 August 2002 and in the Swedish non-paper of June 2002, are consistent with the way Poland perceives the development of the eastern policy of the EU. Poland agrees with the conclusions of the GAERC of 18 November 2002, stating that the EU enlargement presents an important opportunity to advance relations with the new neighbours of the Union. Particularly welcomed is the wish of the Council to establish further conditions which would allow the EU to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus as well as its recommendation for the Commission and the High Representative to prepare relevant proposals. Drawing from Poland's experience and knowledge of the region concerned, we can perhaps bring some new, fresh ideas to the discussion.

## **1.**

Relations with the eastern new neighbours should be developed within a coherent framework, but in an individual way. EU relations with its future eastern neighbours should be differentiated, depending on the progress of the countries concerned in their reform process, the degree of convergence of their values and foreign policies with those of the EU, and relevant to their aspirations concerning their relations with the EU. On the other hand, the countries of Eastern Europe, due to their common historical experience in the 20th century, have a lot of similar problems that result from the legacy of almost a century of communist rule. Despite opening to the West, their economies are still dependent on each other. Moreover, strong political connections exist between them. Therefore it seems reasonable for the EU to have a coherent, comprehensive framework of its eastern policy that will enable individual development of relations with each of the countries concerned, without prejudicing their final formula. This framework could constitute the Eastern Dimension of the EU and facilitate co-ordination of poli-

cies of the enlarged EU and its member states towards the EU eastern neighbours, as well as of the projects. It could allow for co-ordination and synergy of activities of the EU and regional as well as international organisations and institutions. In this respect, a more active involvement of the EU in the co-operation within sub-regional structures like the Central European Initiative would be advisable. Such an umbrella (the Eastern Dimension) would also enable a more effective use of the assistance for the Eastern European states. It should furthermore facilitate a greater involvement of international financial institutions and private capital in assistance projects.

The Eastern Dimension of the EU is not meant to compete with the Northern Dimension, but to be complementary to it. It should build on the experience derived from the Northern Dimension as well as from the Barcelona Process, but also of the CEE new member states. In the course of the transformation process Polish institutions, experts and NGOs have acquired immense experience and know-how, which can be useful for our eastern neighbours. Having been involved in several bilateral and multilateral assistance projects in the Eastern European states, the Polish NGOs offer unique instruments to affect the transformation process in the countries concerned – instruments that the EU and the governmental policies of the EU Member States may not have at their disposal.

Therefore, the policy of the enlarged EU towards its eastern neighbours should consist of three pillars: community (within the CFSP and External Relations), governmental (policies pursued by the Member States both bilaterally and within multilateral framework) as well as non-governmental (involving NGO-s and other non-governmental actors).

In the mid-term perspective, the eastern policy of the EU could aim at a gradual progress towards a European space of political and economic co-operation within the area of Wider Europe. It should build on the concept of the common European economic space, already outlined in relations with Russia, including political co-operation and both a social and human dimensions. The existing agreements with Ukraine and Moldova would be upgraded to association agreements, to reflect the increased significance of

relations with these countries after the forthcoming EU enlargement as well as their aspirations. There should also be an open option for an agreement with Belarus if its internal political situation improves.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, it is in our opinion in the interest of the enlarged EU to recognise the European choice of this country, which is so important for stability and security in the eastern part of the continent. It is also in its interest to appreciate gearing long-term European policy towards the country's membership of the EU. Although Ukraine's progress in reforms and some aspects of its internal as well as foreign policy are disappointing and are a source of our concern, the policy of critical engagement, dialogue and developing co-operation combined with assistance seems for us to be the most effective and relevant. Otherwise we would risk weakening reformist and pro-European forces in Ukraine. The dialogue should be open and should touch upon the problems of concern for both the EU and Ukraine. Ukraine should have a perspective of having relations with the EU at a level and of the intensity equal to the EU relations with Russia. It should also be able to enjoy the market economy status as soon as possible.

In the case of Belarus, the principle of conditionallity should mean an openness of the EU to intensify relations with the authorities, should they initiate democratic reforms. Simultaneously, the support for co-operation with pro-democratic forces and local authorities, for cross-border co-operation and people-to-people contacts, as well as assistance for small and medium sized enterprises, media and non-governmental organisations should be extended. In the present situation, the assistance should focus on the development of the civic society and the society's capability to embrace reforms.

As far as Moldova is concerned, the focus should be on assistance in solving the conflict in Transdnestria, ensuring internal stability as well as in establishing conditions for economic growth and the fight against poverty. The EU should encourage drafting and later implementation of the strategy of integration with the Union, announced by the government of Moldova.

In the long-term perspective, the countries, if they wish so and if they are capable of meeting membership criteria, should have an option of acces-

sion to the European Union, though the process of their integration would certainly be much more difficult and long-winded than that of the present candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The perspective of joining the EU, however distant, would constitute for them a strong incentive to undertake efforts in furthering democratic and economic reforms.

In relations with Russia, the existing framework for co-operation is well developed and seems to function quite well. Poland supports the priorities identified by the EU and the Danish presidency in the Union's relations with Russia. In the short term, the EU should focus particularly on concluding an agreement on technical arrangements, which would implement decisions of the Brussels European Council of 24 October and the EU-Russia summit of 11 November 2002 on the package of measures for the Kaliningrad District in compliance with the Schengen *acquis* and in a way, that will not delay joining Schengen co-operation by the new member states. There is also a need for further discussion within the PCA framework with participation of the neighbouring future EU Member States, Poland and Lithuania, on the possible EU assistance for a Kaliningrad development programme, provided that such a programme is presented by the Russian authorities. In this respect Poland upholds its offer of assistance and engagement in implementation of such a programme both on a bilateral basis as well as in co-operation with Lithuania and the EU. Poland looks forward to joining other mechanisms of co-operation with Russia in vital areas, particularly in political and energy dialogue, co-operation in justice and home affairs' area as well as in drafting the concept of the common European economic space.

## 2.

The priorities of EU relations with new eastern neighbours should reflect their importance for the enlarged Union and address the outstanding problems. While securing integrity of the EU as well as mutual respect of sovereignty of the parties involved, the evolving European space of political and economic co-operation should comprise the following forms of co-operation of the EU with its eastern neighbours:

- Enhanced political dialogue of the EU with the countries concerned. It should be comprehensive and focus on issues of concern for both sides, including human and minority rights, democratic reforms, resolution of regional tensions and conflicts in accordance with international standards, fighting terrorism and trans-national crime, non proliferation as well as global problems. There is certainly ground for co-operation within the area of Common Foreign & Security Policy, including dialogue within the European Security and Defence Policy and possible contribution of these states to the EU missions.
- Assistance in transformations in the countries concerned should be enhanced and reformed – some ideas are presented below. The EU assistance should concentrate on the priority areas that are essential for the reform process. The obvious objectives are the furtherance of democratic reforms, development of civic society including local governments and establishment of civil control of the army. Nevertheless, these objectives will be difficult to meet if there is insufficient legal framework, if institutions are ineffective and the administration does not have adequate capacity, if the judiciary and law enforcement institutions do not work and corruption is rampant. Therefore, more effort should be made to assist these countries in coping with these problems. Another priority area of EU assistance should concern ensuring economic stability, sustainable development, furthering economic reforms in Eastern European countries, particularly improving legal and administrative environment for enterprises as well as supporting development of small and medium sized businesses. Countries in transition need external support for modernisation of their social policy, to counteract social exclusion and negative perception of the reforms in the respective societies. Finally, the Eastern European countries will need access to know-how and financial assistance to improve and modernise their management of environment.

- Development of economic co-operation that should be mutually beneficial for the EU and the Eastern European countries, contributing to economic growth, modernisation and the increase of competitiveness of economies of these countries. It has been proved, that trade and investment may be the most important factors for development. Therefore, the focus should be on facilitating trade and investment. The first step seems to be the long awaited recognition of these countries as market economies. They need further assistance in improving competitiveness of their economies, as well as preparing for WTO membership and using the opportunities it offers. After the accession of the Eastern European countries to the WTO, free trade should be established with them gradually. Free trade agreements should also facilitate a gradual harmonisation of business law in Eastern European states with the *acquis communautaire*. Moldova, which already is a member of WTO, could be the first to conclude an agreement of this kind. After free trade agreements have become operational, a possibility of further economic integration should be explored, in areas of common interest of the EU and the countries concerned. In effect, the Eastern European states would develop a more stable and business-friendly environment that would attract investments.
- Energy co-operation with Russia and Ukraine aiming at securing stable and reliable energy supply to the enlarged EU should feature high among the EU priorities. The co-operation should also focus on joint infrastructure projects in the energy sector, transport and communications. Particular importance should be given to joint infrastructure projects in the border areas and areas adjacent to the enlarged EU, e.g. border crossings, including those for local border traffic, roads, rail connections as well as sewage treatment plants. Environment and more efficient energy use are also of growing importance. Finally there is a range of potential co-operation projects making use of a unique natural environment preserved in Eastern Europe, serving both its conservation and development of the region through diversification of its economy (tourism).

- Co-operation in the area of justice and home affairs will be further expanded to tackle common problems, particularly organised crime, including drug production, smuggling and dealing, money laundering, human trafficking and sex slavery, illegal immigration as well as all forms of terrorist activities. It is in the interest of the EU to provide assistance for its Eastern neighbours in joining and observing international agreements, adoption and enforcement of relevant internal laws as well as in establishment of effective border controls with third countries. The EU as a whole and the future new member states, particularly due to their recent experience, should offer substantial assistance to the Eastern European states, in their fight against corruption and reinforcing their judicial capacity. In the near future we should find a viable solution, in conformity with the Schengen *acquis*, to allow for local border traffic. The proposals presented in September 2002 by the Commission seem to provide a good basis for such a solution. Readmission agreements should be concluded with Eastern European states. In future, if the conditions are met by the neighbouring states (efficient external border control, travel documents meeting international standards, low risk of illegal immigration), some flexibility in the visa regime might be considered. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it should not have any impact on the accession of the new EU Member States to the Schengen co-operation nor on the internal security within the EU.
- The EU has recognised the importance of co-operation in solving specific security problems, like the destruction of old weapons. It should be extended to cover prevention and crisis management in case of natural or man-made disasters.
- Any transformation in Eastern Europe, its rapprochement with the EU and recognition of Western values will be impossible without people-to-people contacts, cultural contacts and access to information. Therefore we should provide conditions enhancing these contacts, co-operation

between universities and schools, co-operation of regional and local authorities as well as of non-governmental organisations. Thus the EU shall facilitate dialogue of cultures and mutual understanding. The EU and other donors should concentrate their assistance on development of human capital – through scholarship schemes, placements, study visits, seminars and workshops, supporting European programmes and chairs at the universities in Eastern European states and joint projects. Poland and other prospective member states are determined to abolish obstacles for border crossing on our Eastern borders – the procedures should be less time-consuming and more comfortable. It should become the objective of the whole, enlarged EU.

### **3.**

Poland shares the position of the EU partners, that developing co-operation with Eastern European states should be gradual and contingent on their progress in democratic reforms, respect of human and minority rights and other values that the Union is based on, respect of standards recognised by the international community in international relations, building democratic institutions and market economy, improving governance as well as fighting corruption. The conditionality principle should be applied evenly to relations with all Eastern European neighbours, neither discriminating nor favouring any of them.

### **4.**

In order to increase the momentum of co-operation of the enlarged EU with its new Eastern European neighbours, a mid-term Action Plan for the Eastern Dimension and Action Plans for co-operation with individual future eastern neighbouring countries could be adopted. It should define further stages of co-operation, objectives and conditions to be met, priority areas as well as EU assistance instruments. Setting a road-map and specifying precise benefits resulting from reforms and development of co-operation would motivate the countries concerned to further reforms. Taking into ac-

count the risks of setting dates and targets that might be unrealistic because their meeting depending first of all on the partner countries, the Action Plans should be agreed upon in close co-operation with the countries concerned. Accordingly, they would be accompanied by their internal country action plans of developing co-operation with the EU. These Action Plans should be reviewed regularly and verified, if necessary, according to changing conditions and needs.

## 5.

EU's policy towards new eastern neighbours should be supported by relevant assistance programmes, which should be modelled with an innovative approach. Undoubtedly, there is a need to adjust assistance instruments to the stage of development of co-operation and progress of the countries concerned in meeting the above mentioned objectives. Even in the case of disappointing performance of authorities of the countries concerned, it is in the interest of the enlarged EU and its Eastern neighbours to keep engaged in co-operation at a relevant level and continue its assistance facilitating further reform process.

With regard to the EU assistance for its future eastern neighbours, Poland suggests considering the following proposals:

- Increase of significance of EU eastern policy after the Union's enlargement should be reflected in the assistance for its future eastern neighbours. Its value should at least be maintained on the present level, however increased if possible, and the use of available resources should be improved. This aim can be achieved through better co-ordination and synergy of the INTERREG and TACIS CBC programmes and introduction of new instruments. The present assistance should be reviewed and focused on the priority areas. Lessons from the experience should be learned and improvements should be introduced. Transferring the management of assistance programmes to EC Delegations in the recipient countries seems to be a positive step forward. Nevertheless, the application and decision-

making procedures are known to be very lengthy and complex. There is certainly a need of their simplification, while still allowing supervising whether the resources are spent properly. Providing wider information on the assistance available, criteria and procedures as well as advice on how to prepare the projects and documents would certainly help to solve the problem. Some forms of assistance are considered less effective than others – e.g. instead of hiring external consultants it might be more effective to contract an adviser that would transfer know-how to the locals and help them to prepare a report or strategy themselves.

- Due to particular needs of countries of Eastern Europe, Poland proposes the establishment of a European Democracy Fund, or of a European Freedom Fund, which would facilitate the introduction of the EU assistance programmes for countries concerned, provided by NGOs. It would have as its objective promoting democratic values in countries of Eastern Europe and transfer of know-how necessary in the transformation process. Such a fund should allow for necessary flexibility of assistance programmes, which are now too rigid due to centralised management, numerous formal requirements and lengthy procedures. Another solution could be the European Peace Corps that would capitalise on the positive experience and success of its American prototype. A lot of Polish and other European NGOs that are involved in projects in Eastern Europe would join the EU assistance programmes to a greater extent, if they were more flexible.
- In order to assist the Eastern European countries through the development of human capital, Poland suggests launching special scholarship programme for students from these countries (European Scholarship Programme) and an placement programme for university graduates and young professionals as well as for those with some experience (European Traineeship Programme). The programmes would allow the beneficiaries to gain knowledge and experience at universities, companies and

institutions in the EU countries and then to use them in their own country. Another option could be granting scholarships for students taking up distant learning courses (via Internet) at universities in the EU countries, combined with short stays at these universities.

- Other ways of assistance in human capital development may include: supporting European chairs or European programmes at Eastern European universities, as well as of joint projects carried out together with EU universities.
- Assistance programmes in institution building could facilitate study visits, twinning projects and advice on specific reforms, internships in relevant institutions of the EU Member States. There is also a need of assistance in the form of co-financing of training and seminars or conferences on common problems allowing the exchange of experiences, including joint cross-border training projects like the Polish-Lithuanian project of training public administration, border guards and customs officers from the Kaliningrad District.
- Countries in transition need strong support for developing local government structures, their capacity to perform the tasks they must accomplish in the process of decentralisation, management of social services and financing local investments. Therefore, a technical assistance in the form of know-how shared by partner local governments in EU countries, particularly new member states, will certainly be appreciated.
- To meet the immense need of information on the EU, its Member States, democratic world etc, the EU should consider assistance in the establishment of the European Information Centres in the Eastern European states. These centres should offer broadband, quick access to Internet and perhaps information materials in a multimedia form. Let's take Poland as example – Institute of High Technologies in Warsaw in co-operation with UNDP and a Japanese donor is now implementing such a project in Ukraine.

- The Eastern Dimension's umbrella should allow the EU to co-finance and prepare a greater number of projects together with international and regional organisations, international and regional financial institutions, as well as with EU Member States and private capital.
- Extension of assistance supporting and co-financing projects of development of infrastructure linking the eastern neighbours with the enlarged EU should i.a. allow for the construction of new border crossings.
- Development of regional and cross-border co-operation with the areas adjacent to the enlarged EU should make use of the experience gained in co-operation within the framework of Euroregions and on other forums of regional co-operation like CBSS or the Central European Initiative.
- Small and medium sized enterprises are a major driving force of economic development and further reforms in Eastern European states. Therefore, they should get more significant assistance. This objective could be achieved by training courses, supporting business incubators or establishment of European Investment Fund for Eastern Europe. It would not only facilitate access to start-up capital, but first of all provide advice, information and assistance in preparing business plan and initial stages of activity of the company. Projects supporting the development of small business organisations as well as vocational associations should also prove to be useful.
- The EU's assistance programmes should make use of the experience of the future member states and their know-how, which would also meet expectations of the Eastern European states.

## 6.

There is certainly a need for a more active promotion in the Eastern European states of the European Union, its forthcoming enlargement and of opportunities as well as benefits that can be derived from closer co-operation with

the EU. A concerted effort of the Member States' posts and European Commission representations can make a significant difference. Poland looks forward to co-operation with the EU, its present and new member states, in promoting the idea and knowledge of European integration in the future eastern neighbouring states and providing all possible assistance for these countries, so as to enable them to get ready for capitalising on the opportunities the EU enlargement will bring.

## 7.

Poland hopes to be involved, together with other interested candidate countries which will soon become members of the EU, in the process of forging the EU policy towards its future Eastern neighbours. Poland hopes to be included in the work on proposals by the High Representative and the Commission. It would be most useful both for the EU and its future member states to include the latter as active observers, after they will have signed the Accession Treaty and before their joining the EU, into existing forums of the EU's co-operation with third parties (particularly with the Eastern European countries). This would allow us to use the time left for accession in the best possible way to get ready to participate in the EU co-operation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working on more concrete proposals concerning Poland's contribution to the development of Eastern policy of the enlarged European Union – among others projects that could be included in the Action Plan, although it will depend on a further discussion and evolution of this concept.

# **Conference programme**

## **The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy International Conference**

Stefan Batory Foundation  
in co-operation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of Poland  
Warsaw, 20-21 February 2003

20th of February 2003

10<sup>00</sup>      **Aleksander Smolar,**  
President of the Stefan Batory Foundation  
**Opening Speech Aleksander Kwaśniewski,**  
President of the Republic of Poland

10<sup>15</sup>–14<sup>00</sup> **Session I: Visions of EU Policy Toward New Neighbours**  
Discussing relations between the European Union and new  
Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement. All of the  
Speakers will try to address the following problems:

- *What type of European perspective should be offered to future EU neighbours?*
- *What could and should be the contribution of the new member states?*

**Polish view on new “Eastern Dimension” of the EU**  
Keynote Speaker: Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz,  
Foreign Minister of Poland, Warsaw  
Chair: Bronisław Geremek,  
former Foreign Minister of Poland, Warsaw

Speakers:

**Dumitru Braghis**, former Prime Minister, Chairman of the parliamentary fraction Social-Democratic Alliance, Moldova, Kishinev

**Józef Oleksy**, Chairman of the European Committee, Polish Parliament, Warsaw

**Sergei Rogov**, Director of the US. and Canada Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

**Jacek Saryusz-Wolski**, former Head of the Office of the Polish Committee for European Integration, Warsaw

**Boris Tarasyuk**, Chairman of European Affairs Committee, Ukrainian Parliament, Kiev

**Vincuk Vyachorka**, Chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF), Minsk

15<sup>00</sup>–16<sup>30</sup>      **Session II: Lessons of EU  
Neighbourhood Policy**

Policy makers involved in developing neighbourhood policy in past and in present will discuss examples of the EU neighbourhood policy and the role played by particular EU member countries in that process. The EU neighbourhood policy as the stimulus of transition from dictatorship to democracy and eventual EU membership in case of Spain; EU relations with Latin America and role of Portugal; Germany's and Finland's policies of association and enlargement toward Central and Eastern Europe and the Northern Dimension of the EU are another important lessons, which are going to be debated during that Session. In that context, the following questions are to be answered:

1. What were particular failures and successes?
2. What is a toolbox of the good policy?
3. How to effectively integrate national agenda with EU objectives?
4. What lessons can be learned for a new neighbourhood policy after enlargement?

**Chair: Tadeusz Mazowiecki,**  
former Prime Minister of Poland, Warsaw

Speakers:

**Fernando Moran Lopez**, former Foreign Minister of Spain, Madrid

**Victor Martins**, former Vice-Minister for European Affairs  
of Portugal, Lisbon

**Hermann von Richthofen**, Plenipotentiary of the Prime Minister  
of Brandenburg for co-operation with Poland, Berlin

**Antti Satuli**, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
of Finland, Helsinki

**21st of FEBRUARY 2003**

**9<sup>30</sup>–12<sup>50</sup> Session III Neighbourhood:**

**Traditional and New Problems of Security**

Experts in security, migration issues will discuss the security implications of new neighbourhood and questions related to the future EU external border:

1. Security threats on the eastern border.
2. The differences of perceptions of the external border functions of EU by member states, candidates and neighbouring countries respectively.
3. How to reconcile domestic EU security concerns with freedom of movement, and objectives of political, social and economic development of the bordering countries?
4. How do new institutional developments (new NATO, development of CESDP) respond to security situation on the eastern border?

**Chair: Aleksander Smolar,**  
President of the Stefan Batory Foundation

Speakers:

**Heather Grabbe**, Research Director, Centre for European Reform, London

**Bronisław Komorowski**, former Minister of Defence of Poland, Warsaw

**Antonio Missiroli**, Senior Research Fellow, European Union

Institute for Security Studies, Paris

**Dominique Moïsi**, Deputy Director, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris

**Andriey Zagorsky**, Deputy Director, Institute for Applied International Research (IAIR), Moscow

**12<sup>50</sup>–13<sup>00</sup>** Center for Eastern Studies presentation,  
Jacek Cichocki, Deputy Director

**14<sup>00</sup>–16<sup>00</sup>** **Session IV: Supporting Changes  
in Neighbouring Countries.  
What is the Role of the EU Policy?**

1. What are the prospects for the democratisation, modern economy development and growth of civil society in new borderline states? How the EU programmes can effectively contribute toward that end?
2. What were successes and failures of the EU assistance programs to Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine after 1991?
3. What role will the new members play in programming and implementation of the EU assistance toward neighbourhood? Will they co-operate or compete for scarce resources of the EU?
4. Should TACIS become PHARE?

**Chair: Krzysztof Lis,**

President, Institute of Business Development, Warsaw

Speakers:

**Pavel Daneyko**, President, The Institute of Privatisation and Management, Minsk

**Marek Dąbrowski**, Chairman of the Council, Research Foundation of the CASE Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw

**Jurij Yechanurov**, Head of the Committee on Industrial Policy and Entrepreneurship, Ukrainian Parliament, Kiev

**Christoph Jessen**, Commissioner for EU Enlargement, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin

**Alistair MacDonald**, Head of Unit, Directorate E (Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asian Republics), European Commission, Brussels

15<sup>30</sup>–16<sup>00</sup>      Open discussion



## Biographical notes of speakers

**Dumitru Braghis** – Ph.D. (Economics), graduated from the Faculty of Engineering at the Chisinau University in Moldavia. Since 1995 Director of Foreign Economic Relations Department. Since 1997 Deputy Minister of Economy and Reforms. Between 1999 and 2001 Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova. Since 2001 MP of the Moldavian Parliament and head of the “Braghis Alliance” (social democratic) parliamentary faction.

**Pavel Daneyko** – graduated from the Faculty of Economics. Between 1988 and 1994 research associate with the Institute of Economics with the Belarusian Academy of Sciences. From 1994 to 1996 Vice-President of the Institute for Privatisation and Management. Between 1999 and 2002 headed an Advisory Board to the Institute for Privatisation and Management, at present President of the Minsk-based Institute for Privatisation and Management.

**Marek Dąbrowski** – Professor of Economics, graduated from the Faculty of Economics at the Warsaw University. From 1989 to 1990 Deputy Minister of Finance and afterwards (1991-1993) MP. Between 1991 and 1996 Chairman of the Ownership Transformations Council. Between 1994 and 1995 consultant with the World Bank. Since 1998 member of the Monetary Policy Council. Advised governments and central banks in Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, Chairman of the Board of Trustees with the

CASE Research Foundation (Centre for Social and Economic Research). Acted as co-ordinator of research and consulting projects focusing on economic reforms in ex-Soviet Block countries and macroeconomic policy issues.

**Bronisław Geremek** – politician, Professor of History, graduated from the Warsaw University and the Sorbonne. One of the founders of the Solidarity independent trade union and former adviser to Lech Wałęsa, in 1989 participated in the Round Table negotiations. Between 1989 and 2001 served as MP with the Lower House of Polish Parliament. Between 1989 and 1991 chaired the Constitutional Committee and between 1989-1997 chaired the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Between 1990 and 1997 head of the Democratic Union (Party) caucus in Polish Parliament. Between 1997 and 2000 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland. Between 2000 and 2001 headed the Parliamentary *Acquis Communautare* Committee. Currently Chair of European Civilisation with the Natolin-based College of Europe.

**Heather Grabbe** – Ph.D. (Political Sciences), graduated from Oxford and Birmingham Universities. Research Director at the Centre for European Reform in London. Published extensively on EU enlargement, institutional reform, justice, home affairs and EU budget. Collaborated with Chatham House, the European Institute in Florence and EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the Centre For International Relations in Warsaw.

**Johann Christoph Jessen** – Ph.D. (Economics), diplomat, since 1978 member of staff at the German Embassy in Manila. Since 1981 headed the Economic Section of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Bucharest. Since 1984 International Commodities Policy Expert with the Federal Foreign Office. Since 1988 North-South Policy Officer with the Federal Foreign Office. Since 1996 headed the EU Internal Policies Division with the Federal Foreign Office. Since 1999 Deputy Director General and Head of Directorate “Europe 2”. Currently the Commissioner for EU Enlargement with the Federal Foreign Office.

**Bronisław Komorowski** – graduated from the Faculty of History at the Warsaw University. Between 1989 and 1990 Cabinet Director with the Office of the Council of Ministers. From 1990 to 1993 Deputy Minister of National Defence, MP with the Lower House of Polish Parliament for four consecutive terms of office. Between 1993 and 1994 member and Secretary General of the Freedom Union (Party). In 1997 one of the founding members of the Conservative and People's Party, now Deputy Chairman of the organisation. Between 1997 and 2001 chairman of the National Defence Committee. Minister of Defence in 2000-2001.

**Krzysztof A. Lis** – economist, since 1977 employed with the Institute of Management at the Warsaw University. Since 1989 the Government's Plenipotentiary for Privatisation. Between 1991 and 1998 worked abroad, including senior consultancy assignments for the World Bank, EBRD and IFC. Advised on privatisation issues to the Governments of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Between 1998 and 2000 advisor to the Polish Minister of Finance. From 1999 Member of the Board at the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Member of the Good Practices Committee that developed a document "Good Practices in Public Companies in 2002". President of the Institute of Business Development.

**Alistair MacDonald** – Ph.D. cand. (European Economics History). Between 1978 and 1984 with the European Commission in the Directorate General for Development. Between 1985 and 1990 First Secretary at the EC Delegation in Bangkok, 1990-95 First Counsellor at the EC Delegation in Manila. Deputy Head of Unit on Asian affairs with DG for External Relations in Brussels, since 2001 Head of Unit with the Department for Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia and Horizontal Matters.

**Victor Mendes de Costa Martins** – graduated and later lectured at Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão. Between 1979 and 1985 Director for the European Integration Office of the Ministry of Industry. Between 1979 and 1985 member of the negotiating team for the Portugal's accession to the EU. From

1985 to 1995 Secretary of State for European Affairs with three Portuguese Cabinets. In 1991 responsible for negotiations on admission of Portugal to the Schengen Treaty. Between 1992 and 1995 represented Portugal at the Council of Europe. At present member of the “Notre Europe” Association and consultant to the National Institute for Public Administration.

**Tadeusz Mazowiecki** – founder of a Catholic „Więź” monthly and for many years its Editor-in-Chief. In 1980 set up and headed a team of experts aiding the efforts of the Strike Committee in the Gdańsk Shipyard and subsequently Solidarity trade union. Editor-in-Chief of “Solidarity” weekly. Between 1989 and 1990 Prime Minister. Between 1991 and 1994 Chairman of the Democratic Union (Party). Between 1991 and 2001 MP with the Lower House of Polish Parliament. Between 1992 and 1995 special reporter of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations during a mission to former Yugoslavia.

**Antonio Missiroli** – doctorate in contemporary history from the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa and Master of International Public Policy, Johns Hopkins University graduated from the John Hopkins University in Bologna. Between 1993 and 1996 lectured at the West European Politics in the Dickinson College and in Bologna, head of European Studies section with the International Centre for Studies on International Politics (CESPI) based in Rome. Between 1996 and 1997 lectured at the Oxford University. At present an analyst with the EU Security Studies Institute responsible for media relations. Also involved in EU enlargement issues and the institutional aspects of CFSP/ESDP.

**Dominique Moïsi** – Ph.D. (Law). Between 1972 and 1975 lectured on International Relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, from 1976 to 1978 lectured on International Relations at the University of Paris Sud. Between 1983 and 1984 Professor at John Hopkins University. From 1981 to 1986 lectured at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), between 1994 and 1999 Professor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris. Currently the Dep-

uty Director of the French International Relations Institute in Paris, member of the Board of the Aspen Institute. Editor-in-Chief of a quarterly titled „Politique Etrangère”; columnist of the „Financial Times”.

**Fernando Moran Lopez** – politician, founder of the so called „Grupo Tierno” in Salamanca and of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). Since 1978 Senator representing the Asturian Constituency. Between 1982 and 1985 Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Socialist Government. Between 1985 and 1987 Spanish representative at the UN Headquarters. From 1987 to 1999 MP with European Parliament – active in the Institutional Affairs Committee and in the Legal Matters and Civic Rights Committee, being the Deputy of the latter.

**Józef Oleksy** – politician, graduated from the Foreign Trade Faculty at the Central School of Planning and Statistics. In 1989 Minister responsible for relations with Trade Unions. Participated in the Round Table talks. Since 1989 MP. Since 1990 member of the Social-Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland, between 1996 and 1997 Party Chairman and currently member of the Democratic Left Alliance. Between 1989 and 1993 member of the European Security and Co-operation Organisation club in Parliament and between 1993 and 1995 Speaker of the Lower House of Polish Parliament. Between 1995 and 1996 Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland. Since 2001 Chairman of the Parliamentary European Committee.

**Hermann von Richthofen** – Ph.D. (Law), diplomat, law studies at universities in Heidelberg, Munich and Bonn. With the diplomatic service in Saigon, Jakarta and East Berlin. In 1986 Director General of Legal Affairs and Chief Legal Advisor to the Federal Foreign Office. Between 1986 and 1988 Deputy Under Secretary (Political Director) in the Federal Foreign Office. Between 1988 and 1993 the Ambassador of Federal Republic of Germany to the UK. In 1998 Permanent Representative of Germany on the North-Atlantic Council. Representative of Prime Minister of Brandenburg for the co-operation with Poland.

**Siergei Rogov** – Ph.D. (Historical Sciences), graduated from the Moscow Institute for Foreign Affairs; since 1976 employed with the Institute of USA and Canada of Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Since 1995 Director of the Institute, member of the Advisory Board of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, member of Advisory Council of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, member of the Board of the Russian Foreign Policy Association, advisor to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma.

**Jacek Saryusz-Wolski** – graduated from the University of Łódź and European Studies at the University in Nancy (France), Junior Professor at the Institute of Economics of the University of Łódź; between 1991 and 1996 Minister for European Affairs and Advisor to the Prime Minister. Between 1999 and 2001 Minister – Secretary of the Committee for European Integration. He was Rector of the European College and Director of the European Studies Centre at the University of Łódź. Currently President of the European Centre in Natolin, head of the European College Foundation, member of the European Integration Committee, Professor of European Integration with the Collegium Civitas in Warsaw and President of the Management Board of the European Institute in Łódź, member of the Board of Directors of the Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) based in Brussels and President of the Euro-Atlantic Society in Poland.

**Antti Johannes Satuli** – diplomat, since 1971 member of staff with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between 1973 and 1975 attaché to the Finnish Mission in Brussels, afterwards (1975-1977) Second Secretary of the Finnish Embassy in Algeria. Since 1977 First Secretary with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and between 1980 and 1983 First Secretary of the Finnish Embassy in Washington, D.C. In 1986 Director of the Western Europe and General Matters. Since 1988 Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – External Economic Relations responsible for liaison with the OECD and GATT and in charge of European Integration issues. Between 1990 and 1994 Director General – External Economic Relations. Since

1995 Ambassador of Finland to the European Union. Since 2002 Secretary of State with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Died in April 2003.

**Aleksander Smolar** – politologist; studied Sociology and Economy at Warsaw University. 1971-1989, a political émigré in Italy, Great Britain and France. In 1974-1990, founder and editor-in-chief of the „Aneks” political quarterly; 1989-1990, political advisor to prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In 1992-1993, Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka. Since 1990, President of the Board of the Stefan Batory Foundation. Scholar at the French National Scientific Study Centre (CNRS). Member of the Political Council of the Freedom Union.

**Borys Tarasyuk** – diplomat, 1975-2000 with diplomatic service of Ukraine. Between 1998 and 2000 the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Director and Founder of the Institute for Promotion of Euro-Atlantic Co-operation, head of Parliamentary European Integration Council, Honorary Director and Professor of the Institute of Social Sciences and International Affairs in the Supra-Regional Human Resources Management Academy.

**Vincuk Vyachorka** – graduated from the Faculty of Linguistics, since the 1970s member of underground anti-communist and independence movement in Belarus. Founder in 1986 of the Confederation of Belarusian Association, the first democratic organisation in Belarus. One of the founders of the “Revival” Belarusian Popular Front, which he has chaired since 1995. Head of the “Supolnost” Civic Society Centre. In 1999 leader of the working group established by the United Organisation of Pro-Democratic NGOs.

**Yuriy Yechanurov** – Professor of Economics, graduated from the Institute of Building and Construction in Kiev and the National Economic Academy in Kiev. In 1993 Deputy Minister of Economy. Since 1994 headed the National Assets Fund. In 1999 Deputy Prime Minister of Ukrainian Government. In 2001 deputy Chief of State Administration. Since 2002 Member of Parliament and head of the Urban Development and Entrepreneurship Committee.

**Andrey Zagorski** – graduated from School of International Relations at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Between 1981 and 1992 a research associate, 1992-2000 Director and Deputy Rector of the MGIMO Centre of International Studies. Since 2000 Deputy President of the East-West Institute in Prague, member of the Centre for Security Policy in Geneva. Since 2002 Deputy Director of Institute for Applied International Research in Moscow. Member of Editorial Committees of “The OSCE Yearbook”, “The Helsinki Monitor” and “The Perspectives”.

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